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 1 
1. Introduction 
In a world where newly emerging political and economic powers are competing for energy 
resources that appear to be holding steady at best and dwindling at worst, access to energy 
producing resources is no doubt becoming increasingly relevant. However, the supposition that 
such competition necessarily leads to war, or any other form of conflict for that matter, is 
questionable. Does international competition for access to energy resources increase the 
likelihood of war? Or is it more likely to lead to cooperation? The fact is that states which are 
highly dependent on external suppliers of oil and natural gas are not constantly engaged in war. 
Energy is no doubt vital for their economic well-being, but economics alone cannot explain state 
behavior. What can is the ability to project power, since that is what matters in international 
politics. This raises two important research questions: (1) how do energy policies affect a state’s 
power projection capability? and (2) what is the relationship between domestic investments in 
substitute fuels and technologies and international cooperation and conflict? 
Unless a country is entirely self-sufficient in terms of fuel resources, it will be forced to acquire 
them abroad, lower its economic standard, decrease its power projection capacity, or transform 
its entire economy to another energy source through substitution. States are most likely to 
choose external acquisition because reducing economic standards or power projection capacities 
are politically undesirable options. Switching to alternative fuels is politically risky because it runs 
against a very strong set of established rights and vested interests; and it requires long-term 
investments based on speculative future developments that, outside of autocracy, far exceed the 
electoral cycles of political decision makers. 
The competitive pursuit of external resources is bound to determine power relations between 
states. Thus the determinant factor in the relationship between domestic energy policy and 
international cooperation and conflict is not the entirety of domestic energy policy, but rather the 
importance that states place on energy in terms of their relative power position toward other 
states. That importance is ultimately determined by the degree to which states are energy 
autonomous, which is defined by their ability to switch fuels.  
Two intervening variables explain the relationship between energy and state behavior on the 
international stage. The first is the resource-price, which can take an ideal form of high or low. 
The second is the importance of supply availability to power projection (SAPP), which can be 
either actual or perceived. The most visible elements of domestic energy policies such as 
regulatory frameworks, environmental and efficiency standards, and taxes have no real 
discernable effect on external state behavior because all they do is raise the bar (by extending 
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time periods) a little bit on when restricted flow circumstances will force states to act violently. 
Cooperation among weak states can be expected, but even the weak will fight when cornered. 
Thus the only aspect that ever changes on the internal front that is serious enough to warrant a 
change in behavior on the external front is the successful or failed implementation of a 
substitution policy because success translates into an immediate and definitive decline in SAPP 
and thus reduced conflict; and failure threatens the ability of the state to survive in competition 
with other states.  
Depending on combined circumstances of price and SAPP, states will adopt one of three 
strategies: (1) a market commodities approach aimed at expanding free markets, (2) a 
cooperation approach aimed at coordinating policies to mitigate price and supply shocks, or (3) 
any set of a gamut of conflict approaches from threats to outright military attacks. Since states 
can be expected to take the least costly approach to acquiring necessary energy resources we can 
assume that under the circumstances of low prices and free flowing resources, states will focus 
their external policies on free commodity markets.  When prices are high and resource flow is 
restricted or under threat of restriction, states are more likely to seek cooperation through a 
variety of foreign policy instruments. Under the same circumstances, a state will resort to military 
means only when the salience of SAPP is high. Likewise, these circumstances and outcomes affect 
domestic investments and policies toward substitution technologies, creating a feedback loop. 
What then is the relationship between domestic investments in substitute fuels and technologies 
and international cooperation and conflict? The more a state needs to cooperate or even resort to 
conflict so too should we find increased spending in substitutes and efficiency.   
These propositions can be tested by looking at the behavior of the US and the EU under different 
price and supply availability circumstances. Given that the EU and US share a similarly high 
salience on supply availability for their economic well-being, we can assume that both will take 
market-commodity approaches under low-price-free-flow circumstances. However, under high-
price-restricted-flow circumstances, the US, which places higher salience on SAPP, should be more 
likely than the EU or its Member States to resort to military means and even armed conflict to 
secure either access or flow. Conversely, since the EU places a relatively low salience on SAPP it 
should be expected to seek cooperation even when prices are high and flow is restricted. Finally, 
we should be able to observe increased investments into substitutes by both the EU and US when 
prices are high and flow is restricted and dramatically reduced investments under conditions of 
low prices and free flow. 
 
The problem: energy as a cause of war 
3 
1.1. The problem: energy as a cause of war 
Do states ever go to war over energy resources? Some suggest that energy is not only relevant, 
but actually a determinant causal factor of international conflict; and that even the possession of 
large supplies may be a significant enough factor to deter attacks from more powerful states. 
Michael Klare claims that “the possession of potent military arsenals can be upstaged by the 
ownership of mammoth reserves of oil, natural gas, and other sources of primary energy” (Klare, 
2008:9) and that “resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of 
the global security environment” (Klare, 2001:213).1 Klare accurately identifies the essence of the 
energy war question. States do need energy for power projection, the use of which ultimately 
determines their relative power vis-à-vis other states and thus the global distribution or balance 
of power. No modern country can seriously consider the domestic survival of their state free from 
the need for energy supplies since energy is required for virtually every activity of state power; 
and availability of energy is a specific determinant of a state’s military capacity. Without energy, a 
state is quite literally powerless vis-à-vis other states as well as within its borders between the 
government and the governed. It is therefore logical to assume that some linkage exists between 
state requirements for energy and its international behavior. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether 
the evidence confirms such an assumption.2  
It is a well established fact that states have fought resource wars throughout history. According 
Clifford Singer, mineral resources have been “a focal point of conflicts from before the 
Conquistadors sacked the Americas through the present day” (Singer, 2008:xv). However, the 
hypothesis that states go to war over finite energy resources is a different claim. Singer argues, 
for example that oil will “inevitably” decrease in importance because “it is just another industrially 
useful commodity […] not worth shedding blood over who controls it” (2008:9). Whether he is 
correct in his assessment of the value of energy resources as strategic or not, the notion that one 
day current energy resources vital for power projection will be substituted by another resource 
and thus rendered redundant or irrelevant is an important aspect of linking internal energy 
policies to interstate war. A state fully independent for its energy resources, and thus free to fuel 
                                                          
1
 For a critical rebuttal of Klare’s thesis based on the difficulty of finding direct supporting cases, see Victor 
(2007). 
2 There is ample evidence in the literature to suggest a linkage between natural resources and civil wars. 
See Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Humphreys (2005), Le Billon (2001). Even in the case of civil conflict, the 
causal mechanisms between natural resources and the onset of civil wars are not well understood Ross 
(2004a), Ross (2004b) and the evidence is far from robust. 
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its military adventures at will, would hardly face the need to engage in wars over energy 
resources.  
Linking internal energy policy with external state behavior rests on three assumptions. The first 
assumption is that energy is essential to a state’s ability to project power, in particular military 
power, which ultimately determines its ability to survive and thrive in relation to other states in 
the international system. The second assumption is that the importance that states place on their 
ability to project power explains the importance they place on the availability of energy supplies 
to that end. States with small militaries and little interest in projecting hard power are less likely 
to take actions that may lead to armed conflicts over energy resources than states with large 
militaries and are thus, more likely to seek cooperation. The third assumption is that every state 
seeks the goal of becoming energy autonomous. However, the effort and internal investments 
they make to become energy independent depends on the level of perceived threat to their 
ability to project power. Therefore, external threats posed to a state’s relative power position vis-
à-vis its needs for energy ultimately shape its internal energy policy.  
With these three assumptions in mind, we can say that states that place a high value on their 
ability to project power (strong states) will resort sooner and more often to military means to 
secure their access to energy resources than those less interested or less capable (weak states) of 
doing so. Energy can lead to war, but it must not do so. Equally important, when supply 
availability is restricted, both the strong and weak types will exhibit the same behavior in terms of 
the pursuit of substitutes; and thus, external conditions determine internal policy. 
While it is reasonable to assume that some correlation exists between international competition 
to acquire natural resources in general and international war (for example, multiple Arab-Israeli 
conflicts over control of the Sea of Galilee and the Litani River; Iraq and Iran over oil fields on 
either side of Shatt-al-Arab; and the conflicts fought over the Americas and Africa by the 
European colonial powers) each so-called “resource war” is better explained as a competition for 
relative power gains whereby the resource being sought plays a secondary role. The real prize in 
such conflicts is not the resource itself, but rather the increased power won by acquiring control 
of the resource in question. Merely “having” a resource is not equal to being able to exploit it; the 
cases of Iran or Venezuela come to mind. Nor is it equal to having the will to use it, as for instance 
is the case of Norway or Canada. 
The dual arguments that “energy resources” can be treated as just another resource similar to 
gold or silver (thus, they are not strategic goods) and that interstate competition over them 
causes states to go to war are both problematic. These two arguments rest on the assumption 
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that if causality can be found between natural resources and war then the same must be true of 
energy resources. However, in order for that causality to be strong, the predicted outcomes of the 
resource war theory must always have been the case, and examples to the contrary would 
decrease, if not negate, the explanatory value of such a hypothesis or at least ask for an 
amendment to the theory. While there is substantial evidence that interstate wars have occurred 
over mineral resources throughout history, the conclusion that wars over mineral conquest such 
as gold, silver, or tin equate to wars over energy resources is not so clear.3 Minerals no doubt 
have economic value useable to purchase military capabilities, but that is not the same thing as 
the energy needed to fuel those capabilities. Spain’s search for gold in the America’s provides a 
good example.  
At the time of the Spanish conquest of the Americas gold was the primary currency of world 
trade. Spain’s acquisition of Latin American gold paid for its military adventures and expanded the 
wealth of its crown. However, the capacity to move its naval fleet was determined by large 
quantities of wind energy, not large amounts of gold, and no amount of gold could ever have 
purchased the wind necessary for conquest irrespective of the quantity and quality of its ships. 
Had the mineral resource of gold indeed been equivalent in power projection value to the energy 
resource of wind, Spain later may have won the Battle of Trafalgar, which it lost in large part due 
to changes in the direction and force of the wind (Adkins, 2005). The Spanish example 
demonstrates a basic problem in equating energy resources with other non-energy commodities. 
While both are used at various stages of manufacturing and trade, energy is a feature of every 
form of activity and is integrated into every economically relevant product and service. Energy 
resources are different than other mineral resources. Whether finite or renewable, once a specific 
energy resource takes its place as the primary fuel of power projection, it becomes a strategic 
good. The same cannot be said of all other mineral commodities, which offer varying degrees of 
usability for specific and limited processes and, in the case of gold and silver, were at various 
times in history sought after as currency itself.  
The causality case between international competition to gain access to natural resources and 
interstate war is stronger when one considers the pursuit of territorial expansion to gain control 
over those resources. However, it requires a leap of logic to claim the same for energy resources 
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 Examples of the evidence of mineral resources causing conflict see Dinar (2011), Gathii (2010), Gedicks 
(1993), Le Billon (2005), Le Billon and International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2005), Renner, Prugh and 
Worldwatch Institute. (2002). 
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just because they are resources. Renewable energy resources for example are available 
everywhere all the time; and thus its ubiquity precludes the necessity for war; that is unless one 
state develops technology that can block the sun, alter wind flows or reroute water flows across 
another. Furthermore, finite fossil energy resources only have been the subject of concern since 
the dawn of the industrial age. None of the resources fought over as part of the territorial 
expansion of colonial conquest were about energy resources and therefore it is unreasonable to 
claim that there is a historical connection between energy resources and interstate war.  
A simple cost-benefit analysis of energy resource wars further weakens the argument that states 
are likely to initiate wars over energy supplies. The energy dependent nature of mechanized 
warfare and modern air and sea power means that for energy resources to be a cause for wars 
there has to be at least the threat of a crippling crunch in supply that necessitates military action 
before the shortfall occurs. Here we are specifically talking about the causes of war and not the 
actions taken once war has already begun for some other reason.4 The cost associated with 
initiating wars in territories where energy resources are located and currently flowing could as 
well discourage the onset of hostilities based on its affect on the cost of the fuel necessary to win 
that war.5 For example, the United States apparently gained no increase in supplies from its 
conquest of Iraq, instead experiencing only increased costs in blood and treasure. If the goal was 
to acquire cheap access to large supplies of oil, similar to Rommel’s goal in North Africa, the 
mission clearly failed.  
For all of these aforementioned reasons it is difficult to prove the case that states wage wars over 
energy. However, it must not be impossible. The presence of military deployments along key 
energy trading corridors, the concentration of military forces in energy rich supplier zones and the 
ongoing territorial disputes and coastal sovereignty claims over energy rich off-shore areas all 
point, at least anecdotally, to some link between energy and hostile international conflict. So does 
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 It seems clear that campaigns in ongoing wars have focused on the control of fuel resources for the 
maintenance of those wars, as was the case behind Rommel’s campaign in North Africa in World War II 
Rommel and Liddell Hart (1988). 
5
 Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the cost of global petroleum has tripled, increasing the cost of US 
military operations. According to Andrews (2009) and Andrews and Schwartz (2008), between 2000 and 
2008, US military outlays for fuel increased by nearly 500% and the cost per gallon of jet-fuel used in Iraq 
increased from $0.70 to $2.00. For details of the specific fuel costs per soldier in Iraq and Afghanistan, see: 
Crowley, Corrie, Diamond, Funk, Hansen, Stenhoff, Swift and Logistics Management Inst Mclean (2007) 
available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA467003&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
While it is impossible to conclude that prices would not have spiked had the invasion not occurred, it 
nevertheless illustrates the added cost-benefit problem of waging wars in areas critical to the steady flow of 
energy supplies. 
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international competition for access to energy resources really increase the likelihood of war? Yes 
and no. Under certain specific conditions it may lead to war. However, in most cases it will not. 
The reason for this lies in the fact that internal energy policies are not merely as important as two 
intervening variables exogenous to domestic policy, namely fuel prices and supply availability for 
power projection. While the former will impact the economies of all consumer states in fairly 
equal manner, the latter more than any other factor will determine policy outcomes; that is, as 
long as the state in question is not fully autonomous in its energy needs.   
1.2. Three possible external outcomes. 
States are likely to act in one of three ideal ways when faced with different conditions of price and 
supply availability. They can do nothing; they can cooperate; or they can enter into conflict.  
When prices are cheap, resources are easily accessed, and no perceived or actual threat exists to 
long-term supplies, no state is likely to take any action that will either raise the cost of that 
resource or hamper its flow. This does not mean that highly dependent states will not adopt 
efficiency standards, or establish taxes in order to reduce consumption in a bid to reduce external 
dependence. However, it does mean that the efforts to do so will be significantly less than under 
conditions of high prices and restricted flow.  
Moreover, internal energy policies are for the most part externally irrelevant. Indeed, one might 
argue that internal energy policies are somewhat of a chimera because they often consist of a 
wide variety of disconnected steps taken in spurts and built up in response to embedded 
domestic interests and short-term internal or external needs. For example, recent trends to 
introduce carbon taxes designed to reduce consumption and pay for the negative externalities of 
energy use may raise the price of a fuel in an internal market and thus spur reduced consumption, 
but one would be hard pressed to argue that it has any real impact on short or medium term 
international market prices, which are tied to a balance between global production and 
consumption levels. Even if lower consumption were the result of internal policies, external 
suppliers would likely cut production to increase prices offsetting any economic gain. 
Such steps can be directly juxtaposed to investments in alternative fuels and strategic stocks 
designed either to replace dependence with autonomy altogether or to prepare an economy to 
survive short-term supply shocks. It is precisely these latter approaches which are less likely to 
occur when there is no pressing need.  
Conversely, when prices are high and the flow of resources become restricted the external 
behavior of states change. Instead of focusing on an internal moderation and an external do 
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nothing policy, states faced with high prices or a short or medium term supply crunch begin to act 
internationally in one of two ways. Either they will seek cooperation with other states or they will 
enter into conflict with other states.  
International cooperation in the energy sphere manifests itself in different ways. The most visible 
examples include the international negotiation of common rules and standards such as those 
pertaining to transparency, market rules, and laws about the transit of energy supplies. However, 
more often than not it takes the form of specialized bilateral arrangements, particularly deals 
about supply quantities, prices, and routes. The most obvious manifestation of this is the case of 
pipeline politics, where special arrangements, contracts, and treaties are negotiated over many 
years. In a more extreme case, producers or consumers may band together to form unions to pool 
their resources either to control prices or to mitigate the risks of supply shocks.  
In either case, states choose to cooperate externally for one of two reasons. Either they have no 
ability to enter into conflict and come out ahead in securing their interests or they do not 
prioritize power projection as being important enough to justify the use of harder power 
instruments. This is not to say that states with low priorities of power projection will never enter 
into conflict or that that those that do will automatically enter into conflict, but rather that states 
with such capacities are more likely to do so sooner. 
The energy leads to war theory suggests that the most likely outcome to high prices and restricted 
flows is international conflict. However, states are only likely to enter into conflict under high 
price-restricted flow conditions when they place a high priority on power projection, i.e. they 
define their security in terms of their relative power vis-à-vis other states. This distinction is 
important because it means that states must not necessarily go to war over the struggle for 
energy resources, even if they are uncomfortably or even entirely dependent upon them. The key 
explanatory variable in the energy war formula is not internal politics, but rather the global 
competition for relative power. This helps explain both the occurrences of conflict surrounding 
energy as well as the avoidance of them. The mere presence of a major power player in an energy 
rich region can just as well incite a conflict as have a deterrent effect on the actions of lesser 
powers that would otherwise act militarily to enrich their own power.  
 
1.3. Energy autonomy and the feedback loop of its internal and external dimensions. 
Energy is only relevant in international politics as long as states are at least somewhat dependent 
on external suppliers. The widespread and extant lack of energy independence among states 
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poses serious challenges for the autonomy principle in international relations. Autonomy places 
states on equal legal footing, regardless of their size or capacity; they alone are responsible for 
their own physical survival. However, the imbalanced global distribution of energy resources 
arguably places consumer states at the mercy of suppliers and thus autonomy is little more than 
an ideal notion rather than a material fact. This became evident in Europe in the 1970s when it 
faced dramatic shortages of oil due to two separate Arab oil embargoes and is arguably a driving 
factor in current EU policies to reduce its foreign levels of dependence on Russian gas.  
So long as states lack energy autonomy, they can never be fully secure either economically or 
militarily. A complete lack of available energy resources would cripple a country’s transport 
sector, endangering its ability to survive and eliminating its power projection capacity.6 While it is 
unreasonable to expect to find such an extreme case, or even a policy of one state aimed at 
another to create such a condition short of war, mere deficiencies in fuel supplies will translate 
into higher costs and present inflationary pressures on all produced and consumed products, 
including food. Energy autonomy is thus inexorably linked to national security, a point elaborated 
by US Senator Evan Bayh in his claim that “economic and financial matters are inextricably related 
to national security matters” and “*t+he same could be said for our energy dependency” (Bayh 
and United States, 2009). Unlike the notion of autonomy itself, the linkage between energy 
autonomy and national security is positively correlated and robust. Countries with high energy 
consumption have larger economies and power projection capabilities.  
The condition of higher prices and restricted resource flows clearly affects the internal dimension 
of energy policy. It does so by spurring government response in the form of internal policy 
initiatives such as increased efficiency standards, regulations, and investments. The first two are 
largely symbolic in terms of their impact on the external dimension. They may reduce 
consumption somewhat, but not enough to offset increased demand resulting from economic 
growth. The third, however, can have a huge impact on external behavior, at least theoretically. 
Faced with the pressing need to reduce foreign dependence on a specific fuel, the only internal 
action that states can take short of shrinking their economy or downgrading their power 
projection capacities, is to identify an alternative fuel, acquire it if it is available or develop it if it is 
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 I am excluding animal and human labor as a source of energy, although both were the primary sources of 
energy production and conversion throughout much of history. For an appropriate handling, see Fouquet 
and Pearson (1998), United States. Department of Energy (2007), and for a comparative historical 
discussion of the evolution of the economic uses of energy over the centuries see, Schubert (2008). 
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not, and provide an infrastructure to allow for its distribution. The most important area where 
this can occur is in transportation, since mobility is the key both to economic well being and the 
ability to project power. Heating and electricity, the two other areas most applicable to energy 
use are producible through a variety of fuels, and are thus more easily subject to substitution. 
Transport is a special sector when it comes to the question of autonomy and essential to 
understanding the affect of external outcomes on internal energy policy. When states are faced 
either with actual restrictive conditions, or perceive that such restrictions are on the horizon, they 
will be more likely to invest in substitution programs. Conversely, when such threats neither exist 
nor are perceived, states will not only be less likely to spend on substitution, they will be more 
likely to reduce spending on existing programs. 
Similarly, if a state succeeds in developing energy substitutes, it will dramatically reduce the pull 
affect of international conditions on its external policy options. Brazil is a case in point. Not long 
ago, Brazil was a net importer of petroleum, a dependence that reduced its importance as a 
regional power. But in the 1990s, the country implemented a nation-wide flex-fuel program and 
developed biofuels from sugar cane that freed the country from its imbalanced foreign 
dependence, and has spurred not only economic growth but growing relevance as a regional 
power. Seen in the light of the global balance of power, Brazil is neither a major player nor does it 
place a high priority on power projection. However, the lessons learned from Brazil are clear. 
Substitution in the transport sector can alter the trajectory of state power regionally and in the 
case of the right players, also globally. It also illustrates the interactive nature of the internal and 
external dimensions of energy policy.  
From a starting point of relative autonomy, states are either more able or less able to project 
power abroad. When conditions of higher prices and restricted flow come about, states initiate or 
expedite existing substitution programs, particularly in the area of transport. The longer those 
conditions hold the more likely it is that states will succeed in finding and implementing 
substitutes, hence, increasing their autonomy and thus, altering the initial parameters for the next 
spike in prices or reduction in supplies. Although most internal energy policies are irrelevant to 
external state behavior, over time internal energy policies toward substitution fluctuate between 
being the independent and dependent variable in the internal-external energy equation. When 
conditions are favorable, internal policy is the independent variable. When conditions are not, 
internal substitution policy becomes the dependent variable. 
Finally, we cannot know the actual external policy outcome of total energy autonomy, because for 
the moment it does not exist. History, however, provides some possible insights. Previous to the 
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industrial revolution, every nation was perfectly energy independent. Those powers that 
possessed the greatest mobility either on land or sea dominated their neighbors and large swaths 
of earth’s territory, from the Romans with their networks of roads and single mast ore driven 
ships to Great Britain’s mighty navy. Arguably, each great historical power placed a high priority 
on power projection. It is thus not at all unlikely that perfect energy autonomy in the modern age 
could unleash similar forces of conquest, so long as the state in question places an equally high 
priority on its ability to project its power. 
1.4. Nine hypotheses in three groups. 
Based on the assumptions that energy is vital to power projection, that states must not prioritize 
power projection, and that initial conditions of autonomy and investments into substitutes modify 
state behavior under different price and resource flow conditions, we can propose several 
hypotheses for this study to examine. By looking at the behavior of the US and the EU under 
different price and supply availability conditions we should be able observe a set of common and 
distinctive behaviors and link them to levels of their energy autonomy and the importance they 
place on supply availability for power projection.  
Because both the EU and US share a similarly high salience on supply availability for their 
economic well-being, the first hypothesis is: 
H1:  Both the US and the EU will adopt market-commodity approaches under low-price-
free-flow circumstances. 
When prices are low and access is easy, neither the US nor the EU will take significant internal or 
external actions to alter the current circumstance. We may call this the cheap and easy 
hypothesis. 
The next four hypotheses extend from the assumption that there are differences in the 
perception of importance of power projection between the US and EU, where the former places a 
higher priority than the latter. Together we may call these four the expensive and difficult 
hypotheses. 
H2: Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, both the EU and US will employ a 
cooperation strategy. 
H3:  Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, the US, which places higher salience 
on SAPP, is more likely than the EU or its Member States to resort to military means 
and even armed conflict to secure either access or flow. 
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H4:  Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, the EU, which places lower salience on 
SAPP, is less likely than the US to resort to military means and even armed conflict to 
secure either access or flow. 
Because the EU places a relatively low salience on SAPP, we can posit that  
H5:  The EU will never seek conflict even when prices are high and flow is restricted. 
Based on the assumptions made about states’ drive to enhance their energy autonomy, we also 
should be able to pose two feedback hypotheses: 
H6:  Both the US and the EU will increase investments into substitutes when prices are high 
and flow is restricted  
and  
H7: Both the US and the EU will dramatically reduce investments under conditions of low 
prices and free flow.  
And finally, for logical completeness we can posit two counter or null hypotheses that would 
disprove the relevance of the intervening variables and any determinant relationship between 
those variables and internal policies toward substitution.  
H8: Both the US and the EU never enter into conflict in energy rich areas when energy 
prices are high or disruptions are imminent. 
H9: Both the US and the EU do not change their investments strategies toward substitutes 
when conditions of prices and flow change.  
1.5. Methodology and sources. 
The approach to investigating the main hypotheses of this study is divided into two large parts. 
The first involves establishing a formal framework for analysis to answer the main research 
question, how do energy policies affect a state’s power projection? as well as the related 
questions, does international competition for energy resources increase the likelihood of war? 
and what is the relationship between domestic investments in substitute fuels and technologies 
and international cooperation and conflict? 
The framework for analysis will establish a model for comparing the relationship between internal 
energy policies and external policy outcomes resulting from different conditions. It will provide 
the basis for a series of assumptions about state behavior in the energy domain. Once presented, 
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the model will then be tested by describing the evolution of internal energy policies and analyzing 
the salience of SAPP for two international actors, the US and EU. Here we will not only describe 
the current policy but identify key milestones where policy changed in some important fashion, 
prioritizing steps taken to increase or reduce the actor’s investments in substitutes or explicit 
changes in its perception of the importance of supply availability to power projection. To do this a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative methods will be used. Estimates of the importance of supply 
availability for power projection will be made by summing a states military investment in terms of 
hardware and personnel, and where possible the fuel costs of operating its military missions at 
home and abroad. Since conflict is not the only possible outcome, a similar method will be used to 
measure efforts in international negotiation and even cooperation by examining investments in 
diplomatic activities, aid, and personnel. Qualitatively, we will analyze executive documents, 
official strategy papers, and press releases to identify explicit changes in policy positions and 
attitudes toward energy and energy relevant regions and states.  
To measure external effects on domestic policy behavior, we can sum the total investments in 
internal substitution programs in correlation with relevant time periods of low or high prices and 
free or restricted flow and the occurrences of specific external policy outcomes. Similarly, we will 
look for those elements of domestic legislation which either directly or indirectly endeavor to 
achieve that end. Because of the complexity and enormity of modern legislation in the EU and US, 
we will limit our focus to only those areas of legislation identified in the framework for analysis as 
having bearing on substitution technologies and not every policy related in some fashion to 
energy. 
We will then investigate four similar cases where conditions of energy prices and flow equally 
affected both international actors. Although it is clear that the US and the EU play on different 
international fields and their dependence varies between different geographically distributed 
suppliers, there are four cases pertaining to petroleum where the relevant factor of price and 
supply availability are common, thus providing a equal platform to assess the relevance of SAPP 
salience.  
The four cases are in reference to time periods and include (1) the two consecutive oil crises of 
the 1970s resulting from the OPEC oil embargo and the Iranian Revolution respectively (high price 
-restricted flow); (2) the declining price, free flow years of the mid 1980s; (3) the low price - free 
flow years of the 1990s; and (4) the rising price - restricted flow period from 2003 to 2009. In each 
case we will examine US and EU responses in terms of whether each adopted a commodity 
market (inaction) or cooperation approach, or chose to enter into some form of conflict in order 
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to secure their energy interests. We will also test the feedback loop hypothesis by measuring their 
internal investments in substitutes over the relevant time periods.  
The problem of determining whether actions were of a cooperative or conflicting nature or a 
combination of the two will be resolved by examining official statements and measuring military 
and diplomatic investments and deployments directed at the problem and the region in question. 
We will specifically search for correlations between the quantity and geographic distribution of 
each actor’s foreign dependence on a specific fuel, determine whether it is relevant to their 
power projection capability and how they prioritize that ability, and then assess their military and 
diplomatic engagement in those areas under the context of different price and flow conditions. 
What sometimes may appear only to be a cooperation strategy, may in material fact be a 
conflicting one. 
 
1.6. Shortcomings and caveats 
The assumption that most domestic energy legislation simply does not matter in terms of external 
state choices over inaction, cooperation, and conflict may be incorrect. It may also be that there 
are variables other than price and the importance placed on supply availability for power 
projection that shape both internal and external state behavior or even that no relation exists 
whatsoever. External state behavior may be almost entirely determined by relative power 
positions in global balance of power as posited by structural IR theories or it may be that the 
globalized economy so intimately binds states together, that economics explains everything. 
Energy may be no different than agriculture; it is just another area of policy. By excluding so many 
known factors relevant to foreign policy such as attitudes toward international institutions and 
the specific culture of relations between states, this study does indeed have many shortcomings. 
Further, by examining only the EU and US, we have excluded a myriad of other actors that are 
certainly relevant to the actions of either. Both actors are large consumers of oil, gas, and coal, 
but so are India, China and Russia, all three of which are relevant regional and global players. 
Structural IR theory would argue that definitively determining the role of energy in external 
relations requires at least some consideration of these players and their roles in balancing the 
actions of others. This study cannot aptly counter such a critique. 
Also because the selected cases are common in terms of the fuel in question, the price, and flow 
factors, it cannot say anything about cases where the conditions would be different, the 
geography of dependence specific to either actor, or where another fuel is in question. It may be 
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that the EU would act very differently if its natural gas were directly and deliberately cut off by its 
main supplier Russia. It may be that the US would act differently if Mexico or Canada stopped 
delivering gas in the deepest winter months than it would if OPEC collectively reduced production 
of petroleum for several years. It would have been equally possible to look at the global 
competition for coal and uranium or to have taken up the question of electricity as a reasonable 
substitution approach. However, none of these appears to be particularly applicable to the 
transport sector, which was identified as essential to power projection. It is possible, however, 
that fuels for electricity may be equally if not even more important than transport for the 
maintenance of economic well being or even power projection and thus have even more 
explanatory power than oil.   
For each of these reasons, and there are certainly more left unconsidered, this study does not 
purport to explain all forms of international behavior in relation to energy. Nor does it fully 
explain the depth and complexity of the internal dimension of energy policy and the effects that 
non-transport-related substitution policies might have. What it hopefully provides is an additional 
perspective for understanding some aspects of the relationship between the internal and external 
dimensions of energy policy and furthers the debate about linkages between energy and 
international cooperation and conflict.  
1.7. Roadmap forward 
This dissertation proceeds in three parts. The first part will present a framework for analysis. It is 
divided into five subchapters. The first chapter explains why energy policy is unique among 
internal policies in terms of its affect on external behavior. The second chapter examines the 
actors, institutions, processes, and instruments that should be commonly found in internal energy 
policy formation. The third chapter introduces and explains the role of the intervening variables of 
price and supply availability for power projection. The fourth chapter describes these may lead to 
three different types of external policy outcomes. The fifth chapter discusses how those 
intervening variables and related outcomes affect internal investments into substitutes creating 
an interactive feedback loop of internal-external energy policies. Consolidating the thoughts of 
the previous four chapters, it establish a model for examining the flow of energy from internal to 
external policy and back and introduces a few general assumptions about energy and external 
state behavior. The two most important are that the priority a state places on power projection 
affects whether it enters into conflict or cooperation when prices and the threat of disruptions 
are high. Conversely, under the condition where access to fuel is easy and prices are cheap, we 
can expect that states will do little to nothing.  
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The second part of the dissertation tests the model presented in part one by examining the 
evolution of energy policy in the US and the EU and the respective salience of supply availability 
to power projection for each. It is divided into for broad sections, one that introduces the 
politicization of energy, one historical review for each actor as well as an assessment of the SAPP 
salience for each, and one dedicated to introducing to the specific hypotheses based on the 
assumptions of the model and the analysis of each actor. The third part of the thesis tests these 
hypotheses by taking up four common international cases involving oil and comparing the 
responses of the US and EU. The dissertation concludes with a summary of the work’s findings 
and provides some suggestions of how the ideas posited here may be of value to the larger field 
of international relations. 
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2. Framework for analysis 
2.1. The uniqueness of energy policy 
Energy policies differ significantly from other public policies in several important ways. Despite 
explicit declarations and titles, energy policies often tend to be vague and diffuse, and relevant 
decisions focus internally, just like most other policy areas. However, they also have serious 
external implications because they directly affect national security by altering external power 
projection capabilities. Meanwhile, the decision making process around energy is uniquely 
affected by a complex cocktail of factors that limit available options. These include time, 
technology, endowments, alternatives, and externalities. And during different periods of stability 
and crisis, the quantity and quality of actors involved in the decision making process undergoes 
extreme shifts to a degree unparalleled in any other internal policy domain.  
At first thought energy policies may seem simple enough: a diverse set of specific laws and rules 
designed to manage supply and demand of resources and the externalities of their use to the 
benefit of the public good. The reality is, however, that despite explicitly stated goals and titles, 
energy policies both are broader in scope and much vaguer in practice. Energy is necessary for 
every social, economic, and political activity. But then again so is currency. The fact is that energy 
applies in some manner to the entire range of public policy decisions. So what differentiates 
energy policy from any other deep impact public policy? Which types of government programs 
can be considered part of that policy? The answers to both questions set energy policies apart 
from all other types of public action. 
The main challenge is determining which programs and actions apply and which do not. For 
example, consider a policy to build an extensive road network. Is that part of an energy policy? 
Certainly the roads will be used for transport and the employed labor and materials will come 
with energy costs. One could as well classify such a policy as a works or transportation program as 
opposed to an energy policy because its primary goal is to increase employment or the efficiency 
of transport and thus energy choices only indirectly. What about environmental rules and 
regulations? It is now commonplace to combine energy and environmental policies as if they were 
one in the same. They are not. No doubt, energy is relevant to the environment. However, 
policies aimed at controlling greenhouse gas emission of non energy producing industries (even 
though the pollution they produce results from the use of energy) can hardly be deemed an 
explicit energy policy.  
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In contrast to these indirect types of energy related programs, there are explicit energy laws 
regulating the production, distribution, and consumption of resources as well as legislated 
incentives, taxes, and oversight bodies. From an internal economic perspective, these various 
energy-specific policies alter the costs of almost every area of commercial production (Jorgenson, 
1984; Kneese and Sweeney, 1985; Slesser, 1978) and thus market price of every good and service 
(Herendeen, 1973; Pimentel and Pimentel, 1996) including food and agriculture.7 Some of these 
fall under pieces of legislation or executive fiat with the word energy in the title. Others do not. 
Explicit or implicit, most energy related policy decisions target changes to extant consumer or 
producer behavior. They have limited impact and their initial primary direction of focus is inward. 
However, a wide range of these decisions, from efficiency and environmental standards to the 
allocation of drilling rights, do directly impact the lives of citizens and can transform the power of 
government.8 This transformative power is one way in which energy policies distinctively differ 
from most other internal public policies. 
Energy related decisions produce national security and foreign policy consequences in that they 
directly affect power projection capabilities. Some of these have an immediate but short-term 
effect such as policies over the size and management of strategic reserves that determine not 
only the time that an economy can withstand a supply crunch, but also the time that a country 
can continue fueling military operations. The effects of many choices are felt over the medium to 
long-term such as those about licensing of transnational pipelines, tanker-ready ports and other 
import facilities. One group of policies is of a definitively long-term nature: the investment of 
material and human resources into the development and implementation of substitutes.  
While one could argue that every public policy serves the national interest in some manner, 
policies in the energy domain stand out because, to a degree unlike any other policy area, they 
can change the calculus of government options across the entire spectrum of internal and 
external policy. Most importantly they can alter physical security strategies through their impact 
on the industrial base and its ability to support external power projection capabilities. Energy 
policies, therefore, constitute a fundamental component of national security.  
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 One could argue that energy policies do not much differ from other trade policies because they tend aim 
at protecting domestic economic interests while promoting external opportunities. Seen as such, their 
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At the core of the industrial base of any nation is the ability to produce physical tools of power. 
That base determines its military capacity through the construction and maintenance of defensive 
military armaments and technologies and allows for the projection of force abroad. It is energy 
reliant and for the foreseeable future specifically reliant on depleting petroleum resources.  
Because military tools produced by that base require enormous amounts of fuel to function, more 
powerful states, defined by the size and quality of their militaries, will necessarily have greater 
demands energy resources. For example, the military constitutes the “single largest consumer of 
petroleum” in the US (Aldridge and Etter, 2001:10). Under the management of its own specialized 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the US military purchases on average between 165,000 to 
200,000 barrels per day of military grade jet fuel alone and manages fuel supply agreements in 
some 40 different countries around the world (Andrews, 2009). The market price of petroleum 
thus directly affects the cost of power projection. Assuming that its price will continue to increase 
over time (Gray, 1914; Hotelling, 1931), governments that place a premium on military power or 
at the minimum on self defense will invest into substitutes to reduce both the risks of disruption 
and costs of waging war.  
Although the EU prioritizes its internal market over military power projection, it has increased its 
internal biofuel production in recent decades, a measure that will enhance its security 
perspectives vis-à-vis its primary oil suppliers. In 2007, EU public R&D into transport biofuels 
surpassed €340 million (Wiesenthal, et al., 2009). The EU’s internal focus highlights another 
unique aspect of the energy policy domain. Decisions about energy mixes and distribution 
infrastructures can either enhance or inhibit the smooth navigation of commercial and military 
assets across the entire space of sovereign control.  
This is particularly important in the areas of power transmission and communication links. Both 
the US, through its “National interest electric transmission corridors” (Wellinghoff, 2009:11) and 
the EU, through it “Trans-European Energy Networks” (most recently 1364/2006/EC) are good 
examples of how electricity infrastructure policies aim to mitigate the vulnerabilities from 
external supply shocks, enhancing their autonomy to act and freeing up resources for other policy 
programs, in both the internal and external dimensions. Internally established energy policies thus 
affect government autonomy in ways that fundamentally change the calculus of external decision 
making.  
Energy policies also stand out as distinct in comparison to other policy domains because 
technology, resource endowments, alternatives, and externalities form a unique cocktail of 
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factors that shape decision making processes and limit outcomes, each of which is negatively 
affected by time.  
In the lifespan of an energy policy, time is its predator. The temporal horizons required for sound 
economic decision-making as well as preparing for or responding to the ebb and flow of energy 
politics far exceed those of most politicians. It is fool’s errand to put arbitrary deadlines on 
scientific discovery and technological innovation. In fact, unless sustained for decades, passing 
appropriate legislation is meaningless in the energy sector. For example, expanding domestic 
production of oil or gas will have no immediate or even medium-term affect on domestic supply 
or prices. It can take up to fifteen or even twenty years to explore, develop, and deliver new oil 
and gas supplies to the market. Likewise, developing new technologies to tap unconventional 
resources, such as shale-based gas deposits, come with huge financial and environmental costs. 
Even if successful, one still cannot control the production behavior of external parties, which can 
offset domestic supply gains. And renewable based substitution policies targeting environmental 
externalities are even more challenging. Reductions in CO2 exhausts and emissions require huge 
investments in new industrial production techniques, scrubbers, sequestration, and processes to 
convert captured GHGs into other usable resources, all of which could take a generation to 
implement. When the urgent need for a solution inevitably dissipates (as a result of heightened 
international production, new discoveries, or reduced domestic demand) support for such 
programs logically will wane.  Therefore, decisions about energy today are laden with the political 
and financial uncertainties of tomorrow.  
One might argue that time is of equal significance in other policy areas. Public health 
emergencies, responses to natural disasters, and financial crises all come to mind. However, in 
each of these cases, short term mobilization of resources can resolve the problem immediately. 
New rules and regulations can immediately change behavior and thus have instant affects on 
long-term outcomes. This is not the case in the energy domain where short-term decisions can 
only have short-term effects, but little to no strategic impact. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the development of new technologies. 
In the energy domain, technology changes the parameters of policy in ways that are difficult to 
predict. For example, over the course of only a few decades in the early twentieth century, the 
development of the gasoline driven combustion engine and advances in chemical sciences turned 
petroleum from a highly inefficient fuel for illuminating street lamps into a strategic commodity 
that fueled the rise of the US to great power status. New technologies to use oil as a fuel changed 
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the way wars were fought. Oil became the alternative to coal, just as today renewables are 
perceived as a future alternative to oil.  
The switch to oil had dramatically different outcomes for the external policies of different actors 
primarily due to differences in their domestic resource endowments. Where the US was saturated 
with petroleum, known deposits of oil were scarce in Europe. While in the US, large supplies, low 
prices and free flow initially led to a do nothing policy, the need for the new resource caused by 
rapid developments in technology led European powers to actively seek policies of territorial 
acquisition. Acquiring oil abroad became a priority of the external policies of the UK, France and 
Italy, and ultimately caused Germany to invest heavily in synthetic alternatives. As a result, oil 
evolved into the ultimate prize in the international competition for power. And that is only the 
external dimension. 
Internally, energy became the driving force for government intervention in markets after 
centuries of avoiding government ownership of private business. Again, resource endowments 
played a role producing fundamentally different government-industry relationships. In the US, it 
provoked an adversarial environment with the government taking on the oil industry as a threat 
to open competition and national sovereignty leading to the establishment of anti-trust laws and 
regulations that are the hall-mark of contemporary regulatory societies. In Europe, however, it 
had the opposite effect, stimulating government cooperation with private industry.9 
Technological innovation and resource endowments thus modify the choices available to 
decision-makers. Technologies are fluid. Resource endowments are not. Governments can 
decrease development costs, but they cannot impose discovery through policy. Indeed, the two 
most profound technological advancements of the industrial age, electricity and the internal 
combustion engine were developed with little to no government support.  
It is precisely this point which constrains contemporary attempts to switch primary fuel use from 
oil to renewable alternatives (Deutch and Schlesinger, 2007). They simply are not yet 
commercially viable substitutes to produce necessary products such as plastics, asphalt, or 
lubrication fluids, each of which is essential to a modern industrialized economy.  
Renewable energies also are problematic because they are intermittent and thus less predictable 
than fossil fuels (Heal, 2009); they are economically inefficient. The UK House of Lords found that 
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without substantial government financing, wind energy will remain uncompetitive and any policy 
to increase its use would fail. In its report it wrote that “a significantly greater capacity of wind 
than of conventional or nuclear plant is needed for any given output of electricity” (United 
Kingdom, 2008:6). But renewable energy resources are attractive precisely because of the static 
nature of resource endowments.10  
Where exhaustible resources are limited and unevenly distributed geographically, renewable 
energy resources are ubiquitous and infinite. Therefore, technological innovations that allow 
renewable energy sources to replace finite ones, and oil in particular, fundamentally strengthens 
the decision making autonomy of every government. While such a development may not end 
government intervention in the energy markets, it most certainly would downgrade the 
importance of the competition over energy resources on the world stage and address one of the 
most politically sensitive topics associated with energy use, namely its massive set of negative 
externalities. 
From mining and production down through distribution and consumption, energy causes explicit 
negative impacts on the environment and public health. It is reasonable to argue that no other 
area of internal political decision making has such a sizeable affect.11 On a local level, the long 
chain of energy use affects air and noise pollution. On the regional and global levels, it affects 
global warming, increases water levels and shifts river flows. Some suggest that it may even affect 
seasonal weather patterns. Such problems are beyond the scope of any single interest group. 
They are truly threats to the public good and thus require government intervention; and the 
problem is not limited to fossil fuels.  
The human health risks associated with nuclear power are well documented, but renewable 
energy forms are not environmental angels either (Owen, 2006a). Those that choose to use arable 
land to replace gasoline with biofuel crops risk consuming limited fresh water supplies and 
creating new forms of pollution through drainage. Large scale solar and wind farms consume vast 
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swaths of territory endangering fragile ecosystems. Although technology may help mitigate some 
of these externalities and the ubiquitous nature of renewables may make the choices between 
the best of bad options easier, every energy related decision creates negative externalities in a 
proportion that far outweighs any other field of public policymaking. 
This complex cocktail of factors (technology, endowment, alternatives, externalities, and time) 
often leads to contradictory policy outcomes that negate their targeted impacts. For example, 
heightened efficiency standards and higher fuel taxes do not necessarily lead consumers to find 
substitutes or even to drive less (Portney, et al., 2003). Raising taxes on gasoline in order to ‘push’ 
substitution may expedite the switch to alternative fuels if one is readily available at a competitive 
price. However, it may delay such an outcome by triggering changes in complimentary goods such 
as more fuel efficient cars that offset the price increase and diminish the immediate need for 
substitution. Conversely, heightened vehicle fuel efficiency standards may offset higher fuel prices 
caused by higher taxes and spread the utility cost per kilometer of driving, neither of which leads 
to the desired effect of substitution or a reduction in driving.  
Finally, this special mix of factors is paralleled by a diverse set of vested interests groups that 
compete for beneficial outcomes. The energy domain is not unique is this manner and at first 
glance its politics do appear similar to other internal policy domains in terms of the influence 
wielded by powerful commercial interests. National champions, whether state owned or private, 
no doubt are important. However, the ubiquitous economic use of energy and its relevance to 
national security, particularly to external power projection, leads to extreme shifts in the quantity 
and quality of actors and interests involved in the decision making process during different times 
of stability and crisis.  
When energy resources flow free of disruption, debates surrounding energy tend to be 
boisterous, even disorderly, and engage a complex network of vested and emerging commercial, 
environmental, civil and government interest groups. The engagement of so many actors is 
indicative of the substantial social and economic consequences of energy related decisions.  
But from the moment that external resource flow begins to slow (for example through supply 
crunches and disruptions) or the control of domestic supplies is explicitly deemed essential as a 
foreign policy tool (such as in the cases of OPEC and Russia), debates become increasingly 
focused. In the event of war they are outright muted. Along the way even hotly held political 
principles such as support for free markets are exchanged for executive intervention and control - 
just like President Nixon did in 1971 when he stated, “I am now a Keynesian” (Silk, 1971).  
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The twentieth century witnessed several examples of such occurrences. The need to acquire oil to 
fuel the Royal Navy spurred the UK government in 1914 to take a 51% stake in the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, breaking a long tradition of staying out of private industry.12 During World War II 
the US established a Petroleum Administration for War to take control of oil supplies and 
deliveries (Yergin, 1991) working together with the same oil companies that it spent decades 
trying to breakup. In response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, both Europe and the US established 
strategic petroleum reserves, introduced fuel efficiency standards, conservation measures, and 
imposed price controls. Many such actions occurred through executive fiat. Those that did occur 
through legislation met little or no significant resistance.  
Also, as energy issues climb latter of urgency, which they inevitably will, the quantity of actors 
involved in the decision making process shrinks considerably and policies become securitized. 
Fewer actors are engaged in the process of forming foreign policies than those in the domestic 
public policy process. When military or security matters are involved, as they quickly become in 
an energy crunch, the stress of urgency shrinks the quantity even further. Traditionally relevant, 
powerful vested interested groups see their influence diminish and are ultimately forced to 
submit to executive political will. In no other policy domain are non-governmental players as 
easily shut out of the decision making process as in that of energy, not even in the financial sector 
where a few key non-governmental players have a profound effect on the economic well-being of 
millions. In this manner energy is unlike any other economic policy. 
Despite its globalized nature, energy stubbornly remains the one area of economics still 
dominated by interstate politics (Westphal, 2004).13 When shortages or disruptions occur, 
governments are forced to act and do so rapidly. Politicians simply do not have the luxury of time 
to wait for a new equilibrium of prices, demand, and substitutes to settle and to build a consensus 
among a diverse set of competing domestic interests. Unless governments are fortunate enough 
to control vast domestic reserves and the means to immediately access them, they will have to 
intervene abroad to secure necessary fuels. The same simply cannot be said of purely economic or 
social problems.  
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 Nevertheless, economic studies have greatly enhanced our understanding energy politics, from early 
works by Gray (1914) on the assumptions of rent and exhaustibility and Hotelling (1931) on the pricing of 
depletable resources, to the optimal depletion strategies of Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Kamien and 
Schwartz (1978), the affects of energy on growth and innovation by Stiglitz (1974) and Dasgupta, Gilbert 
and Stiglitz (1982) respectively, on the structure of markets by Alhajji and Huettner (2000), Hillman and Van 
Long (1983), Sweeney (1977), and trading behavior Boscheck (2007), Brown and Errera (1987), Dahl (2004). 
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Our framework thus consists of four components. First is the internal dimension of energy policy 
which examines how energy policies are made by looking at the actors, institutions, processes and 
instruments involved. The second looks at the variables that shape external policy outcomes, 
namely price and supply availability and the importance given to power projection. The third 
aspect focuses on the outcome of external policies, which are assumed to range from inaction to 
cooperation to conflict and determined in large part by the importance placed on relative power. 
The fourth aspect links back to the internal dimension by enhancing or diminishing the immediate 
need to invest in substitutes, which in turn changes the significance of the variables of price and 
supply availability.  
 
2.2. The Internal dimension (how energy policies are made) 
The internal dimension of energy policy is messy and engages a diverse set of actors, institutions, 
processes, and instruments. Many of these are spatially and temporally specific to the political-
economic structures and conditions of the polity in question and the structural relationship 
between central (federal or supranational) and state governments. Also, the highly technical 
content of the subject matter tends to limit public understanding of the problems and available 
solutions and thus both enhances the role of technical experts and increases to the margin for 
political error. The following assumptions apply to liberal democracies that loosely regulate 
markets and are made up of distributed multilevel institutions.  
When it comes to formulating and maintaining long term policies, representative democracies are 
at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to autocratic regimes. Where political leaders in the 
latter largely are free from the stresses of public opinion, the former’s short electoral cycles 
render most energy policies vulnerable to the vagaries of political expediency. Domestic 
consumers require affordable fuels for transportation and electricity and heat for their homes and 
businesses. Politicians that fail to deliver such stability literally risk their job security. In terms of 
its relation to voter’s pocket books, energy is a component of domestic politics.  
Moreover, changes in energy consumption patterns and associated infrastructures span large 
temporal horizons, and require sustained long-term financial and political support if they are to 
be substantially effective. Building a working consensus in a liberal democracy takes time and all 
the more when government in that system is distributed (as opposed to a highly centralized 
unitary state where policies can be changed more rapidly). Time and power distribution thus 
transforms energy policymaking in liberal democracies into a cumbersome and cyclical process 
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that tends to be responsive in nature. Support will rise and wane according to immediate 
contemporary conditions: when energy supplies are inexpensive or even tolerable, its importance 
logically declines. As a result, those energy policies that have the greatest external impact - those 
that target a substantial shift in the production and use of domestically produced alternative fuels 
- almost never survive long enough to take shape. 
This is explained in part by the fact that energy policies in liberal democracies largely are 
considered as matters of ‘low’ politics because most related decisions fall under the rubric of 
internal economic policy in some manner. Their primary targets are market structures and 
consumer behavior, not relative power projection. Regulations, standards, and taxation are the 
primary instruments of government, not military conquest. Because markets tend to dominate 
the institutional landscape around energy, the policy process tends to be more inclusive rather 
than exclusive, engaging a large and diverse set of actors. All of this is understandable in light of 
the prevailing perception held throughout the 1980s and 1990s that energy supplies were globally 
abundant and easily accessible.14 Also understandable is how this diverse set of factors contracts 
when governments are faced with crises.  
Importantly, the internal dimension is not static. As conditions warrant, its importance migrates 
from the purely internal to the external, driven by the exogenous factors of price, the availability 
supplies and substitutes, and the importance power projection. Since the only internal 
controllable policy which can change the calculus of energy in power projection is the existence of 
substitutes, our focus is limited to those related components. 
 
2.2.1. Actors 
The actors that participate and shape the formulation and implementation of energy policies in 
general and substitution policies specifically can be categorized in two broad groups. They are 
either independent governmental or non-governmental agents. Prontera (2009) suggests that the 
most relevant non-governmental actors will be found in the transport and industry sectors. The 
former seems reasonable enough, but the latter is far too broad. Only those that directly conduct 
or finance research and development of alternative technologies matter and thus warrant our 
attention.  
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There are certain types of actors that are involved in the formation of general energy policies in 
all states. However, they are not necessarily substitution specific. This is either because privileges 
embedded in institutional design limit their access or because they lack the necessary resources 
required to conduct applicable research and development.15 Nevertheless, we can expect that 
peak economic associations (Olson, 1982; Shively, 2008), powerful private market players, a few 
select legislators (assuming no dictatorship), high-ranking executive branch officials, senior 
military officials, and the scientists that work for them will each play some role in the process. 
These actors can be contrasted to mid-level bureaucrats, environmentalists, key media players, 
and non-physical scientists, who also may be involved in the debate, but their role in the 
formation and implementation of actual substitution policies will be more peripheral than direct.  
This is not to say that quasi-governmental entities such as public utilities and cooperative private-
public agencies are entirely irrelevant. However, their role in substitution is either limited or 
subordinate to the interests of their public and private shareholders. The behavior and interests 
of public utilities (transport, electricity, water, and heating) is an outgrowth of public policy and 
not an input. One might even consider them to be instruments of policy as opposed to actors. 
What they certainly are not is independent. Likewise, quasi-governmental agencies that focus on 
oversight and governance16 or government sponsored research and development centers (RDC)17 
consist of a mix of various private, public and academic actors, each of which falls under one of 
the two broader actor groups. Such institutions often have a place at parliamentary hearings and 
are valuable for their technical expertise, but since they either are in part owned or managed by 
government institutions, they too could be considered tools rather than self-serving agents. 
There are two main groups of independent governmental actors. The first are key political 
executives and the officials representing their agencies (ministries, cabinets, and directorates). 
The other consists of key senior legislators operating in the legislative and oversight bodies they 
control. Although there are many lower and intermediate level executives and legislators involved 
in determining much of the detail of domestic energy policy, two important factors separate the 
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senior group. They play a noticeably enhanced role in the assignment of financial support and 
granting of regulatory exceptions explicitly required for a policy of substitution; i.e. they control 
important instruments of power. And in concert they define the overall importance of power 
projection for the government and thus determine the significance of the military as an 
institutional actor in the energy policy process. This latter point is particularly relevant in the 
context of the US and EU where civilian oversight of the military is distributed between legislative 
committees in the former and independently budgeted and controlled by Member States in the 
latter.  
Key political executives include the heads of government and ministries of energy and (where 
relevant) the environment, national security, and defense. These actors are present at both the 
Member State and the federal or supranational levels. Such individuals are distinctive, not 
because they set policy directions, but rather because they are entrusted with some power of 
executive fiat. They may control a discretionary budget and/or possess the authority to issue 
orders and directives.  
Similarly, a few key senior legislators can promote or block bills at various stages of the legislative 
process, from before they are even opened for debate up to controlling the lines of inquiry in 
committee meetings. Such individuals also usually have some degree of control over budgetary 
assignments within their respective institutions by virtue of their positions as chairpersons or by 
pressuring other legislators over their support for particular programs though internal party 
mechanics, institutional procedure, or political largesse. However, in deciding to support or 
oppose substitution programs, key public officials and civil servants are bound to come under 
pressure from important non-governmental actors.  
The fact is non-governmental actors play a significant role in the research, development, and 
implementation of technology as well monitoring the externalities of their exploitation. Their 
cooperation and compliance are essential for any policy to be implemented. This is particularly 
true in the area of substitution where the contemporary state of science and technology and 
related trends in commercial investments are more likely to determine legislative and executive 
action than to be determined by it.  
Seen broadly, the non-governmental category includes virtually every commercial and civil 
interest group. However, for the purposes of comparison, one need only identify the largest and 
best financed. Among these would be the key commercial players and national champions in the 
production and distribution of energy, the main manufacturers in the transport sector, and the 
peak economic groups representing capital and labor. Each of these players has vested interests 
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in the status quo. Equally important are peak environmentalist groups, whose large membership 
bases and annual budgets, allow them promote goals that often tend to be diametrically opposed 
to the status quo aims of their commercial counterparts.  
Each of these powerful vested interests groups is adept at promoting public support or opposition 
to programs and the politicians that back them. And money is important. Using their large 
resources and vested interests, these groups invest significant human and financial capital into 
lobbying in favor of, or in opposition to, any program that enhances or diminishes their prospects 
or goals, sometimes leading to bitter fights while at others creating strange bedfellows. 
Substitution policies based on replacing gasoline with biofuels or electricity provides a good 
example.  
The petroleum industry (producers, refinery and filling station owners, and their employees) and 
automobile manufacturers, stand to suffer significant financial loss if the share of petroleum in 
gasoline is reduced or eliminated altogether. In pursuit of legitimate concerns about pollution and 
land and water use in the production of fuel crops, powerful environmentalist lobbies that serve 
as traditional critics of both industries take on the role of temporary allies. Meanwhile, chemical 
and agricultural concerns, normally aligned with the main players in the energy industry, 
wholeheartedly support such programs as they look forward to windfall profits gained from the 
increased use of their land and technologies.  
Throw in the alternative of electric vehicles into the mix and the debate increases in controversy 
and acrimony. A shift away from liquid transport fuels puts petroleum producers in the position to 
lose their customer base altogether and forces the automotive industry to undergo a dramatic 
retooling of its factories. Given that the latter will not voluntarily shift production to electric cars 
in the absence of a government program to finance either the costs of refurbishing factories or 
the necessary recharging infrastructure to justify sales, political mandates are likely to spark 
lobbying wars for public financing and regulatory exception. All the while, both the oil and 
automotive sectors are equally likely to hedge their bets by competing for available research 
funding.  
Indeed, no major player in the energy or transport sector will passively ignore a substitution 
program. And given their importance to employment and general economic well being, one would 
be remiss to disregard their influence on powerful members of their respective governments, 
their institutions, or the processes involved in decision making. 
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2.2.2. Institutions 
The most important institutions engaged in energy substitution policies are the three main 
branches of government, fuel commodity markets, and the military. In the specific cases of the US 
and EU, government institutions operate both at the federal/supranational and member state 
levels, while in the EU, the military is germane only for Member States. Each is relevant in specific 
ways. Government institutions play the role of initiator, setting priorities, targets, and rules. The 
unique security providing function of the military makes it one of the largest and most stable 
consumers and thus it often acts as a trend setter. And markets serve as the venues where 
success or failure can be observed and measured through the supply and demand for alternative 
fuels.  
Initiating substitution goals and setting targets are primarily the responsibility of the high 
government authorities. This means that both in the US and the EU, federal and supranational 
institutions are likely to play a central role in setting agendas and targets. However, success 
depends on the active participation and with cooperation of Member States because they largely 
are responsible for implementation and enforcement. Sub-federal or community level 
governments often take the lead in pushing the direction and velocity of change, which in turn 
can advance or hinder centrally established goals.  
Two examples demonstrate how Member States play an important role in linking energy 
substitution targets with actions to achieve them. They also show why it is absolutely necessary to 
include them when examining the internal dimension of energy substitution policies. In the US, 
California frequently plays the role of trend setter outpacing the federal government both with 
targets and the laws to achieve them. The state recently added a $5,000 tax credit on top of an 
existing $7,500 federal tax credit for buyers of a low-emission private vehicles and $20,000 to 
buyers for equivalent commercial vehicles (Smith, 2010). It did so in accordance with its own 
independently issued 2006 gubernatorial executive order to raise the minimum biofuel share to 
75% by 2050, a target far in excess of national goals.18 Likewise, the EU’ largest economy, 
Germany has regularly exceeded the EU’s minimum share of biofuels in the transport sector 
(originally 2% in 2005 and 5.75% by 2010 and since watered down to include any type of green 
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energy).19 In respect to incentives, however, Germany reversed its position on pushing biofuels 
into the market in 2006 by introducing a tax that significantly contracted of the share of biofuels 
in its fuel market (Vogelpohl, 2010). Previously, Germany had led the EU with respect to market 
share largely because of the tax exemption it awarded biofuel production.  
Irrespective of where ideas originate, every substitution policy requires targets and the means to 
achieve them and this requires the involvement of all three branches of government at both the 
federal/supranational and member state levels. Targets are set and later enforced in the 
executive branches of government. However, the means are established via legislation and 
executive fiat; and the legitimacy of the use of those means (in some cases the legal right to 
mandate targets in the first place) falls under the authority of the judiciary.  
The EU executive can set targets for biofuels, legislate fuel blend percentages in the consumer 
market, and through courts can even force a powerful member like Germany to accept the use of 
soybean oil as a source (which it has refused), but it cannot control how much Berlin will invest in 
supporting infrastructure or as of yet mandate the actual energy mix of resources used in the 
production of electricity in the country. Likewise in the US, the executive branch has wide 
authority to establish standards, but tends to have that authority watered down by legislation and 
even reversed through appeals in court. Such was the case in December 2008, when US courts 
struck down prevailing pollution control standards associated with electric power plants.20 
In the specific policy domain of substitution, the most important institutions are those that 
establish regulatory laws, conduct land management, and provide public financing for research. 
They consist of legislatures, the offices of the heads of government, and those departments that 
are legally responsible for specific activities. The land management domain, for example, is 
important for energy resource mining, crop production, and transport via pipelines and ports. 
Responsibility in the US for leases and drilling rights in coastal waters falls under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 
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 EU biofuel targets were originally laid out in a 2003 biofuels directive (2003/30 EC) and later in the 
Commission’s "Strategy for Biofuels" (COM (2006) 34) and amended in a 2009 directive on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources (2009/28/EC).  
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 See: State of North Carolina, v. Environmental Protection Agency, Case No. 05-1244, United States Court 
of Appeals, D.C. Circuit (http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/cair/docs/CAIRRemandOrder.pdf). 
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(formerly the Mineral Management Service).21 That department also oversees the extraction of 
mineral resources in the country’s federally-managed lands. Because the EU has no uniquely 
defined public lands, management of its own energy resources, whether coastal or on shore is the 
sole responsibility of its Member States. This complicates the coordination of policies, particularly 
with respect to increasing domestic fossil fuel production.  
Further complicating matters for the executive branch is the fact that its legislative counterpart 
possesses the power of purse and thus determines the availability of public finances for their 
endeavors. Specific to policies of substitution, it allocates financial resources for research and 
development of alternative fuels and technologies, an area where both the EU and US are very 
active.22 According to national records submitted to the International Energy Agency, EU Member 
States France, Germany Italy, and the United Kingdom spent close to €79 billion (in 2009 prices) in 
energy related research and development between 1974 and 2009. Over the same period, the US 
invested as much as €115 billion. However, only a small fraction (2%) of that funding was directed 
towards substitute-related activities such as biofuels, hydrogen, and energy storage. As in the 
case of actors, the role of money and the price of resources are central to institutional 
involvement in the internal energy policy domain. 
In order to realize the potential of energy commodity substitution, new technologies and the 
infrastructure to support them are required.23 The requisite time and investment costs to develop 
and implement them are significant obstacles to market entry and the most important issue is 
that of competitive pricing.   
Energy prices are set in commodity markets (that is before government issued taxes and subsidies 
take effect).24 Those markets are largely dependent on external gluts and shortages, and highly 
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 The name was changed on June 18, 2010 in response to the Deepwater Horizon incident through internal 
Order No. 3302 issued by Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior. A scanned photocopy of the order is 
available at: http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872.  
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 Under its Seventh Framework Program, the Brussels has allocated around €2.3 billion for non-nuclear 
energy related research and development between 2007 and 2013. This is in addition to individual state 
investments which among the EU-15 in 2005 amounted to €1.9 billion. For a breakdown of these 
investments, see <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/total-energy-research-and-
development-1>. 
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 In the case of automobiles, hybrids, flex-fuel, ethanol, hydrogen, and lithium-ion battery powered 
vehicles are currently entering the market, although the infrastructure to support them is strikingly 
limited. 
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 In some cases, as in natural gas, pipelines inexorably link external suppliers to internal markets according 
to long-term contracts and fixed prices, creating recurrent tensions and limiting the political options to find 
alternative fuels and suppliers.  
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integrated internationally such as in the case of primary fossil fuels like oil, coal, and natural gas. 
Price shifts in one country are rapidly manifested everywhere. Pricing in newer or smaller 
markets, such as growing trades in liquefied natural gas (LNG) and biofuels, tend to be more 
dependent on their geographic position.25 The average landfall price of LNG (per MMBTU) in July 
2010 was $4.55 on the eastern seaboard of the US, $6.95 in Spain, and $7.30 in Japan (FERC, 
2010).  
Market location affects prices and shapes state priorities vis-à-vis its federal or supranational 
counterpart. Those variances tend to divide Member States more often than unite them. Pipeline 
infrastructures provide a good example. In Europe, where market integration and fuel 
transportation infrastructures are still under development, physically detached and competing 
markets lead to wide variations in price and supplier composition per each Member State, causing 
stiff debate over the merits of Union-financed supplier-connected pipeline strategies. Similarly, 
despite a higher degree of interconnection (30 large interstate pipelines transport about 81 
percent of consumed gas through 24 hubs), the US is still divided into five regional distribution 
networks and states continuously compete over federal funded investments into port facilities 
and new pipeline routes.  
Market size and trade volume is a major determinant of whether or not a substitution policy is 
actually having any affect. The presence of spot and future contract markets and the volume of 
trade inform us about the economic relevance of substitute fuels. The fact that the quantity of 
LNG contracts sold on the market are so much smaller than standard gas or crude oil markets 
reveals a structural favoritism in the marketplace, one that similarly hampers the entry of new 
substitute fuels such as ethanol, hydrogen, and biodiesel and thus suggests the need for 
government intervention in the form of regulations and incentives to increase their competitive 
value. As is often the case, however, government intervention in the marketplace tends to bias 
one product over another leading to unintended consequences. For example, trade in ethanol has 
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 Prices for LNG in Europe vary according to national or regional schemes, connected to an index of prices 
of oil and other energy related futures. In the UK prices are set by the country’s National Balancing Point 
(NBP). In US, LNG prices are driven by the indexed price of piped natural gas depending on its geographic 
origin or distribution point (Henry Hub for Gulf of Mexico gas and New York ‘Citygate’ for gas transferred 
from interstate or intrastate pipelines to a local natural gas utility). 
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been stymied in Europe because it is classified as an agricultural good and therefore taxed at 
higher rate than biodiesel, which is considered to be an industrial good (Klepper, 2008).26  
Markets take the lead role in transforming government substitution goals into reality. As 
ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson once commented “You [the government] set the taxes. We work on 
it” (United States. Senate Committe on the Judiciary, 2006). In response to the EU’s establishment 
of a trading scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances (Directives 2003/87/EC and 
2004/101/EC) and similar program called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the US, the 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) established a highly lucrative Green Exchange in early 
2010 to cover both US and EU contracts and added four European biofuel commodities to its 
trading portfolio. 27/28/29 Ethanol is now regularly traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) and NYMEX.30 Global biofuel production now exceeds 74 billion liters per annum, far more 
than the 18 billion produced in 2000.31 And as of 2009, EU countries were consuming some 12 
million toe of biofuel annually (Eurobserv'ER, 2010).32  
By creating the basis for effective supply and demand, markets provide essential private financing 
in areas of research and development. Increasing volumes of trade in the NASDAQ’s Clean Edge 
U.S. Liquid Series, Bloomberg’s World Energy Alternate Source and the Frankfurt Dax’s DAXGlobal 
Alternative Energy Index are all examples of how markets pair public policy targets with private 
investment and risk management. And because markets are central to the success of substitution 
policies, overcoming barriers to access are often the primary focus of government intervention 
(Beck and Martinot, 2004; Martinot, 2004). 
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 Ethanol‘s agricultural classification allows countries to impose higher tariff rates to protect domestic 
producers. In 2008, EU tariffs were 0.192 €/liter for undenatured and 0.102 €/liter for denatured ethanol. 
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 The EU scheme covers over 11,000 installations across the EU and almost half of the Union’s annual CO2 
emissions. 
28
 On July, 23 2010, the U.S. Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC) approved the Green Exchange 
as a designated contract market (DCM) allowing the trade of emissions allowances and credits in CO2, NOX, 
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 The US RGGI is the first such mandatory market-based effort in the country and involves ten 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic. See http://www.rggi.org/. 
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 Since ethanol's future is intimately linked to that of the corn and sugar crops, both markets are also 
indicative of the importance of biofuels play in the marketplace. 
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 According Eurobserv’ER (2010) “The incorporation rate has dropped in turn from 7.3% in 2007, to 5.9% in 
2008, down to 5.5% in 2009. The reason for this drop in consumption (by 7.8% between 2008 and 2009) is 
that the German Bundestag decided to reduce the incorporation quotas in June 2009.” 
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 Germany actually experienced a decline in the share of biofuel in its fuel market after removing a tax 
exception status.  
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For all of these aforementioned reasons, markets and three branches of government are 
important institutions in the formation of energy policy. Markets serve as the venue where one 
can observe the success or failure of a substitution policy because it is there where we can 
measure the availability of supply and demand for alternative fuels. Government institutions 
serve as the initiators because they set the priorities, targets, the rules of the game. Yet there is 
still one other institution that plays a vital role both as consumer and shaper of policy, namely the 
military. 
In comparison to the complexity of other government institutions and markets, the military’s 
impact on substitution is simple and very direct. Entrusted with the responsibility to protect the 
state and to project power abroad where deemed necessary, the military has the immediate 
material need for substitute technologies and fuels, possesses the political prestige to win funding 
for research and development, and maintains the institutional stability to plan and act over long 
temporal horizons. 
The military requires fuels for the mobility of its forces. A disruption in times of war is lethal, but 
even supply squeezes in peacetime can pose serious problems. Without large volumes of aviation 
fuel, airspaces are indefensible and the normal transportation of troops could be reduced to a 
trickle. The US military, for example, consumes more energy “than any other private or public 
organization, as well as more than 100 nations” on a daily basis (Warner and Singer, 2009).  
When countries prioritize military power projection, their immediate energy needs and the 
perceived vulnerability of international supplies create a nexus of motivations to develop and 
deploy domestically produced substitutes. This explains the US Air Force’s plan to deploy blends 
of domestically produced synthetic fuels for 50 percent of its aviation fuel by 2016 (Kristine E. 
Blackwell, 2007).33 If achieved, the program’s impact will reach far beyond the confines of the US 
military, affecting other nation’s national defense strategies and changing the market landscape 
for the global supply of aviation fuel.  
Even when countries do not prioritize force projection, military concern over the cost and 
availability of fuel supplies is still high on the security agenda. In 2007, the UK and France had 
combined military fuels costs of $1.6 billion; and in 2008, France was forced to cancel three 
separate naval operations because of “soaring fuel prices” (Pfeifer, 2009). Those costs drove the 
                                                          
33
 The US navy is in the final stages of certifying a 50/50 biofuel mix from Honeywell made from camelina oil 
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UK to invest in new gas and diesel powered electric propulsion systems for its next generation of 
aircraft carriers as well as finance a massive waste-to-energy plant to power the ships when they 
are at port. Despite the general tendency of the EU to avoid international military conflicts, many 
EU countries are actively engaged in foreign naval operations from the Arabian Gulf to the 
Mediterranean. In the latter, Greece, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and Germany are all active 
participants in operations to maintain transit security for key trade routes for fossil fuels and 
resources. Eight EU countries have troops, ships, or planes deployed around the Gulf of Aden for 
similar ends. And although not well advertised, NATO maintains two secure military-use pipeline 
systems that connect Denmark and Germany with Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.  
Most importantly, military institutions carry special weight as consumers. This is not merely due 
to the volumes of fuel they consume. It also is because they are sources of national pride, the final 
guarantors of national autonomy and sovereignty in times of crisis, and exemplify the institutional 
stability of government.  
Because of their reach into local communities and its constant need for hardware and fuel, 
military institutions tend to be deeply embedded into domestic politics and industry. The US, the 
UK, and France each maintain a large standing force of volunteers. They annually invest between 
2.3% and 4.3% of their GDP on defense related activities and maintain expensive and active 
nuclear deterrents. In fact, all three countries have thriving armaments industries that together 
with Germany annually employ more than 2.6 million citizens in the direct production of arms; 
and US and EU companies make up all of the top ten and all but two of the top thirty arms 
manufacturers in the word (SIPRI, 2010).  
Therefore, when the military claims that it needs specific resources to secure the national 
defense, keep pace with allies, or maintain a comparative advantage over rivals, both the markets 
and the political establishment listen either out of national security concerns or electoral and 
economic expediency. And because few would ever doubt that the military will still be there 
decades into the future, it has the creditability to plan for and manage long-term projects, a 
quality that no other institution or individual actor can provide. This unique status positions the 
military to lead the charge toward substitutes. If and when the military decides that substitutes 
are necessary, it will use its prestige to gain public financing for research and development and 
establish the market links necessary to meet its demands. The military thus plays a special role 
the processes that underlie the formulation and success of related policies.  
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2.2.3. Processes 
Why is it that so many substitution policies target reified fata morganas such as energy 
independence or environmental purity and result in only slight shifts in consumer and market 
behavior? The answer lies in the interaction of processes present in government, market, and 
scientific decision making. Substitution policies are initiated when political executives set policy 
goals to achieve targeted shares of a fuel or technology in the market. They are put into practice 
via legislation and executive action; and they are achieved through the actions of market players 
and scientific investigation. In the time it takes to cross the gap between idea and practical reality, 
goals and their importance are bound to change. It simply takes too long for new fuels and 
technologies to become commercially competitive. Because they need continuous long-term 
political and financial support, most attempts are doomed from the start. 
As a rule, substitution policies always target specific fuels or technologies and do so in identifiable 
packages of laws, regulations and incentives that reduce market barriers and increase access to 
capital financing for energy research, development, and demonstration (ERD). Therefore, the 
procedures behind energy substitution policies are dependent upon the technological and market 
status of the alternative in question. If the fuels or technologies are fully developed but too 
expensive to be competitive, focus will be placed on reducing market barriers. If they do not exist 
or are not yet sufficiently developed, focus will be placed on ERD.  
Although the precise modalities of how substitution policies are formed will vary between 
political systems and markets, we can assume that substitution relevant policymaking involves 
similar procedures as found in other policy domains (initiation, formulation, implementation, 
revaluation, and review).34 They are self-interested endeavors that involve setting goals first and 
then going out to find the most efficient means to achieve them.35 Those goals are what 
distinguish substitution programs from the broader and more loosely defined notion of an overall 
energy policy.  
Most conservation or efficiency policies address the symptoms of a problem, but the 
development of alternative fuels attacks the cause head on. The results of the former can be 
observed in the medium-term; the results of the latter only over the long-term. And where the 
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 Simon (1983) calls this the ‘rational’ model. For an opposing view that explains the policy process as less 
goal oriented and more pragmatic see the ‘incremental’ process model of Lindblom (1979). 
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former is often either vague (increase use of alternatives) and indeterminate (becoming more 
efficient), substitution policies are very specific and their outputs are reasonably easy to measure 
through financial cost and market activity. The large scale substitution of petroleum with biofuels 
or batteries in the transport sector will have direct quantifiable affects on the consumption of 
petroleum irrespective of economic growth. Conversely, higher fuel efficiency standards can be 
offset with increased driving. 
The legislative procedure behind the budgeting of ERD largely depends on the form and 
organization of government. Differences present in presidential, semi-presidential, and 
parliamentary governments do affect the procedural process as does the degree to which fiscal 
decision making is centralized. In the EU, most public ERD funding occurs through Member States 
where as in the US, most public funding stems from the federal government.36 In the latter, the 
President has the ability to request funds and targets, but the charge to finance such programs 
falls squarely in the hands of Congress where decisions are debated and responses planned in 
powerful committees such as Ways and Means, which determine the type of measure (market 
interventions or grant funding) and Appropriations, which decide the amounts to be allocated. 
Likewise, all matters related to the military’s budget and activities or energy are decided in the 
Armed Services and Energy committees respectively.  
In the EU, the Commission is responsible for initiating proposals. According to the co-decision 
procedure, legislative powers are shared by the European Parliament and the Council, both of 
which have specialized committees responsible for recommendations and decisions over 
substitution specific matters such as research, the environment, trans-European networks, and 
their associated budgets. For example, the EP’s Industry, Research and Energy Committee is 
responsible for consultations and co-decision procedures on the Union's industrial policy, the 
application of new technologies, research policy, and Community measures relating to energy 
policy in general. However, the Council in its various configurations constitutes the EU’s real 
“decision-making centre” (Wessels, 1991) because that is where Member State governments are 
represented.37  
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Since energy policies largely are the responsibility of the Member States, most substitution 
related decisions in the EU are decided at the Ministerial level in the Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE).38 The TTE meets around four times a year to 
decide on proposals up for consideration. Before matters are considered by the TTE, proposals 
are run through influential working parties. There are currently five energy specific TTE working 
parties that prepare materials for the Council on Land Transport, Shipping, Aviation, Intermodal 
Questions and Networks, and Energy, including one High-level Working Party on Energy (Council, 
2010). Most are of a semi-permanent nature. Others are temporary, such as the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Sustainability Criteria for Biofuels. Made up of national experts, these groups prepare 
technical dossiers before passing them up to the Permanent Representative Committees 
(COREPER I or II) and finally onto the Ministerial level, which exclusively has the authority to make 
legally binding decisions. Other relevant working parties such as the Budget Committee, which 
approves financial allocations together with the EP, and the Working Party on Tax Question, 
which decides over energy related taxation, are equally relevant. 
Despite differences in the EU and US legislative procedures, the strong role of committees 
constitute some important commonalities in way in which policies are developed. Both are 
subject to intensive lobbying by advocacy groups and actors directly engaged in related issue 
networks (Helco, 1978), particularly in when it comes to decisions over choices of fuels and 
technologies (Hallacher, 2005). In the US particularly this has been known to take on the form of 
‘iron triangles’ where executive agencies, powerful commercial actors, and Congressional 
committees form a sort of mini-government that coordinates preferential regulation, such as in 
the cases of military contracting and off-shore drilling rights and rules (Adams, 1982; Vernon, et 
al., 1991). These networks or triangles play an important role in the process of developing policy 
by providing technical expertise not otherwise available to political decision makers.  
The scientific, market, and defense related knowledge provided by those outside of the legislative 
process are essential for sound decision making. Technical experts provide assessments of what is 
possible. Powerful market actors, provide valuable insight into the commercial viability of those 
possibilities. And the military sets the bar on the importance of substitution for national security. 
Each play an important role in a complex ‘Technical Enterprise’ (Fusfeld, 1986) that links 
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government, industry and academia and shapes the relationship between public policy and the 
behavior of ERD organizations that contribute to technological advance (Crow, 1988).  
When policies are drawn up to meet targets, they invariably rely on these inputs. However, the 
often contradictory nature of their positions, the wide time and financial gaps that separate 
possibility from feasibility complicate the process substantially and lead to acrimonious 
encounters between politicians and energy executives. Such was the case in a public 2006 US 
Senate hearing on rising energy prices when Senator Schumer faced off against Rex Tillerson, the 
Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil Corporation: 
“Sen. Schumer: … you have said, Mr. Tillerson, that you have no need, really, to 
pursue alternative fuels. OK? It seems to me your investment in alternative 
fuels, non-fossil fuel sources, is close to zero. Do you think that serves the 
public--first, is it? And second, do you think that serves the public interest as 
prices go up, up, up, up, up? 
Mr. Tillerson: Our investments in alternative fuel sources [are] in the area of 
technology. We do not see any of the currently available alternative-- 
Sen. Schumer [interrupting]: Technology on fossil fuels? 
Mr. Tillerson: Technology on alternatives, whether it be biofuels, breakthrough 
research on cellulosic conversion techniques, breakthrough research on 
other ways to commercialize coal, breakthrough research on, you know, on 
other sources of energy. 
Sen. Schumer: My time is limited, so what--how much did you invest in coal, the 
cellu--what is it?, cellu-what? 
Mr. Tillerson: Well, we are supporting— 
Sen. Schumer [interrupting]: How much did you invest in coal research? 
Mr. Tillerson: We are supporting breakthrough research at Stanford University. 
Sen. Schumer: How much did you invest? 
Mr. Tillerson: We committed $100 million to them over a period of time for work 
that they have under way. 
Sen. Schumer: One hundred million over how many years? 
Mr. Tillerson: Ten years. 
Sen. Schumer: That is $10 million a year. OK? How much did you invest in the 
biofuels? 
Mr. Tillerson: Well, that is part of that research— 
Sen. Schumer [interrupting]: That is part of the $10 million, OK. And how much did 
you invest in the cellulitic--I hope I am pronouncing it right. 
Mr. Tillerson: Well, Senator, I think your question is— 
Sen. Schumer [interrupting]: How much? 
Mr. Tillerson [continuing]: are we investing heavily in alternatives, and we are not. 
Sen. Schumer: You are not. 
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Mr. Tillerson: We are investing in technology and we are investing heavily in 
conventional oil and natural gas, which is the business we are in. We are not 
in those other businesses. 
Sen. Schumer: Right. OK. I just think the public ought to know how little. Ten 
million dollars a year in alternative-type fuels, when the price of fossil fuels is 
through the roof, to me doesn't seem to be serving the public. Now, you have 
a different view in terms of your shareholders, I understand that. But we 
have a public view.” (United States. Senate Committe on the Judiciary, 2006) 
 
The above dialogue is not atypical for the sometimes hostile public interaction between 
policymakers and market professionals, military staff, and leading members of the scientific 
community. However, it belies the fact that they are all intimately engaged in a mutually 
beneficial process where rules are made and funds are provided in pursuit of the public good. 
Despite the rants of politicians, the defensive justifications provided by industry, and the utopian 
or doomsday scenarios put out by competing advocacy coalitions, the process behind the making 
of energy policies in general and substitution policies specifically requires the cooperation, if not 
the consent, of all involved.  
 
2.2.4. Instruments 
Politicians can choose from an array of instruments in the broad domain of energy policy.39 Most 
are of the market intervention kind, such as taxes, incentives, efficiency standards, environmental 
controls, purchase obligations, and price fixing by utilities and quasi-governmental institutions 
(Prontera, 2009).40 More often than not, however, the use of such tools leads to a slow 
evolutionary enhancement of competition and a minor tweaking of consumer behavior. Following 
their successful implementation, the primary fuels previously used in the economy remain 
dominant; only the efficiency of their use has changed. This is because the effectiveness of most 
energy policy instruments are hindered by the fact that existing technologies are not particularly 
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 Several authors have studied the instruments available for specific subcomponents of energy policy. 
Tews, Busch and Jörgens (2003) and Sterner (2003) examine those for environmental and natural resource 
management respectively and Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan (2006) examine the use of financial instruments 
to lower CO2 emissions. 
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elastic in terms of the fuels that power them or the time it takes to achieve technological 
progress.41  
The substitution component of an internal energy policy is very specific and thus the instruments 
available are fewer, their targets are more precise, and their impact is more direct. They seek to 
introduce large amounts of alternative fuels into energy markets. Because those markets “are not 
now and never have been fully competitive and open” (Sawin, 2004:7), substantial and sustained 
intervention is required to achieve even the most modest goals. Very few instruments are likely to 
achieve such practical impact. Since logic deems that alternative fuels are uncompetitive because 
the cost of their production and use is greater than that of existing options, where substitution 
instruments are used, they will take specific legal or financial form and be designed to change the 
balance of products and prices in the market in favor of alternatives. They will incentivize and 
rebate the purchase of specific fuels and technologies, directly fund ERD and enhanced 
infrastructures, and in their most extreme theoretical form, prohibit the use of existing fuels and 
technologies.  
There are two classes of policy instruments for promoting fuel substitution. They are either 
financial or legal. They can occur as mandatory or voluntary, which in turn affects the time period 
in which we can expect to see a measurable impact. Legal mandates (regulations) are the most 
powerful policy instruments because they force compliance in relatively short period of time. 
Inducements or incentives can be helpful, but their voluntary nature limits their practical impact. 
Financial measures can result in immediate market changes if they apply to existing products and 
technologies, but only over the long-run if spent on developing new options.   
Financial instruments include taxes, inducements, penalties, and investments and can be either 
direct or supportive. Direct financial instruments target the competitiveness of substitutes in the 
market and include fuel specific tax hikes and reductions as well as subsidies and grants that 
immediately affect market prices. Supportive financial actions attempt to address the lack of 
substitute fuels in the market by paying for research, development, and deployment of new fuels, 
technologies, and infrastructures and by easing access to credit through, for example, low interest 
loan programs. While most direct financial instruments bias the market in some obvious manner, 
some are more subtle such as active payback systems (rebates) to consumers and industries that 
are willing to comply with certain voluntary targets, such as the installation of grid-connected 
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photovoltaic equipment or the installation of new windows in a home. Likewise, while most 
financial instruments are voluntary (one need not accept a loan or a rebate), taxation is always 
mandatory. 
Conversely, legal instruments are more obligatory than voluntary. They include regulations, the 
powers invested into oversight bodies, and changes in the distribution of authority. These in turn 
force consumers or producers to change the technologies they use, ease or complicate the 
granting permits and licenses, and enhance or restrict competition. One type of legal instrument 
is the Directive. Both the EU and the US have legal instruments called Directives, but they are 
similar only in name. In the EU, they are formal pieces of targeted legislation that order Member 
States to align legislation, although the method of implementation is left to the Member State, 
and together with regulations and decisions, are one of the most important instruments of 
supranational legislative authority in Europe. In the US, Directives take one of two forms. They 
either are requirements placed on executive agencies (often in relation to oversight activities) by 
Congress or executive orders of the President to his or her agencies.42 As where EU legislative 
Directives are always binding in some manner on some Member States, only those that are 
explicitly referenced in bills in the US carry and obligation (Dep. of Commerce, 2008).43 
Meanwhile, all directives ordered by the President are immediately binding upon all agencies and 
through executive orders.  
Irrespective of their different naming conventions, legal instruments do provide powerful tools in 
promoting substitution. They can be applied toward specific services, such as feed-in policies for 
electricity or transportation fuel mix requirements for ethanol and other biofuels, or more 
generally and indirectly by establishing conversion efficiency and environmental standards 
unachievable by existing technologies, thus initiating a market-wide switch toward a substitute.  
Deregulation and changes in the distribution of authority (decentralization, liberalization, and 
nationalization) push the responsibility of developing competitive substitutes away from existing 
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power and use of executive orders see Relyea (2008). 
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institutions under the assumption that current management or governance structures are the 
primary obstacle to market emergence or integration. In pursuit of enhancing competition, at one 
time or another both the US and the EU passed legislation breaking up powerful monopolies in 
their respective electricity sectors giving consumers the power to select their electricity 
suppliers.44 Another approach to competition is to tax both consumers and producers into 
behavioral change. This is precisely what the Netherlands did in 2001, when in order to expedite 
increases in alternative sources of energy, the government levied a large tax on fossil fuel based 
electricity driving many consumers to switch to providers that generated their power from 
renewable supplies.  
The instrumentalization of government intervention is a factor of the time period over which it is 
suppose to be effective. As a rule, both financial and legal inducements have short term affects 
unless the programs are permanent, and while investments will increase capacities over time, 
their affects can only be observed over longer temporal horizons. Likewise, most mandatory legal 
instruments such as regulations that set fuel efficiency standards are implemented slowly over 
long time periods to allow producers to bring upgraded vehicles to market and allow consumers 
the time to purchase them. They are often coupled with voluntarily accessible financial 
instruments such as tax breaks for purchasing new fuel efficient vehicles or low-interest loans to 
produce them. And both may apply either to the entire population or a specific focus group.  
Certain types of regulatory mechanisms such as deadlines and purchase requirements can impose 
product changes over time and force producers and consumers to spend parts of their disposable 
income. Requirements to switch to energy saving light bulbs, to procure new and more fuel 
efficient vehicles, or use more heat efficient building materials are all examples of such actions. 
Compliance in such cases may be voluntary for some period before mandates kick in and financial 
penalties in the form of fines or higher taxes are applied.  
Finally, governments can actively invest into infrastructure to support emergent technologies or 
provide an incentive for commercial investment and economic growth. The US interstate highway 
system, which took thirty six years of continuous investment to build (1956 to 1992) and was paid 
for by federal taxes on gasoline has led to a significant rate of return on aggregate economic 
growth and productivity (Mamuneas and Nadiri, 1996).45 Today, both the EU and US are investing 
                                                          
44
 Those choices are often limited by the continued dominance of local market providers. 
45
 The final leg of all routes originally planned in the US Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, a stretch through 
Glenwood Canyon in Colorado was completed in 1992. See Stufflebeam-Row, LaDow and Moler (2004).  
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in biofuel infrastructures. As of early 2010, the US had almost 2,100 E-85 stations.46 Germany had 
just over 330 and Sweden had over 1,200. In fact, since the city of Stockholm decided to purchase 
flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) in the 1990s, Sweden has seen the number of FFVs expand from around 
700 to more than 100,000 (Kroh, 2008).  
In order for ERD investments to have a noticeable impact, however, they need to be substantial 
and sustained. Since 1986, the EU has spent over €550 million in some 200 research projects on 
hydrogen energy technologies. In 2008, it agreed to a cooperative six year public-private effort to 
spend another €940 million to support the development of hydrogen-powered cars (Stearns, 
2008). The US has spent close to $2 billion since launching its national hydrogen initiative in 2003. 
However, by 2010 these investments only led to a few small demonstration projects across the US 
and EU.47 And projected estimates as to how much it will cost to convert the transport market to 
hydrogen fuel, for example, range between €10 billion, which according to industry advocacy 
groups would supply 70% of the vehicles currently on the road, to $500 billion to serve only 40% 
of light-duty vehicles according to experts from the US Argonne National Laboratory (Mintz, et al., 
2002). The fact is that direct financial investment into substitution technologies and fuels amount 
to the modern equivalent of a Manhattan Project. 
Used in combination, legal and financial legislative and executive instruments can create or open 
up markets to players and products otherwise excluded. The most recent occurrences have 
involved new markets for government sanctioned green certificates or Guarantees of Origin that 
allow utilities and customers to trade renewable energy production and/or consumption credits 
independently of actual electricity sales or use.48 Likewise, in the electricity sector, feed-in policies 
have been effective by requiring public utilities to purchase renewable energies at fixed prices 
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 See “Alternative Fueling Station Total Counts by State and Fuel Type” at the Alternative Fuels and 
Advanced Vehicles Data Center, US Department of Energy: 
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/fuels/stations_counts.html. Statistics are update regularly. 
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 There were 70 hydrogen refueling stations in Europe and 92 in North America as of early 2010. For EU 
hydrogen developments, see the EU’s Commission web page for research on fuel cells and hydrogen at 
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US see the previous note. 
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 Europe embarked upon a “test phase” of such a system between 2001 and 2002, but ultimately chose a 
system whereby Member States could sell or trade excess credits to each other based on statistical values. 
See: http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-renewable-energy-policy/article-117536. 
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from small producers. Several EU Member States (Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) 
recently have implemented such programs and Germany’s dates back to 1991.49  
Together with a package of voluntary incentives, mandatory regulations, and time dependent 
phase-in and phase-outs of certain technologies, substitution policies thus take generally blunt 
policy instruments and convert them into fine scalpels. Sustained over a longer period of time, 
such packages amount to an industrial policy, examples of which can be found in both the EU and 
the US where the promotion of ‘green industries’ are seen not only as mechanism toward 
enhanced autonomy or environmental stewardship, but also as structurally redistributive 
employment and economic recovery programs. 
 
2.2.5. Internal vs. external dimension  
The four components of internal energy policy (actors, institutions, processes, and instruments) 
interact in ways that largely are restricted to domestic politics. Either because of jurisdiction or 
self-interested motive, the actors and institutions involved in the process of energy policy making 
debate over the form and use of instruments almost entirely in an internal context.  
The main issues of debate in internal energy policies pertain to access and pricing of public goods 
(how much should we tax gasoline to pay for road repair, what should be the maximum price for 
electricity in our cities, should we build more nuclear reactors) and the mitigation of negative 
externalities (should we have a carbon tax, should we set pollution limits, where do we store 
radioactive waste). Likewise, legislated efficiency standards, executive ordered environmental 
standards, and local taxation are each bound to affect supply, demand, and prices in domestic 
markets in some way and thus cross the interests of virtually every domestic actor and institution. 
For this reason, energy policies are not only broad in scope; they tend to be vague in practice.  
The process of configuring energy policies is further complicated by the fact that elected, 
appointed, or approved officials in the US and the EU (and the various Member States in each) 
compete for access and control over a limited set of resources and programs. Power is divided 
among them and it is often disputed. In order for any energy policy to take hold, it requires not 
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only the consent of politicians, but also the compliance of a wide range of commercial players, 
advocacy groups, and the military. Often they will have contradictory goals. That makes the 
internal process very messy and subjects it to alteration under political and economic winds of 
change common in representative political systems.  
Still, because energy markets are globalized, internal policy choices will always have some degree 
of short-term external affect. More often than not, those affects are offset by long-term market 
factors exogenous to internal decision making. Short-term decreases in the demand for oil in the 
US or EU will drive down international market prices for some time, but only as long as all other 
buyers remain steady in their demand and suppliers do not reduce their production; a rather 
unlikely scenario given the very same globalization reasoning.  
Internal substitution policies on the other hand differ from general energy policies in two 
important ways. When successfully implemented, substitution affects the international market by 
permanently reducing dependency on or altogether delinking an economy from the specific 
globalized market, and thus enhancing political and military autonomy in international politics. 
This is not simply a matter of comparative or absolute advantage in economic terms, but rather a 
source of relative power gain in political terms. At this point the ideal switch to domestically 
produced alternative fuels is entirely theoretical as no country has yet achieved implementing a 
successful program in the transport sector, which ultimately determines the ability to project 
military power. However, the mere perception that substitutes can so significantly increase 
external power projection options and capacities enhances the role of those actors who are 
directly engaged in national security and foreign policy, in particular the executive agencies of the 
government and the military. Thus, substitution policies are driven by fewer actors whose stake in 
the process tends to be of a higher order than mere market or consumer players.  
The second reason is that support for substitution policies are directly caused by external 
conditions. The very notion of developing a substitute for an existing fuel occurs either because of 
the vaguely perceived danger of foreign dependence on a specific fuel or the specific specter of 
some foreign government using its control of supplies to harm one’s national and economic 
security. No matter how vocal issue-specific advocacy groups might be, the motive to finance a 
substitution program over decades does not depend on the popularity of environmental, social or 
even macroeconomic concerns. Substitution policies are not created and implemented to save 
the world, but rather instead and only in response to disruptions or the threat thereof.  
Thus substitution policies can be either dependent or independent variables in the relationship 
between internal energy policies and international outcomes. Their status depends on the 
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progress of internal substitution programs, the relative importance placed of the ability to project 
power abroad, and the price and availability of existing external supplies. Assuming that power 
projection is important, when substitutes are lacking and disruptions occur, internal energy 
policies will initiate substitution measures and governments will actively pursue external policies 
to secure external resources. Thus, in most cases substitution policies are dependent variables. 
However, once a substitute is in place and competitive with externally supplied fuels in the 
market, higher prices or disruptions are at least going to mitigate the need for immediate external 
action, which significantly lessens the likelihood of international conflict in the short-term. Hence, 
substitution policies become an independent variable that shape international outcomes by 
weakening the pull affect of external conditions.  
This dual internal-external quality of substitution policies is unlike any area of energy policy, 
including the use of large strategic reserves. Efficiency standards, environmental laws, and even 
carbon taxes have no immediate effect on the external behavior of states because they do not in 
any way alter the ability to project power. While such programs may make a country less 
dependent on a specific fuel or supplier, it will not eliminate nor even reduce the dependency to a 
degree that it can change the strategic necessity to secure foreign energy resources.  
Similarly, strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) are emergency response tools only. They are helpful 
in mitigating the immediate effects of supply disruptions. However, any event significant enough 
to require a drawdown is equally likely to force governments to act externally (either through 
diplomatic, financial and/or military means). Indeed, a country that is so desperate that it must 
tap its reserves literally faces a strategic energy dilemma. Notwithstanding temporary exchanges 
to commercial suppliers following accidents, the US has in fact drawn on its strategic reserves only 
three times, and as of August 2010, its 725 million barrel SPR could at best offset only 75 days of 
net imports.50 Whether that is enough to warrant increases or decreases in SPR purchasing 
activity or is a justifiable basis to spend billions on alternative fuels is a question asked by many 
actors and institutions engaged in the energy policy process and one that largely depends on their 
perspective towards external power projection. 
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efforts in response to Katrina, the actions could not stop prices from rising significantly. In total, 62 million 
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Finally, the links between internal substitution policies and external outcomes are measureable 
over time. Although the data is not conveniently stored in any single location, it is possible to tally 
the investments of governments into alternative fuels and technologies and compare substitute 
fuel and vehicle shares in the market over time. Likewise, we can measure fuel autonomy by 
tallying fuel costs published by governments, or where that information is not forthcoming, count 
the fuel consuming vehicles, vessels and warplanes in an arsenal and estimate their annual fuel 
consumption needs and then subtract from that available information on domestic production 
and stocks. This quantifiable information compliments a deep reservoir of primary sourced 
documents containing declarations, orders, and debate transcripts from legislatures and 
executive agencies of government. 
All of this rests on the assumption that changes in internal substitution policy occur in 
representative political systems only when external forces and conditions are perceived to 
threaten the national interest, in particular the domestic economic welfare or the ability to 
project power abroad, and when they are to some degree dependent on external suppliers. This 
will not be the case for all governments and political systems. In autocratic or non-market driven 
economies that are dependent on foreign supplies, substitution policies might flourish because 
they are deemed essential to regime survival and not power projection or even the general 
welfare of its population per se. And in countries where the export of energy resources is the 
primary base of national income, there will be no need for a substitution policy in the first place. 
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2.3. Intervening variables 
Energy’s relevance in international politics rests on the dual assumptions that states deem 
autonomy to be important and that most are to some degree interdependent on one another in 
the supply chain of energy resources. Thus the only scenario where energy could become 
irrelevant is one where the largest consumers become autonomous through the development of 
alternatives producible by all other players.  
Accordingly, consumer states should be expected put aside substantial financial resources to 
develop those alternatives in a sustained manner. Such is the purpose of internal fuel substitution 
policies. Likewise, until they have achieved this autonomous condition, they should prioritize 
acquisition of external energy resources with all the means they have at their disposal, including 
the threat and use of military force. However, this is not always the case. There is in fact an ebb 
and flow in the financing of internal substitution programs and the use of external tools of state 
power to secure energy resources; Why this contradictory vacillation?  
Two intervening variables explain the relationship between internal support for energy 
substitution programs and external state behavior. These are the price of a particular energy 
resource and the importance placed on supply availability of that resource for the purpose of 
power projection (SAPP) by the state or group of states in question. Prices can be measured in 
high or low terms and are usually linked to the actual availability of supplies, which in turn can be 
understood as free flowing or restricted.51 The importance of power projection to a state is 
independent from the actual international flow conditions of a particular fuel supply. In 
combination with perceptions about how current or future flows affect that capability, however, 
it can become a reason for action if not even a casus belli. 
Price, supply availability, and the importance placed on the latter for power projection are most 
relevant for those fuels upon which mobility is dependent.52 At present, fuels for transport are 
derived overwhelmingly from petroleum products. Therefore, in order to measure the effects of 
energy prices and perceptions of supply availability on internal energy policies and international 
outcomes, we must focus our study on oil. This does not mean that international competition for 
natural gas, coal, and Uranium is irrelevant, but rather that the ease by which they can be 
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 Prices could be high and the resource will flow freely in major producer countries where the resource is 
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century and is currently so for the Russian Federation. 
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 All energy commodities are useable for generating electricity and many for heat. 
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interchanged for the same utility decreases their explanatory power. Thus the focus is not on oil 
for oil’s sake, but rather for its utility value in transport, domestic economic well being, and 
external power projection. Natural gas may one day be the primary fuel for mobility, as coal once 
was. If or when that time occurs, we will be able to apply a similar method as we do here for oil.53  
 
2.3.1. Prices matter 
Oil prices matter because there is a negative correlation between oil prices and macroeconomic 
activity (Sauter and Awerbuch, 2003).54 It is particularly relevant in the area of transport where 
price swings immediately change the costs of virtually every good and service and thus determine 
to some extent disposable income and the cost of public policy programs. Hence, oil prices have a 
direct internal impact on policy choices and their costs.  
Like any other commodity, the price of oil changes with variations in scarcity or market control. 
The former applies to the balance of supply and demand; the latter to changes in the degree of 
monopoly.  
In its earliest decades, the world oil market was controlled by a single private monopoly (Standard 
Oil Trust). Up until 1910, the United States supplied as much as seventy percent of the world's 
demand and during World War II it provided six of the seven billion barrels of petroleum 
consumed by the allies (Mintz, 2010). Oil companies from the UK, France and Italy soon 
transformed that market into an oligopoly, but up until World War II, the global price of oil 
continued to be defined as the ‘US price plus freight’ (Adelman, 1995:4).55 For a period stretching 
over ninety years (1880 and 1970) scarcity was low. Supply far outstripped demand. Prices were 
cheap (never reaching $30 in 2000 prices). Government intervention was rare. Taxes were low or 
non-extant. And the market was controlled by a few major international suppliers.  
The oil market has changed drastically since 1970. Early in the decade most foreign held assets of 
European and American oil companies were nationalized by local governments. Those 
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 Hamilton (1983) first introduced the notion that a negative relationship between oil prices and 
macroeconomic activity exists; his most recent analysis is reflected in Hamilton (2008).  
55
 It is probable that they never would have been able to compete if it were not for the breakup of Standard 
Oil Trust as a result of the introduction of US antitrust laws. 
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governments, bound together in a cartel, set a floor on prices and tried to take control of the 
market. As a result, despite the addition of new discoveries, scarcity levels changed as markets 
became tighter.56 Control of the flow of supply into the market is now firmly in the hands of 
nationally owned corporations well outside the influence of Europe and the United States.  
Meanwhile, global demand has almost doubled since 1970 when the EU and US accounted for 
28% and 34% of oil consumption respectively.57 Today, the EU accounts for only 17% and the US 
for only 22% respectively. The list of major competitors has grown. China and India, each an 
emerging economic power in their own right, combined for 14% of global demand in 2009. That is 
phenomenal given that in 1970 they consumed just over 2% of global production. And along the 
way the average annual price (in 2009 dollars) has risen from just around $10 in 1970 to over $60 
in 2009.58 
As the world's most actively traded commodity, oil prices are set in international markets, and the 
vast majority of trades are in futures contracts. Three separate international benchmarks are used 
for pricing international crude sales, depending on market location and fuel origin. These are 
West-Texas Intermediate (WTI), Brent Blend, and Dubai. A fourth, the OPEC Reference Basket of 
Crudes (ORB), is used by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).59  
Benchmarks are important because they provide stability and add transparency to markets, but 
also because using one allows us to normalize data when evaluating the effect of international 
prices on states’ external behavior and internal investments into substitutes. The most heavily 
traded contract by volume is currently WTI futures, but such contracts only date back to the early 
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1980s.60 Records for WTI spot trades date back to the 1940s. Until the futures market in crude oil 
opened for trading in 1983, all trades were spot.61 BP (2010) publishes inflation adjusted averaged 
annual historic prices since 1861 where it uses Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura for values 
between 1945-1983 and Brent-Dated for values from 1984 forward.62 For purposes of 
consistency, we will use the BP historic data for annual average pricing and NYMEX future 
contract prices for purposes of forward speculation. 
Similar to the breakup of Standard Oil, the emergence of international majors and the rise of 
OPEC, the 1983 introduction of crude oil futures on the NYMEX transformed the international oil 
market. It permanently undermined OPEC’s price setting power by taking away the organization’s 
ability to determine who had “rights to a single barrel of oil” (Yergin, 1991:725) in what amounted 
to the final phase of an evolutionary shift in market control from monopoly to an open market. 
Futures contracts are now the primary price setting mechanism in the international oil market. 
Because oil is a consumption asset it has a significant cost of carry (storage costs plus financing 
less income earned). Under normal conditions, therefore, the futures price will be higher than the 
actual future spot price. But conditions are not always normal and predicting future spot prices on 
consumption assets as opposed to investment assets is problematic. In fact, Hull (2009:73) 
concludes that, “In the case of consumption assets, it is not possible to obtain the futures price as 
a function of the [current] spot price and other observable variables” (2009:76). Nonetheless, that 
does mean that there is no observable relationship.  
Silvapulle and Moosa (1999) argue that future prices have a sort of pull or ‘lead-lag’ affect on 
actual spot prices and Bekiros and Diks (2008) claim that this is because futures prices respond to 
new information quicker than spot prices. This may be true since a futures contract has lower 
transaction costs than spot trades because the former does not immediately fill inventories and is 
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flexible through the practice of short selling (the sale of a borrowed asset with the expectation 
that the asset will fall in value). Because such contracts can be executed immediately by parties 
with no intention of actually taking control of the oil, it also is an inviting venue for speculators 
and hedgers, who balance each other’s opposite goals.  
Hull provides a clear explanation of this balance, rooted in economic theory.  
“John Maynard Keynes and John Hicks, in the 1930s, argued that if hedgers tend 
to hold short positions and speculators tend to hold long positions, the future 
price will be below the expected future spot price. This is because speculators 
require compensation for the risks they are bearing. They will trade only if there is 
an expectation that the futures price will rise over time. Hedgers, on the other 
hand, because they are reducing their risks, are prepared to enter into contracts 
where the expected payoff is slightly negative. If hedgers tend to hold long 
positions while speculators hold short positions, Keynes and Hicks argue that the 
futures price must be above the expected future spot price. The reason is similar. 
To compensate speculators for the risks they are bearing, there must be an 
expectation that the futures prices will decline over time.” (Hull, 2009:76) 
Finally, the importance of futures extends beyond their price setting influence or their historic 
liberation of market control. They provide insight into the psychology of the market and the effect 
of known and unknown information on the outlook of investors toward a myriad of economic and 
political factors. As their name implies, futures incorporate imperfect information about potential 
developments. Hence, perceptions about the prospective implications of current events to some 
degree drive the price of oil. It is not merely a matter of supply and demand. 
Spot trades are still the most important marker for immediate decision making because their 
pricing is concrete evidence of the contemporary state of the supply/demand balance (scarcity) in 
the market. This is reflected in the fact that much of the volume of futures contracts look only 
toward the immediate future, a month or two in advance, and fall off sharply the more distant 
one projects into the future. However, the trade in crude oil futures opens a lens through which 
one can observe expectation and concern about the future state of that scarcity.  
Fears about the possible onset of hostilities and bad weather are just as valuable inputs as 
declarations about future production intentions by a major producer or poor economic data from 
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the EU, not to mention the actual outbreak of war.63 Some events cannot be predicted; it is 
impossible to forecast sudden natural disasters, major terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure, 
or the destructive force of seasonal Hurricanes, although, in the latter case, some cyclic drop off 
in supply is often assumed. Certain seasonal trends are commonplace.  
Likewise political conditions that are expected to lead to severe supply disruptions are often 
figured into the price long before the event actually occurs. Thus international market prices are 
valuable indicators of concern about the current state of the world’s affairs. This in turn 
complicates internal and external policymaking.  
Externally it affects policymakers by raising the transaction costs of any possible future military 
action or economic sanction. On one hand it positively influences states to choose inaction or 
appeasement in order to keep prices steady or low in defense of their domestic economies. On 
the other, it negatively influences the choice to resort to armed intervention by raising the fuel 
costs of any such operation.  
Internally it directly affects substitution programs because from the moment that the market 
becomes aware of a government’s major investment into alternatives, it will figure that into the 
future price of oil. Unless a project and its costs are conducted under maximum secrecy à la the 
Manhattan Project or Sputnik, traders will factor in expectations about future technologies and 
their effect on both supply and demand. Ceteris paribus, the closer that policy gets to achieving 
success, the quicker oil’s futures and expected future spot prices will decline, reducing or even 
eliminating the economic impetus to continue supporting the program. 
 
2.3.1.1. When prices are low 
When oil prices are low, governments in large energy consuming nations should be less likely to 
invest substantial resources in developing alternatives. This is because it is difficult to justify 
allocating huge sums of public money to fix a problem that either does not exist or is beyond 
decision making horizon of elected officials. Also, from a political economy perspective, low prices 
are indicative of markets that are working either efficiently or at least to the benefit of the public 
at large. Thus it is equally unlikely that governments would take concerted action to intervene in 
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those markets, based on the assumption that intervention is bound to unleash unknown forces 
that may drive up prices. 
In addition to its negative effect on support for internal substitution programs and domestic 
market intervention, conditions of cheap oil should also reduce the impetus for interstate 
cooperation in the same areas. Following the maxim “if it's not broke, don't fix it”, states are not 
likely to act in concert with others if there is not a clear and present need to do so. In fact, 
because cheap oil lowers the material costs of power projection, it increases the perception of 
liberty to act as an autonomous agent on the world stage, allowing states to pursue other foreign 
policy goals that might otherwise be considered too risky or costly. 
Finally, the effect of low prices on economic activity (as measured in GDP growth) is not as severe 
as that of high prices (Sauter and Awerbuch, 2003). In their study of seven OECD countries, Mork, 
et al. (1994) found that while the positive economic effects of oil-price decreases vary between 
some and none in industrialized states, increases have a consistently negative effect.  
 
2.3.1.2. When prices are high 
When oil prices are high, governments in consuming nations should be more likely to invest 
substantial resources in developing alternatives. This is because the strain of high prices on the 
domestic economy justifies allocating huge sums of public money to fix a clear and present 
problem.64  
There is strong quantitative evidence linking sudden spikes in oil prices and government monetary 
policy responses to negative macroeconomic output. Hooker (1996) and Hamilton (2003) found 
that following a 10% spike in oil prices, GDP growth declined by between 0.6% and 1.4%. In their 
study of 14 European countries Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia (2003) found that the negative 
effects of upward swings (5% and 10%) peak at around six months after the shock and that 
recovery can take up to three years.65 
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 This is obviously not the case for large producing or net exporting states that depend on oil revenues for 
the lion’s share of their national budget such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, each of which would 
welcome high prices as a boost to their economic fortunes.  
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 For a recent assessment of studies examining the relationship between oil shocks and macroeconomic 
activity see Jones, Leiby and Paik (2004). 
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Also, because high prices usually occur in tandem with restricted flow of a resource 
internationally or because global markets are tight, i.e. the margin of spare capacity has been 
reduced, the problem is often identified as originating externally. Thus it is equally likely that 
governments will take concerted action to intervene in internal markets, based on the assumption 
that through such intervention they can reduce the domestic costs of the fuel by temporarily 
reducing or eliminating taxes, providing subsidies, or even setting or capping prices. 
Just as low prices have a negative effect on support for internal substitution programs and 
domestic market intervention, conditions of expensive oil should enhance the impetus for 
interstate cooperation in these areas under the rubric of ‘energy security’. We can expect that 
states will be more likely to act in concert with others precisely because there is an immediate 
need to do so. And finally, since expensive oil amplifies the material costs of power projection, 
and thus constrains the liberty to act as autonomous agents on the world stage, we can expect 
that states will see cooperation as a more cost effective way to seek individual foreign policy goals 
than when prices are low.  
In sum, if price was the only determinant factor in explaining internal substitution policies and 
external behavior, we should expect to see the following: 
Low Prices   Less Investment into substitutes 
  Reduced impetus for international cooperation 
 
High Prices  Substantial investment into substitutes 
  Increased market intervention 
  Increased international cooperation and/or conflict   
Price is not, however, the only factor. When prices are low, resources tend to flow freely. But 
when disruptions and market tightness restrict flows, prices logically rise. When that happens the 
salience of energy supply availability for the purposes of power projection becomes a determining 
factor. 
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2.3.2. The salience of supply availability for power projection (SAPP) 
‘Supply availability’ and ‘supply availability for power projection’ (SAPP) are not the same thing. 
The former refers to the actual or perceived flow of resources internationally. It is largely a matter 
of the balance between supply and demand or production and consumption, and is an important 
factor in economic planning and trade relations. The latter refers to the importance placed on the 
availability of supplies by states for purposes of maintaining military advantage over others and 
their ability to use armed force as an instrument of foreign policy. It is an essential component of 
the equation behind state behavior. It is not merely a matter of ‘securitization’ in the 
constructivist sense.66 It is a real material fact that determines the ability to wage war. 
By power projection, we specifically refer to the capability to change the behavior of other states 
through some sort of coercion in order to secure state interests on the world stage. Since supply 
availability is vulnerable to disruptions of pipelines and maritime bottle necks, those with the 
capability and the political determination to secure the steady flow of resources are likely to use 
whatever means are at their disposal including diplomatic and economic agreements and the use 
of armed force. The need to access a fuel resource as a means to project force can be labeled 
supply availability for power projection (SAPP). It is a variable which alters the path of external 
policy outcomes.  
The status of SAPP will vary significantly between states. This is because power projection is not 
equally important for all players; nor must it always imply the use of force. In absence of the 
ability to employ hard power assets, however, third parties are less likely to succumb to pressure. 
Thus, those states that prioritize power projection are likely to invest more resources into military 
capabilities, which in large part are determined by the availability of fuels necessary for mobility. 
This makes the prioritization of power projection an essential component of state approaches to 
the steady supply of energy resources and may explain which states are more or less likely to 
resort to conflict when faced with disruptions.  
Furthermore, SAPP can be understood both as an actual or perceived condition. Sudden and 
actual supply reductions have immediate, if only short-term effects. Following the onset of the 
Suez Crisis in late 1956, for example, the UK and Germany were forced to introduce severe 
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 Securitization in this sense means the legitimization or enabling of the use of force in the name of 
security. For a detailed discussion of the concept of securitization see Buzan, Wæver and Wilde (1998). 
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rationing programs, limiting individual access to gasoline and fuel-oil deliveries up to 20%.67 
Similarly, during the winters of 2006 and 2009 Europe experienced significant declines in natural 
gas deliveries as a result of disagreements about transit fees between Russia and Ukraine.  
Most of the time fears about supply availability are projections based on the perception that 
supplies are or will become restricted in the near or medium term. In the market, this is revealed 
through futures contracts. In politics, it is visible in the political dialogue and the budgets invested 
into both the deployment of forces to protect fuel shipments and investments into substitute 
fuels. In this regard one might conclude that energy has simply not yet been ‘securitized’ to the 
extent necessary to cause affected governments to change their SAPP priority. And when they do, 
they would then be more likely to resort to military measures to secure their interests. But this 
suggests that energy by itself is not an issue of national security, unless it is deemed as such, and 
this simply is not the case. The availability of energy supplies is and always has been an internal 
economic and political security issue. Its specific place in the projection of power has been a 
hallmark of the geopolitical balance of power only since the early twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, it seems logical that that most discussions about supply availability are limited to 
market based approaches. Restricted flows and high prices usually occur simultaneously or with a 
slightly delayed effect, the result of tightness in the market and limited spare capacity of 
producers to ramp up production in times of immediate need. When faced with these flow 
restrictions, markets will quickly find a settlement price to reflect the new state of scarcity.  
Government reactions to swings in supply availability depend on more than just the price of a fuel 
because those swings change the material costs of internal economic and external policy 
activities. Governments that place a high salience on SAPP cannot ignore the negative impact of 
high prices and restricted flow on their military capabilities.  
Energy’s specific value to the military is located in its centrality to projecting force in a world 
where comparative military advantage largely determines the balance of power; and the mobility 
of forces largely determines the ability do so. Transport fuels are essential for transferring forces 
and arms to theatres of war and regions of heightened concern. Without their steady supply, air 
forces would be grounded, mechanized equipment immobilized, and troop deployments would 
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 A detailed description of the measures taken by European governments was reported by Time Magazine 
in the early weeks of December 1956.  
See: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,808686,00.html>. 
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take far too long to be relevant. In any supply constrained situation, governments will lose the 
ability to project force, rendering them vulnerable to attack and reducing their relative power 
position vis-à-vis others.68 This in turn can drive states to act unilaterally with very uncertain 
outcomes; and hence, makes the perception of SAPP a political game changer in world affairs.  
Finally, prioritizing supply availability for internal economic stability is distinctively different than 
prioritizing supply availability for the purposes of power projection. While it seems logical that 
every government prioritizes supply availability to some extent and thus pursues some degree of 
cooperation to secure their interests, only those that place a premium on relative power in the 
world would be willing to exert to force. This is because their relative military power itself is 
dependent upon mobility to be effective. Hence countries with higher military budgets should be 
more likely to prioritize securing the flow of energy resources than those with lower budgets. The 
null hypothesis here is that a country with no military or security budget would never be able to 
engage in force projection, let alone prioritize it.  
 
2.3.2.1. When SAPP prioritization is low 
States that place a low priority on SAPP should have relatively small military budgets, be less likely 
than those with higher SAPP priority to respond with force to disruptions and threats to supply, 
and invest substantially less in substitute fuels. The assumption here is that the desire and ability 
to project power are connected and visible through military activity. This does not mean that 
governments which minimize power projection in the traditional hard power sense do not pursue 
other means of influence, such as international rules and regulations, or in the EU context 
specifically, rule export. It does suggest, however, that they will not spend the resources 
necessary to able to do so unilaterally if and when the need arises.  
Those with a low SAPP should almost never resort to international force. Instead they will choose 
either to do nothing (i.e. leave the securing of supply availability to the market or others) or seek 
cooperation through negotiations, depending upon the prevailing price. The variable in this case is 
not the importance of energy, but rather the importance of relative power and the maneuverings 
of a state to maintain or alter its position vis-à-vis others. Hence, when the priority to project 
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 This is not to say that the economic fallout of a severe disruption is irrelevant as it surely is painful for 
most consumers. However, its effect on the military poses a greater long-term risk to national security by 
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power is low, the options of external action will be limited to diplomatic and commercial 
negotiations. 
Finally, in terms of internal investments into substitute fuels, it is not immediately clear whether 
low SAPP contestants would be more or less likely to sustain their efforts when supplies flow 
freely. What is clear is that their militaries will play a lesser role in the process than in high SAPP 
priority countries. They also should be more likely to pool their resources in cooperative research 
programs in an attempt to reduce their foreign dependence on a specific fuel irrespective of its 
general availability and flow. In all likelihood, their efforts will be very visible and public because 
the matter does not fall under the rubric of national security and because the economy-centric 
orientation of such states would make open markets the preferred platform for seeking 
alternatives. Despite their public nature, however, the financial resources invested should be 
significantly less in countries with low rather than high SAPP priorities. 
 
2.3.2.2. When SAPP prioritization is high 
States that prioritize SAPP should have robust military budgets, be more likely than those with a 
lower SAPP priority to respond to supply threats with some application of force, and in 
combination with conditions of high prices, also be more likely to invest larger sums of money 
into the research, development, and deployment of substitute fuels. The assumption here is that 
a high salience of power projection will be reflected in significantly higher military budgets as a 
percentage of GDP. This does not mean that governments which maximize power projection in 
the traditional hard power sense will not pursue diplomatic means or eschew cooperation in 
general, but rather that they will spend substantially more resources to allow unilateral action if 
and when the need arises.  
Those with a high SAPP should not only be more ready to resort to force, they should actually 
apply that force more frequently and over greater distances, even when the resource or location 
in question does not play a significant role in fueling their military capabilities, such as when they 
deploy forces to protect oil conduits that supply allies or are designed merely to deter aggressive 
actions of other states. This is because high SAPP countries perceive themselves as engaged in a 
global competition for relative power and see the projection of force as the primary means by 
which they can either maintain the status quo or promote a revisionist strategy. Because such 
states prioritize their relative position with respect to other states in the international system, 
unilateral external military action is always more likely than reliance on universal cooperation or 
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market mechanisms.69 Although cooperation and negotiation may be preferable and less costly in 
blood and treasure, doing nothing may be tantamount to forfeiting a leadership role. 
For similar reasons, high SAPP contestants should always invest substantially more resources into 
substitute fuels than their low SAPP counterparts when perceived or actual conditions of supply 
constraints exist. This is logical because they have much more to lose if supplies are in fact 
disrupted. Where disruptions will certainly create economic hardship for both low and high SAPP 
countries, the latter may also lose its ability to project power and hence reduce or lose its 
ordering position in world affairs. As a result, militaries in high SAPP countries can be expected to 
play a visibly more important role in substitution programs than in low SAPP countries. And given 
that political support for alternative energy research will fluctuate with prices over time, the 
military in such countries should be the most stable supporter of research into alternative 
transportation fuels. That is, even when prices decline and political support wanes in the economy 
at large, the military should continue to support such programs.  
Finally, high SAPP salience should translate into an activist foreign policy that prioritizes both 
substitution and securitization of energy issues. This may lead to international cooperation in the 
form of substitution research and joint military exercises. But it can equally lead to unilateral 
actions and the refusal to cooperate if such cooperation requires any reduction in material 
military or industrial capabilities.70 
 
2.3.2.3. The combination of prices and SAPP  
Prices and SAPP interact to determine external outcomes. Since prices and SAPP can be either 
high or low and supply flows can be either free or restricted, they can be combined into a total of 
eight ideal configurations. However, because flows always refer to international movements and 
prices are measured on international markets (the two are intimately linked), we can exclude two 
combinations each of restricted flows and low prices and free flows and high prices respectively.  
If we were to focus at a different level of analysis, say domestic market prices, then self sufficient 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and its Emirate neighbors, which can keep domestic prices low 
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 It is precisely in the context of perceived need to maintain or expand industrial capacity that most 
international agreements over climate change have run into difficulties. 
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through subsidies or proximity to well heads, could be seen as operating under conditions of 
restricted international flows and either high or low domestic prices. Both place a low priority on 
SAPP. Thus they could constitute the combinations LP-RF-Low-SAPP and HP-FF-Low-SAPP 
respectively. Likewise, countries such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, each of which is self 
sufficient in oil supplies and places a relatively higher priority on SAPP would constitute 
reasonable examples of LP-RF-High-SAPP and HP-FF-High-SAPP conditions.   
That leaves four remaining configurations that would be applicable to states that are not self 
sufficient in terms of oil. Since we can assume that prices and flows will negatively correlate, we 
can say that there should be two variable sets (HP-RF and LP-FF) that can combine with high or 
low SAPP and that any of these four combinations should lead to different outcomes. But we can 
whittle our list even further when we consider the logic of these four combinations.  
SAPP is only really relevant when prices are high and actual or perceived flows are restricted. 
Irrespective of its salience, the combined condition of low prices and free flows predicates a 
reduced incentive for states to take any international action, be it of a cooperative or conflictual 
nature. There simply is no good reason to spend human, material, or financial resources to secure 
resources that are cheap and freely flowing.  
Such conditions must not decrease the probability that high SAPP states will execute military 
operations in pursuit or relative power gains in general. It may even increase their activities 
because the fuel costs of doing so are cheaper. But the explanatory power of SAPP in predicting 
their actions, i.e. the causal factors involved, cannot reasonably be linked to the price or flow 
status of the resource any more than the general pursuit of power itself.  
Therefore, the specific combination of LP-FF with high or low SAPP is not particularly helpful in 
understanding the role of energy in external behavior. Instead, we can take the LP-FF condition as 
a common block and assume that as far as energy supplies are concerned, states of either ilk will 
pursue passive and non-interventionist strategies. Under such conditions both will do little to 
nothing. Meanwhile, under conditions of high prices and restricted flow, different outcomes will 
depend on SAPP prioritization. When SAPP is low, cooperation should always be the result and 
when it is high conflict should become more likely. The three relevant combinations of price, flow 
and SAPP are represented below in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Price, flow, and SAPP 
 
 
2.4. Outcomes 
Three possible outcomes or external strategies emerge from the combination of domestic 
substitution programs, prices, supply flows, and the salience of supply availability for power 
projection. These are the Market-Commodity Approach, Cooperation, or Conflict. Depending on 
prevailing conditions governments are likely to change their strategies accordingly. 
 
2.4.1. Market-Commodity Approach 
The Market-Commodity Approach (MCA) is a minimalist, Laissez Faire, strategy whereby 
governments eschew any action that might alter or disrupt the free functioning of international 
energy markets. They can be identified by a low securitization and general lack of cooperation on 
energy issues. Inherent in such a strategy is the assumption that markets are the best mechanism 
to allow for the continuous and secure supply of energy resources. It also assumes that 
substitutes will be developed by opportunity seekers in the market who are willing to gamble that 
particular commodities may price themselves out of the market opening new avenues of income 
for products that are currently uncompetitive.  
Still, some cooperation may occur. But like any action, it will come with a price tag. Thus under 
MCA strategies governments may agree to coordinate strategies, such as build up domestic 
strategic reserves or even finance some research into substitutes. However, the actions largely 
will be focused internally. Reserves will be built up and drawn down not for the purposes of 
sharing internationally, but rather for domestic emergencies alone. And financing for substitution 
programs will be significantly lower than under high price conditions. 
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2.4.2. Cooperation 
Cooperation is largely, but not exclusively, a strategy of peaceful interstate coordination. It is 
most likely to occur when prices are high. Under high price and restricted flow conditions there is 
a clear impetus to take action. Diplomatic agreements, rule export, and coordinated interventions 
in the market will be its most common manifestations. The most visible example is the 
International Energy Agency and the EU’s Energy Charter. However, depending on the severity of 
price and flow pressures, it can also lead to coordination of joint military maneuvers and security 
operations to secure vital energy transit choke points and pathways. 
Unlike the Laissez Faire policy of Market-Commodity Approach (MCA) where governments 
eschew action that might disrupt the free functioning of the market, cooperation can take the 
internal form of coordination between the government and private sector, such as specialized 
subsidies, tax breaks and other hidden tariffs. Because such actions can be understood as 
protectionist, they usually lead to interstate negotiations in order to harmonize or balance the 
independent actions of other states.  
Cooperation is likely to focus in some way on mitigating the negative effects of prices, reducing 
the risks of disruption and in the extreme coordinating responses to disruptions such as the 
transferring of strategic reserves in times of emergency. Inherent in a cooperative strategy is the 
assumption that energy markets are imperfect in that they fail to allow for the continuous and 
secure supply of energy resources at affordable prices and that substitutes will not be developed 
by opportunity seekers in the market. Therefore, market intervention is assumed to be required 
and in order to spread the risk of that intervention, cooperation is chosen over doing nothing or 
choosing conflict. 
High-level government to government contacts and agreements (both bilateral and multilateral) 
reveal attempts to either increase cooperation or, in response to miscues or events, to mitigate 
heightened tensions. Diplomatic activities can be measured in the size of embassies (staff and 
budget), the number of high-level state visits and receptions, the negotiation of treaties, and 
engagements in energy related international institutions.  
In terms of substitution policies both high and low SAPP countries are more likely to invest into 
the research, development, and deployment of substitute fuels under the same conditions that 
cause cooperation. However, in countries where SAPP is prioritized, the investments should be 
substantially larger. 
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2.4.3. Conflict 
Conflict includes a broad category of disputes that can range from simple disagreements to 
outright war. We can assume that differences in energy related needs, uses, and choices 
necessarily lead to differences in interests and desired outcomes between states, thus creating 
conflicts where otherwise they would be absent. Inherent in the occurrence of conflicts is the 
assumption that markets have either failed or are about to fail to deliver stable supplies at 
affordable prices. Also assumed is that peaceful resolution through negotiation and cooperation 
will be or has become ineffective.  
Conflicts are most likely to occur under conditions of high prices and restricted flows. Disruptions 
are the most obvious trigger, but heightened concern about possible future disruptions are 
equally likely to motivate high SAPP countries to prepare for hostilities by moving forces into or 
near vital theatres of operations in order to deter perceived threats to the steady flow of supplies. 
At present, there are armed international fleets guarding the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, 
Strait of Malacca, and the Gulf of Aden precisely for this purpose. 
While the quality of the relationship between states (ally, rival, or enemy) surely shapes the 
nature of conflicts when they arise, alliances can fail, enemies can become friends and rivalries 
can turn into unions or all out wars. It seems logical to assume that when the ability to project 
force is threatened and hence autonomy restricted to the point that it is perceived to be an 
existential threat, states will respond in a military manner. Examples of this may include sudden 
responses to inter alia the immediate cessation of fuel deliveries by a highly important supplier or 
the closure of routes to deliver them. 
In terms of substitution policies, conflict outcomes should have the greatest impact. Countries 
that prioritize SAPP may be more likely to fight to secure the flow of an existing fuel, but for 
similar reasons, they also are likely to invest substantially more in substitution programs than 
those that minimize SAPP. Indeed, in the former the military itself can be expected to play a lead 
role in financing and providing a strategic market for substitutes because doing so as rapidly as 
possible minimizes the risks of future disruption to its ability to project force. 
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2.5. General assumptions 
Based on the model presented so far we can make several assumptions about autonomy and 
substitution, intervening variables and outcomes, intervening variables and internal policy, and 
the relationship between all three. Since the latter provides an overall picture of our model, we 
will begin there. 
2.5.1. Overriding assumption linking internal policy, outcomes and intervening variables 
2.5.1.1. Assumption 1: A feedback loop exists between internal substitution policies, 
intervening variables and external outcomes. 
Every external outcome has a feedback effect on internal substitution policies, which in turn 
revises the importance of supply availability for power projection over time (Figure 2 below). This 
is because the combination of prices, supply flow and outcomes enhance or decrease the need 
and impetus to legislate and invest in substitution programs. 
When prices are low and a resource flows freely the momentum of substitution programs lose 
speed as their legitimacy is reduced. There simply is no economic need to tax existing fuels or to 
subsidize alternatives. Nor is it politically astute to do so in a political environment where voters 
often make electoral decisions based on personal economic imperatives. Thus it is logical to 
assume that there is an inverse relationship between government intervention in supporting the 
emergence of substitutes and the time that prices of existing fuels remain low. 
Conversely, as prices rise, the political inertia against government intervention decreases. The 
longer prices remain high and flows are restricted, the more likely it is that both the public and 
private sectors will invest into alternatives. The degree to which they succeed in developing and 
deploying domestically produced substitutes in turn reduces the need to secure fuel supplies 
abroad.  
The graphic below implies an ideal type representation where cooperation includes both 
interstate coordination and internal government-private sector collaboration. It does not exclude 
the tendency among states to maintain sovereign control of their energy mix. Indeed, 
independent states will always strive to maximize their autonomy, and that is in fact the ultimate 
goal of substitution policies. Rather, the implication here is that high prices/restricted flows 
should always lead to either cooperation or conflict and never to the MCA approach, which is the 
closest equivalent to a Laissez Faire policy. While it is theoretically possible that governments 
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could eschew cooperative opportunities to reduce their overall energy costs, it seems contrary to 
logic to assume that they would do so willingly in the face of higher costs. 
Figure 2: Feedback loop of internal-external energy policy 
 
One important caveat bears mentioning. The timeframes involved in the feedback loop between 
internal substitution policies and external outcomes are long. Whether measured in years or 
decades, the time it takes to develop and deploy substitute fuels and transform or exchange 
existing technologies to use them will extend far beyond the relatively short-term crises that 
originally caused the policy change. Where the intervening variables should have immediate 
impact on outcomes, the effects of both on internal policy can be observed only over broad 
temporal horizons.  
 
2.5.2. Assumptions about autonomy and substitution 
 
2.5.2.1. Assumption 2: Energy autonomy is the underlying purpose of substitution policies  
The primary purpose of internal substitution policies is to increase the level of energy autonomy 
vis-à-vis international markets and suppliers, which in turn is directly connected to the 
prioritization of securing supplies for power projection purposes. Most states are dependent in 
some way on foreign energy supplies and thus vulnerable to disruptions.71 Either they import 
fuels or, if fully self sufficient depend on trade with others that place a premium on the access to 
such resources. Mitigating and ideally eliminating that vulnerability is not only popular politically, 
it directly enhances national security. Indeed, without the strategic goal of increasing autonomy 
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based on an ideal target of achieving complete energy independence, there would be no strategic 
rationale to invest substantial resources into developing and deploying costly alternatives. 
There are other reasons to invest in substitutes, but they seem insufficient. Climate change and 
economic progress are two good examples. Substitutes may mitigate climate change. However, 
the actual extent of environmental externalities caused by the production of alternative fuels (et 
al ethanol, biofuels, and even hydrogen) and electricity are unknown and untested. If developing 
these substitutes requires the increased involvement of external producers or reduces self 
sufficiency in agriculture, political support is likely to drop off quickly precisely because it 
increases rather than reduces external dependence. Similarly, policies aimed at structurally 
changing the economy by introducing ‘green industries’ certainly will result in higher investments 
into alternatives. But without sustained high prices of existing fuels, the market is unlikely to 
cooperate voluntarily without substantial and sustained government intervention. This is a 
serious problem because governments are particularly fickle with public resources.  
 
2.5.2.2. Assumption 3: Long durations of cheap prices reduce concerns about supply availability 
and sap support for substitution programs 
Long periods of cheap prices are likely to sap support and reduce the stress to develop substitutes 
because even slight declines in price (like that between the early and mid 1980s) are likely to be 
misinterpreted as synonymous with positive changes in supply. However, price declines are more 
often than not the result of a decrease in demand, not an increase in production or even the 
perceived long term availability of supplies.72 Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that long 
durations of cheap prices translate into reduced concerns about supply availability. 
If left entirely to the market, the development and deployment of alternative fuels will take a very 
long time. The investments required are far beyond the capacities of any single company and the 
rollout of such technologies can only be planned over decades. It is simply impossible to upgrade 
or exchange the majority of existing privately owned combustion engines to use exclusively or 
even partial mixes of biofuels in a matter of few years. Thus when prices do not remain high for 
very long, it is reasonable to assume that that companies will be unlikely to invest resources into 
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these resources are significantly higher than easier fields and global demand is continuously rising. 
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uncompetitive alternatives unless governments require them to do so or provide opportunities to 
make alternatives more competitive by investing in alternative infrastructures and providing 
subsidies.  
Oil prices since 1861 reveal that they have tended to be either high or low, with very little middle 
ground. Using inflation adjusted figures of $2009 the average price of oil between 1861 and 2009 
was $28.64, within which the price was below the average more than twice as often as vice versa 
and only exceeded the average for longer than two years on four occasions. Periods of cheap oil 
tend to last twice as long (10 years) as expensive oil (5 years) and most high price periods lasted 
for only two years or less, way too few to justify a serious investment into alternatives (See Table 
1 and Figure 3 below). The two most recent spikes were from 1989 to 1992 and 2000 to 2009. 
Hence, assuming that oil supplies are not about to disappear, time does not work in favor of long 
term investments into alternative fuels. 
Table 1: High/low periods of oil prices (P) since 1861 
P < Average  Duration P(Average)   P > Average  Duration P(Average) 
1861 1862 2 17.06   1863 1873 11 64.10 
1874 1875 2 24.18   1876 1877 2 49.96 
1878 1894 17 19.37   1895 1896 2 32.62 
1897 1898 2 21.83   1899 1900 2 31.85 
1901 1919 19 19.35   1920 1920 1 32.86 
1921 1973 53 14.91   1974 1985 12 63.79 
1986 1986 1 28.25   1987 1987 1 34.82 
1988 1988 1 27.06   1989 1992 4 32.88 
1993 1999 7 23.67   2000 2009 10 53.47 
Total Years 104       45   
Average duration 11.6       5   
Source: (BP, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 3: High oil prices and durations 1861-2009 
 
Source: (BP, 2010) 
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2.5.2.3. Assumption 4: Achieving total energy autonomy is an ideal possibility 
Although unlikely in the short term, the achievement of complete energy autonomy is by no 
measure impossible in the long run. Before the advent of petroleum most countries were entirely 
energy independent. It seems logical to assume that at one point in the future they will be again. 
In fact, the longer the period where a resource remains expensive and is perceived to be 
vulnerable to disruption, the higher the priority will be to act both externally to secure their 
steady flow and internally to develop and deploy alternatives. 
The post 1974 concentration of extended periods of expensive oil indicate that supply availability 
is in fact becoming more restricted and more expensive with time (see page 70). In its first 
hundred years, a barrel of oil cost $24.13 on average. In the last fifty it averaged $36.60 and in the 
last twenty it average almost $40. This means that the maintenance of military dominance in the 
world is becoming more expensive and thus increasing the need to adopt measures that reduce 
those costs if political autonomy is to be secured. 
In an ideal situation, prices remain high for a time period such that domestically produced 
substitutes can enter the market, become competitive and satisfy all domestic demand for the 
primary fuel. This would result in total energy autonomy and reduce the value of SAPP to a point 
approaching null, thus removing any link between international energy prices and external 
conflict. 
Each time that a conflicts occurs the process will be accelerated in sudden and short term spurts, 
but when countries revert to Market Commodity Approach the process will be decelerated, if not 
reversed. Since conflicts do not occur perpetually and throughout most of its history the price of 
oil has been well below its overall average (see page 70) the evolution toward energy autonomy 
can be expected to be slow, arduous and uneven where long periods of relatively affordable and 
stable prices reduce the momentum toward substitutes (see Figure 4 below).  
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Figure 4: Diagrammatic representation of the path toward energy autonomy 
 
 
2.5.3. Assumptions about intervening variables and outcomes 
2.5.3.1. Assumption 5: The importance of SAPP should be visibly evident 
The importance of SAPP is directly related to the mobility of military assets, economic goods and 
services, and the control over key routes that allow states to pursue those ends. Because existing 
energy resources are unevenly distributed, regionally concentrated, and increasingly being 
developed offshore, certain geopolitical indicators should reveal the extent to which state 
prioritize supply availability for power projection.73  
The SAPP prioritization of states should be visibly evident through domestic military and 
diplomatic budgets, through their physical engagements on the world stage, and official 
declarations about energy security, a political euphemism for maintaining the free flow of primary 
resources. Where available the annual fuel budgets will be particularly telling. Less specific, but 
nonetheless informative is the number of geographically distinct deployments (both military and 
diplomatic) in areas that are either transit or source points of transport fuels. To a lesser extent, 
but still relevant, is aid in the form of grants and loans and the supply of war materials and 
training to important resource-supplying countries.  
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 Classical geopolitical thought stemming from Mahan (1890) and Mackinder (1904) hold that there is a 
permanent struggle between land and sea powers. Egypt through its control of key rivers, Athens versus 
Sparta, Rome versus Carthage, and the Spanish and British quests for world empires exemplify the 
importance of maritime power as where Germany and Russia are classic examples of land-based heartland 
centered powers. Pape (2004) explains the added importance of air power. 
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We can assume that cooperation and conflict outcomes will occur in areas where there are 
transnational pipelines, maritime choke points, and resource concentrations both on land and at 
sea.74 Since there are only a few key passages through which much of sea-borne global trade 
flows, we can expect to find there higher concentrations of military deployments by states that 
prioritize SAPP. We should be able to observe similar deployments on or near land where primary 
fuels are produced.  
 
2.5.3.2. Assumption 6: low prices and free flows, always lead to market commodity approaches 
irrespective of SAPP 
Large net energy importing states are likely to adopt a Market Commodity Approach during 
periods of low prices and free flows because there is reduced impetus to take any sort of action. 
As long as there is no perception of an impending supply crunch or disruption, there is simply no 
reason to seek conflict or even any heightened degree of cooperation. Doing so might change the 
outlook on the market, raise prices and thus result in higher transaction costs for every sort of 
government action, be it internal or external.  
We further may assume that the absence of stress to secure the flow of supplies is a prerequisite 
to such as a strategy. As a consequence, under such conditions, MCA strategies will be adopted by 
governments irrespective of their prioritization of supply availability for power projection. While 
some states (those that place a premium on power projection in general) may still pursue 
aggressive actions on the international stage because they are interested in increasing their 
relative power positions, they would be doing so for reasons that have little to do with the specific 
availability of energy supplies.   
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 Pipelines are concentration in the land based zones of Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Mediterranean Basin states, the East Asia landmass, and North America. At sea, there are five natural trade 
choke points (Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandab, the Bosporus/Turkish Straits, and 
the Strait of Gibraltar and two constructed ones (the Suez and Panama Canals). 
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2.5.3.3. Assumption 7: Disruptions (actual and perceived) lead to conflict only under high SAPP 
salience 
In terms of energy supply availability, we can assume that actual disruptions or the perception 
that disruptions are imminent or forthcoming will lead to conflicts only when they affect at least 
one net energy importing state that places a premium on power projection. No state with a low 
SAPP priority can reasonably be expected to initiate hostilities, choosing instead either to adopt a 
strategy of cooperation or leave the business of conflict to an ally. Logically, countries that place a 
high priority on SAPP will have larger militaries and fuel budgets and thus feel the cost of any 
disruption in its ability to maintain or increase its relative power. Thus, conflicts will only be 
initiated by countries that have both the capacity and the resolve to do so.  
In fact, not only are such states inclined to use force more frequently and earlier than low SAPP 
countries, they also are more likely to eschew cooperation and pursue unilateral actions. The 
need to satisfy supply availability for power projection has caused several countries that prioritize 
SAPP to initiate or prepare for conflicts in the past century. Most actions have been of a deterrent 
nature, but at least one explicitly targeted the free flow of oil to the military in pursuit of relative 
power positioning. In 1956, the UK and France, both of which considered fuel supplies for their 
navies as a vital to their ability to project power and reflective of their great power status tried 
and failed to seize control of the Suez Canal.75  
 
2.5.3.4. Assumption 8: Disruptions lead to cooperation when SAPP salience is low 
Contrary to the case when SAPP salience is high, countries that place a low priority on SAPP are 
likely to cooperate as a result of disruptions or under conditions when concerns about disruptions 
are heightened. Such countries should place a lower priority on power projection. Thus they will 
have smaller military budgets.76 This does not mean that countries which place a premium on 
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 According to Immerman (2006), the action also provided an impetus for Soviet Union to crush the 
uprising in Hungary for fear of losing it along with Egypt and changed the attitudes of France and the UK 
toward the US, driving a wedge in Atlantic Alliance. As where the severe economic hardships incurred by 
the UK in the crisis led the future UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to declare, “We have to stop because 
the economy is going to collapse” which, according to Owen (2006b) resulted in a British decision to never 
again to “fall out of step” with the US, France took the opposite track and prioritized cooperation with 
Europe. A year after the conflict subsided, France joined Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands in forming the European Economic Community (EEC) while the UK sat on the sidelines. 
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 An important caveat: military spending does not necessarily equal military strength. 
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SAPP will eschew cooperation at all times, but rather that they are more likely to pursue conflict 
when fuel supplies are at risk and are less likely to exhibit patience in letting cooperation run its 
course. Even in the extreme event that low SAPP countries are forced into conflict in some 
manner, such as joining a naval fleet to secure vital transit pathways, they will always choose to 
pool their resources, rather than act unilaterally. And given the complexity and risks associated 
with cooperative military efforts, they thus can be expected to almost never resort to force.  
It is safe to assume also that because low SAPP countries have reduced military expenditures, 
their militaries play a lesser role in the formulation of external policies and are less present as a 
tool of foreign policy. Therefore, the impact of fuel disruptions, while equally felt by the military 
will be more severely recognized within the economy at large, which inevitably will lead to market 
intervention. And because fuel markets transcend borders and unilateral military action in such 
countries is rarely considered an option, let alone feasible, the impetus to coordinate market 
interventions between consumers will be strong. Logically, disruptions will more severely affect 
those economies with a higher and more concentrated external dependence than those with a 
diverse set of suppliers, but this too will lead to cooperation among low SAPP countries as they 
work to spread their diversification across a wider group of consumers. To a certain extent this is 
the notion underlying strategic reserves. But it is also the underlying notion to developing what 
the EU calls its ‘internal energy market’. 
It is important to mention that the notion that a country actually can have a low salience of power 
projection is a relatively recent development. Until the end of World War II, it was widely 
assumed that every country places a premium on their relative power positions, and when they 
did not, it was only because they were held in check by other powers. The advent of the EU and 
other cooperative international institutions reveal the growing explanatory power of different 
cultural understandings of power itself. In comparing the EU and the US for example, Kagan 
(2002) refers to a growing gap in perceptions about the merits of diplomacy and force, an 
argument that highlights the role of power perception and projection in international outcomes 
and suggests that power projection remains highly salient in the US and significantly reduced in 
the EU.  
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2.5.4. Assumptions about intervening variables and internal policy 
2.5.4.1. Assumption 9: Lower salience of SAPP equals less investment in substitute technologies 
Countries with a lower salience of supply availability for power projection can be expected to 
invest less in developing and deploying substitute fuels than those with a higher salience. The 
reasons for this are similar to those that explain why low SAPP countries are more likely to 
cooperate under actual or threatened disruptions. The two most important are that they have 
fewer costs for military adventures and will tend to cooperate in research activities, thus 
spreading the costs of development. This should hold true even when prices are high and flows 
are restricted, and even when disruptions occur or are perceived to be forthcoming.  
Because militaries play a lesser role when power projection is downgraded, one can safely assume 
that they will have smaller fuel budgets, which will be reflected in fewer available financial 
resources and market opportunities for the corporate and scientific institutions that they 
contract. It is safe to assume that in highly salient SAPP states, the military is the largest, 
coherently organized, consumer-driven financer of substitution fuel research. While the energy 
departments of national governments and related directorates in international or supranational 
institutions also fund research, they are not end consumers and are not likely to be able order 
volumes to satisfy the risk of investing in the research in the first place, which in low salience SAPP 
countries largely depends on commercial market demand even if it may be driven to a limited 
extent through government intervention.  
Also, because public support for such programs will ebb and flow with the price of the fuel that is 
supposed to be substituted, those involved in the research face the risk of either losing their 
funding or never finding a market when prices change. Meanwhile, when the military pays to 
develop and deploy a new fuel, there is a much higher certainty that it will end up purchasing 
large orders. This higher certainty in terms of future sales all but guarantees a higher level of 
interest and rate of return by those in the private sector charged with developing the substitute in 
the first place.  
Therefore, overall public outlays into substitution fuels will be lower in countries where the 
salience of SAPP is low rather than high even under conditions of where prices are high and flows 
are restricted or disrupted. 
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3. Testing the Model 
Before proceeding to test the model, one important caveat bears mentioning. Comparing the US 
and the EU poses serious challenges. They are, after all, very different institutions. The former is 
for the most part a united entity, a single international actor with a strong central government. 
Despite all its efforts at cooperation, the latter is not. The most important decision makers in the 
EU are the Member States. In the US, the most important actors tend to be in the federal 
executive; although even this is not always the case and largely depends on the issue at hand and 
the conditions at play. In terms of the tools of foreign policy, the two are also very different. Since 
1941, the US actively has fielded a large and united military force and used it for not only national 
defense, but also the extension of its political will. While some EU Member States have done the 
same to lesser degrees, the EU does not, and some might argue cannot, field such a force. 
On the energy front specifically, the two are even harder to compare. For as much as half of the 
modern history of oil, the US was the world’s leading producer, consumer, and exporter. It was 
entirely self-sufficient. The history behind that development created animosities and alliances in 
the US that are central to the country’s political dynamic. The EU and its Member States never 
had the luxury of surplus oil. When a few individual Member States did achieve petroleum self-
sufficiency through discoveries at home, they could not maintain it for long. The rest needed to go 
out and get it and usually relied on government support. The same is to a large extent true of 
natural gas.  
Further, the US emerged as a world power only in the twentieth century as where the UK, France, 
Germany, Spain, Portugal, the Netherland, and not too long past, Austria, were all major world 
powers across the previous centuries. Easy access to energy was the core ingredient of the US’ 
rise. Conversely, energy was a factor in Europe’s disintegration into both World Wars. Finally, the 
evolution of energy policy in the EU and US has not been documented to the same degree. Many 
of the conversations, internal debates, and even certain supply data have been published in full 
only recently by the EU. Before that many of its states, either out of national security reasons or 
lack of need published very little. The opposite is the case in the US.  The US Freedom of 
Information Act (1966) has brought to light such diverse records as telephone conversations, 
cabinet meetings, and embassy communiqués. Further, Congress has exercised its power over the 
years to require the Federal Government to publish historical, current, and projection data. It is 
thus a great deal easier to document with certainty what US policymakers were thinking, when 
they thought it, and how they planned to achieve it. Indeed, the EU and US are two vastly 
different units that in many ways defy reasonable comparison. 
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Despite their dissimilarity, the two are, nevertheless, comparable in several aspects. When 
combined as a whole, the EU is equal if not larger in physical and economic dimension than the 
US. Both units (or in the case of the EU its subunits) have nuclear weapons. Both can field large 
military forces, assuming there is a need and will to execute action. Both are major importers and 
consumers of petroleum and have been for much of the post-World War II era. At the core of 
both economies is transportation and mobility. In the problem area of diverse and competing 
energy mixes of Member States, they are similar in that those mixes apply to the whole and not 
its parts, which tend to act independently according to their available resources. In the electricity 
mix, for example, France relies on nuclear power and Germany relies increasingly on natural gas; 
and Member States use various mixes of coal despite supranational efforts to reduce it as a group. 
Likewise, in the US, big states like Illinois, California, and Texas get more electricity from oil than 
from natural gas or coal while the important electoral swing state of Ohio relies on coal for more 
than 85% of its electricity. Where there are highly influential state-owned companies, so-called 
national champions, in EU Member States, there also are powerful corporate interests, albeit 
privately owned, and state or regional regulatory bodies in many US Member States. There also 
are similarities in the internal balance of power between large and small Member States. There is 
little doubt that Texas, California, and New York are in many respects just as influential in 
determining US policy at the domestic legislative level, as France, Germany, or the UK is in 
determining the internal workings of the EU. Finally, while the EU executive certainly is weaker 
than its US counterpart, treaty obligations do oblige Member States to cooperate in areas of 
trade, and increasingly in matters of foreign policy. In fact, one might argue that having many 
Foreign Ministers simultaneously pursuing common interests abroad can be more affective in 
achieving targeted goals than being limited to one.  
For the reasons identified above, the validity of the comparisons below will always be subject to 
the fair criticism that the US and the EU are incomparable at the unit level. One cannot in good 
faith discount such a critique. However, by assuming that there are in fact common grounds for 
comparing energy policies, the exercise may broaden our understanding of the feedback loop 
between the internal energy policy and the external behavior of large players in the international 
system of states. It is the suggestion of this thesis that such a comparison and analysis can be 
achieved by looking at energy.  
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3.1. The politicization of energy 
The very existence of internal and external energy policies are, in fact, recent phenomena. In 
order to compare them it is useful to understand some of the common roots and key points of 
divergence as they emerged. Across the preindustrial age, energy was a communal good, neither 
excludable nor particularly subject to rivalry. The widespread availability of wind, water, and 
wood made the issue of supply availability too insignificant to be considered essential for power 
projection. Europe’s great powers (and subsequently the US) relied almost exclusively on animal 
and muscle power for economic production and mobility, and timber for heat.77 By modern 
standards, trade and power projection were extremely expensive78 and energy was not a political 
issue.  
Between Holland’s mastering of wind and biomass power in the seventeenth century79 and the 
advent of the gasoline-powered combustion engine in the early twentieth century a series of 
scientific advancements in the use of energy resources lowered the costs and increased the speed 
of transport. It also transformed economies and political powers and increased the role of SAPP as 
a determinant factor in international affairs. Already by 1900, energy had evolved from a 
universally accessible asset to a highly competitive marketable good, in part because of political 
choices made by governments to pursue better and faster means of transport. Coal and iron had 
become the core components of economic and military power. And just a few decades later, oil 
would take its place in solidifying the role of energy as a strategic good. 
Energy emerged as a relevant internal political factor in the industrial age, particularly through the 
inventions of the coal-driven steam engine and the electric generator. Gross (1971) sums these 
developments up succinctly:  
“The substitution of mineral fuel for wood and charcoal and of steam for water 
power was not only the most general component of industrialization, in the wider 
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 For an historical account of preindustrial energy use see Smil (1994) and Reynolds (1983). Detailed 
studies on the preindustrial uses of energy in England have been produced by Fouquet and Pearson (1998) 
and Peter Bowden’s "Statistical Appendix" in Finberg and Thirsk (1967).  
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 Eckel (1920) estimated that the cost of moving a “ton of anything” anywhere in 1750 was around $0.50 
cents per mile (or circa €2.3 per kilometer at today’s value). Today prices vary depending on the means and 
commodity of transport. However in 1998, for example, shipping “anything” by water cost on average $.007 
per mile, by road $0.25, and by air $0.59. For details of cost estimates and models see Ballou (1999). 
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 Holland’s advancements in the use of wind power on land and sea allowed it to specialize its economy 
and dedicate its population to productive labor, while hiring mercenaries to fight its wars. For a detailed 
history of the Dutch Golden Age see de Vries (1974). 
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sense of the term. It also was a prerequisite for the growth potential of firms and 
industries in many instances, among them such strategic sectors as iron and steel 
or overland transportation.” (Gross, 1971:898)  
In rapid succession over the course of a single century, these inventions led to the developments 
of railroads, steamships, widespread illumination and mechanical power, mass transit, telegraphy, 
telephony, and the radio. And they also transformed the external behavior of states through their 
effects on military science, where the advent of these new technologies initiated a revolution in 
naval tactics and strategy. Steam became a substitute for wind to power ships and did so first and 
foremost by increasing their speed. 
By enhancing the speed of military vessels, the introduction of the steam powered warship 
increased power projection capabilities and set off a mid century arms race between Europe’s 
great powers (Brodie, 1969). The process began with France’s introduction of the first ocean-
faring ironclad in 1859. The UK quickly followed suit with the first all-iron high-speed steam 
warship a year later (Sondhaus, 2001:73). Shortly thereafter, European powers Austria, Italy, 
Russia, and Spain began developing their own coal driven fleets. And over the next twenty years, 
this new intra-European competition driven by the pursuit of political and military power resulted 
in rapid advancements in engine design, increased efficiency of coal use (Beeler, 2001), and 
heightened competition for control of the high seas, a domain that had been dominated by the 
UK for much of the previous century. Indeed, the Royal Navy considered the advancement of 
other European navies to be so threatening to its supremacy that it adopted the so-called 'two-
power standard' whereby it committed to build and maintain a coal and then later an oil-driven 
fleet larger than the combined forces of the next two largest navies (Parkes, 1990).80  
The embedding of coal into the calculus of naval supremacy changed the strategy of naval combat 
itself. During the age of sail, naval strategies largely amounted to blockades of ports. But because 
steamships only could carry a finite amount of fuel, enemy fleets had to be attacked in harbor as 
soon as possible before fuel supplies were depleted, a problem first experienced by the French 
navy when it attempted to blockade Wilhelmshaven in 1870 at the onset of the Franco-Prussian 
War.81 Cheap and universally available wind was not only obsolete by the turn of the twentieth 
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 For a detailed depiction of this and other steam warship battles, see Sondhaus (2001). 
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century, it had been replaced almost entirely by coal, the control and the technology of which had 
become central to naval power projection. 
The introduction of electricity had equally profound political and military implications leading to 
communication technologies that dramatically shortened the time it took to make decisions and 
accelerated technological development in virtually every industrial process. By 1896 electric 
generators were being fitted onto ships, not just for illumination, but for mechanical control of 
gun turrets (Hammond and Pound, 1941:253) and shortly thereafter for wireless telegraphy 
allowing vessels to coordinate maneuvers. By the onset of World War I, such features were 
commonplace on naval vessels in virtually every major fleet. Meanwhile, commercial generators 
began powering residential and industrial services in London, Paris, New York, and Berlin.82 
Electric lighting was quickly adapted to the mining, textile, steel, and printing industries. In Paris, 
it powered the elevators of the newly built Eifel Tower in the 1889 Exposition Universelle. A year 
later it was used for the city’s trams and by 1900 electricity was powering its public subway 
system (Soppelsa, 2009). Only a few years later everything from stoves to sewing machines to 
cranes was powered by electricity. Just like coal, it had become a marketable and competitive 
commodity and its use was becoming so ubiquitous that it was emerging as a public good.   
The rapid growth in demand for electric power led to the construction of multi-megawatt steam-
driven generators, sparking further technological revolutions in turbine technologies, which led to 
even greater advances in the transportation and military sectors83 and accelerated the evolution 
of mass production and developments in the iron industry, particularly steel production. Because 
of the latter’s greater strength, buildings and armaments could now be constructed with much 
less material, altering the art and business of weapons production, and permanently binding 
economic and political power with the production of coal and steel.  
Massive increases in energy consumption followed. Between 1840 and 1913, for example, UK, 
consumption of coal in the shipbuilding and railroad industries increased 3,500 percent to 32 
million tons (Fouquet and Pearson, 1998). And it pitted producers against one another for control 
of Europe’s booming markets. By 1900, the UK and Germany were Europe’s largest producers of 
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 Edison’s plants were opened in 1882; Humphrey Davy (1808) and Michael Faraday (1831) had previously 
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 For details of early turbine development, see McDonald (1962) and an example of how energy 
transformed the big city (the case of Chicago) see Platt (1991).  
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coal and France was one of their most competitive markets (Fremdling, 1995).84 Where a century 
earlier, the world’s great powers were energy independent, by 1918, France and much of the 
continent were increasingly becoming dependent on Germany and the UK for their primary fuels; 
and together with the US, the three were the only remaining energy independent industrialized 
economies.  
Where the European switch to coal was explicitly connected to the power projection capabilities 
of its great powers, the American drive for coal in the latter half of the twentieth century was less 
tied to military power projection than to basic internal development. Economically far behind its 
European counterparts and emerging from a destructive civil war (1861–1865), the country’s 
westward expansion heavily relied on the development of railroads to create new trade and 
transport routes. Tracks were laid systematically in accordance with coal deposits, which in turn 
set the foundation for a highly efficient coal production and distribution infrastructure. According 
to the US Department of Energy, between 1880 and 1918, the country quadrupled its thirst for 
energy and by the end of World War I, coal fueled some seventy-five percent of its energy needs, 
all of which was produced domestically.  
The biggest breakthrough for the politicization of energy was, however, the discovery and use of 
oil as a transport fuel. Although the existence of petroleum had been known for millennia, it was 
not until advances in chemistry in the mid-nineteenth century made it possible to distill kerosene 
from the product that it began to serve the purpose of industrial and communal lighting.85 
Enormous finds in the US, allowed the country to quickly corner the global market in illumination 
oils replacing coal-derived gas and whale oil. In short order the US became the world’s largest 
exporter of the product, a status it would maintain well into the twentieth century.  
The use of oil would soon dominate the transport sector and take its place as the primary fuel for 
the world’s most powerful navies. As chemical distillation processes advanced, oil began to be 
used to drive vehicles powered by internal combustion engines. On land, these new engines and 
their backers pushed electric cars out of the recreational market.86 Within a matter of only a few 
years, oil had become the dominant transport motor fuel. From a technological perspective, 
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 The US was the largest worldwide. Fremdling provides a detailed analysis of the Anglo-German rivalry to 
control Europe’s coal markets between 1850 and 1913. For a handling of coal use in the Austria and 
Hungary between 1831 and 1913, see Gross (1971). 
85
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Europe led the way in producing automobiles and aircraft engines until Ford introduced the 
Model-T in 1908. Within twenty years, millions of oil powered cars were driving on US and 
European roads and these new engines were being fit into mechanized war vehicles, from tanks 
to airplanes.87  
The parallel entry of motorized vehicles and electricity took different paths in Europe and the US 
that would be reflective of future approaches. Although motor vehicle technologies were evolving 
at an exponential rate with faster and more powerful engines coming out of small European 
production houses, their presence in the US quickly dwarfed that of Europe. By 1929, three 
quarters of the world’s cars were located in the US, one car for every five Americans. By 
comparison, there was only one for every 30 persons in France and the UK, one for every 102 in 
Germany, and one for every 6,130 in the Soviet Union (Yergin, 1991:208-9). Nye (1999) suggests 
that the reason for the large difference between the US and Europe in adopting the automobile 
lies in the fact that Europe had long since developed densely populated urban centers allowing for 
greater use of intra- and inter-city railways to service its urban population. The same argument 
explains Europe’s much more rapid advance over the US in installing and using electricity. Denser 
populations make electricity distribution easier to provide universally and politically much more 
difficult to deny on a commercial basis. Thus, where electricity services remained under private 
control in the US, they quickly became a public service in Europe. 
Figure 5: European electricity production , 1900-1925 
 
Source: (Mitchell, 2003:562-3) 
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Figure 6: Motor vehicles on European roads, 1900-1925 
 
Source: (Mitchell, 2003:735-8) 
 
Table 2: Imports of petroleum in selected years and countries in thousands of metric tonnes 
 
 
France Germany UK Italy 
1905 117 959 1172 67 
1913 117 1034 1907 150 
1923 352 492 5158 349 
1930 3857 3271 9076 739 
1938 8293 4986 11849 1682 
Source: (Mitchell, 2003:487-97) 
 
 
The next major politicization of energy was set into motion against the backdrop of Europe’s 
increased competition for naval supremacy. Just as rumors began to emerge that Germany was 
developing oil-powered ocean liners, Kaiser Wilhelm dispatched a gunboat to Agadir amidst the 
second Moroccan Crisis in 1911.88 Fearful of losing the advantage of speed over Wilhelm’s fleet, 
the UK responded by converting its fleet from steam to motor engines and its fuel from coal to 
oil.89 As Admiral John Fisher advised Winston Churchill, “The first of all necessities is SPEED, so as 
to be able to fight-When you like, Where you like, and How you like” (Yergin, 1991:155).90  
The policy was at odds, however, with the UK’s domestic resource endowment. The problem was 
that it had no domestic sources of oil. At the time, the US was producing two-thirds of the world’s 
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oil. Thus, once the decision was made to switch fuels, acquiring oil became the government’s 
highest priority and over the course of following decades, it led to a national security policy to 
acquire and control oil and the routes to deliver it. Departing from centuries of non intervention 
in the markets, the UK government initiated an approach to directly invest in a privately owned 
commercial venture to explore and control oil far beyond its borders and by 1914 had acquired a 
51% stake in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. As in the developments of iron armor and coal, its 
European competitors quickly followed suit.  
What previously was a competition for naval supremacy had now become a global struggle to 
control the supply of fuel. The UK and the Netherlands were best positioned for this new race to 
globalize what Rockefeller had coined the “Great Game” given their expansive territorial 
holdings.91 And they would be successful, ultimately forming two of the world’s largest integrated 
oil companies (Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Persian) which in only a few years (by 1920) would 
control approximately half of the world’s proven reserves.  
Across the Atlantic, the abundance of oil led to the opposite effect, spurring an adversarial 
relationship between government and the oil industry, with the former seeing the latter as a 
threat to fair play, open competition, and national sovereignty. In the late nineteenth century, the 
US was emerging as a global industrial power and oil was literally bubbling out of the ground. But 
most of the country’s production was controlled by a single company, the Standard Oil Trust, 
which had anything but a cooperative relationship with the government. It is noteworthy that the 
same year (1911) that the UK decided to consolidate control of foreign oil, the US Supreme Court 
decided to break-up Standard Oil’s control of domestic resources, a move that marked the 
beginning of anti-trust laws that are a vibrant part of modern regulatory economies.  
The rapidity of oil’s ascendance as a substitute for coal is a remarkable feature of the politicization 
of energy resources. Oil industry executives had already expanded outward to secure new 
reserves in foreign countries.92 The increasing need for foreign oil amplified the strategic value of 
key maritime transit routes to ship fuel from Asia and the Middle East to Europe. By 1892, the 
world’s first oil tanker (the Murex) had transited the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the Italo-Turkish War 
(1911-12) and the two Balkan Wars (1912-1913) highlighted the impending breakup of the 
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Ottoman Empire. Italy won Libya and Rhodes as new colonies and the former would become a 
vital source of European oil, while the remainder of Ottoman holdings would soon become the 
target of European oil barons. These new events further increased the geopolitical importance of 
Europe’s colonies and the territories of the Ottoman Empire and raised the profile of the Caspian 
littoral states as a source of oil for Germany and Russia.93 In the Wars that would follow, coal and 
then oil would become bound with iron, steel, and conflict as wartime strategies increasingly 
focused on supply lines and security of fuel and war materials.  
By the onset of World War I, oil already had solidified its position in the national economic and 
political systems on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe’s navies were switching from coal to oil 
rapidly; the US took a little longer to start, but the transformation was well underway by 1925. 
Before the interwar period came to close, the international competition for oil had become a 
matter of the highest political order. Consumption had risen so much that even the US was 
beginning to import small amounts to make up for domestic demand.  
Concerns that reduced oil supplies could endanger national security and power projection 
capabilities already were on the rise in the early twentieth century. They became palpable during 
World War I. French Prime Minister George Clemenceau highlighted these concerns in a 
November 1917 telegram to US President, Woodrow Wilson, where he wrote: 
“At the decisive moment of this war, when … major military operations get under 
way on the Western Front, our armies must at no time lack the fuel required for 
our military trucks, for our aviation, for our mobile field artillery (...) France must 
possess the gasoline that will be as necessary as blood in tomorrow’s battles” 
(Bérenger, 1920:59-60) 
Oil was growing in importance, particularly with respect to military mobility, but it was still only 
one aspect of the issue. The struggle for control of iron and coal resources in the Rhineland was 
equally important as a definitive component of World War I’s Western Front. In the opening days 
of hostilities, Germany occupied the steel-industry-rich areas of Belgium and Luxembourg, and 
took just enough French territory to control three quarters (30 out of 41 million tons) of the 
latter’s 1913 coal production (Jensen, 1968). In the subsequent months (July-September 1914), 
annual German-Austrian coal production rose from 355 to 420 million tons and allied production 
declined from 405 to 375 million tons (Eckel, 1920:78-0). By Autumn, member of France’s 
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government were calling for the “the destruction of German industrial power through … the 
annexation of the Rhineland’s coal regions” in particular the Saar (Henze, 2005).94  
By the end of World War I, it had become abundantly evident that energy resources were a 
“critical element in the balance between war and peace” (Singer, 2008:75) and oil was emerging 
as the key component. As Sassi (2004) observed, “The First World War demonstrated powerfully 
and unequivocally that oil was an essential strategic product for armed forces, both land- and sea-
based.” The combined control of oil, coal, and steel was now almost synonymous with national 
security. Recognizing this, France used the Treaty of Versailles to secure almost all of 
southwestern Germany's metallurgic industry, annexed Alsace and Lorraine, and German-owned 
property was sold to French buyers with the proceeds returned to France as reparations. For 
France, Germany, the UK and the US, supply availability for power projection had become a top 
priority and driver of external behavior.  
The shift was not only sudden; it was also volatile, particularly in reference to petroleum. 
Immediately following the war, concerns that oil was running out sent oil prices higher (from 
$1.98 in 1918 to $3.07 in 1920 in nominal values) and sparked a nationalist driven global struggle 
to control the remainder of world’s known oil reserves (even initiating claims that oil could be 
extracted from shale deposits and artichokes).95 Because most easy oil was located within the 
boundaries of their vast colonial holdings, France, Holland, and the UK were particularly well 
poised to win this new competition and they took advantage of it by initially excluding each other 
and the US from exploiting their respective territories.  
As part of the Versailles peace settlement, both France and the UK won interests in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company (TPC).96 In 1920, the UK and France agreed in San Remo to divide the vast oil 
reserves of Mesopotamia between them (building on their secret 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement to 
divide up Arabia). The US, which saw its influential companies being excluded, responded by 
passing the Mineral Leasing Act, the country’s first update since 1872, restricting foreign rights to 
drill for American oil unless equal access was provided to American companies. Meanwhile, 
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France, which had recovered TPC shares previously held by the Deutsche Bank, formed its first 
national oil champion, the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) in 1924.  
It soon became clear, however, that transatlantic cooperation in exploration was necessary, 
particularly with respect to the financial and technical means required for successful exploitation. 
That recognition led to a flurry of diplomatic and commercial negotiations resulting in European 
and American cooperation in exploiting the reserves of the Middle East. In 1928, European and 
American companies would cooperate to form the Iraq Petroleum Company97 and over the course 
of the next ten years, international oil prices remained volatile, but never exceeded two dollars. 
The immediate inter-war energy crisis had been avoided, but a new and far more ominous one 
was about to begin. 
World War II witnessed a repeat of the struggle for the Rhineland’s vital resources. After Germany 
swept across France in 1940, it re-annexed Alsace and Lorraine and used its resources for its 
expanding military dominion. It also witnessed the first explicit evidence of restricted SAPP (while 
costs of the fuel were relatively low) causing the development of internal substitution programs.  
In 1938, Germany consumed a relatively moderate 44 million barrels of oil annually, of which only 
3.8 million barrels were produced domestically.98 More than half of its needs came from overseas 
imports (28 million barrels) while an additional 3.8 million barrels came from European sources 
(mostly from Romania) and the remaining 9 million were produced synthetically from coal (United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1945).99 When the war began, Germany had a total of 15 million 
barrels of oil in stock. Although it would add 5 million barrels by seizing fields in Norway, Holland, 
Belgium, and France and import another 5 million from the Soviet Union between 1940 and the 
Summer of 1941, it was estimated that because its monthly military requirements were around 
7.25 million barrels, its “stocks would be exhausted by August 1941” (Becker, 1981).100  
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The termination of overseas oil imports at the start of the war so significantly endangered 
Germany’s ability to conduct warfare that terminating its treaty and invading the Soviet Union to 
“gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, together with … Donets coal” 
became an attractive if not necessary option (Becker, 1981). While Germany would later try and 
fail to seize fields and refineries in Grozny and Baku, Romanian fields continued to supply 
Germany well into the war until allied air raids destroyed much of their refining capacity.101 
Germany also began developing its own fields and following annexation of Austria ultimately 
boosted its internal output to 12 million barrels by 1944 (Birkenfeld, 1964:217). However, it was 
Germany’s development of synthetic fuels that made the difference and reflected Hitler’s desire 
to make Germany energy independent (Petzina, 1968:36). 
Using hydrogenation, Germany tried to master the art of turning coal into high-octane gasoline, 
useable in all its military vehicles and particularly its air force. At the start of the war, Germany 
had seven plants in operation producing almost 5 million barrels of petroleum fuels and planned 
to build enough capacity to produce at first 36 million barrels by October 1938 and 68 million by 
1943 (Birkenfeld, 1964).102 Germany was never able to achieve the high end of its goals and did 
not build a single new synthetic aviation fuel plant after September 1939, but between 1938 and 
1943, it did match the 36 million mark, and the substitute fuel constituted about half of its needs 
by 1943 (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1945:74). Interestingly, the war also caused a 
reverse or retro-substitution in 1942 when Germany was forced to introduce a plan to switch 
vehicles from liquid to solid fuels amounting to some 8 million barrels of savings by 1943. 
Although these developments came too late to save the German war effort, the importance 
placed by Germany on its substitution program highlights the changes that had occurred in the 
previous decades. Energy resources, and liquid fuels for transport in particular, had become 
essential to power projection. And Germany’s pursuit of alternative fuels demonstrated that 
internal substitution both affected and were affected by external events.  
German Field Marshal Erhard Milch summed up this condition in 1943 by declaring that 
Germany’s hydrogenation plants “are our most vulnerable spots; with them stands and falls our 
entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will 
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stop running if the hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked (Becker, 1981).103 His vision 
was prophetic. In May of the next year, the allies attacked those plants, putting a final end to 
Germany’s substitution program and its ability to wage war.  
By the war’s end, the politicization of energy was almost fully complete. States that had once 
eschewed intervention in markets in general now saw such intervention in the energy sector as 
natural as taxation. Even the US, previously adverse to public-private cooperation, was convinced 
of the necessity for coordination and in 1946, President Truman requested his Secretary of 
Interior to establish a quasi-public body “to assure coordination in peace-time of the Federal 
Government's many interests in petroleum, petroleum products and associated hydrocarbons” 
(Truman, 1946). Perhaps even more importantly, supply availability for power projection was 
explicitly evident in the policies of all the major powers. Battle lines had been drawn over the 
locations of key coal deposits and oil fields; refineries had become targets of acquisition and 
attack; and Germany’s initial attempts to develop an internal fuel substitution program in pursuit 
energy supplies to project power had proven limitedly successful. 
Furthermore, World War II’s enormous destruction highlighted the need to find a solution to the 
ongoing conflict between Germany and France (three wars between 1870 and 1945). The post-
war Marshall Plan (1948) was part of that process. Integration of Europe’s war-making and war-
fueling capabilities was another.  
Europe’s initial steps toward integration were not easy. Following the war, some French officials 
initially wanted to repeat the mistakes of Versailles and re-acquire the Saar and Ruhr areas, or at 
least “Frenchify” them (Dinan, 2004).104 Their aims were overcome, however, by the efforts of 
France’s Jean Monet and Robert Schuman, to place “the whole of Franco-German coal and steel 
production under a common High Authority, with the framework of an organization open to the 
participation of the other countries of Europe” (Dinan, 2005:11; Fontaine, 1990:44). If Europe was 
to find peace, it was to do so by instrumentalizing energy as a common basis of interdependence 
and security. The establishment of the new European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 
marked the beginning of a structural transformation of historical conflict over the trade in natural 
resources. As Henze (2005) notes, “While the primary cause of conflict between France and 
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Germany was geopolitical, the solution lay in resolving the issue of natural resource competition. 
The ECSC was thus a first step into a new world.” 
Europe and the US now faced a world where the control of energy resources in general and oil 
specifically where paramount to national security. New actors including large private and national 
energy companies (national champions) had entered the fold of internal policymaking and the 
military had emerged as one of the most important players in determining the necessity to find 
substitutes. New legislation in the US and Europe created powerful committees and oversight 
bodies enhancing the power of both the executive and legislative branches at multiple levels of 
government providing new instruments for market intervention. Just as these changes took form, 
the markets for primary fuels boomed in volume, setting the stage for an increasing level 
competition over national and international control and coordination.  
In the course of little more than one century, energy had undergone a paradigm shift that altered 
the global landscape of economic and military power. It had evolved from a freely accessible, non-
tradable commodity in a world of energy independent countries to a strategic resource and thus 
became the wellspring both of cooperation and conflict. With Europe divided, in ruins, and 
emerging as a new cooperative pact, the US had become the world’s leading industrial and 
military power. The Soviet Union controlled the energy resources of the Caucuses, the Urals, the 
Caspian Sea and its Littoral states. French and UK companies controlled most of the oil fields in 
the Middle East and North Africa. And coal and steel, the core components of industrial power 
and war making, became the focal points of a new and more peaceful Europe.  
 
3.2. The EU’s Energy Policy 
3.2.1. Evolution of Internal policy 
The foundation of the present day EU finds its roots in the post-World War II notion that peace 
could be built through energy cooperation and security. Two of the three founding treaties 
explicitly deal with energy issues. The 1951 Paris Treaty between France, Germany, Italy, and 
three Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) established the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 1957 Euratom Treaty among the same six established 
intra-European coordination over uranium supplies. Both were leges speciales, sectoral treaties 
that aimed at introducing coordination with regard to specific commodities, but in practice “did 
not intend to establish a coherent and common energy policy”(Pollak and Schubert, 2010:5).  
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From its inception, the EU’s predecessors constituted a liberal economic project, based on a 
market commodity approach of non-intervention. The ECSC established a common free market 
for coal and steel, the necessary elements of war, devoid of subsidies and import and export 
duties. Intriguingly, European leaders excluded oil from their original energy agenda. Although 
clearly important, Europe had little of it on the continent. Focus was placed instead on atomic 
energy because of “high expectations about the role” it would play in the future and French 
advances in the technology (de Jong, 2008:96).105 The omission of oil would come back to haunt 
Europe’s political elite as early as 1956 when its supplies would be reduced for weeks during the 
Suez Crises. At that time, discussions about wider economic and nuclear cooperation were so 
close to fruition that the new ECSC Member States decided to put oil (and the broader agenda of 
energy cooperation) off for later discussion. The EU was thus founded on the control of two 
energy resources, coal and uranium. 
 
3.2.1.1. Phase 1: The early years 1951-1970 
In the incipient years of the EU, energy was a core component of discussion, but hardly one of 
complete cooperation. The UK, a coal powerhouse and holder of major oil assets in the Middle 
East and Asia was not a founding member of either the 1951 ECSC or the 1957 European 
Economic Community (EEC). Coordination, where it existed was limited to the six continental 
powers. Even though nuclear power offered future promise and free flowing supplies of cheap 
foreign oil provided the basis for building the foundation of a common energy market, coal 
remained the primary energy source for heating and electricity generation on the continent. 
Agreements over oil and natural gas were hindered by both political and technical considerations.  
Energy policies have always been affected by scientific, technological, and price issues, and at the 
time (in the early 1950s) there was little evidence of any cost effective alternative to oil as a 
transport fuel, nor for that matter any reason to be concerned about supply availability. Oil was 
abundant and Europe controlled most of the world’s known reserves. But cooperation on the 
energy front also confronted European leaders with dilemmas about the high degree of 
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interdependence between energy resources and a diverse set of policy sectors such as 
competition, external relations, transport, industry, and environment externalities.  
Also, the fact that energy was (and still is) regarded as a strategic good (Prontera 2009) by the 
EU’s founders, led its Member States “to favor national energy champions instead of opting for 
integrated, transnational approaches” (Pollak and Schubert, 2010:5), which in turn complicated 
relations over primary fuel policies and led to diverging and sometimes even contradictory 
political objectives. Indeed, in this early phase, Member States were more interested to secure 
the energy supplies that their national industries required for post war reconstruction than they 
were in sharing those resources. As a result, they tended to promote national energy companies, 
which to a large degree were controlled by the respective states. Thus at the earliest stages of 
Europe’s nascent energy policy, state executives and national champions played a vital role in 
setting tone and direction. And because commodity prices were low (despite an obvious increase 
in post-war demand) the need to extend cooperation beyond the rules of free trade seemed 
unnecessary if not even against their respective national interests.  
Moreover, with necessary materials of war regulated, adjacent attempts were made to establish a 
common defense community, particularly in opposition to US calls for the rearmament of West 
Germany and its inclusion in the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Those attempts subsequently failed, however, in 1954, when Gaullists in the French Parliament 
blocked ratification (preventing a vote) on the basis that such an agreement would endanger 
France’s national sovereignty and independence; a prelude for a problem that would later 
become one of the primary weaknesses in the EU’s ability to act with unanimity on the 
international stage. 106 
Not long afterwards, ECSC foreign ministers met in Messina in 1955 inter alia to appoint a 
successor to Jean Monnet as the High Authority’s next president and discuss expanded economic 
cooperation in the form of a fully-fledged customs union.107 The end result was an agreement to 
move forward on greater economic integration through a gradual reduction of trades and tariffs 
and a sector-based approach for integrating transportation and energy.  
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A new committee was formed to prepare a step-by-step plan chaired by Belgium’s foreign 
minister Paul-Henri Spaak. The work of Spaak’s committee led to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and 
the formation of both Euratom and the EEC. Again, oil was absent from the resulting agreement. 
As Willenborg, Tönjes and Perlot (2004) aptly note, the EEC treaty did contain references to non-
coal and uranium energy resources, but it did so without special stipulation and created a 
fragmentary legal structure that became a serious barrier to achieving an integrated European 
energy policy.  
Energy cooperation or at least the pursuit thereof began to take off with the establishment of the 
Community’s first energy related executive committee, but it also ran into its first major obstacle, 
namely the competing national interests of its Member States. One of the first actions of the 
EEC’s new executive was the mandating of an Inter-Executive Energy Committee (IEC) to 
investigate the energy balance of its Member States.108 It took them until 1962, however, to 
present their research, which recommended a massive shift of sovereign power to the EEC’s 
supranational authority..109 The Member States responded by reducing the IEC’s tasks to 
identifying opportunities for more “pragmatic coordination”. While the Member States wanted a 
common energy policy, none was prepared to relinquish sovereign control.  
Although the then six Member States agreed on the need for such an integrated approach and the 
Commission demanded more coordination in the energy area, it took the IEC another two years to 
come up with an appropriate proposal. In early 1964, it delivered a series of recommendations 
that led to a “Protocol of Agreement” that included objectives such as cheap and secure supplies, 
cost stability, fair competition, and the ‘progressive development of substitute products’.110 
Vague as these recommendations were, the presence of the notion of substitution was indicative 
of EU’s early recognition of its importance to energy security. 
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It took another three years until hostilities erupted in the Middle East (June 1967) and closed the 
Suez Canal again for several days that Europe’s leaders finally realized the dangerous scope of 
their earlier omission of oil. The crisis confirmed the need for expanded cooperation in the energy 
field and a broader supranational perspective.111  
Within a year (1968), the Commission released its “First Guidelines for a Community Energy 
Policy” (COM (68) 1040 final) which recognized “serious obstacles to trade within the Community 
as regards energy products” that if not addressed soon could endanger integration. The 
Commission laid out a series of important observations and recommendations. Foreign 
dependency was a strategic problem. Europe’s oil and gas industries were emerging as relevant 
forces while its coal industry was on the decline. And more than half of the Community’s energy 
requirements were being met through imports. The memorandum specifically addressed the 
need to improve competition because it “stimulates the natural processes of substitution” and 
explicitly recommended that Member States adopt “measures to be taken in the event of partial 
interruption of deliveries” (COM (68) 1040:10-12).  
In doing so, the EC’s actions seem to point to two initial and somewhat contradictory conclusions. 
Prices were generally cheap and with the exception of short-term interruptions, oil supplies were 
reliable and free flowing. Hence, according to the model presented earlier, cooperation should be 
at a minimum, and in fact was, and government intervention in the markets should also be 
constrained, which it was not. This is because repeated occurrence of interruptions pointed to the 
need for greater intervention through member state coordination and an increased focus on 
internal substitution programs. Thus under the extant circumstances of feared constraints to 
supply (even though prices were generally inexpensive), the Commission recommended that 
Member States consider “rigorous regimentation” of their respective national energy markets.  
This led to the regular reporting of energy forecasts and balances for each Member State allowing 
greater harmonization of policy.112 It also set forward the idea that every Member State should 
establish a strategic reserve and make plans to release those reserves to other Member States in 
the event of any future disruptions. This was codified in a 1968 Directive prescribing all Member 
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States to maintain a strategic reserve of 68 days and came on the heels of an earlier Decision to 
allow Member States to financially support their coal industries.113/114 In addition, the Commission 
recommended that Member States should use specific policy instruments to harmonize related oil 
licenses, permits, and taxes, noting that the “differences in taxation of the various forms of 
energy within a Member State” were hampering  attempts to develop substitutes. Therefore, it 
encouraged increased investments in the energy sector through “direct participation, interest rate 
‘subsidies’, *and+ loan guarantees” and by strengthening both domestic oil industries and 
alternative fuel technologies by stimulating research and development (COM (68) 1040:18-19). 
After two decades of attempted coordination, Europeans were finally beginning to consider 
overcoming nationalist thinking in the energy field. Unfortunately, just as those ideas were once 
becoming en vogue, external forces would shock the Europeans back into division. 
 
3.2.1.2. Phase 2: the period of crises from 1970 to 1990 
Between 1970 and the late 1980s, Europe’s political landscape underwent a substantial 
transformation. The Union grew to nine Member States (adding the UK, Denmark, and Ireland in 
January 1973), then ten (Greece in 1981) and finally twelve (Portugal and Spain in 1986). But what 
began as a harbinger of greater cooperation (new accessions, the adoption of a plan for greater 
economic and currency coordination, and new procedures for enhanced foreign policy 
coordination) quickly deteriorated in to a period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ as internal rivalries, geopolitical 
struggles, and international economic crises tore at Europe’s unity.115 While energy was not the 
only factor involved in that deterioration, the problems Europe faced in overcoming the deep 
divisions between Member States visibly played out in energy politics. Indeed, for most of the 
period, intra-European cooperation in the energy sector was scant and acrimonious.  
Political turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa led to consecutive crises in the supply and 
pricing of oil and sparked a drive to find alternative fuels with very different results among 
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Member States. As a result, emergent progress toward an integrated internal energy policy was 
placed once again on the back burner in exchange for national interests.  
In 1970, oil was cheap and Europe’s economies were performing well. This gave rise to the belief 
that greater European cooperation would make sense. In October, a committee chaired by 
Belgium’s Étienne Davignon produced a report on enhanced political cooperation recommending 
that Member States should try to speak with a single voice on international issues and his 
proposals were unanimously approved in an official program called European Political 
Cooperation.116 This new cooperative albeit flawed spirit of unity quickly deteriorated, however, 
with the onset of the 1971 currency crisis, when the US broke the gold standard and suspended 
convertibility of the dollar into gold for foreign holders.117 The crisis sent Europe’s economy into a 
period of uncertainty and recession and divided it largely because its two core currencies were 
taking different trajectories; France was forced to devalue the Franc while the German Mark was 
gaining in strength.  
Despite their economic troubles, however, European leaders tried to push forward on the energy 
front. Meeting in Paris in October 1972, they agreed that “there is a need for the Community 
Institutions to work out as soon as possible an energy policy which ensures a reliable and lasting 
supply on economically satisfactory terms” (Willenborg, et al., 2004:8). Symbolic of their wavering 
unity, they watered down the terms of their pricing goals in order to satisfy the reality of the 
markets and the individual interests of each member. The term ‘cheap’ used in the 1968 
declaration to refer to the goal for energy resource pricing was now replaced with ‘economically 
satisfactory’.  
Two months later, the Member States States accepted OECD recommendations to raise stock 
levels to 90 days (Council Directive 72/425/EEC) and in July 1973 obliged Member States to take 
steps to mitigate difficulties associated with any future supply shocks (Council Directive 
(73/238/EEC). They were to do this by tapping stocks during disruptions, imposing consumption 
restrictions, prioritizing the supply of certain groups, and regulating prices. The responsibility of 
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choosing the instruments and the affected actors remained the business of each member state. 
Europe’s common energy policy thus was codified as a policy not of a single market, but rather of 
many independent markets. 
Europe’s increasing intergovernmental outlook was highly visible in the energy domain by the 
time the first major oil embargo occurred in 1973. Because of its strategic nature (the energy 
sector was essential to the post-war growth of Europe), autonomy over national energy sectors 
were carefully guarded. Supplies of most domestic energy services in the Member States were 
inherently uncompetitive, strongly set in the hands of state monopolies. Coordination was further 
hampered by “the heterogeneity of energy infrastructures across Member States” that included 
“wide variations in *the+ primary energy base, commercial structures, legal frameworks, and 
regulatory regimes” (Padgett, 1992:53). Indeed, from the perspective of market integration, 
Europe’s early attempts to formulate a coherent energy policy were weak. 
This weakness became blatantly evident during the 1973-1974 oil price shock. The October 1973 
Arab-Israeli War set off a two-year long oil crisis sending international prices skyrocketing from 
$3.29 to $11.58 (15.89 to 50.41 in $2009). At the onset of the crisis, more than sixty percent of 
Europe’s primary energy was derived from oil and almost all of it was imported. Not only did the 
crisis reveal the insight that energy policy is to large degree subject to geopolitics, it also left bare 
the limited solidarity between the Member States, particularly those that had ignored the 1964 
stockpiling directive (68/414/EEC).118 
Meeting in Copenhagen two months after the crisis began, EC leaders were unable to reach a 
consensus on what to do.119 In the Annex to their final declaration (15 December 1973) the 
Member States explicitly identified that a “prolonged scarcity of energy resources would have 
grave effects on production, employment and balances of payment within the Community” and as 
a result each Member should “introduce on a concerted and equitable basis measures to limit 
energy consumption” (European Communities, 1973). Therefore, when faced with its first major 
external supply crisis, European leaders agreed on three things: (1) the need to consume less oil; 
(2) the need to diversify both sources and suppliers of oil; and (3) they agreed that the best 
strategy was to allow each member state to fend for itself. Thus, the Member States agreed to 
allow each other to individually enter into negotiations “on comprehensive arrangements 
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comprising co-operation on a wide scale for the economic and industrial development“ of the 
Arab oil producing states, including large industrial investments in return for stable energy 
supplies at “reasonable prices” (European Communities, 1973). Because those negotiations were 
to be undertaken by the individual Member States, it reinforced the rising tendency among them 
to pursue individual national objectives; France, Italy, and West Germany immediately organized 
independent supply contracts largely “in exchange for military equipment”. As Willemborg et al 
(2004:28) puts it, the European Member States decided individually to concentrate “on securing 
their own energy supply … instead of coming to the assistance” of their fellow Member States.  
Europe’s divided response to the 1973 oil price shock was symptomatic of the sclerosis it was 
facing. Driven by the need maintain national autonomy, Member States immediately branched off 
into widely different energy policy solutions. France invested heavily in nuclear power. Germany, 
Italy and others began to look eastward toward the Soviet Union for natural gas; and the UK 
moved forward with massive investments into exploration off its coast.  
Meanwhile, it was Washington, not the EU, that pushed for an organized consumer response. The 
former sponsored an international energy conference in February 1974, where US Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger floated the idea of an ‘Energy NATO’ that foresaw an international oil 
sharing mechanism between OECD consumers. By November, leading OECD countries had agreed 
on a new International Energy Program (Paris Treaty) which founded the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), the purpose of which was to foster the development of emergency stocks to 
withstand future crises and to reduce overall consumer dependence. In many respects 
(particularly as pertains to ordering the buildup of stockpiles) the EC was ahead of the US in many 
of its stated aims. Nonetheless, it could not muster a unified response as France initially refused 
to join.120 
Despite their disunity, however, there was no shortage of EU declarations moving forward. In 
1974, for example, the Council adopted a “New Strategy for Energy Policy” in which it explicitly 
set the goal “to increase by every possible means the Community’s independence of oil supplies 
from abroad” (Com(74) 550 Final/2)121 including the “substitution of other fuels for petroleum 
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products where at all possible” (COM (74) 20 Final).122 That same year the Commission released 
numerous brochures on matters such as the role of energy in the EC (67/74), nuclear fuel supplies 
(76/74), the status of oil and gas use (77/74), as well as proposals for ‘rational use’ of energy 
supplies (75/74). The Commission also proposed a series of recommendations to coordinate 
internal and external energy policies (COM (74) 20 final) and delivered reports on the state of 
energy research and development (SEC (74) 2592 final) and the energy balances of the Member 
States (SEC (74) 280 final).  
By 1975, the Community had identified several core “Objectives for a common energy policy until 
1985”; among these were increasing the use of electricity, and with it nuclear power, to raise its 
share of overall energy consumption to 35% by 1985 from 25% in 1973; to reduce foreign energy 
dependence to 40% from the 1973 level of 65%; to increase production and imports of coal and 
natural gas; and to achieve greater overall efficiency through a policy of “technological research 
and development”.123 One overriding objective lied at the heart of all these recommendations, 
namely increase efficiency in order to reduce import dependence. But differences between the 
energy balances among Member States continued to hamper coordination (COM (74) 280 Final) 
despite several previous steps to develop a Community wide policy on oil and gas.124 And the 
main focus of energy research and development (as well as the very notion of substitution itself) 
continued to be based on the idea of replacing oil with gas and coal technologies.125  
Moreover, just as the shock of the oil crisis was receding, another sequence of crises in the 
Persian Gulf began to severely impact the flow of oil to Europe. By the late 1970s, the Gulf was a 
major transit area for much of Europe’s oil supplies. When the 1979 revolution in Iran was 
followed by an Iraqi invasion sparking the decade long Iran-Iraq war, European supplies were 
acutely endangered. By 1981, Baghdad was attacking Iranian oil ports and complexes. The matter 
was exacerbated a few years later when Iraq started a sustained three year campaign to attack oil 
tankers sailing to and from Iran using French combat aircraft armed with Exocet missiles (the so-
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called Tanker War); seventy-one non-military vessels were attacked in 1984 alone.126 In a strange 
turn of events, the weapons used were those sold to Iraq as part of the EU’s earlier response to 
the 1973 crises (Metz, 1988). But even the sum of these combined events provided insufficient 
impetus for Europe to overcome its inability to cooperate on the energy front.  
Before the Iranian revolution, the international oil price was hovering around $14 a barrel. By the 
end of 1979 it was over $30, and by 1981 it had peaked around $35 a barrel. Despite the spike in 
prices, however, Member States were no more willing to pass the necessary legislation for the 
start of a common foreign energy policy, nor for that matter any rules on internal deregulation of 
their concentrated energy markets (Pollak and Schubert, 2010). About the only thing they could 
agree on was the need to independently pursue further diversification of sources and expand the 
use of nuclear power, a key component of their 1985 objectives. The Commission began heavily 
investing in exploration (particularly offshore technologies) in the petroleum sector. Between 
1973 and 1979, the Community invested a little over $220 million in 140 related projects 
(Brunner, 1979) and between 1978 and 1979 it invested another 78 million EUA ($96 million) in 
energy related research and development (European Communities, 1979).127 
Many states seized the moment to move forward on nuclear power, with France making the 
largest investment. Other Member States added to their nuclear portfolio by turning toward 
Soviet natural gas. In a strategy led largely by Germany, they moved to thaw relations with the 
Soviet Union and invest in its westward expanding gas pipeline network.  
Europe’s move to diversify its energy sources and particularly to increase the share of nuclear 
power ran into a major obstacle on April 26 1986 when the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the 
Ukraine exploded releasing a plume of radioactive fallout that drifted across much of continent’s 
central and northern countries. Coming on the heels of a less dramatic, but nonetheless scary 
1979 meltdown at a US reactor at Three Mile Island in the US state of Pennsylvania, a skeptical 
European public quickly turned against nuclear power. The belief of the early 1970s that nuclear 
energy will solve all its energy problems was no longer considered reasonable. Now it was seen as 
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a risk to public health and safety. Yet once again the responses would be uneven across the 
Community. France, already heavily dependent on nuclear power and much further away from 
the disaster, was unremitting in its pro nuclear policy. Germany and Italy on the other hand 
introduced stronger anti-nuclear measures (Liberatore, 1996).  
By the mid of the 1980s, many of Europe’s best laid plans had fallen victim to national 
competition and growing environmental concerns. Although it was becoming conventional 
wisdom that a safe and sustainable energy supply required an effective internal market, 
Europeans were far from united over the optimal makeup of respective energy mixes. Thus a 
period which began in the highest spirit of cooperation had by 1986 deteriorated into one of 
outright national competition. Oil prices were volatile. Germany was overproducing coal and 
France was overproducing nuclear energy. Member States were taking their own approaches to 
resolve what they saw as individual needs.  
As the decade closed, the average international price of oil began to decline, dropping below 
twenty dollars, largely due to a decrease in global demand caused by the earlier period of high 
prices. This led to the beginnings of an economic recovery. But in Europe, where a recalcitrant 
recession, a nuclear disaster, and a litany of new rules and goals had been established to mitigate 
the worst effects of the past crises, little had changed in terms of oil consumption among the 
Community’s now twelve Member States. In 1970, the Member States consumed 11 million 
barrels a day. By 1990, they were consuming 11.4 million barrels a day. Nuclear power was no 
longer at the center of Europe’s consensus.  
Against this backdrop, the European Commission and the Member States began to risk timid steps 
towards liberalization and deregulation in the late 1980s.128 Poised for yet another enlargement, 
Europe was now revisiting its long-standing goal to develop a common internal energy market. 
When it finally agreed on the Single European Act (1986), that renewed vigor in market building, 
(largely based on Article 308 TEC) was a fundamental aspect of a new post-crisis European age 
(Pollak and Schubert, 2010). New issues had also emerged to unite the Member States. 
Environmental concerns had been growing across the Union, in part because of the 1979 and 
1986 nuclear accidents and in part because of the 1980s discovery that energy related emissions 
were leading to Acid Rain. Thus, when evidence was presented at the World Climate Conference 
in Toronto in June 1988 linking energy consumption and climate change, the EU received the final 
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impetus to move forward in a coordinated fashion in an area that all could agree on, the welfare 
of the planet. Already in a leading position on environmental issues, Member State governments 
pledged to voluntarily cut CO2 emissions by 20% by 2005 and the Commission found new ways to 
tackle old problems by actively using European environmental law to pass energy relevant 
legislation. In the final years of the 1980s, the EU was well on its way to addressing many of the 
political problems it faced in the previous decades.  
 
3.2.1.3. Phase 3: The rise of deregulation and progress toward a unified policy (1991-2000).  
The 1990s began with dramatic political changes in Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 
November 1989 and the re-unification of Germany a year later completely altered the landscape 
of the European Community. Not only was it the first step in the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(December, 1991), it removed an artificial split across the continent and led many to believe that 
liberal economics had won the day over socialism. The immediate result was an accelerated push 
for deregulation and an expansion of what was seen as a new globalized economy.  
Moreover, the fall of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia forced Europe to 
overcome their differences and seek a new level of political and economic cooperation.129 Within 
a period of six short years, the EU expanded to include Austria, Sweden, and Finland, established 
the Shengen Agreement removing border checks between the original six, witnessed the breakup 
of Yugoslavia, and negotiated the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) creating a single 
currency and pillared structure of political authority. Europe was no longer an economic union of 
twelve, but rather an aspiring political union of fifteen with greatly enhanced supranational 
powers.  
In 1990, Ruud Lubbers, then Prime Minister of The Netherlands, suggested the establishment of a 
European Energy Charter. Four years later the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was signed in Lisbon. 
The agreement established that energy should be traded according to GATT/WTO standards 
(exploration, production and transport must be non-discriminatory and even in times of conflict, 
transit must be allowed). In creating the ECT, the EU ported its widely diverse internal energy 
                                                          
129
 The sudden absence of the Soviet Union also hoisted the US to a status of a unipolar superpower. The 
first test of that new balance came in 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, threatening to take control of the 
latter’s oil supplies and possibly move into Saudi Arabia, the world, including Europe united behind the US 
in a joint military operation to dislodge it.  
Testing the Model 
104 
policies into a unified external one. Energy was no longer just a matter of Member States or 
internal markets. It was now a fundamental aspect the EU’s nascent foreign policy. Behind that 
policy was the endeavor to secure the safety of supplies through the export of EU rules and 
regulations with its primary intent being to lock Russia into a set of European defined rules for the 
trade and pricing of its precious energy exports (Pollak and Schubert, 2010).130 
The rapid developments of the nineties led to an increased willingness to cooperate on the energy 
front. In October 1996, the Commission published a Green Paper on renewable sources of energy 
(Com (96) 576 Final). It explicitly pointed to the need to increase “the share of renewable sources 
of energy in research and development programmes (JOULE and THERMIE)” and set an indicative 
objective of 12% for the contribution by renewable sources of energy to the EU’s gross inland 
energy consumption by 2010. A year later it, followed up with a White Paper on the “Community 
Strategy and Action Plan for renewable energy” (COM (97) 599 final) largely based on earlier 
recommendations to contain the environmental damage associated with energy consumption 
(COM (97) 481 final) and proposed a series of cooperative energy-related Decisions for the 
Council.131 
Meanwhile, Cyprus and nine former Soviet bloc countries were knocking on the door seeking 
entry, each with their own unique set of energy problems and opportunities. Cyprus was entirely 
dependent on imported oil. The former Soviet bloc countries as well as the former East Germany 
were all dependent on Russia for oil and natural gas. As a consequence, the next planned EU 
expansion would not only increase membership to twenty-five, it would change the Union’s 
overall foreign energy dependency structure. Already in the mid 1970s, Europe had begun to 
substitute natural gas for oil in its electricity and heating sectors. But by the end of the 1990s it 
had fully switched tables. Instead of being dependent on Arab oil, large parts of the Union were 
about to become dependent on Russian oil and gas. 
In the run-up to its next enlargement, the Member States amended their treaties. The 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty solidified decision making procedures and finally established a Common 
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar. Henceforth, the Community’s external strategies would 
be coordinated via the Council, with all the caveats pertaining to national sovereignty that were 
part and parcel of European integration. A new High Representative for EU Foreign Policy was 
appointed to work together with the Presidents of the Council and Commission in representing a 
unified front. While this step marked significant progress in terms of the EU’s ability to speak as a 
single entity, it changed little in terms of its ability to act in such a manner. In fact, the primary 
tool of state power projection, a common defense system was excluded from the treaty on similar 
grounds that it failed in the past, namely Member States’ need to maintain national autonomy.132  
Already since the late 1980s, the EU had been pursuing the ambitious project of liberalizing the 
continent’s network industries, notably telecommunications, electricity, gas, rail and transport, 
which were long regarded as natural monopolies characterized by public ownership. Indeed, 
between 1975 and 1990, OECD indexed figures of regulation in energy and transport show 
significant reductions in public ownership in the UK and Germany and slightly less France and 
Italy.133 By 1988, the Commission had published its influential working paper “The internal market 
for energy” (COM (1988) 238 fin.) emphasizing the connection between supply safety and the 
internal market. At the center of the proposal was the strict application of single market principles 
to the energy sector (i.e. competition law). Thus, the new emergent energy policy was based on 
markets that were as free as possible. 
In accordance with previous trends, most Member States were initially skeptical, France and the 
UK being notable exceptions. The former was seeking more opportunities to export its 
considerable overproduction of nuclear generated electricity and the latter had already 
underwent a liberalization program under Prime Minister Margret Thatcher (1979-1990) in the 
preceding years. Among the most contentious issues were the so-called common carrier principle 
(opening up existing gas and electricity grids for alternative suppliers in exchange for a fee) and 
customer rights to choose their own energy suppliers. It took four and half years of protracted 
discussion until a common directive was finally passed.134  
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The steady stream of progress (caused largely by external factors) throughout the 1990s changed 
the internal energy landscape of Europe, as well as that of the world at large. Freed from the 
shackles of its controlled economy past, Russia emerged both as a major player in the global 
energy sector and as Europe’s primary supplier of natural gas. Also, environmental issues, which 
had emerged as an important policy area for the Commission at the end of the previous decade, 
now became a centerpiece of European policymaking. The reduction of CO2 emissions, 
investments into renewable energy production, alternative fuels and technologies, and increased 
energy efficiency have since become the corollary and sometimes even the heart of EU energy 
politics (Pollak and Schubert, 2010).135 
 
3.2.1.4. Phase 4: Climate change and the reemergence of supply security (2000 to the present) 
By the beginning of twenty-first century, energy had moved to the center stage of European 
politics. Now that it was closely tied with environmental concerns, actions on energy flourished. 
Germany led the way in the electricity sector by introducing new feed in tariffs in 2000 requiring 
utilities to buy renewable generated electricity (RES). The Commission followed suit in September 
2001, by adopting a Directive on the “Promotion of Electricity from Renewables”.136 That same 
year, it became abundantly clear to the EU that there was a pressing need to find substitutes in 
the transport sector.  
In its 2001 White Paper ‘European transport policy for 2010: time to decide’, the Commission 
reported that it expects CO2 emissions from transport to rise by as much as 50% by 2010 
compared to 1990 (COM (2001) 370 final) implicitly recognizing that continued dependence on oil 
in the transport sector was threatening economic prosperity and political autonomy. This 
understanding was explicitly stipulated in a 2003 Directive on the promotion of the use of biofuels 
and other renewable fuels for transport (2003/30/EC) where the EU recognized the need to 
decrease its “dependence on imported energy and influence the fuel market for transport and 
hence the security of energy supply in the medium and long term.”137 The same directive 
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recommended that Member States increase their investments in hydrogen research and other 
key substitute fuels.  
The recognition of the need for substitute transport fuels marked an important change of 
direction for European energy policy. As indicated earlier, mobility is the key to power projection. 
Although the EU nowhere explicitly states that it has any intention project hard power in the 
world, the development and ultimately the implementation of substitute fuels carry implications 
for its external policy behavior. It is not insignificant that parallel to these initial developments, 
the price of oil had moved above its historical average in 2000 and was rising steadily until the 
economic fallout of higher prices cut global demand toward the end of the decade.  
By 2007, the drive to switch transport fuels was full in swing. In accordance with Directive 
2001/77/EC, all of the Member States had already adopted national RES targets for electricity 
production. Now the EU went one step further publishing a “Renewable Energy Road map” (COM 
(2006) 848 final) that called for an overall reduction in annual fossil fuel consumption by over 250 
Mtoe by 2020, of which approximately 200 Mtoe would have been imported.  
The road map specifically recognized the security granting value of renewables. It called them 
“largely indigenous” and disconnected from “uncertain projections on the future”, and noted that 
“their predominantly decentralised nature makes our societies less vulnerable” and a it “is thus 
undisputed that renewable energies constitute a key element of a sustainable future.” By Spring, 
2007: EU leaders endorsed a binding agreement to achieve an overall target of 20% RES by 2020 
and in 2009 the Council adopted two Directives to achieve it (Directive 2009/28/EC and Directive 
2009/30/EC).  
After almost fifty years of trying, the EU’s diverse and now much larger group of Member States 
finally agreed that energy independence was essential to its collective political and economic 
autonomy and found a way to achieve it within the constraints of national sovereignty and 
competition. The brief period of maximum liberalization in pursuit of globalized interdependent 
energy relations was ending. While the pursuit of rule export was by no means diminished, it was 
now being matched by a new internal industrial policy aimed at enhancing energy independence. 
The internal market was developing, but it would come together as a byproduct of national 
targets, not by supranational fiat. Most importantly, the need for energy security, driven by 
higher prices and greater uncertainty of supplies, was pushing the EU to develop domestic 
substitutes. 
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The uptick in EU energy cooperation from 2000 forward paralleled several important internal and 
external developments. Internally, most of the larger EU Member States successfully switched 
their electricity and heating sectors away from oil following the 1970 price shocks. As per EU 
targets, the use of nuclear power and increased electricity consumption have been achieved. 
Externally, Russia’s recovery from the economic malaise that beset it immediately following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union put Moscow in position to become the EU’s premier external energy 
supplier.138  
In trading Middle Eastern oil for Russian gas, however, the EU positioned itself poorly to handle 
any disruptions from its eastern neighbor. Approximately 80% of Russian gas bound for EU 
markets travels through one country, Ukraine, leaving little room for error. The severity of that 
dependence was recognized in the winter months of 2006, 2008, and 2009 when price disputes 
between Ukraine and Russia led to brief but painful gas cutoffs. A similar dispute with Belarus in 
2007 led to a cutoff of oil supplies. And Russia’s 2008 intervention in Georgia led to a temporary 
stoppage of oil flows through that country.  
The Russia-Ukraine energy dilemma is indicative of the geopolitical risks of the EU’s energy 
interdependence and in particular the touchy issue of pipelines and their routes. Pipelines cost 
large amounts of money and both suppliers and consumers want to maximize direct access 
because transit states through which the pipelines flow take cash fees or in kind supplies raising 
costs and reducing profits. When disruptions do occur, everyone loses money and consumers lose 
energy. Therefore, the choice of routes and transit players affects national and commercial 
incomes and consumer supply security. As a result, international competition over which lines to 
build, which routes to follow, and which volumes of supplies to deliver are often the source of 
bitter debate. 
The EU currently depends on three overland pipeline corridors geographically linked to specific 
suppliers forming interdependent relationships. One originates in the Norwegian and North Seas 
and runs to the UK, Scandinavia, and the continent and binds the UK, Belgium, and France to 
Norway. Another runs from North Africa to Southern Europe tying Spain and Portugal to Algeria. 
But it is the third corridor that matters the most. Running eastward over Belarus and the Ukraine 
the third corridor carries Russian, Caspian and Central Asian supplies to central and Eastern 
Europe, binding Germany, Poland, Greece, Italy and the eastern Member States to political 
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machinations of Moscow. Recognizing the need to secure its position of strength, the EU has 
supported numerous projects to expand its gas pipeline reach (e.g. Nabucco, Nordstream, 
Transmed, Green Stream). Russia has responded by making deals with its Central Asian neighbors 
in a bid to lock up gas resources and limit the success of alternative routes that might reduce its 
profits or exclude it altogether (MEES 2008).  
Europe’s counter-strategy to break the Russian ‘lock’ on Caspian gas has been to foster 
investment into a series of Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E). The most important of 
these are the high priority Nabucco pipeline, also known as Natural Gas (NG) Route Number 3 
(NGR3) and the Turkey-Greece Interconnector (TGI). The planned source of both pipelines is 
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field. If successful, the new routes would open an important fourth 
energy corridor to Europe, one that also happens to offer an important link to Iraqi and Iranian 
gas.139/140 The most significant step in this new EU approach came when Brussels broke procedure 
concerning common rules for the internal market and passed another directive in 2003 
(2003/55/EC) to finance half the cost of the feasibility study. It then allocated €200 million from 
its European Economic Recovery Plan for the Nabucco pipeline. Defying years of discord based on 
the protection of national champions, Brussels finally established common rules for the internal 
natural gas market and established a new intergovernmental actor bringing together national 
energy regulatory authorities in a body called the European Regulators Group for Electricity and 
Gas liberalization (ERGEG) to serve as the Commission’s main advisory body on internal energy 
issues (2003/796/EC). 
The EU’s backing for a new route to Caspian energy resources can be traced back to the March 
2001 Stockholm Council where the need to invest in energy infrastructure was first identified. It 
was cemented a year later when the Barcelona Council decided that, “Energy infrastructure 
should be constructed and maintained so as to enable the internal energy market to operate 
efficiently” (1229/2003/EC).141 The fact that it has now become a bone of conflict with Russia 
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reveals both the risks and the raised stature of energy in EU foreign affairs. Importantly, Brussels 
is not the driving force behind the Nabucco project. Instead, it is financed and operated almost 
entirely by private or semi-private commercial interests. Thus, profit and not energy security is 
driving the EU’s cotemporary external energy infrastructure development program. Nevertheless, 
the pipeline’s route is designed specifically to bypass Russia by opening a new pipeline corridor to 
Caspian countries, freeing them from their reliance on Russia for transit, linking Austria and its 
Central European distribution facilities with Eastern Turkey, and hence positioning the EU to 
eventually import gas from the greater Middle East. It is what EU Energy Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger called “a European project" (Euractiv 2010), a multilateral effort that symbolizes the 
unity behind the EU’s nascent attempt to achieve greater energy autonomy through diversity of 
suppliers. It is only fitting, therefore, that the pipeline’s backers gave the project a symbolic name, 
Nabucco, derived from a Verdi Opera that tells the story of the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar 
and the struggle for freedom and independence.  
EU-Russian competition over Caspian resources demonstrates how both Moscow and Brussels 
increasingly perceive energy as a geopolitical asset; and it serves as a reminder that no matter 
which targets or policy intentions the EU adopts, the realities of its energy situation tie its 
domestic welfare to the vagaries of geopolitics. Furthermore, oil prices rose steadily between 
2000 and 2007, flattening out toward the end of the decade at a price that makes it economically 
feasible to invest in substitutes. And that development came just as technological advances in the 
late nineties led to more efficient means to transport, convert, and store natural gas. The result 
has been new opportunities for the EU to diversify suppliers and routes which has led to a 
proliferation of natural gas hubs across Europe able to support regional markets in integrative 
ways along the lines of original ECSC and very similar to the regional multistate market system 
existing in the US. In support of these developments, Member States have begun constructing 
LNG import terminals and in the coming decades plan to quadruple their import capacity through 
more than triple the number of facilities (Pollak, et al., 2010).  
Recognition of the transformations in the market together with the long list of incrementally built 
rules and regulations passed in previous years were incorporated in the Commission’s proposed 
third legislative energy package of 2007. Not only did Brussels propose to increased liberalization 
of Member State energy markets through increased unbundling or the establishment of 
independent systems operators, it specifically identified the need to link energy policies with 
climate change targets.  
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In so doing, the EU begun to take an approach to convert its greatest weakness (the divisive 
protection of national champions) into a powerful asset by harmonizing and strengthening the 
decision-making authority of national regulators, requiring them to have independent 
management teams and budgets and legally binding them to cooperate. By 2009, the Member 
States had hammered out the details of this new package and set an obligatory target date of 
March 3 2011 for full implementation.142 Among these were three new Regulations (No 713/2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators; No 714/2009 setting conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity;143 No 715/2009 setting 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks);144 and two new Directives 
(2009/72/EC setting common rules for the internal market in electricity;145 and 2009/73/EC 
setting common rules for the internal market in natural gas146). 
These changes came on the heels one successful attempt at treaty reform and one failed attempt 
at a broader overhaul of the Union. In 2001, the Member States signed the Treaty of Nice, which 
provided the Council with the power to adopt under conditions of unanimity “measures 
significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of its energy supply.”147 Although energy was not the focus of the treaty (it was rather 
institutional reform in the run up to the fifth enlargement), the treaty included important aspects 
concerning intra-EU cooperation on external matters (by lowering the threshold on the number of 
Member States required for enhanced cooperation) and distributed the funds of the now defunct 
ECSC, which expired in July 2002, to the Commission to be used for research in sectors related to 
the coal and steel industry. Also in 2001, the Member States embarked on efforts to draft a Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). The TCE would have raised the stature of energy 
policy by providing the EU with significant co-decision making power and making it a new 'shared 
competence' between the EU and Member State governments through the re-categorization of 
Union competences (Article I-12). Those shared competences would have included transport, 
trans-European networks, research and development, and energy. Also, the Constitution would 
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have established a specific legal basis (Article III-256) for the adoption of laws and measures 
relating to energy policy, although the new powers would not allow the EU to tell its members 
which energy sources they could use or decide over the general structure of their energy supply. 
Hailed as a major breakthrough, the treaty was signed in October 2004. Unfortunately, 
enthusiasm quickly waned as first the UK, then Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal each announced that they would put the Constitution to 
referendum. In May 2009 votes, the French and Dutch publics rejected it, essentially killing the 
reforms. In response to this defeat, European leaders regrouped behind former Italian Prime 
Minister Giuliano Amato, one of the original architects of the Constitution, in order to pave the 
way forward. Meeting in Rome in 2006, the Amato group began preparing a report on how to 
proceed. In their final report delivered in June 2007 they proposed writing a new shorter treaty 
incorporating many of the aspects of the Constitution and using amendments to the Treaty of 
Rome to account for excluded aspects.148 Based on their recommendations, the Member States 
formerly abandoned the Constitution in June 2007, and agreed to negotiate a new Reform Treaty, 
negotiations for which they completed and signed in Lisbon in December 2007.  
Known as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (or simply the Lisbon Treaty), the 
new structure came into force in 2009. For the first time in its legal history, the Member States 
agreed to a section on energy (Title XXI, Article 194). The Union was now officially responsible to 
set policies that ensure the proper functioning of the energy market, secure energy supplies, 
promote efficiency, savings, and the development of new (substitute) forms of energy, and 
promote the interconnection of energy networks. The Lisbon Treaty also specifically granted the 
European Parliament and the Council the authority to establish “measures necessary” to achieve 
those objectives. Member States still retain the right “to determine the conditions for exploiting” 
their energy resources as well as their “choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure” of their energy mix. However, most energy security matters relating to rules and 
regulations, previously the sole domain of Member State governments, are now considered to be 
of shared competence and, outside of fiscal expenditures which still require unanimity in the 
Council, are subject to qualified majority voting in the Council.149 
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Taken together, the events since 2000 represent a remarkable shift in EU energy policy. There has 
been a candid recognition of the dangers of foreign dependence that has gone beyond mere 
declarations and studies. Through a series of decisions, directives, and coordinated policies, the 
Union has fostered significant interest and growth in multiple areas of energy policy that directly 
affect its external policies and in turn are feeding back on its support for internal substitution 
programs. This has led to the creation of new actors, common rules, and a set of carefully planned 
exceptions that aim to take advantage of the very same national forces that divided it in the past. 
Since 2000, the EU initiated a variety of energy-related cooperation instruments with several 
countries. It initiated the EU-Russia energy dialogue in 2000 and then launched a new 
Mediterranean aid program for 2007-13 aiming at integration of the European and Maghrebi gas 
markets. It extended the EU energy acquis to the Balkans and included Azerbaijan into the 
European Neighbourhood Policy to reflect its importance in terms of energy resources. In 2004, 
the EU launched the Baku initiative with the declared aim of developing regional markets and 
network interconnections in the Caspian and Central Asia and in 2008 launched a Black Sea 
initiative aimed at the progressive integration of the region into the European energy market.150 
And last but not least, the EU established the Energy Alliance with Africa that explicitly sets the 
goal of “increased regional and continental interconnectivity”.151  
While those efforts aim at the export of European market principles and regulations, they can also 
be seen as accompanying measures for what amount to a far more pro-active and coordinated 
energy foreign policy than had been present in previous decades. That coordination, like many of 
the EU’s successes has come with the recognition of the need for compromise between the liberal 
roots of the Union and the realities of the national interests of its Member States. As the High 
Representative Javier Solana said, “Market liberalisation is only part of the answer”.152  
Thus, in dialectic fashion, the EU and its Member States have come almost full circle since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Energy is once again at the heart of national foreign policies. 
This time, however, diplomacy and coordination are the primary instruments instead of 
colonialism and conquest, and the portfolio of relevant energy sources is far more inclusive. Still, 
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the EU’s common energy market is far from being completed and its external policy is far from 
perfectly unified. The specific energy interests of Member States vary as significantly today as 
they did 1957 and that makes it exceedingly difficult for Brussels to coordinate unity on matters of 
external energy relations.  
Despite three legislative packages (1996, 2003, 2009), there is still  a lack of cross-border trade 
and interconnections of energy grids, a low rate of supplier change by consumers, no tested 
evidence of sustainable solidarity between Member States in the case of supply-crises, no 
formally established crisis-mechanism, and a wide-ranging diversity of competences among 
national regulatory agencies. The Lisbon Treaty and further development of regional markets may 
change that in time, but for the moment, the EU is a camp that is easily divided. Member States 
remain the EU’s most powerful actors.  
 
3.2.1.5. Summary tables and charts of the evolution of EU’s energy positions 
3.2.1.5.1. Comparative energy mixes of the EU 1970, 1991, 2008 
The energy mix in the EU has changed significantly since 1973, with oil dropping from almost sixty 
percent to less than a third in 2008, largely due to the increase in the use of nuclear power and 
natural gas in its electricity sector. Over the same period, however, the use of all renewables 
(including biofuels) only increased its share from 3 to 8.5 percent, and almost all of that was used 
for electricity. Presented below is data from 1973, 1991, and 2008. The reasons for the specific 
date selection are twofold. First, the 1973 data comes from the last edition of the International 
Energy Agency’s Energy balances of OECD Countries (IEA, 2001) to explicitly refer to the EU as a 
group, then consisting of 15 countries. Later reports refer to the OECD-Europe group, which does 
not include all 27 Member States of the EU following the fifth enlargement. The data for 1991 and 
2008 covers all 27 Member States and comes from the European Commission (2009) and Eurostat 
(2010a) respectively. Second, the three dates represent important milestones in the evaluation of 
the EU’s energy policy. 1973 marks the beginning of a spike in prices and threats to the flow of 
supplies; 1991 marks the beginning of a low-price-free-flow period; and 2008 provides a recent 
snapshot of energy balances following several years of high prices and increasingly tight supplies. 
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Figure 7: The EU's energy mix, 1973-2008 
 
 
3.2.1.5.2. EU Oil consumption 1955-2007 
Between 1955 and 1973, when the first oil price shock occurred, the EU experienced rapid growth 
in the consumption of oil. Since then, consumption has remained fairly steady largely due to 
successful efforts to find substitutes in electricity generation and the implementation of increased 
efficiency standards in the transportation sector. The data from 1955-1964 comes from multiple 
BP Statistical Reviews up to 1974 as reported in Jenkins (1989:141-3). In those years, values for 
the EU are approximated based on the inclusion of Eastern Europe’s planned economies. The 
years 1965-2009 come from BP (2010). 
Figure 8: EU oil consumption, 1955-2009 
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Table 3: EU oil consumption, 1955-2009 
 
EEC-6 EC-15 EU-27 
  
EEC-6 EC-15 EU-27 
1955 57.9 116.8 199.1 
 
1983 352.6 547.1 616.3 
1956 68.0 133.0 227.0 
 
1984 343.1 550.9 620.8 
1957 85.0 270.0 397.0 
 
1985 345.5 540.1 627.7 
1958 95.0 303.0 443.0 
 
1986 362.2 559.6 645.4 
1959 105.0 344.0 499.0 
 
1987 363.1 557.9 645.7 
1960 107.4 191.5 217.8 
 
1988 366.8 566.1 651.9 
1961 124.9 214.3 242.8 
 
1989 363.0 570.2 655.5 
1962 149.1 247.8 279.8 
 
1990 371.0 580.9 663.1 
1963 174.3 284.3 309.8 
 
1991 383.4 594.2 667.8 
1964 201.0 322.6 350.7 
 
1992 387.8 605.1 668.7 
1965 234.7 373.2 400.1 
 
1993 383.7 599.8 662.2 
1966 256.7 409.5 438.6 
 
1994 380.2 599.9 662.2 
1967 277.5 442.0 474.7 
 
1995 385.1 607.5 671.8 
1968 306.4 484.2 520.9 
 
1996 390.3 620.2 686.9 
1969 344.6 541.4 582.6 
 
1997 393.5 625.0 691.4 
1970 384.8 599.3 645.8 
 
1998 398.3 636.2 704.6 
1971 405.0 624.6 674.7 
 
1999 397.0 637.2 701.3 
1972 435.7 668.4 722.6 
 
2000 394.8 635.2 697.7 
1973 465.9 711.9 771.9 
 
2001 396.8 641.1 704.3 
1974 432.2 664.3 725.5 
 
2002 391.5 637.3 700.8 
1975 408.8 629.6 696.8 
 
2003 391.8 640.4 704.3 
1976 439.5 672.4 744.5 
 
2004 393.4 647.2 714.4 
1977 428.7 658.0 734.5 
 
2005 392.8 650.6 721.3 
1978 444.4 677.0 758.8 
 
2006 396.5 652.3 724.9 
1979 453.9 693.4 776.7 
 
2007 382.7 634.3 707.9 
1980 420.7 643.5 724.1 
 
2008 381.5 628.1 703.4 
1981 388.9 598.2 673.5 
 2009 364.3 597.5 670.8 
1982 363.0 565.4 637.1 
 
 
3.2.1.5.3. EU natural gas consumption 1955-2007 
The EU has seen a steady growth in its consumption of natural gas since 1955, but there is a 
acceleration in the growth of its use in the early 1970s. Also, the following graph and data reveals 
that the original Six ECSC Member States continue to account for about half of all consumption. 
The data from 1955-1964 comes from BP Statistical Reviews up to 1974 as reported in Jenkins 
(1989:141-3). In those years, values for the EU are approximated based on the inclusion of 
Eastern Europe’s planned economies. The years 1965-2009 come from BP (2010). Information on 
Lithuania between 1965 and 1984 is not included and all other entries where the consumption 
was less than 0.05 Mtoe have been set to null. 
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Figure 9: EU natural gas consumption, 1955-2009 
 
Table 4: EU natural gas consumption, 1955-2009 
 
ECSC6 EEC15 EU27 
  
ECSC6 EEC15 EU27 
1955 4.15 4.85 11.25 
 
1983 130.06 181.49 242.56 
1956 5.25 6.00 13.00 
 
1984 139.42 192.23 254.58 
1957 5.70 6.45 14.25 
 
1985 141.05 198.39 264.17 
1958 6.20 6.95 15.75 
 
1986 142.57 201.11 268.83 
1959 7.90 9.10 19.00 
 
1987 152.72 213.63 282.13 
1960 9.55 11.05 21.65 
 
1988 149.20 209.18 277.63 
1961 11.35 12.95 24.25 
 
1989 155.64 216.95 286.77 
1962 12.85 14.55 27.65 
 
1990 160.04 224.72 290.54 
1963 13.55 15.25 30.05 
 
1991 169.42 239.15 297.60 
1964 15.05 16.95 33.35 
 
1992 169.06 239.02 293.78 
1965 16.22 18.60 35.38 
 
1993 175.66 253.64 307.75 
1966 19.16 21.64 40.21 
 
1994 173.05 254.02 308.09 
1967 23.52 26.42 47.56 
 
1995 186.86 274.07 331.96 
1968 32.05 36.59 60.26 
 
1996 204.13 304.22 365.77 
1969 42.61 50.21 78.49 
 
1997 197.37 302.38 358.86 
1970 54.40 67.28 97.93 
 
1998 204.87 315.93 370.66 
1971 67.17 86.96 119.85 
 
1999 210.19 330.48 383.50 
1972 81.10 108.69 142.47 
 
2000 213.72 339.25 392.99 
1973 96.77 126.56 162.60 
 
2001 220.07 347.51 403.06 
1974 110.59 146.27 184.08 
 
2002 218.15 347.53 402.40 
1975 115.74 153.15 194.92 
 
2003 230.25 363.77 421.05 
1976 125.99 166.16 213.29 
 
2004 235.96 375.58 433.78 
1977 129.48 171.74 222.70 
 
2005 238.67 380.59 441.02 
1978 133.95 177.88 231.47 
 
2006 235.65 375.10 434.76 
1979 142.05 189.67 243.59 
 
2007 231.37 373.24 429.86 
1980 138.74 186.90 244.83 
 
2008 232.62 381.46 437.82 
1981 134.99 183.96 243.13 
 2009 223.63 360.44 411.11 
1982 127.22 176.56 237.25 
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3.2.1.5.4. EU oil import dependence (%) 1970, 2000, 2008 and dependence on oil-based 
transport fuels (1970, 2007) 
The following table shows the changes between 1970 and 2007 in the key transport/oil related 
areas of oil import dependency, the dependency of oil in transport, and the on-road fuel intensity. 
The latter is presented in gallons per mile and not liters per kilometer because that is how the 
data was originally published. Also, the on-road fuel intensity data is limited to those countries 
reported in Sovacool and Brown (2009); unfortunately, neither the OECD nor the EU publish 
consolidated reports on on-road fuel intensity and neither yet includes such figures in their annual 
reports on energy statistics. Still, it is notable that the on-road fuel intensity reported in Sovacool 
and Brown declined in all the countries where data from 1970 was available. This demonstrates 
that fuel efficiency programs are working. However, several Member States have seen their 
import dependence increase and in several cases so has the share of oil in transport, meaning that 
they have failed to increase the share of substitute fuels. The data for the share of oil in transport 
and oil import dependence is derived from multiple sources, although the latter is incomplete 
because data for certain countries were not reported in the early 1970s. The data for oil import 
dependence from 1970 comes from the International Energy Agency (1984; 1991) as reported in 
Sovacool and Brown and the data for Romania in 1970 comes from Hudson (1980). The data for 
the import dependence in 2000 and 2008 come from Eurostat (2010b) and thus is complete for all 
27 Member States. Sovacool and Brown provided only a limited snapshot for the oil in transport 
and on-road fuel intensity percentages for 1973 and 2007. The figures were unavailable for the 
every Member State in the respective years. However, using data from the International Energy 
Agency’s Energy Balances of OECD Countries (IEA, 2006; 2010a) and Energy Balances of non-OECD 
Countries (IEA, 2010b), we were able to fill in much of the missing data for the share of oil out of 
total energy consumption in the transport sector of all 27 Member States. 
Table 5: EU petroleum dependency, 1970-2008 
 
Import dependence  Oil in transport  On-road fuel intensity 
 
1970 2000 2008 
 
1970 2007  1970 2007 
EU (27) .. 75.8 84.3 92.6 95.2  .. .. 
Austria 57 89.5 93.5 94.3 96.3  0.048 0.32 
Belgium 100 100 98.8 98.4 98.1  0.045 0.34 
Bulgaria .. 95.6 99 84.5 88.1  .. .. 
Cyprus .. 100 100 100 100  .. .. 
Czech Republic .. 94.5 97.5 86.3 95.5  .. .. 
Denmark 99 -80.9 -51.3 98.1 97.7  0.042 0.033 
Estonia .. 77.4 63 97.6‡ 100  .. .. 
Finland 100 100 100 97.7 98.1  0.045 0.34 
France 98 98.9 97.9 96.3 98.1  0.036 0.031 
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Import dependence  Oil in transport  On-road fuel intensity 
 
1970 2000 2008  1970 2007  1970 2007 
Germany 92 94.5 95.5 96.4 98.1  0.042 0.034 
Greece 99 100 101 98.3 98.1  0.048 0.034 
Hungary .. 77.5 81.7 70.8 97.1  .. .. 
Ireland 98 98.8 99.8 97.2 98.1  0.045 0.034 
Italy 97 96.1 91.5 98.7 97.5  0.036 0.034 
Latvia .. 94.4 98.9 95.4‡ 99.2  .. .. 
Lithuania .. 100 92.6 98.9‡ 95.5  .. .. 
Luxembourg .. 100 100 95 97.7  .. .. 
Malta .. 100 100 100 100  .. .. 
Netherlands 97 99.7 97.9 98 98.1  0.040 0.033 
Poland .. 97.1 96.4 45.9 95.2  .. .. 
Portugal 99 99.1 102.2 98 98.1  0.043 0.034 
Romania 14.6 34.9 51.6 100 95.2  .. .. 
Slovakia .. 89.4 91.7 97.2 75.2  .. .. 
Slovenia .. 101 101 97.8‡ 98.3  .. .. 
Spain 99 101 100 97.3 98.1  0.037 0.032 
Sweden 100 100 100 97.5 98.1  0.050 0.036 
United Kingdom 100 -54.5 8.8 97.7 96.3  0.048 0.032 
 1971 data. 
‡ 1990 data. 
.. No data. 
 
3.2.1.5.5. Fuel Switching and R&D into substitutes 
3.2.1.5.6. Biofuel production and solar power panel installation (1990-2008)  
The following table shows the growth in EU biofuel production and solar power panel installation 
between 1990 and 2008. Earlier data was unavailable. While solar power panel installations have 
risen steadily over the period, there are significant jumps in biofuel production in 2000 and 2006. 
Data is taken from Eurostat’s online database, table nrg_114a, Infrastructure - renewables - 
annual data  (Eurostat, 2010c). 
Table 6: EU biofuel and solar panel deployment, 1990-2008 
EU 
(all 27 Member States) 
Biofuel production 
(1000 tonnes) 
Solar Panels 
(1000 m2) 
1990 0 3846 
1991 0 4163 
1992 0 4634 
1993 0 5263 
1994 0 5880 
1995 0 6569 
1996 0 7352 
1997 0 8129 
1998 0 9031 
1999 694 9251 
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2000 1017 10622 
2001 1347 12324 
2002 1464 13295 
2003 2013 15363 
2004 2187 16815 
2005 4480 18928 
2006 11503 21869 
2007 14998 24673 
2008 21000 28896 
 
3.2.1.5.7. Energy R&D, 1980-2007  
The following and graph compares indexed growth/declines in total energy research and 
development (ERD) between 1970 and 2008 for 19 Member States and the US alongside an 
indexed view of the rise and fall of international oil prices. The table contains expenditures in 
€2008 and exchange rates for total ERD for the 19 Member States between 1974 and 2008 and 
contains an additional partial breakdown in percent of the focus areas. The 19 EU Member States 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Oil 
prices are indexed at their 1974 value in order to align with the onset of ERD data and in order to 
illustrate the enormous spike that occurred in the price between 1973 and 1974. Data for 
research and development expenditures between 1974 and 2008 come from the International 
Energy Agency’s online table of "R&D Budgets" in their Energy Technology R&D 
Statistics database (IEA, 2010c). Oil price values are set in $2009 and come from (BP, 2010).  
Figure 10: EU energy R&D (ERD), 1980-2007 
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Table 7: EU energy R&D in €2008, 1974-2008 
 
EU 'Total 
Energy 
R&D' 
Of which in specific areas: 
Transport 
Biofuels 
Hydrogen/Fuel 
Cells 
Fossil 
Fuel 
R&D 
Energy 
Efficiency 
1974 2496.94 
  
14.5% 3.0% 
1975 2810.44 
  
17.5% 8.2% 
1976 2845.22 
  
25.1% 8.6% 
1977 3385.78 
  
31.7% 11.4% 
1978 3710.98 
  
36.3% 13.1% 
1979 4120.35 
  
34.7% 13.5% 
1980 4294.74 
  
41.4% 17.7% 
1981 4979.21 
  
34.2% 13.0% 
1982 4863.29 
  
20.8% 11.3% 
1983 4142.42 
  
20.2% 15.6% 
1984 4660.14 
  
17.7% 13.0% 
1985 5234.62 
  
15.2% 11.2% 
1986 4345.69 
  
17.4% 12.4% 
1987 3678.48 
  
17.2% 13.3% 
1988 3527.36 
  
21.9% 11.9% 
1989 3027.03 
  
23.9% 13.4% 
1990 2791.77 
  
39.7% 16.6% 
1991 2709.96 
  
34.2% 19.9% 
1992 1820.32 
  
29.5% 26.3% 
1993 2069.50 
  
24.5% 27.4% 
1994 1915.92 
  
30.3% 32.6% 
1995 1882.52 
  
20.6% 36.9% 
1996 1823.08 
  
21.9% 34.2% 
1997 1850.50 
  
12.8% 32.2% 
1998 1867.59 
  
12.0% 33.6% 
1999 1569.39 
  
15.9% 38.5% 
2000 1855.67 
  
13.5% 34.7% 
2001 1723.78 
  
22.0% 40.7% 
2002 2065.18 0.2% 1.2% 29.5% 34.6% 
2003 2109.56 0.1% 1.4% 27.2% 25.0% 
2004 1950.83 0.9% 9.4% 27.6% 25.3% 
2005 2099.35 1.2% 10.8% 23.6% 23.5% 
2006 2356.41 2.4% 12.8% 21.7% 26.4% 
2007 2428.30 2.4% 14.1% 20.0% 28.0% 
2008 1387.03 2.4% 21.1% 29.5% 40.4% 
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3.2.1.5.8. Major market players 
Major market players are those commercial actors that have a large stake in the development of 
alternatives and the response to policy initiatives that lead to fuel substitution. Large companies 
(national champions) collectively invest vast sums of money into research and development in ten 
major energy related industries. These companies can and do play a role in national responses to 
energy needs. The industries include Aerospace/defence, oil/gas producers, oil equipment/service 
/distribution providers, mining, chemicals, automobiles/parts, industrial transportation, 
commercial vehicles/trucks, electricity producers/distributers, and gas and other utilities. The 
data provided below lists the top ten companies in 2005 in terms of net sales (mio €) and with 
research and annual development budgets of over €5 million in each these industries. It thus 
provides a snapshot of European commercial energy relevant research and development. The 
source of the data is EU’s 2009 industrial R&D investment scoreboard (Joint Research Centre, 
2009). The reports and data are available via the JRC website 
(http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/research/scoreboard_2009.htm).  
Table 8: Major energy relevant market players in the EU 
Aerospace & defence 
     
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
EADS NL 2354.00 34206.00 113210 2367 
BAE Systems UK 463.00 16037.00 74000 2108.88 
Finmeccanica IT 359.00 11166.00 52844 1746 
Thales FR 227.00 10263.00 53367 503.6 
Rolls-Royce UK 361.00 9610.00 35600 512.3 
SAFRAN FR 301.00 8692.00 51918 470 
Smiths UK 166.00 4391.00 28509 209 
Dassault Aviation FR 80.00 3428.00 12109 284.56 
SAAB SE 34.00 2057.00 12006 89.9 
Cobham UK 56.00 1587.00 10715 62.44 
 
Oil & gas producers 
     
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
TOTAL FR 8208.00 122618.00 112877 676 
Royal Dutch Shell UK 13256.00 260028.00 109000 498.47 
BP UK 10841.00 211481.00 102700 425.57 
ENI IT 6558.00 73728.00 71303 202 
Repsol YPF ES 3173.00 49368.00 35239 63 
OMV AT 1277.00 15604.00 55633 12.19 
BG UK 1688.00 8168.00 5363 10.19 
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Oil equipment, services & distribution 
    
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Compagnie Generale de 
Geophysique 
FR 125.00 870.00 3952 39.3 
Tenaris LU 224.00 5711.00 17693 29.42 
Technip FR 167.00 5377.00 20898 29.4 
Sondex UK 3.00 75.00 350 8.33 
SBM Offshore NL 338.00 1288.00 2253 8.24 
 
Mining 
     
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Anglo American UK 2859.00 24952.00 195000 33.91 
BHP Billiton UK 3942.00 25082.00 36468 27.98 
Boliden SE 142.00 2177.00 4530 21.2 
Rio Tinto UK 2113.00 16135.00 27824 16.96 
LKAB SE 282.00 1527.00 3563 16.94 
Hoganas SE 25.00 489.00 1572 14.06 
 
Chemicals & petrochemicals 
    
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Bayer DE 1292.00 27383.00 93163 1886 
BASF DE 2188.00 42745.00 80992 1086.3 
AKZO Nobel NL 514.00 13000.00 61400 837 
Solvay BE 555.00 9053.00 28730 477 
DSM NL 378.00 8195.00 22839 290 
Linde DE 715.00 9501.00 42081 227 
ICI UK 223.00 8459.00 32530 213.94 
Wacker-Chemie DE 288.00 2756.00 14434 146.9 
L'Air Liquide FR 931.00 10435.00 35900 141.1 
Rhodia FR 258.00 5399.00 19444 134 
 
Automobiles & parts 
     
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
DaimlerChrysler DE 6621.00 149776.00 386465 5649 
Volkswagen DE 12376.00 95268.00 323831 4075 
Peugeot (PSA) FR 2927.00 56267.00 208500 2151 
BMW DE 9610.00 46656.00 103546 3115 
Fiat IT 2684.00 45818.00 170071 1318 
Robert Bosch DE 2925.00 42016.00 250862 2931 
Renault FR 3223.00 40412.00 126584 2264 
Michelin FR 1267.00 15590.00 127319 565 
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Continental DE 844.00 13837.00 81085 590.4 
ZF DE 525.00 10833.00 53940 559 
 
Industrial transportation 
     
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Deutsche Post DE 1366.00 44594.00 388859 175 
SNCF FR 2527.00 20994.00 205839 55 
BAA UK 2129.00 3311.00 15337 39.3 
Finland Post FI 90.00 1348.00 23946 29.5 
La Poste FR 729.00 19329.00 303405 28 
Bollore Investissement FR 99.00 6338.00 31931 23.5 
Autostrade IT 852.00 2957.00 9106 21.9 
BBA UK 116.00 2199.00 13318 15.72 
Vossloh DE 25.00 996.00 4732 14.8 
ASF FR 489.00 2474.00 7255 11.5 
 
Commercial vehicles & trucks 
    
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Volvo SE 1210.00 25625.00 81184 1124.98 
Scania SE 823.00 6846.00 29869 295.6 
Wartsila FI 62.00 2639.00 12049 70.1 
Claas DE 42.00 2175.00 8122 59.93 
Jungheinrich DE 176.00 1645.00 8930 40.22 
JCB Service UK 59.00 1601.00 4631 39 
Same Deutz-Fahr IT 16.00 937.00 2697 19.23 
LDV UK 70.00 175.00 856 14.65 
 
Electricity 
     
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
AREVA FR 415.00 10125.00 58760 408 
Electricite de France FR 5839.00 51051.00 156765 402 
Vattenfall SE 1296.00 13758.00 32231 114.72 
British Nuclear Fuels (now 
British Nuclear Group 
Sellafield) 
UK 597.00 3441.00 23016 80.05 
Energie Baden DE 579.00 10817.00 17926 24 
Union Fenosa ES 1302.00 6099.00 18485 23.04 
Pohjolan Voima FI 766.00 601.00 938 21.5 
Enel IT 3037.00 35525.00 60084 20 
Fortum FI 335.00 3877.00 8939 14 
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Gas & multi-utilities 
     
Company name Country 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
RWE DE 3869.00 40518.00 86426 127 
Suez FR 2154.00 41489.00 157639 84.8 
Gaz De France FR 1991.00 22394.00 52958 73 
Veolia Environnement FR 1668.00 25245.00 241627 62.9 
E.ON DE 3162.00 51854.00 77347 24 
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3.2.2. Salience of SAPP 
Given that the EU was founded largely as a peace project between historical rivals, it is safe to 
assume that the EU should represent an ideal case of low SAPP, at least when understood as a 
group. This is not to say that the relative importance of SAPP was or even is uniform across 
Member States. Indeed, manifest distinctions of the strategic importance of power projection 
between Member States are visible in a number of areas including their use of military force, the 
size of standing forces, and annual military expenditures. It is not unimportant that several of the 
Member States controlled vast holdings of colonial property at the end of World War II. Nor is it 
illogical that those states that have been at the center of Europe’s internal competition for 
dominance would place a higher priority than lesser powers on maintaining large and mobile 
militaries.  
An analysis of every Member’s individual attitude toward SAPP would be superfluous. Many 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and East Germany) were part 
of the Warsaw Pact for much of the EU’s early history and thus greatly restricted in their ability to 
execute autonomous military operations even had they wanted to. Others (Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Malta, and Sweden) claim neutrality or are constitutionally restricted (Germany) from 
offensive foreign military adventures and thus cannot ever be expected to prioritize SAPP.153 
Instead, we can assume that the best way understand the status of SAPP for the EU is to evaluate 
the behavior of those Member States that by virtue either of their historical disposition toward 
power projection or their sheer economic size are most likely to engage in military activities. 
The term ‘armed conflict’ refers to the UCPD definition presented in Harbom (2010) as “a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths in a year”. In the context of European SAPP, France and the UK are 
standouts. Both maintain nuclear arsenals and both have engaged unilaterally in several armed 
conflicts since the 1950s, many of which were directly related to the anti-colonial struggles. The 
Netherlands and Portugal engaged in fewer but similar conflicts over the same period. Despite its 
                                                          
153
 Although not entirely prohibited in its Basic Law, Art. 26 (1)of the German Constitution bans any 
preparation for a war of aggression as unconstitutional and Art. 87a (2) limits the Bundeswehr to territorial 
defense. A series of Constitutional Court cases in the 1990s led to the interpretation that Germany may not 
deploy forces outside of NATO territory without a specific resolution of parliament. Since then, over a 1,000 
German sailors had participated in Operation Atalanta and some 5,000 have seen duty in northern 
Afghanistan. 
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early rearmament and membership in NATO (1955), Germany has been absent from any degree 
of material power projection because of the constitutional restrictions. Nevertheless, between 
1949 and 2009, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK combined to invest 
more than $12 trillion in constant 2008 dollars in their militaries.154 By comparison, the remaining 
Member States spent less than $2 trillion over the same period and the US spent over $25 trillion. 
When all EU military expenditures are summed together, the overwhelming burden of cost lies on 
the shoulder of a just a few powerful Member States (See Figure 11 below) and they have 
engaged in multiple wars and minor armed conflicts since the late 1940s (See Figure 12 below).  
Among states, there is a hierarchy and the most powerful ones, i.e. those with the greatest 
capacity to project power are often called major powers. They are distinguished from ‘central’ 
powers, which play an active role in international affairs and are still highly relevant, and 
‘peripheral’ powers, which while members of the international system carry little weight in 
shaping its affairs. In their seminal work on the study of the correlates of war (COW), Small and 
Singer (1982) point out that there is no absolute consensus as to what constitutes a so-called 
major power. It seems clear that post-war Germany and Japan are powerful economic players. 
However, it would be erroneous to call them military powers as well. In their work, Small and 
Singer identify  China (since 1950), Russia (since 1922), France and the UK  (since 1816), and the 
US (since 1899) as members of the major powers club.155 Although one may disagree with the 
authors’ terms and associations, their contribution to the scientific study of states and war is 
incontestable, and their labels provide a reasonable point of departure.156 Moreover, their ranking 
and method provide a transparent means by which to measure the power projection of a state 
based on the number of foreign armed conflicts in which it engages.   
                                                          
154
 Data for five Member States (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) are only since 1988. Data 
extracted for NATO members are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database on 
NATO military expenditures and the data (1988-2009) for Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Sweden 
come from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at http://www.sipri.org.  
155
 Austria-Hungary ceased being a major power 1918. Netherlands, Belgium, Spain Portugal, Italy all where 
at one time so-called ‘central players’ but never major powers. Germany and Japan were considered great 
powers until 1945 and Turkey until 1919.  
156
 Based on their work, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University maintains 
and provides extensive online databases on the quantifiable correlates of war.  
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Figure 11: EU military expenditures 1949-2009 in $2008 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  
Notes: Figures are for calendar years and notes are the originals that came with the SIPRI dataset as follows: 
“[1] The figures for France from 2006 are calculated with a new methodology due to a change in the French 
budgetary system and financial law. [2] From 2001, the UK moved from a cash based accounting system to a 
resource based system. The figures for the UK from 2001 are based on the "Net Cash Requirement" figures 
given in the Annual UK Defence Statistics, which are closest to the old cash definition. [3] The figures for Italy 
include spending on civil defense, which typically amounts to about 4.5% of the total.” 
 
Historical analysis of the importance of power projection among EU powers reveals a waning over 
time. Both France and the UK experienced the unwanted dismantling of their colonial holdings 
and reduced their unilateral (non-UN sanctioned) military operations to a trickle. Importantly, it 
cannot be said that France or the UK were prepared in the early 1950s to willingly forfeit their 
position as global powers, even if the economic and military facts of the early post-war periods 
demonstrated otherwise. In fact, France and the UK sent forces into over 100 unique conflicts 
between 1946 and 2009 (Harbom, et al., 2010). Most of those conflicts involved areas of former 
colonial holdings and only three were in some way directly connected to the flow of energy 
supplies.157 By the end of the 1980s, however, those conflicts had passed. Not only were there no 
more colonial holdings worth fighting for, the EU’s most powerful states had begun to increase 
cooperation in their foreign and security policies, the material evidence of which can be found in 
the increasing number of coordinated multilateral peace missions collectively undertaken by the 
Union. 
                                                          
157
 These include the 1951 UK intervention in the Suez, the 1956 French-UK intervention in the Suez, and 
the 1991 engagement in the first Gulf War with Iraq over Kuwait. Klare (2001) cites numerous territorial 
disputes in areas containing oil or natural gas, but not one includes an EU Member as a belligerent since the 
1950s.  
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Figure 12: Quantity of dyadic armed conflicts fought by 
EU Member States 1946-2009  
 
Figure 13: Distribution of unique conflict areas in 
ten-year periods 
 
Source:  the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, version 1-2010 
Notes: Internal armed conflicts occurring between the government of a state and one or more internal 
opposition group(s) without intervention from other states have been excluded. Each conflict listed had a 
minimum of at least 25 battle deaths. Actual figures may be slightly higher because cases where foreign 
mercenaries, colonial forces, or private security companies fought on behalf of states or governments in 
foreign countries are excluded.  
 
Why did Europe move from a collection of competing powers with vested interests in maintaining 
their status as ‘great powers’ to a collective Union of lesser powers? How did they transform their 
individual orientation toward power projection? The answers to these questions inform the shift 
of the EU from the initial idea of a new and united European global power to a wealthy, but 
largely soft power player; and the process was neither easy nor particularly quick.  
From the moment that Winston Churchill famously warned in 1946 that, “From Stettin in the 
Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent" (Churchill, 
1946), a new post-war military realignment began as Europe moved toward building a western 
union to stem the spread of Communism. By 1948, the foreign ministers of Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK had agreed on the “Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence”158 a move countered by the Soviet Union 
with a blockade of Berlin. Within a year (April 1949), much of what remained of free Western 
Europe had joined the US and Canada in forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
At the core of the new alliance was the notion of mutual defense, codified in Article 5 which 
stated that "an armed attack against one or more of [Member States] in Europe or North America 
                                                          
158
 For a detailed account of the early post-war years of military cooperation and the founding of NATO see 
Ismay (1954). The full text of the Brussels Treaty can be found online at the NATO Archives: 
http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm#f.  
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shall be considered an attack against them all.” Although untested until September, 2001, NATO’s 
Article 5 has become the standard by which collective security in Europe has been understood. 
The creation of NATO achieved three important things. First, it tied West European security to 
that of the US. Second, it created a clear geographic distinction between its free-market oriented 
countries and those under Soviet-styled planned economics. Third, it left a buffer zone of 
countries that would claim neutrality between the two sides. Thus, in the immediate years 
following the war, divisions in Europe were formalized, and in the process, sparked a drive among 
its western units to establish a new unified global power.  
In October, 1950, French Prime Minister Rene Pleven led the charge with a bold proposal to 
create a European Defense Community (EDC) between France, Italy, the Benelux countries and 
West Germany.159 He asked for “a complete fusion of all the human and material elements” of 
war among European powers creating a European army under the control of the political 
institutions of a new united Europe (Ismay, 1954:Chapter IV). Under the Pleven plan, an 
intergovernmental “European Assembly” would appoint a single European Minister of Defense. 
The new supranational European army would have a single common budget “placed at the 
disposal of the unified Atlantic force”.  
Pleven’s plan was watered down significantly over the course of the next four years and never 
made it to a vote in the French Parliament in 1954 when it became clear that it could not pass. In 
the absence of the EDC and its goal of new unified European power, West Germany joined NATO 
in 1955. Almost immediately thereafter, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania formed the Warsaw Pact. Far from creating a new and powerful 
player to balance the emergent US and Soviet Union, Europe’s first attempts re-enter the ranks of 
great powers failed. Indeed, the division of Europe was complete. 
Europe’s lack of military integration allowed nationalist interests to guide events in the 
subsequent years. Already burdened by the heavy costs of reconstruction and a military buildup 
to offset Soviet gains in the East, France and the UK faced immediate losses of their colonial 
holdings. Europe’s first post-war energy crisis came about as they tried to prevent losing control 
of the Suez Canal, which had become the main artery for eastern oil flows to Europe. Therefore, 
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 The UK was neither included nor willing to entertain placing its armed forces under what amounted to 
French control. 
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when Egypt nationalized the canal in July 1956, both the UK and France faced a direct threat to 
their economic and military power projection capabilities.  
France, which was engaged in defending its rule in Algeria, considered Egypt’s president Nasser to 
be “responsible for assisting the anti-colonial rebellion” and saw the seizure as strengthening the 
forces opposing Paris (Risse-Kappen, 1995:85).160 Also France’s Compagnie Francaise Des Petroles 
(CFP), now known as Total Oil, had just joined a consortium deal forming the Iranian Oil 
Participants Limited with the government of Iran to drill for oil.161 For its part, the UK feared the 
seizure would endanger the kingdom’s ability to meet military obligations under the 
anticommunist alliances established in the 1954 Manila and 1955 Baghdad Pacts in the Middle 
East.162/163 In an influential report on the status of the canal in 1954, Donald Watt (1956) 
highlighted its strategic importance noting that the canal had been used in the past to transport 
troops from the "Dominions of Australia and New Zealand" during wars in Europe. He also 
highlighted the economic consequences that would result from the loss of oil if the canal traffic 
were disrupted. In his concluding remarks, he noted that “the possibility of the Canal being closed 
to troopships makes the question of the control and regime of the Canal as important to Britain 
today as it ever was” (Watt, 1956:8).  
The result was a coordinated, but misguided and failed tripartite attack (together with Israel) to 
seize control of the Canal in October 1956, which not only led to sever disruptions along the canal, 
it also led to a deep division in transatlantic relations between the France and the US, which had 
vocally opposed the intervention.164 Following the crisis, France turned inward toward increased 
cooperation with its neighbors and the UK became the US’ junior partner in military operations 
                                                          
160
 It may be argued that France was far more interested in seeking revenge upon Nasser for his role in 
fomenting rebellions in French North Africa than they were securing energy resources or for that matter 
access to the canal as a support line for eastern holdings. Paris had already forfeited control of Indochina in 
the 1954 Geneva Agreements, nullifying its territorial claims. For a discussion of French motivations to 
intervene in the Suez see Chapter 4 “Unworthy and Unreliable” (pages 83-104) in Risse-Kappen (1995). 
161
 The consortium consisted of British Petroleum, Exxon, Socony, Texas Oil, Socal, Gulf, Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group, and CFP.  
162
 Created the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) between France, the UK, the US, Australia, 
New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, East Pakistan (Bangladesh), and the Philippines; dissolved on June 30, 
1977 
163
 Created the Central Treaty Organization between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the UK; dissolved in 
1979. 
164
 It has been argued that the Suez Crisis provided the impetus for the Soviet Union to invade Hungary just 
as the latter was beginning to express its desire to join its western neighbors. See footnote 75 on page 57. 
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around the world. Thus, between the end of World War II and the birth of ECSC in 1957, both the 
aims and the reach of Europe’s former great powers were dramatically reduced.  
The waning of Europe’s approach toward power projection took a further hit in 1961, when the 
Soviet Union raised the Berlin Wall dividing the former German capital in two. At the time, France, 
the UK, and the US each had one brigade stationed there to defend the city. But instead of 
responding in a concerted effort to support one of its own, the Member States were forced to rely 
on the US to intervene. On August 20, 1,500 heavily armed American soldiers in a column of 491 
vehicles and 160 kilometers long, began marching from West Germany through East Germany en 
route to West Berlin.165 The rapidity and dimensions of that response, along with the lack of 
substantial French and UK support, illustrated what was now quickly becoming a paradigm shift in 
European military thinking; individual national interests prevailed over collective ones, and no 
Member was actually prepared to directly risk conflict with a great power state. Moreover, France 
was mired in a losing conflict in the Algerian War (1954 to 1962) and undergoing a Gaullist 
resurgence at home and just three years later withdrew its commitments to NATO altogether 
booting the allies and their headquarters out of the country.166  
Europe’s failure to unite under a common defense strategy in the early 1950s and subsequent 
failures of its former great powers to stake out an equal position in world affairs exacerbated an 
underlying flaw in European integration process. Whether it was De Gaulle’s desire for an 
independent or lead role for France or a resurgent Germany under the reins of Willy Brandt 
pushing a new agenda of Ostpolitik eloquently presented in a famous article in Foreign Affairs 
(Brandt, 1967), Europe was as divided as ever and as a result, its parts, as well as the whole, were 
weakened.  
When Soviets tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to suppress the Prague Spring, 
European leaders were in no position to muster a united response and instead “worked 
individually rather than collectively to avert military action in Eastern Europe through the use of 
quiet diplomacy” (McGinn, 1999:112).167 The situation was complicated by divisions among 
European leaders as to their future path together with the UK and Germany favoring stronger 
                                                          
165
 The exact same exercise was repeated every three months by one battalion for the next three years. 
166
 They relocated within a year to Belgium. 
167
 West Germany’s State Secretary Rolf Lahr even lobbied US Secretary of State Dean Rusk not to use any 
form of public diplomacy for fear that “rash words could only be counterproductive”. See Memcon, 
Secretary of State Rusk and West German State Secretary Rolf Lahr, Washington, DC, 10 May 1968, NSA, 
SFC, Box I. 
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Atlantic ties and Gaullists pushing for a continentally centered European Europe (Brzezinski, 1968; 
Camps, 1968).168 
By the early 1970s, the perception toward power projection by both France and the UK had 
changed dramatically. After fighting in four inter-state wars (Egypt, North Korea, Tunisia, and 
Thailand) engaging in three internationalized internal conflicts (Cameroon, Gabon, and Chad) and 
an additional seven extra-systemic wars in its colonial holdings (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Malagasy, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania) France’s standing as great power and the reach of 
its influence had been shrunk significantly.169 Paris continued to maintain ties to the Francophone 
world, but both its ability and its will to project power unilaterally and globally had been seriously 
abridged. The same is true of the UK, which had fought in four inter-state wars (Albania, North 
Korea, Egypt, Indonesia), intervened in two internal conflicts (Oman and Malaysia), and engaged 
in six extra-systemic wars (Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, North Borneo, and South Yemen) 
since 1946. And by 1970, troubles in Northern Ireland began to occupy much of its military focus. 
Thus, between 1950 and 1970, Europe’s former great powers had tried and failed to reestablish 
their position as primary players on the international stage. During that time, SAPP was important 
for at least France and the UK. Indeed, the former had doubled its annual military budget and the 
latter had increased its by 50 percent (SIPRI, 1980:21), but both had lost most of their foreign 
holdings along the way. By 1973, most of their efforts had come to naught and neither had the 
unilateral capability to project hard power wherever and whenever they wanted. Across the 
1960s their military manpower dropped significantly from a combined 1.3 million in 1960 to 855 
thousand by 1972. This was followed by a five year period of reductions between 1969 and 1974, 
that saw the UK’s Air Force shrink by 100 combat aircraft, its submarine fleet by twenty, and it 
navy by one less operational aircraft carrier.170 Over the same period, France reduced its combat 
aircraft by a hundred and reduced its aircraft carrier fleet to one (IISS, 1969; 1973). Intriguingly, 
these changes came concurrent (1969-1974) with huge spikes in oil consumption in both 
countries; from 71.8 to 121 million tonnes in France and 89.8 to 105.3 million tonnes in the UK 
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 Also relevant is the fact that there was growing domestic turmoil and violent student protests spreading 
in France, the UK, Italy, and Belgium, at the time. The reasons for this were many, but not least among 
them was a strong opposition to the US-led war in Vietnam. Various chapters of Fink, Gassert and Junker 
(1998) provide an in-depth analysis of the 1968 movements in various Western countries.  
169
 See Harbom and Wallensteen (2010); data from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, Version 1-2010 
(http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm)  
170
 For a detailed account of the UK’s long period of relative economic decline during the post-war years and 
its plane to ‘punch above its weight’ militarily see Chalmers (1985).  
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respectively. Despite their increased oil dependence, the importance of SAPP had actually 
appeared to decline. If Europe was to project hard power in the future, it would have to do so 
multilaterally. 
The crises that would occur in the 1970s, from increased oil prices to splits within Europe over the 
stationing of nuclear missiles in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK, would 
further work toward pushing Europe further away from its early post-war attitudes toward power 
projection. These were followed by another set of crises in the 1980s including the Iran-Iraq War 
and the subsequent tanker wars in the Persian Gulf that threatened the stability of EU oil supplies. 
Amidst the latter crisis, several European flagged vessels were either directly attacked or suffered 
damage from mines laid by Iran and Iraq. The UK and France moved quickly to protect their 
vessels. But it took several years before European leaders decided to coordinate their military 
presence in the Gulf. Ultimately they did agree to loosely coordinate plans to secure shipping in 
the area and by November, 1988, there were 21 West European warships in the Gulf and German 
support ships in the Mediterranean (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990). The newly coordinated 
efforts came on the heels of a 1987 decision to adopt a broad "Platform on European Security 
Interests" based on the principles of prevention of war through deterrence (nuclear and 
conventional), the promotion of disarmament, and a continued US presence in Europe (Hill, et al., 
2000:189).  
This new spirit of European-centered cooperation was encapsulated in Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 
proposal to France to form a joint Franco-German brigade as the first step towards a joint 
European fighting force. Because the former could only act in self-defense or under UN authority 
and then only in non-combat operations, Europe’s new emerging idea was not one of power 
projection, but one of security promotion through multilateral mandate. 
Almost a decade later (1995), when NATO forces launched Operation Deliberate Force to compel 
Serbia to end violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, European forces flew 388 sorties (17%) and 
later (2004) took over policing operations there under an extended UN mandate. This latter 
approach would become the symbolic hallmark of the EU’s new approach to power projection. 
Europe will act together so long as the operations are not offensive in nature and are authorized 
by the UN.  
By the end of the 1990s, the EU had begun to unify its approach to security and defense, 
reinitiating what it had started back in the 1950s, only this time with a new understanding of 
power projection based on multilaterally authorized crisis management. At the Helsinki European 
Council meeting in 1999, leaders set a ‘Headline’ goal of 2003 to establish European Rapid 
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Reaction Force essentially to increase the Union’s capability to carry out the 1992 established 
‘Petersberg tasks’ of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and the tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management and peacemaking.171  
In September 2003, the EU joined the UN in a Joint Declaration on EU-UN co-operation in Crisis 
Management setting up joint consultative mechanism for coordinating international 
peacekeeping missions. Then, in July 2004, the Council established the European Defence Agency 
"to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s defense 
capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and 
develops in the future” (JOINT ACTION 2004/551/CFSP).172 A year later, leaders met informally at 
Hampton Court to discuss ways in which to increase financing, research, and development in the 
military sector among Member States. They also agreed to coordinate planned and future crisis 
management operations. On the capabilities front, the leaders agreed to focus on ways to 
enhance Europe’s capabilities for “Strategic Lift, Air-to-Air Refueling and C4ISTAR (Command, 
Control, Communication, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance)”. In short, the EU was beginning to plan for increased use of military forces 
worldwide. 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain have since established the European 
Gendarmerie Force (EGF), a rapid deployment (30 days) European intervention force to respond 
to international crises.173 Fifteen new European battle-groups have been established.174 And in 
March, 2009, France officially rejoined NATO’S integrated military command structure. In the last 
decade alone, the EU has engaged in 24 different security missions (police and military).175  
Such measures could be understood as a strengthening of the EU’s perception of SAPP. However, 
in a 2006 strategy paper, the EDA made scant reference to energy merely noting that “bio- and 
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material sciences and energy technologies will provide modern Armed Forces with great 
advantages”, adding the platitude that , “Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on the rest 
of the world, especially for energy” (EDA, 2006). The same was true for a later Solana report 
(S407/08, 2008) on the implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy. The military may 
be growing in importance for the EU, but talk of EU militarization of energy security, particularly 
as pertains to supply availability for power projection is pure speculation.  
Nevertheless, defense related research and development has become a primary focal point of 
contemporary EU interest, and that does at least point to some change in the orientation of 
European power projection, if not quite its contemporary perception of SAPP. In fact, in 2005, the 
EDA’s head, High Representative Javier Solana, implied as much by placing EU military R&D in the 
context of a competition with the US. In a letter to the Council, Solana wrote, “The US is out-
spending Europe by 5:1 in defence R&D. Calls for urgent action have been made by industry to 
increase the proportion of the whole spent collaboratively in Europe from less than 5% to 20%” 
(S416/05). And in 2007, the EDA’s Ministerial Steering Board set the goal of a R&D share of 
collective defence expenditures at two percent. As of 2008, however, the EU was still spending 
less than 1.25% of its collective military budgets on research and technology, which is less than 
the 1.32% it was dedicating in 2006 (EDA, 2010) and was still far behind the US in terms of its 
overall military expenditures and military R&D between 2006 and 2008.176  
Table 9: Defense and research expenditures in Europe and the US, 2006-2008 
 
Europe* US** 
 
Defense 
Expenditure 
(share of 
GDP) 
Defense 
Expenditure 
(10^9 €) 
R&D 
Share 
R&T 
Share 
Defense 
Expenditure 
(share of GDP) 
Defense 
Expenditure 
(10^9 €) 
R&D 
Share 
R&T 
Share 
2006 1.8% 201 4.8% 1.3% 4.7% 492 11.8% 2.2% 
2007 1.7% 204 4.7% 1.3% 4.5% 454 12.4% 2.1% 
2008 1.6% 200 4.3% 1.3% 4.8% 466 11.6% 1.6% 
* 26 EDA participating Member States;  
**Euro/Dollar exchange rate average for 2008: 1.470; 
Source: (EDA, 2010) 
 
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty in 2010 has solidified the role of the two cores elements of SAPP with EU 
politics. Both the common security framework and energy security have been given specific 
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attention. However, despite their common presence in treaties and speeches, the two are not 
necessarily linked. The EU no longer maintains any colonial holdings that can force it into 
internationalized internal conflicts, even if such conflicts beg for intervention as in the cases of 
Darfur, Afghanistan, Chad, and the Congo. Its military, even with the early buildups under the 
threat of the Warsaw Pact are in no position to attack and seize territory abroad, or for that 
matter even secure vital energy transit routes on their own. The presence of European naval 
forces off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is testimony to both the spirit and 
limitations of EU naval power. 
Although SAPP was once important for two of the Member States of an earlier EU, today’s Union 
sees power projection in a different light. The EU as a group now prioritizes military operations 
only under the auspices of international legal authority, notably the UN, and because of the 
combination of the diverse makeup of its Member States’ military capabilities together with its 
commitment to multilateralism, we can assume that the EU now collectively fits the model of an 
international actor with low SAPP. 
3.2.2.1. SAPP relevant data 
Since the core military projection capacity of the EU rests with only few players, the following 
SAPP related charts will focus on their role.  
3.2.2.1.1. EU military expenditures / personnel 
The following charts show the growth of EU military expenditures from 1949 to 2009 in constant 
$2008 and active military personnel between 1950 and 2007. For comparative purposes, three 
EUs are identified in the military expenditures chart: one includes the original six; a second 
includes the nine Member States following the first enlargement; and a third incorporates all 27 
Member States. The reasoning behind this approach is that when expressed as a complete group 
(its 2010 status), the share of overall military expenditures by the original six never exceeds 70% 
of the total. The nine Member State group, however, never drops below 84% of overall military 
expenditures. Thus one can assume that these nine Member States (in fact eight because 
Ireland’s military budget is negligible) are most representative of EU military investments prior to 
fifth enlargement in 2004. These three groups are then juxtaposed to the price of oil (set on the 
secondary, right axis) for context.177 Active military personnel are presented in two groups, the 
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first being for the nine Member States after the first enlargement and the second being the total 
active personnel for the current Union. Military expenditure data comes from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute Database on NATO military expenditures, available at 
http://www.sipri.org and SIPRI's Full Military Expenditure Database from 1988-2009. Personnel 
data comes from the Correlates of War Project originally published and updated in (Singer, 1987; 
Singer, et al., 1972). 
Figure 14: EU military expenditures, 1949-2009 
 
 
Figure 15: EU active military personnel, 1950-2007 
 
 
3.2.2.1.2. Estimated inventories of energy dependent military hardware 
The following table is presents an estimated assessment of the total energy dependent active 
military hardware in the arsenals of France, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain in selected 
years between 1960 and 2005. The reason for the limited country selection is that of the EU’s 
western Member States, including those that were also part of NATO, only the five identified 
above had equipment levels and the necessary manpower to be considered as offensive 
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capabilities. The selection is based on a subjective assessment of the military value of their 
hardware. Only weapons systems that are practical for offensive power projection are included. 
Transport ships and planes, minesweepers are not included. Principle surface fighting ships 
include a broad range of coastal and deep water destroyers, frigates, and escorts; their relevance 
to offensive power projection was the sole discretion of the author. The table illustrates the 
steady and consistent balance of air and naval power over the period, with a slight increase in the 
number of naval vessels many of which were escorts, indicating an overall lack of interest in 
projecting power. Submarines did increase through 1975, at the height of the Cold War, but have 
steadily dropped since as the EU has little need for their attack capabilities. Data for the table 
comes from multiple annual editions of The Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies., 1965; 1966; 1969; 1970; 1974; 1975; 1979; 1980; 1984; 1985; 1989; 1990; 2004). 
 
Table 10: Energy dependent active power projection military hardware for selected EU Member States and 
years 
 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2005 
Aircraft/Helicopter 
Carriers 
8 6 4 6 7 8 8 6 
Submarines 156 128 122 151 153 147 147 110 
Principle Surface 
Fighting Ships 
100 
< x > 
120 
140 
< x > 
160 
160 
< x > 
180 
170 
< x > 
190 
180 
< x > 
200 
170 
< x > 
190 
170 
< x > 
190 
140 
< x > 
160 
Air Combat / 
Bombers 
1000 
< x > 
1200 
2000 
< x > 
2200 
2000 
< x > 
2200 
2000 
< x > 
2200 
2000 
< x > 
2200 
2100 
< x> 
2300 
2100 
< x> 
2300 
1700 
< x 
>1900 
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3.3. The US’ Energy Policy 
3.3.1. Evolution of US energy policy 
The evolution of energy policy in the US is colored by two contradictory traditions inherent in 
American political culture that at different times have taken priority over one another. The first is 
that of a hands-off, Laissez-faire approach, rooted in the tradition of free market. The second is 
one whereby the government intervenes as a coordinator in the name of national security. The 
dominance of one over another tradition was determined largely by matters of price and the 
importance of fuel supplies to power projection.  
Energy and its associated research and development already were major political issues in the US 
by the end of World War II. However, that was not the case just a few years earlier. Before the 
War, energy had been a matter only of economics and competition policy. Oil supplies were 
abundant. The relationship between the US government and the petroleum industry swung 
between resentment and acrimony. Despite the fact that the US already had supported the 
development of biofuels in the early part of the century, government funding for energy related 
research was limited, spurious, and scattered across multiple pieces of legislation and executive 
agencies. The events of World War II changed that perspective and did so in three important 
ways: (1) by raising the importance of oil to national security; (2) by introducing nuclear 
technology to power projection; and (3) by initiating the idea that research and development 
required government support and coordination. 
World War II was not a war over oil. However, oil was a “critical dimension” in what became a 
“war for mobility” (Pratt, et al., 2002:x-xi) and oil was central to its outcome. Indeed, cutting off 
Japan’s petroleum supply lines in East Asia was as much a core component of US strategy in the 
Pacific War as Germany’s attempts to secure Baku and sink US oil tankers in the Atlantic.178 Even 
before the US officially entered the war, the government recognized the growing importance of 
oil to the Allies war effort. In May 1941, the Department of Interior established an office called 
the Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense (PCND). Almost immediately, after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, the management of petroleum supplies became synonymous with the war 
effort. Recognizing its vital importance to its Pacific Fleet as well as Allied forces, President 
Roosevelt issued an Executive Order (EO) establishing a Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) 
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in 1942 “to coordinate and centralize the war policies and actions of the Government relating to 
petroleum” subsuming the previously existing Petroleum Coordinator.179 The fact that authority 
was specifically placed under the control of the US Department of Interior (and not the 
Departments of State or Defense) highlighted both the importance of internal institutional actors 
in the US and its abundance of supplies. The PCND and PAW managed all wartime issues related 
to petroleum and with the support of the Petroleum Industry War Council (PIWC), a group of 66 
American oil executives that reported directly to the PAW, the US increased its wartime oil 
production by 30% and developed new and advanced high-octane fuels vital for the air war in 
Europe.   
Born out of the successful cooperation experienced during the war, the US quickly recognized the 
value in maintaining some degree of coordination over the nation’s fuel supplies. Acting under 
orders of President Truman, Interior Secretary Julius Krug created in May 1946 a National 
Petroleum Council (NPC) in order to foster a “close and harmonious relations between 
government and industry” to “consult and advise” the Interior Department (Pratt, et al., 2002:7). 
This new organization was unique among American institutions, for although it was federally 
chartered, it was an entirely industry-financed operation that was assigned a specific mission to 
enhance the national security, emergency preparedness, and crisis management capabilities of 
the country through the management of petroleum. Thus, over the course of just a few short 
years, the politics of energy caused the US to undergo a sea change in its approach to government 
intervention. In order to meet the immediate needs of war, the US government first overcame a 
decades-long shadow of mistrust to cooperate with an oil industry that it had loathed. It then 
emerged from the war with an existing institutional framework for the coordination of oil 
production and supply directly linked to power projection. 
The emergence of oil as a national security factor was only part of a larger, sweeping 
transformation that occurred in the government’s attitude toward energy during the war years. 
Another important shift was the centralization of control over energy related resources and its 
use in industry and foreign affairs (see Table 12 on page 182). The most decisive decision came in 
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 The EO 9276 ‘Establishing the Petroleum Administration for War and Defining its Functions and Duties’ 
was signed on December 2, 1942 (US Federal Register 7 FR 10091, December 4, 1942). The EO amended 
previous orders (EO 1965: ‘Providing for the Protection of Essential Facilities From Sabotage and Other 
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1941 when the US established the Lend-Lease program,180 run out of the Office of the President 
(EO 8926),181 which supplied the Allies with over $50 billion (almost $760 billion in $2008) of war 
material through 1945 (Crowley, 1947:858-60); a move that also ended years of US isolation. The 
Lend-Lease program came on the heels of a 1939 decision to coordinate the import and export of 
electricity and natural gas (EO 8202).182 Seeing the centrality of energy in terms of its effect on 
industrial output, President Roosevelt then issued several additional executive orders establishing 
an Economic Defense Board (EO 8839), an Office of Defense Transportation (EO 8989), and a War 
Production Board (EO 9024).183 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), established 
through the earlier New Deal Program, created several government-owned corporations (Metals 
Reserve Company, Rubber Reserve Company, Defense Plant Corporation, Defense Supplies 
Corporation, War Damage Corporation, U.S. Commercial Company, Rubber Development 
Corporation, and the Petroleum Reserve Corporation).184 Even under the circumstances of war, 
the creation of these new government agencies ran counter to the government’s long-standing 
tradition of staying out of the economy.185 Joseph Eastman in a famous 1943 editorial in the 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences lamented that there had never 
before been agencies like these, adding, “I sincerely hope that no occasion will soon arise for 
creating another one” (Eastman, 1943). The government merged or abolished many of these 
agencies shortly after the war. However, the controversy about their establishment and lessons 
learned by the US government remained; and by 1950, the US government recognized the 
importance of staying actively engaged in the petroleum sector. 
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The war also drove developments in another key area of energy, namely atomic power. Shortly 
before Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Roosevelt 
informing him “the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in 
the immediate future” imploring him to assign an official to both take the lead on developing 
atomic technologies and materially support academic research in the area.186 Roosevelt 
responded by establishing an Advisory Committee on Uranium and then in June 1940 
incorporated it into the highly secret National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) before 
moving it a year later into the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) under his 
direct control.187 Government support for atomic research was first tentative and skeptical, but 
then accelerated in 1941 when the UK MAUD commission produced a secret report about the 
feasibility of producing an atomic bomb. Vannevar Bush, the acting head the NDRC, seized the 
moment and proposed the US move forward with just such a project. The fact that the US was 
fully engaged and losing the Pacific War in mid-1942 provided the impetus for support. Bush 
began organizing secret laboratories in Chicago, Tennessee, Berkeley, and Manhattan and by the 
close of the year the President approved the plans. The Manhattan Project was born.188 
The Manhattan Project was more than just a weapons program. It also was a full-blown 
cooperative research program between the government, the military, universities, and key 
industrialists. The output of the program was not only a weapon, but an advancement in the 
knowledge of energy physics that would alter the historical path of the country itself. The 
detonation of the country’s only two functional bombs in August 1945 brought about Japan’s 
surrender and ended the war. It is in this light that Manhattan Project became the paradigmatic 
organizational model for future grand scientific endeavors, from putting a man on the moon to 
achieving energy independence. The advancements also had one other effect. It introduced the 
notion of an almost inexhaustible source of energy that could drive engines at sea. Thus, shortly 
after the conclusion of the war, the US embarked on a massive program to build a nuclear navy 
(see chapter on US SAPP, page 198) and in so doing took control of the seas for the remainder of 
the twentieth century. Indeed, there is no better example of how the control of energy altered 
the ability to project power.  
                                                          
186
 The letters between Einstein and Roosevelt are widely available in the Public Domain. A facsimile of the 
original letter is available from the US National Archives: 
<http://media.nara.gov/Public_Vaults/00762_.pdf>. 
187
 The office was terminated during 1947. For a complete account of the developments of the OSRD and 
early US government stewardship of scientific research see Stewart (1948), Stewart (1980). 
188
 For a full and detailed accounting of the Manhattan project, see Gosling (1999).  
Testing the Model 
144 
With the genie now out of the bottle and the war past, the US Congress moved quickly to restore 
the country’s old hands-off tradition and wrest control from the executive branch. In 1946, it 
passed the Atomic Energy Act, which transferred all atomic related research and materials from 
the military to civilian control, including the development of nuclear bombs and power, and it 
created a specialized agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to coordinate it, placed under 
their oversight.189 
The combination of the successful Manhattan Project and the coordinated efforts of temporary 
centralized agencies setup during the war solidified the bond between the US government and 
the civilian scientific community. The US had already begun supporting war related scientific 
research and development during World War I when it worked together with the UK and France 
on ways to detect German submarines. The most important figure of the time was Vannevar 
Bush. Already an active member of the National Research Council (NRC) in 1917, he coordinating 
thousands of American scientists, became the first presidential science adviser, and in 1939 
became chairman of the influential National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the 
forerunner to the future National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Bush had 
originally proposed creating another influential agency, the National Defense Research 
Committee (NDRC), and when it was incorporated into the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD), in 1943 he became its director and thus ultimately controlled the 
development of the Manhattan Project until the Army took it over. As the country’s chief 
researcher, Bush orchestrated a seemingly united front of American scientists that led not only to 
the atomic bomb, but to sonar and radar technologies and amphibious landing vehicles. His 
previous successes, however, were nothing compared to what he initiated in 1945. 
In July 1945, Bush delivered a report to President Truman titled Science, The Endless Frontier.190 
Noting that, “In this war it has become clear beyond all doubt that scientific research is absolutely 
essential to national security”, he proposed that the US government establish a “National 
Research Foundation” in order to 
“develop and promote a national policy for scientific research and scientific 
education, [that] should support basic research in nonprofit organizations, should 
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develop scientific talent in American youth by means of scholarships and 
fellowships, and should by contract and otherwise support long-range research on 
military matters.” (Bush, 1945). 
Responding to his call, Congress passed a law in 1947 to establish just such a foundation, but 
Truman vetoed it because it lacked provisions for proper government oversight. Science 
promotion was good, but not when left entirely to scientists. Despite the failure to pass, Congress 
did reorganize the post-war military in the National Security Act of 1947.191 The act merged the 
Departments of War and Navy into a National Military Establishment and created the Air Force by 
separating it from the Army’s Air Forces, all under the control of the Secretary of Defense. It also 
transformed the Army and Navy’s Joint Research Development Board (JRDB), chaired at that time 
by Bush, into the Research and Development Board (RDB) with a budget of almost $500 million, 
the purpose of which was to promote research through the military until a National Science 
Foundation could be established.192 It took three more years of debate, but finally in 1950, the 
Congress passed and the President signed Public Law 81-507, creating the National Science 
Foundation (NSF). In so doing, it also established a governing board, the so-called National Science 
Board (NSB) appointed by the President. Bush was not on the board.193  
The establishment of the NSF was the final spoke in the new wheel of American political traditions 
toward cooperation between science and government. With its establishment, the US laid the 
groundwork for decades of dominance in the area of public-private partnerships in research and 
development. With a new and improved relationship with oil companies, the introduction of 
nuclear power, a new technical enterprise emerged that married the military, industry, and 
academia to a degree and depth that transformed the traditional hands-off, Laissez-faire 
orientation of government to one of coordination and investment, all in the name of national 
security. The shift in tradition, however, was incomplete and temporary. Despite the impending 
surge in naval nuclear propulsion, the vast majority of energy used for mobility, so vital in the 
victory of the previous war, was still based on oil; and oil was cheap and fully in the hands of 
private corporations.  
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By 1950, the US tradition of non-interference in the economy, which had been temporarily traded 
for one of cooperative collaboration in the area of energy during the war, reemerged. Having 
established an institutional mechanism to allow oil industry executives and the government to 
cooperate, it soon became clear to the government (and those that advised it) that overregulation 
was unwanted, if not unnecessary. Meanwhile, nuclear power, used originally for war purposes, 
was now put to the task of creating global peace. Although supplies and technology had to be 
controlled, the notion that nuclear power could solve most of the world’s energy problems was 
taking hold. The US economy was booming and with it so too the consumption of electricity and 
motor fuel. Thus, just at the time when the US was entering into a Cold War with the Soviet Union 
in a global battle between Capitalism and Communism, the wartime tradition of cooperation gave 
way to the forces of free enterprise. Energy policy in the US underwent a proverbial reset. 
3.3.1.1. The post-war reset and foreign oil 
Within 24 hours of the Japanese surrender, the US government lifted its wartime gasoline-
rationing program sparking a run on car sales. Demand for motor fuel exploded and oil’s share of 
the country’s total energy consumption quickly began to outpace that of coal (Yergin, 1991:409). 
Also, by the end of the war America’s great suburbanization had already begun. Between 1944 
and 1950, new housing starts rose from an annual 114,000 to 1.7 million and by 1954 some 9 
million Americans had moved to the suburbs. Two decades later, the number of Americans living 
in the suburbs surpassed those living in cities or rural areas.194 The essential tool of this new life 
was the automobile. There were 26 million cars in service in the US in 1945. By 1950 that number 
exceeded 40 million. The numbers would only explode from there as the country’s new interstate 
highway system (introduced under the Eisenhower administration) connected all of the country’s 
major cities. To pay for this new transportation infrastructure the government introduced a tax on 
gasoline. 
This massive increase in the consumption of fuel only exacerbated concerns about supply raised 
during the war effort. In order to maintain superiority in future conflicts, access to more oil in as 
many places as possible would be necessary. Based on its successful experience in developing 
new technologies, optimism was growing that the country could develop synthetic fuels that 
would replace the need for oil altogether (Jaffe, 1948) and thus the Department of Interior 
requested $10 billion in Manhattan Project form to research synthetic fuels. The assumption at 
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the time was that gasoline made from coal would cost the same as from oil; an assumption that 
proved wrong, and came concurrent with advances by US oil companies in gaining concessions in 
the Middle East.195 New domestic discoveries196 and the successes of America’s oil majors 
ultimately killed the program.197 Indeed, a US government policy review in 1948 may have put the 
final nail in the alternatives coffin by arguing that access to apparently limitless supplies of Middle 
Eastern oil would allow the US to shut-in domestic production, i.e. implement a production cap 
lower than available output, effectively creating a military stockpile. The idea of letting others 
produce in order to secure the country’s strategic resource assets would become a subliminal 
theme in the country’s future attempts to formulate an energy policy. The DOI ultimately received 
less than $60 million for its synthetic fuels project. The US’ first attempt at substitution failed. The 
new strategy was to gain access to Middle Eastern oil. 
At the height of the World War II, the U.S. government had little interest in Arabia. Washington’s 
official presence across the entire Arab world was so limited that in 1941 President Roosevelt 
flatly rejected advice to provide aid to Saudi Arabia with the comment, "This is a little far afield for 
us!" (Duncan and LIFE, 1949).198 Although relations between the two countries were established 
in 1939, no American diplomat was resident in the kingdom;199 nor was any Saudi representative 
stationed in Washington. Thus, the only way to conduct business between the two was through 
the Standard Oil Company of California, which was operating concessions in the kingdom, thus 
establishing an American precedent of high-level inter-state communications through industrialist 
interlocutors. For its part, Saudi Arabia sought improved relations with Washington because it 
wanted nothing to do with the UK, and in 1945 sent two of the kingdom’s prices, Faisal and 
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Khalid, to Washington where the President welcomed them with a state dinner.200 So enamored 
were they and the President that Roosevelt chose to meet privately with King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud 
aboard a US navy warship following the Yalta Conference in 1945 (Lippman, 2005). And a year 
later, the US began laying the seeds of a strategic relationship: the US Export-Import Bank lent the 
Kingdom $10 million for various infrastructure projects, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) sent a 
team to look for water and vital energy resources, and the US mission was upgraded to full 
embassy status. 
That relationship would be tested quickly with very positive results for US strategic energy 
interests. Between 1947 and 1948, the price of oil spiked as the run on gasoline exceeded refinery 
capacity. Refineries were still converting back from the wartime practice of producing high-octane 
aviation fuel.201 By the end of 1948, consumption had risen so much that it exceeded imports for 
first time in the country’s history introducing the notion of ‘foreign oil’ to American politics. 
Moreover, just as these events occurred, three major developments unfolded in the Middle East. 
American companies had just formed Aramco to exploit concessions in Saudi Arabia and Gulf of 
Texas had just agreed to work with Royal Dutch Shell in Kuwait.202 The Soviet Union was moving 
forces to retain parts of northern Iran in order to control its oil assets and secure Baku by 
supporting the Communist Tudeh party in Tehran, which was fomenting strikes and raising 
concerns that Iran might be lost to the Soviet sphere. And in Palestine, the Jews were claiming a 
state, raising the ire of Ibn Saud. On the day that Israel declared its independence, the Saudi king 
reportedly told an Aramco executive (who quickly passed the message on to Secretary of State 
Marshall) that he “may be compelled, in certain circumstances, to apply sanctions against 
American oil concessions” (Yergin, 1991:426).203 Saudi Arabia neither cut-off oil supplies nor 
revoked American concessions. Nor did the US lose access rights in Kuwait. For the Arab leaders, 
there was a clear and distinct division between the US government’s policies and those of its 
industrialists. The workings of America’s old tradition thus saved US strategic interests and 
allowed US companies to continue operating without problem. For the oil rich Arab leaders, the 
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American companies were not the colonial rulers of years past; they paid well and often in cash or 
gold. 
The example of Saudi Arabia illustrates the delicate balance between division and cooperation 
between government and industry that took hold in early post-war years. The US had become 
what Fehner and Holl (1994:3) called a “reluctant manager and guardian” of energy that “acted 
more as a broker among diversified interests than as a master planner, leaving the task of long-
range planning and energy utilization to private industry or state, local and regional authorities.” 
Where Americans might accept government intervention in wartime, the role for government in 
peacetime was limited to monitoring energy data, coordinating research and development, and 
regulating where necessary. Nor would that position change even as foreign oil exporting 
countries began to take control of their oil exports.  
The process toward foreign nationalization began in America’s backyard but quickly spread 
elsewhere. US companies had already lost access to Mexican reserves in 1938 when the country 
nationalized its oil. Those companies did not want to lose their rights Venezuela, which had 
played a major supply role during the war. Unfortunately, the US government was not interested 
in lending its companies the support they wanted. Instead, recognizing the need for oil producing 
countries to generate income and thus reduce the need for US foreign aid, the government 
pushed for a new deal whereby oil companies would recognize foreign ownership of resources 
and share profits.204 Although contrary to the US’s liberal traditions, this new deal initiated a 
process that ultimately pushed privately owned international oil companies out of their 
controlling position and brought state ownership in. Venezuela’s success was contagious. Saudi 
Arabia followed suit in 1950 by taxing Aramco, again with US government support. In rapid 
succession, Kuwait then Iraq demanded similar deals. While the change disturbed its private 
companies, the US government was relieved that it did not have to throw money at Latin America 
or the Middle East at a time when it was bleeding funds to pay for Europe’s reconstruction. The 
shift, however, had its dark sides, particularly in Iran and Egypt.  
In 1951, Iran’s Tudeh party led by Mohammed Mossedeq's came to power and quickly 
nationalized the UK’s Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, effectively halting Iranian oil exports. Fearful of 
Iran falling into the Soviet sphere, both Truman and then Eisenhower tried to negotiate a 
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settlement. After failing, the US and UK orchestrated a sloppy but successful coup in 1953, the so-
called ‘Operation Ajax’.205 Unfortunately, for the Eisenhower administration, American oil 
companies simply were not interested in Iran. They already had enough oil in Saudi Arabia, and 
Ibn Saud did not like Iran. Moreover, just as the State Department was pushing the oil majors to 
invest there, the Justice Department was busy building yet another anti-trust case against them 
over their international activities based on a damning government report titled "The International 
Petroleum Cartel".206 Although the President might have thought otherwise, the US government 
was divided and despite his efforts to the contrary, Eisenhower was forced in 1953 to file a civil 
case against them.207 By ultimately reducing the case to civil matter from a criminal one, the 
President was able to convince the companies take a minority stake in the new arrangement, 
ostensibly to shore up Iranian exports and thus keep the Shah in and the Soviets out.208 While the 
internal political mechanics of the deal were messy, the foreign policy outcome was simple. The 
US, and not the UK or France, now controlled access to most of Middle East’s vast oil reserves. 
Three years later, when France and the UK would make one last attempt to shore-up their 
regional assets (see page 130), Eisenhower saw the move as a threat to the new post-war order 
and American dominance. While he did not want Nasser and his Socialist movement to become 
more important than they already were, he was not prepared to let the Europeans slip back into a 
position of regional power. When their attempts failed, largely through the opposition of the US, 
European influence in the region was almost exhausted.  
The pendulum like swings in Washington’s relationship with its oil industry took on yet another 
dimension towards the end of 1950s. The US slipped into brief recession in 1958, which sapped 
domestic oil demand just as the world’s oil market were being flooded with new supplies, 
collapsing prices and harming the countries smaller domestic producers. Powerful oil-rich states 
like Texas claimed that protecting America’s producers was a matter of national security. 
Secretary of State Dulles was unconvinced. In a reported conversation with Attorney General 
Herbert Bronwell, he is said to have claimed that “this business about national security is a good 
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deal of window dressing” (Yergin, 1991:538). Nevertheless, Eisenhower eventually succumbed to 
domestic interests and in 1959 issued the country’s first foreign oil import quotas.209 The decision 
had the immediate effect of helping small American producers (US output increased by almost 
30% over the next nine years) and demonstrated how weak the large American oil companies 
were in comparison to the interests of smaller domestic producers and their powerful state 
representatives. It also set in motion the wheels of an international response.  
At the time of Eisenhower’s decision, some 40% of Venezuelan oil exports were heading to the US 
and the new quotas severely hurt its income. In response, Perez Alfonzo, the Venezuelan Minister 
of Mines and Hydrocarbons, called for a multilateral agreement with the Western Hemisphere 
producers and consumers to form a government controlled cooperation system. After Eisenhower 
refused to even entertain the idea on the basis of his long-standing animosity toward 
government-industry cooperation in the oil sector, Alfonzo travelled to Cairo to join the Arab Oil 
Conference (originally started in 1955) where he met with his Saudi counterpart Abdullah ibn 
Hamoud Tariki and together they hatched the idea of an international oil exporting cartel. One 
year later, after OPEC was founded, Washington was still unfazed. Just two months after OPEC’s 
founding, a secret CIA National Intelligence Estimate on Middle East Oil dedicated only four lines 
to the new organization.210 Thus, at the beginning of the 1960s, just as the US was beginning to 
lose its dominance of the world oil market, the government was hardly aware of its precarious 
condition. 
3.3.1.2. The emergence of nuclear power 
As where the oil industry had a complicated and unstable relationship with the White House, the 
government’s approach to nuclear power took on an entirely different narrative. In fact, it alone 
constituted the bulk of post-war research and permeated the country’s first real energy policy. Oil 
and coal were both cheap and abundant and thus there was no pressing need to control it. 
However, nuclear power was unproven and untested and its military importance placed it 
squarely at the center of national security.  
In the early post-war years, the US government perceived energy through the lens of specific fuels 
and not energy as such. Indeed, in almost every area of energy research, management, and 
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control, programs were spread across multiple departments of government. While the 
Departments of State and Defense focused on acquiring local and foreign sources of oil, separate 
offices in the Department of Interior focused on promoting markets for the various fossil 
resources and the Bureau of Mines oversaw the workings of a distributed coal industry. Although 
federal support for hydroelectric power was rigorous in the Columbia and Tennessee River 
Valleys, management was in fact regionally staffed and distinctly separate from other related 
institutions. The Federal Power commission was responsible for seeking fair prices in the trade of 
gas and electricity between the states, but the Federal Trade Commission was tasked with the job 
to promote energy competition within both related energy technologies. Hence, when it became 
clear that atomic power needed to be controlled and promoted for the national interest, the 
federal government dedicated almost all its resources to this one new promising area. 
The focus on atomic energy began as a project of war. In June of 1946, the US tried to make it a 
tool of peace. Earlier that year, the new United Nations had passed its very first resolution 
establishing the UN Atomic Energy Commission. At its first meeting in June, the US together with 
the UK and France proposed a plan to share and control atomic technologies, eliminate atomic 
weapons, and establish a system of inspections to enforce compliance. The Soviet Union 
immediately rejected the plan. It was undertaking a rapid development plan to build its own 
arsenal, a target they achieved August 1949. In response to its diplomatic failure and the Soviet 
success, President Truman ordered the development of a more powerful thermonuclear bomb 
and set aside $1.4 billion to upgrade and expand the civilian controlled Atomic Energy 
Commission’s facilities, setting the atomic war project back on track, and taking with it the entire 
focus of US energy policy. 
Progress on the research front was rapid. By 1951, the US had moved beyond pure military 
applications by producing its first electric power-generating reactor. A breeder reactor, it was 
capable of producing more fissile material than it consumed. A year later, Truman’s weapon 
target was reached as the US detonated its first thermo-nuclear device (10.4 megatons). Atomic 
technology was taking off and it appeared that a new permanent solution to the world’s energy 
needs was just around the corner. Thus, it was in the context of this backdrop that the newly 
elected President Eisenhower resurrected the notion of the atomic peace project. Speaking 
before the 1953 UN General Assembly, he elaborated on the destructive dangers of the new 
atomic weapons age proclaiming that  
The United States *…+ is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other 
countries as may be principally involved, to seek an acceptable solution to the 
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atomic armaments race which over shadows not only the peace, but the very life, 
of the world. *…+ It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the 
soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its 
military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.211 
In so doing, Eisenhower introduced the Atoms for Peace program whereby nuclear technology 
and information was provided to hospitals and schools, at home and abroad. But peace was only 
part of the program. The very notion that atomic power could to produce seemingly endless 
amounts of electricity had direct consequences for military mobility. The first to recognize this 
was the US Navy. Within a year of Eisenhower’s speech, the US Navy launched its first nuclear-
electric-powered submarine, the Nauatlis and before he would leave office, another six nuclear-
powered submarines and one guided missile cruiser would enter into service. The military 
advantages of nuclear power were twofold. Its engines were quieter than combustion based 
versions and thus were harder to detect under water, and once at sea, a nuclear powered ship 
could extend its sailing period without returning to dock for refueling for months, even years at 
time. As the military increased its interest in atomic power the money started flowing. Huge 
portions of the US scientific community turned their focus to developing faster propulsion 
systems based on nuclear power; and weapons production skyrocketed as the US and the Soviet 
Union entered into a full scale nuclear arms race. 
Nevertheless, Eisenhower was sincere in his goal to find peaceful uses for atomic power. In 1954, 
he worked together with Congress to pass the Atomic Energy Act to finance and coordinate 
together with private industry the building of a civilian atomic power station. By 1957, the first 
commercially operated plant came online in Pennsylvania. That same year he ordered a 
moratorium on all future nuclear weapons tests (after a few more scheduled tests). Still, 
Eisenhower discovered against his better judgment that the genie was not out only of the bottle, 
it was also out of the hands of the President. By the time he left office, he was saddened by the 
fact that atomic power had become an asset upon which the powerful interests of American 
companies, the military, and the various agencies of his own executive vied for political power. In 
his farewell speech to the nation, he lamented, 
“Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my 
predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or 
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Korea. Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments 
industry. *…+ But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national 
defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of 
vast proportions. *…+ We annually spend on military security more than the net 
income of all United States corporations. 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry 
is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even 
spiritual – is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal 
government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we 
must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and 
livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.  
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial 
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will 
persist.”(Eisenhower, 1961). 
Eisenhower’s concerns would go unheeded and his testing moratorium would last only until 
shortly after John F. Kennedy came to power, when the Soviet Union began testing again. Shortly 
thereafter, the US observed Soviet missile encampments on Cuba. For the first time in its recent 
history, the US was suddenly under direct threat of attack to its mainland. The crisis that ensued: 
the blockade, the threats, and the looming danger of a devastating nuclear war exemplified all the 
dangers of the nuclear age and the ongoing Cold War with the Soviet Union.212 Despite the fact 
that the US, the UK and the Soviet Union would sign a limited test ban treaty two years later, 
Eisenhower’s portents of the nuclear age were now a matter of record. 
The ensuing, albeit brief, Kennedy years were filled with crises involving domestic turmoil, labor 
strikes, fights between and within the aviation and rail industries, and international arms control. 
He set into motion new rules pertaining to emergency management of the energy and transport 
sector and left an indelible mark, both directly and indirectly on US energy policy.213 Kennedy was 
a powerful advocate of the country’s coal industry and strongly believed that U.S. energy 
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resources needed to be managed to promote economic growth. Concerned that more than 
70,000 jobs had been lost in the coal sector since 1948, then Senator Kennedy running for 
President in 1960 called for increased use of coal “burned at the mines and transmitted over huge 
cables” into homes “as electric power.” 214 Once President, he announced a proposal to develop 
vast coal slurry pipelines, to facilitate interstate transportation leading to the construction of the 
world’s longest water-slurry pipeline capable of moving five million tons of coal per year from 
Northern Arizona to an electric power plant in Nevada (Glennon, 2002:155).  
On the reform front, Kennedy recognized that “the widely scattered resource policies of the 
Federal Government” were hazarding efforts at coordination. Pointing to the problems present in 
previous administrations, he criticized policies that “overlapped and often conflicted” with one 
another causing an enormous waste of spending “on competing efforts” (Kennedy, 1961a). In the 
nuclear domain, he pushed for increased civilian power projects and ordered the Atomic Energy 
Commission to take a “hard look at the role of nuclear power” in the economy and directed it to 
cooperate with the DOI, FTC, and private industry to develop a coherent strategy.215 He 
specifically pointed to the Hanford plutonium manufacturing facility, a sprawling complex along 
the Columbia River. He wanted its excess steam to be used be used to generate electricity 216 and 
actively pursued the extension of rural electrification. As a result of his initiatives, the US 
expanded construction of its electricity infrastructure throughout the next decade.217 
Kennedy’s most important contribution to US energy policy was, however, indirect. On May 25, 
1961, in an urgent message to Congress, he called upon the nation to undertake a new 
Manhattan Project style program stating, “I believe that this nation should commit itself to 
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him 
safely to the earth” (Kennedy, 1961b). A new grand project was under way. Over the course of the 
next fourteen years, the US government would spend over $96 billion in $2007, a full 2.2% of all 
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federal outlays, and almost 0.4% of its GDP (Stine, 2008). The massive project cost almost double 
the funds and ran three times the duration of the Manhattan Project. Like the program to build 
the atomic bomb, Apollo was the perfect project. It had a specific goal and was driven by military 
and security concerns. Its success and the advances it brought in aviation and rocketry on top of 
what the Manhattan project had brought would become the litmus test to guide the US’ future 
Energy Technology Program, which would be launched in the mid 1970s. 
 
3.3.1.3. The first warning signs 
The Assassination of Kennedy in November 1963 brought Lyndon Johnson in to office and with 
him came new priorities and problems for the United States. The Kennedy legacy left the US 
deeply embroiled in a costly quagmire in Vietnam. The same internal political rumblings that 
Europe experienced were rocking the US as well. Energy consumption was becoming 
unsustainable and the country’s demand for electricity was exploding far beyond its capacity to 
maintain steady supplies.  
Johnson did not focus much on energy policy. While he did promote environmental conservation, 
urban renewal, and mass transportation legislation, such as the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964, military matters abroad mired his time in office. Also, his authority to act on energy was 
limited by all the problems pointed out by his predecessors. The temporary closure of Suez Canal 
amidst a brief 1967 Arab-Israeli War had little impact on price, supply availability, or policy. 
Indeed, given the prevailing conditions of the time, creating an energy policy in the climate of the 
mid-1960s would have been equivalent to a government program to herd cats. Power and 
authority were scattered, the market for electricity was fraught with horse-trading between the 
coal and nuclear industries, and the price of oil was holding steady at under $2 barrel (circa $12 in 
$2009). The fact is that there was little incentive to look toward any new technology other than 
expanded nuclear power. 
In November 1965, with demand for heating stressing the network to the maximum, a surge at a 
US hydroelectric power plant tripped a security circuit and the entire network came cascading 
down, leaving millions without electricity for almost half a day. American officials moved quickly 
to fix the situation and created a new institution, the Northeast Power Coordinating Council 
(NPCC), to make sure it never happened again. The blackout occurred just at a moment when the 
promise of nuclear power was at its height. The Atomic Energy Commission, had already fast-
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tracked a program to build a new advanced type of liquid metal fast breeder reactor.218 But the 
damage was already done. Steady energy supplies no longer could be taken for granted.  
When Richard Nixon arrived in the White House three year later, the country was facing social 
chaos. The costs of the war in Vietnam were spiraling out of control. Energy politics were all over 
the place and no single agency or authority had control of anything. Ten months after he took 
office, a brown out swept across the Northeast, this time caused by Americans’ excessive demand 
for air conditioning. Within a year, he announced that the AEC plans to cooperate with industry to 
build its long-sought liquid metal reactor by 1980; and by 1972, they had selected a location. But 
time was running out. America needed either more electricity or it needed to consume a great 
deal less.  
The sixties were watershed years in terms of the reality of the country’s energy condition. In the 
early part of the decade, most Americans thought their energy problems were a thing of their 
past. Continuous supplies of cheap oil had allowed demand to skyrocket. States and domestic 
regional groups that had replaced the federal government in the management and regulation of 
fuel were forced to loosen their grip in order to accommodate for growing demand. As a result, 
the US began to lose its position of swing producer in the world. Where it had maintained a 
surplus of some 4 million barrels per day in the early 1960s, it was around only one million in 
1970, and that was despite new discoveries including a massive field in Alaska’s North Slope in 
1968. Meanwhile, nuclear power usage was increasing in the electricity sector, and so too was the 
use of coal to meet runaway demand. All the signs were pointing to a disaster. A country that was 
able to withstand multiple, albeit minor, price shocks and supply shortages (1948, 1951, 1956, 
and 1967) was no longer in the position to do so. Across the world, oil-producing countries were 
beginning to take on oil distributing companies, and the former was winning. By the end of the 
1960s, the US was heading full steam toward an energy calamity; and few in the government saw 
it coming (Yergin, 1991:566-569). 
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3.3.1.4. Crises, controls, and the pursuit of energy independence 
In 1970, everything began to fall apart. The problems began when Libya started pushing western 
oil companies out of the country, which in turn set in motion a rapid succession nationalizations 
and oil seizures by Arab exporting states. Cooperation between suppliers that had until then been 
merely a myth, was beginning take shape. OPEC was coming of age. By mid 1970, President Nixon 
saw the clouds coming and proposed a cabinet level position for an energy chief, but the public 
was not interested. As Fehner and Hall (1994: 5) put it, “Americans could not perceive of an 
energy crisis when there was ample supply of cheap gas for their cars, electricity and fuel for their 
homes, and power for their industries and businesses.” Besides, America would soon go through a 
debt crises in 1971 forcing Nixon to set price controls and freeze wages across the country. 
Amidst the turmoil, the public had little interest in something as obscure and distant as an energy 
policy.  
Oil was a primary target of those price controls. International oil prices were on the rise (25% on 
average over the previous year according to BP, 2010). This would not have mattered in the past, 
but the US was now a major importer.  
The controls froze prices just as the international market was undergoing dramatic changes. 
Congress tried to insulate the US market by imposing new regulations, including the Emergency 
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA), turning control of existing domestic oil production to 
federal regulators while deregulating oil from new discoveries. Imported oil, which was more 
expensive, was not subject to any price controls. Since most large American oil companies were 
operating internationally, they listed their prices at the higher international price, while refineries 
were buying up local production at a cheaper rate, creating windfall profits. The EPAA actually 
created an incentive for companies to hoard domestic oil precisely at the moment when more 
supplies were needed. In April, Nixon warned the country that its energy demands had grown 
beyond supplies, and that it might face higher prices and energy shortages in the immediate 
future. In what amounted to the clearest assessment yet of the country’s energy dilemma he 
wrote,  
“Over 90 percent of the energy we consume today in the United States comes 
from three sources: natural gas, coal and petroleum. Each source presents us with 
a different set of problems. Natural gas is our cleanest fuel and is most preferred 
in order to protect our environment, but ill-considered regulations of natural gas 
prices by the Federal Government have produced a serious and increasing scarcity 
of this fuel. We have vast quantities of coal, but the extraction and use of coal 
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have presented such persistent environmental problems that, today, less than 20 
percent of our energy needs are met by coal and the health of the entire coal 
industry is seriously threatened. Our third conventional resource is oil, but 
domestic production of available oil is no longer able to keep pace with demands. 
In determining how we should expand and develop these resources, along with 
others such as nuclear power, we must take into account not only our economic 
goals, but also our environmental goals and our national security goals. Each of 
these areas is profoundly affected by our decisions concerning energy.” (Nixon, 
1971a).  
After signing the EPAA into law, Nixon went on to request that the Congress establish a 
Department of Energy that would consolidate and manage national energy priorities and research 
and development; and then he took the extraordinary step to establish a Special Energy 
Committee of senior advisors and a National Energy Office to coordinate analysis between 
agencies. When his legislation stalled in Congress, the President established another group, the 
Energy Policy Office, which combined and expanded the previous two. For the first time since 
1945, energy issues would now to be planned and executed out of the White House. He further 
proposed centralizing the various activities of government (including the highly competitive 
Department of Interior and Atomic Energy Commission’s research wings) into one Energy 
Research and Development Administration with the goal of developing new energy technologies. 
By September, Congress had still not acted, but Nixon would not be deterred. He began pushing 
four separate bills to pay for the construction of an Alaskan pipeline, deepwater ports, the 
deregulation of the gas market, and new and looser mining standards (Nixon, 1971b). All of his 
efforts were, unfortunately too late. On October 6, 1973, Washington discovered that it had 
waited too long. A new Arab-Israeli war unleashed a series of events that sent prices skyrocketing, 
America’s economy into the doldrums, and reminded everyone that energy and international 
politics had become permanent bedfellows.219 
The Arab oil exporting countries immediately imposed an oil embargo on among others, the US. 
By November, it was experiencing the most acute shortage it had encountered since World War II 
(Anders, 1980). As motorist lined up to buy gasoline, Americans finally realized that energy was in 
fact a national issue and directly affected the well-being and survival of the country. Nixon 
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responded with a televised message where he presented “Project Independence”. Drawing on the 
traditions of the Manhattan Project and the Apollo Program, his goal was no less than to achieve 
“energy self-sufficiency” by 1980. He provided another candid assessment of America’s energy 
situation: 
“Now, some of you may wonder whether we are turning back the clock to another 
age. Gas rationing, oil shortages, reduced speed limits--they all sound like a way of 
life we left behind with Glenn Miller and the war of the forties. Well, in fact, part 
of our current problem also stems from war--the war in the Middle East. But our 
deeper energy problems come not from war, but from peace and from 
abundance. We are running out of energy today because our economy has grown 
enormously and because in prosperity what were once considered luxuries are 
now considered necessities.” (Nixon, 1971c) 
Shortly thereafter, Nixon ordered an increase in domestic heating oil production, closed gasoline 
stations on Sundays, and established the Federal Energy Office (FEO) in the executive Office of the 
White House (Executive Order 11748).220 The age of energy abundance was over. 
Nixon’s executive order was the first legal institutionalization of a response to oil shortages in the 
post-war period. All previous efforts dealt with coordination, production, even research, but none 
had been given the task of allocating oil supplies to refiners. The US government now controlled 
the supply of oil on the US market and set prices, squarely placing America’s hands-off tradition in 
the back seat. The FEO quickly consolidated control, taking leading staff from the Departments of 
Interior, Treasury, and Internal Revenue; and played the lead role in guiding Project 
Independence. It set speed limits and diverted funds from highways to mass transit. It prioritized 
conservation and research into alternatives and substitutes. It doled out allotments to industries 
and coupons to customers; and established new rules for the distribution of domestic oil between 
refineries.221 Despite all the evidence and concerted action, however, Americans remained 
unconvinced that a crisis existed. Almost 50% continued to blame the government and oil 
companies for the country’s shortages and virtually no one believed that supplies were limited.222 
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In May 1974, Nixon’s FEO became the Federal Energy Agency (FEA) after he signed into law the 
Federal Energy Administration Act. Nixon tasked the new agency to develop “new methods of 
producing energy, such as the commercial use of geothermal energy and oil from our vast oil 
shale reserves” and announced support for “research and development to find new and better 
ways of using our abundant coal resources and to capture the benefits of solar energy and nuclear 
fusion” (Nixon, 1974a). Substitution was back on the table.  
With a new internal program in place, the Nixon administration raised energy to the domain of 
foreign policy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first delivered the message in December. 
Speaking before the influential Pilgrams Society in London, he reshaped the energy crisis into an 
opportunity to become the “the economic equivalent of the sputnik challenge of 1957”.223 Noting 
that the crisis itself was not merely a product of the Arab-Israeli War, but rather “the inevitable 
consequence of the explosive growth of world-wide demand outrunning the incentives for 
supply”, he argued for a massive, coordinated international effort to increase supplies, decrease 
consumption, and to develop alternate energy sources. He then proposed a formal international 
institutional framework, an Energy Action Group, to coordinate international research and 
development of new energy technologies.  
Three months later, the US convened a three day Washington Energy Conference of thirteen 
principle oil consuming nations (11-13 February, 1974) including senior officials of the EEC and 
OECD.224 In his opening words to the meeting, Kissinger told the delegates, “the energy situation 
poses severe economic and political problems for all nations” adding that “isolated solutions are 
impossible”.225 He accentuated the need to develop non-oil sources of energy and proposed plans 
for a joint allocation system to be made available in times of supply emergencies and the 
development of a common system to define the criteria of just such an emergency, noting “we 
cannot leave our security or our national economies to forces outside our control”. He further 
proposed that the group try and coordinate with oil-producing nations to guarantee stable 
supplies.  
The meeting proved to be a success as the US proposals were in large part accepted by all 
attendees except France, which refused to cooperate and almost scuttled the agreement. But the 
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US failed to secure a common agreement on a code of conduct to regulate the efforts of 
individual consumer states to secure special deals with Middle Eastern producers, particularly 
those tied to weapons sales.226 The fact that the US had secured it own secret deals with Saudi 
Arabia did not particularly engender cooperation on that front. Still, the acerbity of French 
Foreign Minister Jobert’s comments set the tone for greater US-EU cooperation uniting the 
remaining eight EEC Member States and the US in their resolve.227 Elements of a February 11th 
telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon reveals the extent of its effect: 
“K: Mr. President. 
N: Hi. How are you, Henry. 
K: I just wanted to bring you up to date on how that conference went. 
N. Yes. Fine. 
K: *…+ We just laid out the problem. Then Ohira, everybody gave talks supporting 
our position. *…+ Schmidt spoke for Germany because Scheel represented the 
European Community. Schmidt was superlative, and if you have a chance to to say 
something to him tonight you might mention that. Home was pretty good *…+ well 
to make a long story short, everybody was good. Except Jobert, who was a 
bastard. He made a really vicious speech, in fact people were groaning *…+ it was 
awful.  
N: Yes. We’ll just ignore that. 
K: *…+ if the other eight Europeans stand up to Jobert we can have a good 
communiqué, if they don’t *…+ then I think we should say the hell with it and that 
we met and had a nice meeting. I don’t think we should fake a success because 
the Saudis have now come to us and offered bilateral deals and we shouldn’t bind 
ourselves *…+ Incidentally I hardly dare tell you but we have _____ assurance. 
N: Al told me, I got that. 
K: And also the Egyptians are going to announce that restoration of diplomatic 
relations with us shortly after that. 
N: That’s good, well, I just hope the Europeans will stand up to this fellow, but 
who knows. 
*…+ 
K: Well, Mr. President, if anybody has been pro-French, it’s been you. 
N: God, yes. 
K: What have we done to these people. If they did this to Kennedy, that’s one 
thing, but I suppose French domestic politics, and if you look at French history. 
N: Well we’ll see, they can change too. I don’t know whether they will, but I hope. 
*…+ 
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K: You might flatter Scheel a little bit. He’ll probably sit next to you, because he is 
the ranking member.  
N: Yes, I know. 
K: He’ll respond, he’s been pretty good, he’s a weakling. 
N: I know. 
K: But we need him to get that communiqué through. 
N: Right, OK. I’ll give him a little pat on the back. Thank you Henry and get a rest. 
K: Right.” 
[END] (Kissinger and Nixon, 1974) 
 
Later that night, Nixon addressed the leaders at dinner. Speaking in frank manner he told them 
that  
the US “can and will become totally independent, we believe, of any outside source for energy” 
by 1980 and that “the purpose of our Project Independence, let me emphasize, is not isolation”, 
but rather to be “self-sufficient.” He implored them to cooperate, telling them that, “We can have 
no real security in the world unless we are all secure and unless we all cooperate”. And then 
directly broached the subject of independent deals saying it was “understandable” that each 
country present might “go into business for itself *and+ seek to make a bilateral agreement with 
the oil-producing nations”, but such action would in fact be “possibly good short-term politics, but 
disastrous long-term statesmanship”. Inevitably, he argued, it would “drive the prices of energy 
up, it will drive our economies down, and it will drive all of us apart.” Finally, heeding Kissinger’s 
advice he singled out President Scheel for the only toast of the night.228 When the ministers left 
Washington, they had agreed on a deal. Nine months later, they signed a treaty under framework 
of the OECD establishing the International Energy Agency, headquartered in Paris. It marked the 
first multilateral success of Nixon’s emergent US energy policy, but he was not around to take 
credit for it. He had resigned in August under the disgrace of the Watergate scandal. 
Henry Ford served out the remainder of Nixon’s term. In his first press conference, Ford promised 
to accelerate Nixon’s Project Independence.229 He then established a national energy board to 
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develop one single encompassing policy for all fuels across the entire country. In October, he 
signed the Energy Reorganization Act, which abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and 
established two new institutions in its place, the Energy Research and Development Agency 
(ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Ford’s energy board was formalized as the 
Energy Resources Council and given a temporary mandate until Congress could pass planned 
legislation to create a full-blown department of energy.  
The ERDA was designated to achieve two goals: to bring together all the various ERD programs of 
the government into one unified agency to promote the rapid development of new technologies 
and to disconnect civilian nuclear regulatory activities (now the task of the NRC) from the 
development and production of military nuclear power and weaponry. It received most of the 
AEC’s former substantial budget including all its offices and laboratories, took over all the coal 
research from the Department of Interior, the solar and geothermal programs of the National 
Science Foundation, and the Environmental Protection Agency’s research projects on advanced 
automobiles (Abbasi, 1975). In its first year of operation the ERDA published a comprehensive 
research plan and strongly encouraged early commercialization of synthetic fuels.  
With the worst part of the crisis behind and fuel supplies easing, Ford moved to decontrol 
domestic oil prices and get a tax on imported oil. Finishing what Nixon had started he submitted 
to Congress a bill called the Energy Independence Act. After a year of negotiations, particularly 
over price controls, which many wanted to keep for the profits and low fuel prices, Congress 
produced the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA). The Act extended price controls 
through 1979, but mandated fuel standards for new cars and authorized construction of a one-
billion barrel strategic petroleum reserve (SPR). Imperfect as it was, Ford signed the legislation 
and declared, prematurely, that the time had “come to end the long debate over national energy 
policy” (Ford, 1975a).  
However, Ford neither could nor did end the debate.230 Warning Congress about the growing 
foreign dependence problem, he sent a letter in February 1976 cataloging the fact that Congress 
had passed only 4 of his 18 energy requests (Ford, 1975b). In August, Congress sent him back the 
Energy Conservation and Production Act mandating him to submit his recommendations, as well 
as a complete documentation of the Project Independence Evaluation System computer model. It 
also established an Office of Energy Information and Analysis and a National Energy Information 
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System to assure the availability of credible information to the public.231 Ford had little time to 
respond. He was amidst a tight Presidential race, one in which he would lose. Moreover, as the 
winter set in, a massive cold wave swept the country’s northeast, driving up demand for natural 
gas beyond the breaking point and forcing schools and businesses across multiple states to close. 
In his Farwell message, Ford argued that “we should not seek to eliminate all energy imports, 
because generally it will be in the Nation's best interest to continue importing energy when it can 
be obtained at lower cost” (Ford, 1977). The debate about energy independence had indeed 
come to an end, and like the President, the notion of energy independence had lost. 
When Jimmy Carter entered office, he immediately took action. He assigned James R. Schlesinger, 
a former chairman of the AEC and director of the CIA, the task of addressing the national gas 
shortage. He then submitted to Congress an emergency request for additional powers “to ensure 
that no portion of our country must go without essential services” and received that authority in 
record time (Carter, 1977a).232 He then declared a natural gas emergency and addressed the 
public in a televised “fireside chat” declaring “The amount of energy being wasted which could be 
saved is greater than the total energy that we are importing from foreign countries. *…+ All of us 
must learn to waste less energy” (Carter, 1977b). Adding that he would now expedite the 
development of coal in an “environmentally sound way” as well as solar and renewable sources, 
Carter reintroduced the goal to harmonize all the government’s ERD activities into one cabinet 
level department “to bring order out of chaos”. Despite all the efforts of his predecessors, energy 
management was still split among more than 50 different offices of the federal government. By 
April, after cancelling the national emergency, Carter sent Congress his plans for the new 
department. Calling it the “the moral equivalent of war” he argued that the country’s struggle to 
change its approach toward energy “will test the character of the American people and the ability 
of the President and the Congress to govern this Nation” (Carter, 1977c). By July, Congress had 
approved most of his requests and on August 4, 1977, Carter signed into law the Department of 
Energy Organization Act (Public law 95-91) finally establishing a cabinet level Department of 
Energy.  
Moving away from supply management toward efficiency, conservation, and the development of 
alternatives, Carter proposed massive changes in US internal energy policy. He abandoned the 
notion of energy independence and replaced it with the more modest goal of containing energy 
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growth. His proposals led to the installation of insulation and solar panels in millions of homes 
and businesses. His administration added new and complex regulations to make limited resources 
stretch further and began to reduce domestic oil price controls. And his new Energy Secretary, 
Schlesinger, moved quickly to consolidate the Energy Department’s authority. Research foci were 
changed from a fuel specific orientation to division between basic and applied research.233 As all 
basic research was placed under the authority of the Office of Energy Research, accountable 
Undersecretaries would oversee the development of applicable technologies in respective 
markets. Research programs would now move between authorities according to their evolution, 
all under the control of the Secretary of Energy. A new Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) was established within the Department to regulate and license electricity production and 
transmission, natural gas transportation and sales, and the operation of gas and oil pipelines.234 
The Department established two administrations: the Economic Regulatory Administration to 
manage oil pricing, allocation, and imports;235 and the Energy Information Administration to 
consolidate the government’s diverse energy data systems. The new Department also inherited all 
the offices and laboratories of the various agencies it superseded (see map of DOE facilities, 
Figure 27 on page 195). It was a massive reorganization of the country’s intellectual and 
managerial assets in the realm of energy and the prize achievement of the Carter 
Administration.236 After almost ten years of trying, the US finally had an energy policy and a 
coherent institutional framework to achieve it. 
Carter’s progress ran into obstacles in late 1977 because Congress could not agree on his 
comprehensive national energy plan beyond the reorganization. After a year of horse-trading, 
Congress passed the National Energy Act of 1978, a huge bill that included five distinct Acts to 
accommodate the various state and industrial interests in the country.237 It added taxes on gas 
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guzzling cars, gave credits to families that installed solar and other renewables for their homes, 
forced feed-ins of renewable sources by electric utilities, and began a phase out of price ceilings 
for interstate gas trade in order to foster investment. However, it did not contain the one item 
Carter wanted the most, a petroleum tax to bring domestic oil prices in line with international 
market prices, reduce imports, and force Americans to reduce consumption. He simply could not 
get the support of the public or the oil industry. Having failed to get an oil tax, Carter took it upon 
himself to begin lifting price controls in April. His actions together with unfolding international 
events would send the price of oil and gasoline through the roof. 
In January, amidst increasing protests and strikes, the Shah of Iran fled his country. Iranian oil 
exports had already declined from six to less than two million barrels a day and as a result the 
price of oil on the international market began rising rapidly. By February, the spot selling price of 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) rose by 6% from $14.8 to $15.8 (in nominal dollars).238 Within a 
month of Carter’s easing of controls, the price was at $18, by June just over $21 and over $32 
(circa $94 in $2009) by the close of the year. The tightening of the international market forced US 
producers to ramp up production, but in the interim, there were serious shortages. Carter 
requested permission from Congress to issue gasoline rationing coupons and tax the windfall 
profits of oil companies while the Department of Energy called for voluntary conservation, but 
Congress rejected all the proposals. Rapidly rising prices sent the public into a panic. Long gas 
lines, like those in 1973, reappeared. Despite the reorganization and a big new plan, America fell 
into another deep energy crisis.  
In July, after an emergency meeting with his IEA partners, the President arranged a domestic 
summit of national leaders at Camp David to come up with a coordinated solution. Carter 
delivered his recommendations in a infamous ‘Malaise Speech’ speech where he told Americans 
that “the true problems of our Nation are much deeper than gasoline lines or energy shortages, 
deeper even than inflation or recession. *…+ It is a crisis of confidence *…+ that strikes at the very 
heart and soul and spirit of our national will.” Adding, “Beginning this moment, this Nation will 
never use more foreign oil than we did in 1977” he claimed, “every new addition to our demand 
for energy will be met from our own production and our own conservation” (Carter, 1977d). He 
set out to reintroduce import quotas and establish an “energy mobilization board” akin to the 
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War Production Board of World War II “to cut through the red tape, the delays, and the endless 
roadblocks to completing key energy projects”. This would take form in an Energy Security 
Corporation, a government owned business to produce oil substitutes. Unfortunately, Carter was 
running out of time. Elections were just around the corner. The Three Mile Island Nuclear 
accident in March sapped public support for nuclear power. Energy prices were skyrocketing out 
of control. And then, when it seemed that the situation could not get any worse, his trusted ally 
Schlesinger, resigned as Secretary of Energy. Carter replaced him with Charles Duncan, a Texas oil 
engineer. The DOE was now being run by an oil man. 
Duncan immediate pushed for further deregulation to allow market forces to regulate price and 
demand and made it clear that Department of Energy “should not be in the Energy business” 
(Fehner and Holl, 1994:30). Its proper role should instead be to foster “appropriate incentives” for 
private investment. He reversed Schlesinger’s evolutionary approach to research and reinstituted 
fuel specific research programs. As Duncan took control of the DOE, the President was forced to 
turn his attention elsewhere; in November American diplomats were seized in Tehran. Congress 
would go on to pass a windfall profits tax on oil companies. Americans got used to higher prices; 
and domestic production increased. Congress also passed the Energy Security Act (ESA) which 
authorized $20 billion to establish the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to promote private industry 
investment (through loans and subsidies), added financial incentives for the private development 
of biofuels and other renewable energies, and authorized the President to rapidly fill the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve by 100.000 barrels a day.239 Despite his legislative successes, however, the 
many domestic and international crises he faced doomed his re-election bid. Carter came into 
office at the end of one energy crisis and left at the end of another. In the process, he created a 
new cabinet level position to guide America’s energy future, a massive investment in alternatives, 
and killed the dream of energy independence.  
3.3.1.5. The old tradition strikes back 
The Reagan-Bush-Clinton years witnessed a wholesale reversal of the country’s energy policy, 
from government control to stewardship and from energy independence to energy 
interdependence. Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 as the champion of America’s old hands-
off tradition. Although energy was not a major theme of his campaign, he advocated abolishing 
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the Department of Energy altogether arguing that it had not “produced a quart of oil or a lump of 
coal or anything else in the line of energy” (Carter, 1980:2494). He also took the position that 
government interventions “consistently discourage discovery and production” emphasizing that 
“America has an abundance of energy” (Kneeland, 1980). Over the course of his eight-year term, 
Reagan redirected the nation’s energy programs away from the activists years Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter. 
Reagan eliminated programs that he considered better suited for private industry, including most 
of the government’s regulations and price controls on gasoline, propane, and crude oil and 
rescinded Carter’s restriction on building-temperature controls. Instead of focusing on the 
development of commercially viable technologies, Reagan instead turned funding towards long-
term, high-risk programs in which private enterprise either would not or could not invest. By the 
end of its first term, the Reagan administration was pushing for substantial investments into basic 
research to explore the frontiers of energy science and technology, from superconductivity to 
magnetic fusion.240  Meanwhile, Reagan appointed James Edwards, a leading Republican energy 
expert, to become the third Secretary of Energy and tasked him to reorganize the DOE. Following 
in Duncan’s footsteps, Edwards finished the job of moving research and management back from 
evolutionary development into fuel specific areas.   
With major shortages behind them and restrictions gone, the price of oil held steady and then 
dropped dramatically (and with that drop, the incentive to invest in alternatives declined). 
Edwards setup a 22-member Energy Policy Task Force in February 1981 comprised of leading 
energy industrialists and public officials to advise him on writing Reagan’s energy plan, the 
country’s third national energy plan since the founding of the DOE. The plan, Securing America’s 
Energy Future, was a severe break from the past. Based on the key principles of reduce spending, 
taxes, and regulation and letting the market decide what the best energy decisions should be, the 
report called for the government to open up the outer continental shelf to private exploration, 
the termination of energy subsidies, and boldly claimed, “All Americans are involved in making 
energy policy” (United States, 1981:1). Thus, within the first 100 days of his administration, 
Reagan returned the US to its pre-1970s role as manager and steward of the nation’s resources 
and took the position that the very reason for earlier shortages was in fact government 
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intervention itself (Fehner and Holl, 1994:36). In late 1982, when Edward retired, he declared the 
national energy crisis a thing of the past.  
Edward’s successor, Donald Hodel, tried to build a consensus between the President and 
Congress, cancelling plans to dissolve the department. His main concern was the country’s 
growing dependence on foreign oil, now a matter of national consensus. In its 1983 energy plan, 
the administration called for a balanced and mixed energy resource base and proposed to support 
it through a package of continued research, deregulation, and conservation. The budget of the 
DOE did not change much between 1982 ($12.6 billion by Carter) and 1985 ($12.8 billion for 
Reagan), but the distribution of funds did dramatically. Reagan’s 1985 energy budget cut the 
‘energy’ budget line by half and doubled expenditures for nuclear weapons.241 To promote the 
nuclear power industry and support the buildup of its expanding nuclear weapons program, the 
administration proposed and won landmark legislation to coordinate the storage and disposal of 
nuclear waste (the Nuclear Waste Act of 1982).242  
In early 1985, Reagan reshuffled his cabinet. Hodel moved to Interior and John Herrington 
became the country’s fifth Energy Secretary. Herrington immediately introduced a new notion, 
that of ‘energy strength’. Given the changes in consumer behavior and the growth of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve, he argued that the key to America’s future lie in an ‘energy triad’ of reduced 
overall oil dependence, increased coal and nuclear use, and the massive potential of energy 
efficiency and conservation. Declaring “I think coal is where our future is”, he ushered in a 
resurgence of the country’s private coal industry through the promotion of ‘clean coal’ 
technologies (Fehner and Holl, 1994:42) and eliminated the government run Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation.243 By 1986, the price of oil had collapsed (now selling at around $14 or circa $28 in 
$2009), and government investment in synthetic fuels made no economic sense. By late 1988, the 
country’s economy had undergone almost five and half years of uninterrupted expansion, or as 
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Herrington put it, “the longest peacetime economic expansion in U.S. history”. In large part, this 
was seen to be the direct result of cheaper oil prices and reduced government, leading him to 
conclude “our economic and energy security is inextricably tied to the fate and fortunes of our 
domestic petroleum industry” (Fehner and Holl, 1994:46-7). Congress could hold out no longer. 
Bending to Reagan’s repeated demands, it repealed the windfall profits tax placed on oil 
companies passed during the Carter administration. The repositioning of private enterprise to the 
forefront of America’s energy strategy was complete and the lion’s share of Department of 
Energy’s budget was now dedicated to defense-related activities. In Ronald Reagan’s last budget, 
defense accounted for 60% of the Department’s ERD programs (United States, 1989) 
President Bush continued Reagan’s hands-off approach to energy policy, but because he oversaw 
the end of the Cold War and dismantling of the Soviet Union, he also redirected the Energy 
Department’s efforts away from defense centric activities. The US stopped building new nuclear 
weapons lowering the defense share of the DOE budget to less than 38%. The Department instead 
turned toward cleaning up the damage caused by decades of weapons production. Focus moved 
to environmentalism, efficiency, a concerted research effort based on new scientific data over 
global warming, and increasing support for basic research. The President began pushing for green 
technologies and advanced ERD and Energy budget allocations increasingly favored conservation 
issues. In his 1993 budget, Bush requested more than $500 million for clean coal technologies, 
more than $800 million in materials and superconductivity, and $210 million in renewables 
(double the amount from 1990).244 One of the core new objectives was the development of 
advanced electric storage opportunities for automobile through the private Advanced Battery 
Consortium, a quasi-public institution that worked to combine the technical and financial 
resources of the DOE, the country’s automakers, and its national laboratories.245 
The administration created a Global Climate Change Executive Committee within the DOE and 
spent $1 billion on global warming research in 1992, despite Congressional efforts to water down 
the Global Warming Treaty recently negotiated at the Rio Earth Summit. But in keeping tack with 
the resurgent tradition of free enterprise and the need reduce the country’s dependence on 
foreign oil, the Bush administration also pushed (unsuccessfully) to open up the Arctic National 
Wildlife Preserve (ANWF) and the outer continental shelf to new exploration and tried to defend 
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 See pages 49-75 in United States. Department of Energy (1993). 
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 Part of the United States Council of Automotive Research (USCAR), the ABC is comprised of Chrysler, 
Ford, and General Motors. It funds pre-competitive electrochemical energy storage R&D.  
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the expansion of nuclear power. However, not a single new plant was ordered under Bush’s term 
in office and he was the last President to oversee the completion of one in 1996 (see Table 11 
below). By the time he left office in 1993, the two nuclear backbones of American energy policy 
(weapons production and commercial power) were no longer front and center. The 
Environmental protection Agency, and not the Department of Energy, was the key player on 
energy issues and the DOE was, in fact, no longer capable of building producing nuclear weapons 
on its own (Fehner and Holl, 1994:76-8).246 
Table 11: US nuclear reactor construction 1968-1996 (operating and license year) 
License Year Reactors Licensed Share of Reactors Closed Reactors Operable Reactors Share of Operable 
1968-74 38 33.6% 6 32 30.8% 
1975-78 23 20.4% 3 20 19.2% 
1979-96 52 46.0% 0 52 50.0% 
Total 113 100.0% 9 104 100.0% 
Source: US Department of Energy, “Nuclear Power: 12 percent of America’s Generating Capacity, 20 % of 
the Electricity” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/analysis/nuclearpower.html 
 
Bill Clinton came into office as a reformer and jobs creator. He saw energy as the “Achilles’ heel” 
of the American economy that instead should be used as a means to stimulate the sagging 
economy. Like his predecessors, he saw foreign oil dependence as a danger to the country, 
pointing out in 1992 that the country had just “fought a war, at least in part, because of our 
dependence on foreign oil”.247 He moved quickly to put his stamp on US energy policy. He 
appointed Hazel O’leary the country’s first female Energy Secretary and tasked her with the job of 
outsourcing energy research by expanding implementation of Bush’s 1989 National 
Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act (Public Law 101-189). That Act created more than 300 
Cooperation Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) to transfer technology from the 
Department of Energy to academia and industry. Clinton also changed the research direction back 
to applied, agreeing to kill the super collider program, launching the Partnership for New 
Generation Vehicles (PNGV)248 with the country’s big automakers to produce a prototype car 
three times more fuel-efficient by 2004, and initiating an openness program to declassify DOE 
documents and research studies.  
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 This was partly due to opposition and a lack of support from the administration, but mainly because new 
safety regulations enacted in 1992 required a Presidential proclamation of emergency to overcome them, 
something for which Bush had no interest and no need. 
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 Cited on page 78 in Fehner and Holl (1994) from page 5 of Clinton (1992). 
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 The PNGV later became the Freedom Car Program under George W. Bush. Recent achievements are 
updated on the DOE website: <http://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/about/index.html>. 
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Two of Clinton’s top priorities were an energy tax and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards.249 Clinton’s energy tax was based on the BTU heat content so as not to alienate any 
specific sector and was proposed via an omnibus budget bill. A broader solution than the 
unpopular carbon tax, which would be “too hard on the coal States” and an equally unpopular gas 
tax, which would be “too tough on people who drive a long way to work”(Clinton, 1993), the 
proposal unleashed a firestorm of acrimony and debate. When it finally passed the House, 
Northeastern States had exacted exemptions on heating oil and Midwesterners on ethanol and 
methanol. It underwent further revision in the Senate (Cloud and Rubin, 1993; Hager and Cloud, 
1993). In the end, Clinton’s broad energy tax was thrown out altogether and replaced with an 
almost cynical gasoline tax of 4.3 cents per gallon (Cloud and Hager, 1993a; 1993b).250  
Still, Clinton set the wheels in motion for legislation that accelerated the use of alternative 
energies. This included a $30 stimulus bill that contained $200 million in energy related 
expenditures and a government program to purchase alternative fuel vehicles. Overall, he 
planned for as much as $5 billion in energy related programs, $1.9 billion for conservation and 
$263 million in natural gas research. He pushed and won the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 
102-486), which introduced the Production Tax Credit (PTC), which established a ten-year 
subsidization program for independent power producers ($0.15 per Kwh) that used renewable 
sources. The Act established efficiency standards for commercial heating and air-conditioning 
equipment, electric motors, and lamps, liberalized tax breaks for oil and gas, and began the 
process of deregulating the electricity markets by removing obstacles to wholesale power 
competition in place since the 1935 Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA).251 He later 
signed into law two tax revisions that reduced taxes on alternative transport fuels and raised 
them on fossil fuels, further tilting the regulatory balance in favor of alternatives.252 In essence, 
Bill Clinton thus finished the process of liberalization of America’s energy market begun by Ronal 
Reagan began in 1981. 
Clinton also tackled the thorny issue of global warming, but when Congress baulked on new 
emissions standards, the President proposed a system of voluntary cooperation with business, 
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 During the 1992 election, Bush accused Clinton of wanting raise taxes so high that it would “break the 
auto industry” See pages 74-75 in Fehner and Holl (1994). 
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 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Public Law 103-66) 
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 For a full account of the history of PUCHA, including a complete register of all US Public holding 
companies over its 57 year history, see United States. Energy Information Administration (1993). 
252
 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-34) and the Tax Relief and Extension Act, enacted under 
Title V of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-170) 
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much to the dismay of environmentalists, calling for an investment of $1.9 billion by 2000, 60$ 
billion of which would come from private industry (Clinton and Gore, 1993). He negotiated and 
signed the Kyoto Protocol (1997), but never submitted it Congress for ratification.253 Meanwhile, 
he poured money into alternative energies, budgeting $789 million for efficiency programs in 
1994 (35% over previous year) and $327 million for solar and renewables (a year on year increase 
of 30%) and used his executive authority to close off lands that Republicans wanted to open for 
fossil fuel exploration.254 Clinton’s concerted emphasis on efficiency, conservation, renewables, 
and natural gas, all driven by private industry and guided by Federal policy was so ubiquitous that 
by the time he left office in 2001, the energy policy, efficiency standards, and environmental 
protection had become both synonymous and commonplace.  
However, when the price of US crude dropped to lowest level since 1976 ($11.28) on December 1, 
1998, it seemed once again that the country’s energy woes were outdated. Indeed, between 1986 
and 1999, oil prices in the US averaged around $17 a barrel. As a result America’s domestic 
producers were losing income, its oil refineries were making a killing, and public consumption was 
growing (Lazzari, 2007:8). This led to a decline in private investment into alternative technologies 
and fuels and created a disincentive to conserve. In fact, despite repeated proclamations to 
reduce oil consumption over the past decades, by 2001, Americans were consuming more oil than 
ever (19.6 million barrels a day in 2001 versus 17.23 million in 1993 and 16 million in 1980 (BP, 
2010). 
3.3.1.6. Energy independence reemerges and fuses with national security  
Oil prices started to swing upward in early 1999. By March, the price rose to $14.66 and by the 
end of the year oil prices closed above $27 and continued upward until the November election. 
Prices had dropped slightly (just under $30) by the time George W. Bush entered the White 
House, but with international demand growing, an electricity crises crippling California, and 
consumption at home expanding, oil prices returned to the agenda. Against this backdrop, Bush 
tasked Vice President Cheney to chair a National Energy Policy Development Group to “develop a 
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 In July 1997, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution indicating that it would oppose any treaty that 
did not also require developing countries (India and China particularly) to reduce to similar levels. See the 
unanimous Byrd-Hagel Resolution (S.Res 98) of July 25, 1997. 
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 He cleverly drew on the Antiquities Act of 1906 to declare vast areas as national monuments, including 
Utah’s 1.7 million acres Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument which, according to a New York 
Times report, held “the largest known coal reserves in the nation: an underground bank of nearly seven 
billion tons of coal worth up to a trillion dollars.” See Egan (1996). 
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national energy policy designed to help the private sector, and *…+ promote dependable, 
affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for the future” 
(National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001:viii).255 The NEDP almost exclusively negotiated 
with fossil interests (Suskind, 2004:146-7 ) and its final report warned that within 20 years, the 
country will be importing two out of every three barrels of oil from states that work against the 
country’s national interest.  
Bush subsequently introduced his controversial national energy policy in May 2001. Convinced 
that the real issue of oil was not its price, but the national security consequences of foreign 
dependence, Bush noted that “we haven't built a refinery in years and we should have” and 
proposed expanding domestic production and opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
(ANWR) to leasing (Bush, 2001a). He also proposed opening the Rocky Mountains and Gulf of 
Mexico to oil exploration, easing regulations on pipelines and new power plants, increasing the 
use of nuclear and coal power to diversify electricity generation, fund clean-coal research, extend 
eminent domain rights for power line ‘right-of-ways’ to incentivize industry to upgrade the 
electricity infrastructure, and set newer, higher standards on electric appliances. The centerpiece 
of his plan, however, was the conclusion that energy security results from a combination of 
expanded domestic oil production and a full court press to ‘grow’ energy at home in the form of 
biofuels. Speaking before an audience of energy engineers in Iowa in May, Bush confirmed, 
 “We face a shortage of energy *…+ So today I've laid out an initiative that said, 
first and foremost, *…+ we need to conserve. We need to be wise about how we 
use energy. *…+ And secondly, no matter how well we conserve, we're still going 
to need more energy.*…+ And one of the keys to energy security in America, and 
national security, is to have a diversified energy base. That means oil; that means 
gas; that means safe nuclear energy; that means clean coal technologies to make 
sure the abundance of coal that we use is done in a friendly—environmentally 
friendly way. But it also means interesting new opportunities such as biomass *…+ 
I can't think of anything better for national security than to replace barrels of oil 
that come into the country from nations that can't stand America— some of them 
don't—with products that we grow here in America. I can't think of— I would 
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 The highly controversial report was accompanied by accusations of oil industry influence. In 2004, 
documents came out showing that Cheney’s Committee had studied maps of the Middle East’s oil fields 
causing Michael Klare to suggest that the Bush-Cheney plan all along was to conquer the region and seize its 
oil. See Klare (2004). 
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much rather replace oil from Iraq with corn products from Iowa, and it's getting 
within our reach.” (Bush, 2001b) 
The Bush initiative set off a stream of debates, but his efforts were interrupted by the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. As the country moved swiftly to a war footing, energy reform took a back seat to 
national security concerns. Nevertheless, Bush slipped in incentives for biofuels production into 
the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (Public Law 2002). In his 2003 State of the Union 
message, President Bush pledged “to promote energy independence for our country” and 
pledged $1.2 billion to develop hydrogen-fueled vehicles (Bush, 2003). But, it would take another 
two years and his re-election before Bush would get many of his originally desired reforms 
through.  
In August 2005, he signed the Energy Policy Act (Public Law 109-58), a sweeping program that 
provided extensive loan guarantees and tax breaks to energy producers and changed the focus of 
the country’s energy policy from advanced research to commercialization of substitute fuels.256 
Upon signing the bill, Bush claimed, “It's an economic bill, but *…+ it's also a national security bill” 
and “every time we use a home-grown fuel, particularly these, we're going to be helping our 
farmers and, at the same time, be less dependent on foreign sources of energy” (Bush, 2005). The 
Act authorized subsidies for wind energy producers and consumers that buy hybrid cars and for 
the first time legally defined wave and tidal energy as renewable and thus available for public 
funding. After almost a decade of attempts, the government finally had the authority to begin 
issuing leases for exploration on the outer continental shelf. The US now had a federally 
mandated Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) just as oil prices were topping $60 a barrel and 
together with costs of war, draining the US economy.  
Almost immediately afterwards, Hurricane Katrina struck, temporarily shutting down refinery 
production and oil flows into Louisiana. Although the government’s response to the human side 
of the disaster was widely subject to criticism, the government averted an extended price spike 
when the EPA temporarily lifted fuel standards and some crude was released from the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve keeping price spikes to a minimum. Years of preparation for government 
emergency response in the oil sector finally paid off.  
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 The Act set mandatory target for the share of biofuel in gasoline market to 4 billion gallons by 2006 and 
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Then in early 2006, prices started to rise again and by 2007, with oil approaching $90, a 
Democratic controlled Congress passed two important bills, one at the President’s request the 
other in the face of timid resignation. The first was the America COMPETES Act, which established 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) modeled on the Defense Advanced 
Research Project Agency (DARPA) that had ushered in technologies such as the Internet, stealth 
aircraft, and Gallium Arsenide, the core ingredient in wireless communications chips.257 ARPA-E 
was tasked to develop new energy technologies to reduce the country’s energy imports by 
coordinating grants and cooperation agreements for research and development. The second 
piece of legislation was the Energy Independence and Security Act (Public Law 110-140) increasing 
CAFE standards to 35 mpg by 2020, providing additional incentives for hybrids, higher shares of 
biofuels (36 billion gallons by 2022), and new funding for small businesses to enter into the 
renewable fuels market.258 Strong as they were, the incentive programs could not offset the 
skyrocketing price of oil. By June 2008, at the height of the election season, West Texas 
Intermediate peaked at $133.9 and with it, the American economy tanked, its citizens reducing 
driving for the first time in decades, and car sales slumped to all time lows.  
When he left office in 2009, Bush had effectively altered the US approach from loose stewardship 
of resources to a quasi-mandated industrial program to create a home-grown green economy 
under the banner of national security.259 The economy was in shambles. The country was 
embroiled in two wars. And energy independence, a notion loathed and ridiculed by his 
supporters in industry, was now firmly back on the agenda, and this time it was financially backed 
with a technology program aimed at finding substitutes.260  
From the moment he entered office, Barack Obama placed energy at the heart of his agenda to 
rebuild the country’s sagging economy and disintegrating infrastructure. In his inaugural address 
he claimed, “each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our 
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 See Public Law 110-69 §5012. The full name of the law is “The America Creating Opportunities to 
Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007”. 
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 The Act’s full title says it all: “An act to move the United States toward greater energy independence and 
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 Over the next few years various additional energy tax breaks were attached to otherwise innocuous 
pieces of legislation. See, for example the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-246), 
also known as the 2008 Farm Bill.  
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adversaries and threaten our planet”. He called for “action, bold and swift” in order to “build the 
roads and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us 
together”. And he promised to “restore science to its rightful place” by harnessing “the sun and 
the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories” (Obama, 2009c). Pointing to the 
failures of past programs to achieve a reduction in imports, he announced that “it will be the 
policy of my administration to reverse our dependence on foreign oil, while building a new energy 
economy that will create millions of jobs” (Obama, 2009a).  
The vehicle by which he would initiate the country’s new green economy was a massive stimulus 
proposal. With unprecedented speed, the President pushed through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 (Public law 111-5), which marked an abrupt turn away from the 
country’s free market tradition toward a decidedly Keynesian, even protectionist, approach.261 
Announcing his proposal, he promised to “ensure that the fuel-efficient cars of tomorrow are built 
right here in the United States of America” (Obama, 2009a). The new Act allocated more than 
$120 billion in energy related investments including $30 billion in direct energy related grants to 
be managed by the Department of Energy, a package of energy related tax credits worth $70 
billion, and an additional set of ‘green energy loans’ worth another $27 billion.262 For the first time 
since the Kennedy administration, the Federal Government committed financial support for 
commercial modernization of the nation's electrical grid and directly invested in upgrading the 
country’s automobile fleet. Obama ordered the EPA to implement new higher standards on 
automobile efficiency (Obama, 2009b) and, to reinvigorate the auto industry, worked with 
Congress to pass a $3 billion program to promote the sales of newer more efficient vehicles, the 
so-called Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) or “cash for clunkers” program (Public 
Law 111-32).263  
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 A special Buy American provision (Section 1605) required that “none of the funds appropriated or 
otherwise made available by this Act may be used” for public infrastructure or assets “unless all of the iron, 
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 Grants included $16.7 billion for projects to increase efficiency in buildings, expand the domestic 
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modernization; $3.4 billion for demonstration projects to prove that carbon capture and sequestration can 
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By the beginning of 2010, Obama’s recovery plan was slowly beginning to take hold. Seizing the 
moment, he announced that The Recovery Act had been broken “the trajectory of [the] 
recession” largely because the new clean energy sector it created had opened new “jobs of the 
future, jobs that pay well and can't be outsourced”. According to Obama, those jobs were the key 
to reducing the country’s “dangerous dependence on foreign oil” and the means by which the US 
“will combat the threat of climate change and leave our children a planet that's safer than the one 
we inherited” Cautioning against the risks of allowing other nations to beat the US in the race to 
produce the next generation of clean energy technologies, he introduced a $2.3 billion new clean 
energy manufacturing initiative to “close the clean energy gap that's grown between America and 
other nations.” (Obama, 2010a). The initiative authorized tax credits for manufacturers of wind 
turbines, solar panels, and batteries. Summing it up succinctly, Obama declared,  
“I don't want the industries that yield the jobs of tomorrow to be built overseas. I 
don't want the technology that will transform the way we use energy to be 
invented abroad. I want the United States of America to be what it has always 
been, and that is a leader—the leader—when it comes to a clean energy future.” 
(Obama, 2010a).  
In recasting the energy debate from Bush’s helping America grow to a new central role as the 
backbone of the future, Obama took the policy started Bush one step further. And then he took it 
another. In a March 31, 2010 speech to military audience at Andres Air Force base, he announced 
that he was considering “potential areas for development in the mid- and south Atlantic and the 
Gulf of Mexico while studying and protecting sensitive areas in the Arctic.” Recognizing the 
firestorm this would create with his political base, he chastised those who opposed drilling 
anywhere and those that want it everywhere. He countered that he was taking a broader view, 
one that would move the US “from an economy that runs on fossil fuels and foreign oil to one 
that relies more on homegrown fuels and clean energy.” And there, standing in front of the 
Navy’s ‘Green Hornet’, a biofuel retrofitted fighter jet capable of flying faster than the speed of 
sound, he lauded the military for its “leadership” in developing biofuels.  
In his closing remarks, President Obama took the country that one necessary step further, the 
step that no other nation was yet prepared to make, to begin the transformation of its military 
infrastructure to biofuels. With clarity and honesty, the President told his audience, 
“Now, the Pentagon isn't seeking these alternative fuels just to protect our 
environment; they're pursuing these homegrown energy sources to protect our 
national security. Our military leaders recognize the security imperative of 
Testing the Model 
180 
increasing the use of alternative fuels, decreasing energy use, reducing our 
reliance on imported oil, making ourselves more energy efficient. And that's why 
the Navy, led by Secretary Mabus, who's here today, has set a goal of using 50 
percent alternative fuels in all planes, vehicles, and ships in the next 10 years. 
That's why the Defense Department has invested $2.7 billion this year alone to 
improve energy efficiency.  
So moving towards clean energy is about our security. It's also about our 
economy. And it's about the future of our planet. And what I hope is, is the 
policies that we've laid out—from hybrid fleets to offshore drilling, from nuclear 
energy to wind energy—underscores the seriousness with which my 
administration takes this challenge. It's a challenge that requires us to break out 
of the old ways of thinking, to think and act anew. And it requires each of us, 
regardless of whether we're in the private sector or the public sector, whether 
we're in the military or in the civilian side of Government, to think about how 
could we be doing things better, how could we be doing things smarter so that we 
are no longer tethered to the whims of what happens somewhere in the Middle 
East or with other major oil-producing nations.” (Obama, 2010b). 
After decades of failed attempts, by 2010 the US was once again trying to become energy 
independent. Instead of doing it by rationing, taxing, over producing at home, setting quotas, or 
turning off lights, elevators, and air-conditioners, a new more complex project had been unveiled. 
More similar to the Manhattan Project than either Apollo or Project Independence, the laws 
passed in the Bush and Obama administrations set the basis for a transformed economy, one led 
by the country’s most important player in terms of its national security. For the first time, the 
military was on board. 
Between 1942 and 1946 the US spent $21 billion (in $2007) on the Manhattan Project (or about 
$4 billion per fiscal year). Between 1960 and 1973, it spent $96 billion on the Apollo Program (or 
$7 billion per fiscal year). Both resulted in success. Both were driven by military security concerns. 
However, for the country’s energy program, run through what collectively might be known as the 
DOE Energy Technology Program, the government spent more than $115 between 1974 and 1980 
(less than $3 billion per fiscal year) and much of that was in nuclear technologies (Stine, 2008). 
After 35 years of energy programs, the US was more, not less dependent on foreign oil. The 
reason? The military had no need, incentive, or guarantee that alternatives would be available.  
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Between 2009 and 2010, with more money spent on alternative energy programs than the funds 
allocated to all the previous national security initiatives combined, the military began to play an 
increased role. Thus in its most recent evolution, US energy policy merged the two notions of 
energy independence and national security. The two were now synonymous.  
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3.3.1.7. Summary tables and charts of the evolution of US energy policy 
3.3.1.7.1. Key energy related Executive Orders and related institutions during World War II 
Table 12: Key wartime energy related EOs and institutions 
Executive Order 
Number / Date 
Effect 
6777 / June 30, 1934 
Established the National Resources Board, which planned and coordinated 
public works related to conservation and use of national resources and, 
after 1939, performed special duties related to the national defense. 
Abolished in 1943.
264
 
8202 / July 13 1939 
Authorized Federal Power Commission to manage transmission of 
electricity and natural gas between the US and foreign countries.
265
 
8807 / June 28, 1941 
Advised the President on status of scientific research relating to national 
defense, coordinated all related federal government research, and 
maintained defense mobilization lists of scientific personnel and 
resources. It was abolished in 1947 by EO 9913. 
8339 / July 30, 1941
266
 
Established an Economic Defense Board consisting of the VP, Secretaries 
of State, Treasury, War, Navy, Agriculture, and Commerce and the 
Attorney General. Advised the President on economic defense measures 
to be taken deemed essential to the effective defense of the country and 
to coordinate the policies and actions of the various related executive 
departments and agencies including ways to protect the US trade 
positions.
 267
 
8926 / October 28, 1941 
Established the Office of Lend-Lease Administration in the Office for 
Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President. 
8942 / November 19, 1941 Requisitioning of Property Required for National Defense. 
8989 / December 18, 1941 
Established the Office of Defense Transportation, which coordinated the 
utilization of domestic transportation facilities during World War II and 
operated seized transportation properties Abolished in 1949 (EO 10065) 
and succeeded by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
9024 / January 16, 1942 
Established the War Production Board, which exercised general direction 
over federal war procurement and production programs. Abolished in 
1945 (EO 9638), it was succeeded by the Civilian Production 
Administration (CPA), OEM (1945-46), Office of Temporary Controls (1946-
47), and ultimately the Department of Commerce (1947). 
9380 / September 25, 1943 
Established the Foreign Economic Administration in order to centralize 
foreign economic functions. Abolished in 1945.
268
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 Abolished and replaced by the National Resources Committee under authority of EO 7065, June 7, 1935. 
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 The Federal Power Commission came into existence under the 1920 Federal Water Power Act (41 Stat. 
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9718 / May 3, 1946 
Terminated the Petroleum Administration for War together with the 
offices of Petroleum Administrator and Deputy Petroleum 
Administrator.
269
 
9791 / October 17, 1946 
Provided for a Study of Scientific Research and Development Activities and 
established the President's Scientific Research Board, which was 
terminated by terminated by EO 9841 in 1947. 
National Security Act of 
1947 (Public Law No. 235, 
80) 
Created a National Military Establishment, headed by the Secretary of 
Defense and established, the National Security Council, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Research 
Development Board (JRDB), headed by Vannevar Bush to act as a 
temporary agency to coordinate military research until a more permanent 
institution was established.  
 
3.3.1.7.2. Comparative energy mixes of the US 1949-2009 
The following section present three charts displaying the change in US TPES since 1949. The first 
chart compares the energy mix at three fixed points (1973, 1991, and 2009) and shows a steady 
change since 1973. The share of oil dropped slightly from 46 percent to just over a 37 percent in 
2009, largely due to the increase in the use of nuclear power and coal in its electricity sector. Over 
the same period, however, the use of all renewables (including biofuels) increased its share only 
from approximately 6 to 8.2 percent. While most was in the electricity sector, an increasing share 
was occurring in the transport sector. The second chart displays the linear change in the total 
consumption of energy sources normalized in billions of BTU since 1949. The third chart places 
the other two in context by comparing the growth in primary production of fossil versus 
renewable fuels indexed at 1949=100 and shows several distinct changes in the direction of 
renewable production. The data presented below for all years comes from the US Department of 
Energy’s 2010 released Annual Energy Review (United States. Department of Energy, 2010a). The 
data excludes net electricity imports, which were negligible (x < 0.1%) in the years represented; 
and 2009 data is preliminary. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
food programs, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s foreign procurement and development 
programs and preclusive buying operations. 
269
 See US Federal Register, 11 FR 4965, May 7, 1946. 
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Figure 16: The US energy mix, 1973-2009 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Comparison of total US energy consumption by fuel source (heat content) 1949-2009 
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Figure 18: Change in primary production (fossil vs. renewable fuels) 1949-2009 
 
 
3.3.1.7.3. US oil and gas consumption of oil US 1949-2009 
Between 1955 and 1973, when the first oil price shock occurred, the US experienced rapid growth 
in the consumption of both oil and natural gas. Although demand for oil and gas tapered off 
slightly in the wake of the 1973 crisis, oil continued to rise in the run-up to the 1979 crisis, before 
dropping to 1971 levels in the early 1980s. It then travelled a steady upward path until 2005. After 
its initial drop in 1973, gas consumption declined fairly steadily until 1986, when it began a steady 
climb until the late 1990s, where it has held steady since. As the graphs and tables show, despite 
all efforts to the contrary, oil consumption increased across every Presidential administration 
since Truman, except for Carter, whereby an economic recession sapped demand. The gas case is 
less volatile as its use was largely limited to the heating sector for most of the period; the demand 
for which one might expect to remain fairly steady. The increase from the 1980s forward is due to 
its introduction into the electricity sector. The data from 1955-1964 comes from multiple BP 
Statistical Reviews up to 1974 as reported in Jenkins (1989:141-3). The years 1965-2009 come 
from BP (2010). 
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Figure 19: US oil and gas consumption, 1949-2009 
 
 
Table 13: US oil and gas consumption, 1949-2009 
 
 
Oil Natural Gas 
 
Oil Natural Gas 
1955 415.60 245.60 
 
1983 704.89 433.96 
1956 433.00 261.60 1984 723.28 463.51 
1957 434.00 276.50 1985 720.17 446.12 
1958 443.00 291.20 1986 749.34 418.10 
1959 460.00 317.50 1987 764.79 444.52 
1960 473.10 337.50 1988 796.74 464.89 
1961 478.10 350.00 1989 795.31 493.95 
1962 498.20 372.30 1990 781.82 493.99 
1963 513.00 394.10 1991 765.58 504.82 
1964 527.20 416.00 1992 782.25 521.97 
1965 548.93 397.37 1993 789.35 534.96 
1966 575.66 428.27 1994 809.78 547.54 
1967 595.76 452.21 1995 807.73 571.30 
1968 635.45 484.08 1996 836.55 581.72 
1969 667.79 521.08 1997 848.02 585.20 
1970 694.59 549.22 1998 863.76 575.31 
1971 719.27 566.21 1999 888.89 577.30 
1972 775.84 571.98 2000 897.64 600.35 
1973 818.03 567.29 2001 896.07 573.86 
1974 782.55 547.64 2002 897.36 593.66 
1975 765.90 502.68 2003 912.26 575.33 
1976 822.36 512.69 2004 948.75 577.30 
1977 865.86 502.25 2005 951.37 568.53 
1978 888.85 503.99 2006 943.80 560.04 
1979 868.03 520.77 2007 942.30 597.28 
1980 794.11 509.92 2008 888.48 599.52 
1981 746.00 497.62 2009 842.89 588.71 
1982 705.54 462.57 
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3.3.1.7.4. US oil import dependence (%) 1970, 2000, 2008 and dependence on oil-based 
transport fuels (1970, 2007) 
The following tables and graphs illustrate the changes that have occurred in the US since the early 
1970s in the key transport/oil related areas of oil import dependency, the dependency of oil in 
transport, on-road fuel intensity, and efficiency. On-road fuel intensity is presented in gallons per 
mile and not liters per kilometer because that is how the data was originally published. Notably, it 
has declined only very slightly. However, the fact that the actual number of vehicles on the road 
has increased substantially from approximately 74 million in 1960 to 255 million in 2008 while oil 
consumed in the transport sector has increased from 228 million TOE to 563 million TOE over the 
same period, indicates significant success in fuel efficiency programs. All the data in Table 13 ‘US 
petroleum dependency’ comes from International Energy Agency (1984; 1991) as reported in 
Sovacool and Brown (2009) except for the years 2000 and 2008 in the import dependency 
columns, which come from the US Energy Information Administration, September 2010 Monthly 
Energy Review (United States. Department of Energy, 2010b). The vehicle data for Table 14 and 
Figure 17 comes from the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics (United States. Research and 
Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), 2010) and the data for oil consumption in the 
transport sector comes from IEA (2010a) as does the data for the country’s Strategic Petroleum 
Reserves. Finally, the data for US oil imports comes from United States (2010b). 
Table 14: US petroleum dependency, 1970-2008 
Import dependence  Oil in transport  On-road fuel intensity 
1970 2000 2008  1970 2007  1970 2007 
22% 53% 57%  95.1% 97.1%  0.077 0.500 
 
Table 15: Oil, cars, and efficiency 
Year Registered vehicles 
Oil in transport 
sector (mtoe) 
TOE/vehicle 
1960 74,431,800 228.15 3.07 
1970 111,242,295 346.00 3.11 
1980 161,490,159 414.29 2.57 
1990 193,057,376 476.68 2.47 
2000 225,821,241 574.32 2.54 
2008 255,917,664 565.30 2.21 
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Figure 20: Oil, cars, and efficiency 
 
 
Figure 21: US petroleum imports (1000s of barrels /day) and OPEC and Persian Gulf shares 
 
Figure 22: Strategic petroleum reserves and available days of net imports 
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3.3.1.7.5. Fuel Switching and R&D in substitutes 
The following table shows the amount of total US investment into ERD between 1974 and 2008. 
The data demonstrates the fossil fuel research peaked twice (in 1981 and in 1990). It also shows 
that energy efficiency’s share rose steadily until 2002, the first fiscal year of the G.W Bush 
administration and declined since. Meanwhile, biofuel and renewable fuel research soared 
between 1974 and 1981 then tapered off significantly. Not included is the data for 2009 and 2010 
under the Obama administration. Also not included in the table are all those ERD programs 
related nuclear power, nuclear weapons and non-fuel related research, such as other kinetic 
weapons designs and defense technologies. Although unpublished in their entirety, it is safe to 
assume that nuclear power and weapons account for much of the missing shares. Data for total 
research and development expenditures between 1974 and 2008 comes from the International 
Energy Agency’s online table of "R&D Budgets" in their Energy Technology R&D 
Statistics database (IEA, 2010c). Finally, a comparison of indexed overall US and EU ERD 
expenditures and international oil prices are represented in Figure 10 on page 120.  
Table 16: US energy R&D, 1974-2008 
 
EU 
'Total 
Energy 
R&D' 
Of which in specific areas: 
Renewables 
including  
Transport 
Biofuels 
Hydrogen/Fuel 
Cells 
Fossil 
Fuel 
R&D 
Energy 
Efficiency 
1974 1952.53 1.2% 
 
9.4% 0.2% 
1975 2698.04 3.7% 
 
11.3% 0.7% 
1976 3168.80 6.0% 
 
15.8% 1.1% 
1977 4827.13 9.7% 
 
16.5% 3.4% 
1978 5599.84 12.6% 
 
17.5% 3.9% 
1979 6171.01 15.5% 
 
15.3% 4.8% 
1980 6074.78 17.2% 
 
21.7% 7.5% 
1981 4676.65 20.1% 
 
24.5% 6.8% 
1982 3610.72 12.5% 
 
14.2% 5.4% 
1983 3362.78 10.1% 
 
10.6% 8.1% 
1984 2834.38 9.8% 
 
12.4% 7.2% 
1985 2845.37 9.0% 
 
12.7% 9.2% 
1986 2550.60 7.5% 
 
14.1% 8.3% 
1987 2260.27 7.7% 
 
13.2% 8.4% 
1988 2390.51 5.7% 
 
19.9% 6.7% 
1989 2307.76 5.2% 
 
20.8% 7.3% 
1990 2563.98 4.4% 
 
34.5% 7.3% 
1991 2579.62 5.8% 
 
29.5% 8.3% 
1992 2108.81 5.9% 
 
18.1% 13.1% 
1993 2059.30 5.5% 
 
18.2% 14.2% 
1994 2265.60 9.1% 
 
19.9% 17.5% 
1995 2191.72 11.3% 
 
12.5% 21.0% 
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EU 
'Total 
Energy 
R&D' 
Of which in specific areas: 
Renewables 
including  
Transport 
Biofuels 
Hydrogen/Fuel 
Cells 
Fossil 
Fuel 
R&D 
Energy 
Efficiency 
1996 1918.46 9.5% 
 
16.0% 19.2% 
1997 1726.49 10.0% 
 
8.4% 19.7% 
1998 1757.94 12.1% 
 
8.8% 20.8% 
1999 1963.22 11.3% 
 
8.7% 20.9% 
2000 1899.31 9.3% 
 
9.2% 23.8% 
2001 2302.93 8.9% 
 
12.5% 20.7% 
2002 2289.56 8.7% 
 
14.9% 20.3% 
2003 2165.66 8.8% 
 
15.1% 14.2% 
2004 2210.32 8.4% 5.7% 14.9% 13.2% 
2005 2232.24 8.3% 6.2% 12.1% 12.0% 
2006 2197.60 7.7% 7.6% 12.1% 13.6% 
2007 2507.05 11.6% 8.8% 10.2% 12.6% 
2008 2952.85 10.3% 9.1% 10.7% 11.6% 
 
3.3.1.7.6. Biofuel production and solar power panel installation (1990-2008)  
The following table shows the growth in US biofuel production, solar installations, and alternative 
fuel vehicles in the US for different periods beginning in 1974. All figures are annual and show 
considerable growth since their introduction. Domestic solar thermal installations began following 
first crisis as part of the Nixon Project Independence program, but took off following Carter’s 
targeted plans to expand home solar heating. Numbers are presented in surface area (meters 
squared) as is standard for the industry. Data for domestic solar photovoltaic sales was available 
only from 1982 forward. The numbers represent both Crystalline Silicon and Thin-Film Silicon 
models, the two photovoltaic technologies commonly used. Biofuels production and consumption 
are listed in billions of BTU (heat content). Alternative fueled vehicles refer to accumulated 
acquisitions, less retirements, at the end of each calendar year, but do not include concept and 
demonstration vehicles. The data includes vehicles that drive on the following fuels: electricity, 
liquefied petroleum gas, compressed or liquefied natural gas, 85% and 100% methanol, 85% and 
95% ethanol, and Hydrogen. No biodiesel vehicles were reported in the data. All the data is from 
United States (2010a). Although the numbers are listed by a different standard than those 
provided for the in chapter on EU biofuel data, they nevertheless indicate clear growth trends 
over the period. To illustrate this, an addition set of charts follows the table below. 
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Table 17: Alternative energy indicators 
Domestic Solar 
Thermal Deliveries 
m2(note) 
Solar PV Sold 
(in Peak 
Kilowatts) 
 
Biofuels 
Production 
(Billions of 
BTU) 
Biofuels 
Consumption 
(billion of 
BTU) 
Alternative-
Fueled Vehicles in Use 
(Estimated) 
1974 118,358 
No  
data 
reported 
No  
data 
reported 
No  
data 
reported 
No  
data 
reported 
1975 347,736 
1976 538,931 
1977 958,016 
1978 930,888 
1979 1,244,529 
1980 1,698,546 12,720 12,724 
1981 1,891,692 34,404 34,415 
1982 1,687,677 6,897 
 
63,143 63,163 
1983 1,548,601 12,620 77,302 77,326 
1984 1,564,766 9,912 93,151 93,179 
1985 N/A 5,769 107,099 107,133 
1986 848,762 6,333 122,725 122,763 
1987 658,404 6,850 124,058 124,096 
1988 744,711 9,676 125,378 125,417 
1989 1,023,884 12,825 110,867 110,902 
1990 1,037,170 13,837 128,000 128,040 
1991 579,901 14,939 145,005 145,051 
1992 628,954 15,583 169,336 169,116 
 
30,352 
1993 609,165 20,951 188,391 188,451 45,848 
1994 670,946 26,077 197,737 199,862 60,472 
1995 662,956 31,059 141,284 142,835 493,710 
1996 665,372 35,464 186,315 183,686 530,012 
1997 720,835 46,354 202,474 201,099 560,410 
1998 687,111 50,562 210,809 209,035 590,060 
1999 747,498 76,787 233,146 235,789 644,604 
2000 730,032 88,221 254,453 252,721 789,328 
2001 961,454 97,666 308,118 303,405 850,914 
2002 1,022,305 112,090 402,048 403,876 942,196 
2003 1,015,059 109,357 487,311 499,537 1,067,998 
2004 1,235,703 181,116 564,094 577,027 1,130,984 
2005 1,363,817 226,916 720,308 771,145 1,184,250 
2006 1,814,675 337,268 977,678 991,310 1,269,124 
2007 1,279,925 517,684 1,387,251 1,372,407 1,391,532 
2008 1,367,161 986,504 1,561,841 1,544,751 1,551,334 
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Figure 23: Solar installation deliveries, 1974-2008 
 
 
Figure 24: Biofuel production and consumption, 1980-2008 
 
 
Figure 25: Alternative fuel vehicles on the road, 1995-2008 
 
3.3.1.7.7. A comparison of the Manhattan Project, Apollo Program, and US ERD 
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The following table compares the funding for three major US technology programs. The table is a 
near facsimile of that reported on page 7 of Stine (2008) with the addition comments indicating 
mission targets and evaluative estimate of success or failure. It excludes funding allocated in 2009 
during the Obama administration. It is simply too early to estimate if the funding will be 
sustained, spread across years or decades, or cancelled before all commitments are fulfilled. 
Nevertheless, the table below illustrates the intensity of investments made by the government to 
achieve three projects of utmost importance to the national interest as deemed by the respective 
administrations in power. Following the Stine Table is her graphical representation of annual 
funding for Manhattan Project, Apollo Program, and DOE Energy Technology R&D Program. A 
map of major US Department of Energy facilities follows, the source of which is the DOE’s online 
interactive list.270 
Table 18: Cumulative and Annual Average Program Year Funding for the Manhattan Project, the Apollo 
Program, and DOE Energy Technology R&D Program 
 See footnote for original 
source note.
271
 
Cumulative 
Funding (in 
billions of 
$2007) 
Length 
in Fiscal 
Years 
Annual 
Average 
Funding 
(in 
billions 
of 
$2007) 
Percent of 
Federal 
Outlays 
During Peak 
Year of 
Funding 
Percent of 
GDP During 
Peak Year 
of  Funding 
The Manhattan Project 
(1942-1946) - Mission: 
Military Superiority; End 
Result: Success 
$21 5 $4 1 0.4 
The Apollo Program (1960-
1973) - Mission: Military 
Superiority; End Result: 
Success 
$96 14 $7 2.2 0.4 
                                                          
270
 See < http://www.cfo.doe.gov/strategicplan/doelabs.htm>. 
271
 Original source note: “Source: Congressional Research Service. Manhattan Project data: Richard G. 
Hewlett and Oscar E.  Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: The New 
World, 1939/1946, Volume I. Apollo program data: Richard Orloff, Apollo By The Numbers: A Statistical 
Reference, NASA SP-2000-4029, 2004 web update. DOE data: CRS Report RS22858, Renewable Energy R&D 
Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy Efficiency R&D, 
by Fred Sissine. Federal Outlay and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data: Office of Management and Budget, 
Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government FY2009. Peak year of funding (in current dollars) 
for Manhattan project was 1946, for Apollo program, 1966, and for DOE Energy Technology R&D programs, 
1980. The greatest annual funding (in constant dollars) for DOE energy technology programs took place 
from 1975-1980.” 
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DOE Energy Technology 
Programs (1975-1980) [Peak 
Funding] - Mission: 
Economic Independence; 
End Result: Failure 
$41 6 $7 0.5 0.1 
DOE Energy Technology 
Programs (1974-2008) 
[Long-Term Funding] - 
Mission: Economic 
Independence; End Result: 
Failure 
$115 35 $3 0.5 0.1 
 
Figure 26: Annual funding for Manhattan Project, Apollo Program, and DOE Energy Technology R&D 
Program 
 
Source: Stine (2008).
272
 
 
                                                          
272
 Stine’s original source text reads “Source: Congressional Research Service. Manhattan Project data: 
Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: 
The New World, 1939/1946,Volume I. Apollo program data: Richard Orloff, Apollo By The Numbers: A 
Statistical Reference, NASA SP-2000-4029, 2004 web update. DOE data: CRS Report RS22858, Renewable 
Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy 
Efficiency R&D, by Fred Sissine. 
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Figure 27: Map of major DOE installations and facilites 
 
3.3.1.7.8. Key commercial market players 
The following tables identify the major commercial actors that have a large stake in the 
development of alternatives and the response to policy initiatives that lead to fuel substitution. 
The data source for the ten major energy related industries listed here is the same as used in the 
chapter on the EU’s major market players, the EU’s 2009 industrial R&D investment scoreboard 
(Joint Research Centre, 2009). The reports and data are available via the JRC website.273 For the 
                                                          
273
 See <http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/research/scoreboard_2009.htm>. 
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sake of clarity, the industries included are Aerospace/defence, oil/gas producers, oil 
equipment/service/distribution providers, mining, chemicals, automobiles/parts, industrial 
transportation, commercial vehicles/trucks, electricity producers/distributers, and gas and other 
utilities. The data provided below lists the top ten companies in 2005 (and 11 cases in the 
Chemicals area because by the author’s discretion not to exclude Monsanto with its over €400 
million annual research budget) in terms of net sales (mio €), but unlike their European 
counterparts, with research and annual development budgets of over €25 million in each these 
industries. Likewise, there were only nine companies in the commercial vehicles & trucks sector 
that met the above standards, only four oil & gas producers, and only one in the gas, water & 
multi-utilities and industrial transportation sectors respectively. That said, it provides a snapshot 
of US commercial energy relevant research and development.  
 
Table 19: Major energy relevant market players in the US 
Aerospace & defense 
    
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Boeing 1268 46494 153000 1869.27 
United Technologies 788 36220 222200 1158.86 
Lockheed Martin 733 31547 135000 883.35 
Northrop Grumman 699 26043 123600 456.08 
Raytheon 287 18560 80000 426.41 
General Dynamics 237 18009 72200 291.62 
L-3 Communications 102 8007 59500 55.7 
Goodrich 183 4582 22600 226.26 
Rockwell Collins 94 2920 17100 206 
Alliant Techsystems 55 2727 15200 43.66 
     
Automobiles & parts 
    
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
General Motors 6934 163278 335000 5679.86 
Ford Motor 6372 150228 300000 6781.92 
Johnson Controls 563 23295 114000 351.81 
Delphi 1003 22844 184200 1865.03 
Goodyear 537 16720 80000 309.43 
Lear 482 14487 115000 147.51 
Visteon 496 14391 49575 681.58 
TRW Automotive 426 10718 63100 172.09 
Dana 252 8348 44000 233.13 
ArvinMeritor 124 8321 29000 148.35 
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Chemicals 
    
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Dow Chemical 1354 39256 42413 909.63 
EI du Pont de Nemours 1136 22583 60000 1132.58 
Lyondell Chemical 211 15773 10000 77.14 
Huntsman 287 11009 10800 80.96 
PPG Industries 244 8648 30800 261.95 
Ashland 322 8359 20900 38.15 
Air Products and Chemicals 788 6904 20200 112.5 
Rohm and Haas 282 6777 16519 231.43 
Praxair 743 6490 27306 67.82 
Eastman Chemical 291 5984 12000 137.33 
Monsanto 238 5336 16500 498.47 
     
Commercial vehicles & trucks 
    
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Caterpillar 2047 30155 85116 918.95 
Deere 435 18038 47400 574.17 
Paccar 719 11549 21900 99.86 
Cummins 158 8408 33500 235.67 
Navistar International 195 8026 14800 175.48 
AGCO 75 4620 13000 103.17 
Terex 30 4255 16800 39.25 
Oshkosh Truck 37 2509 7960 28.31 
Sauer-Danfoss 81 1312 8600 49.74 
     
Gas, water & multi-utilities 
    
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Nalco 63 2808 10900 49.68 
     
Industrial transportation 
    
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Westinghouse Air Brake Tech.  19 886 5229 27.81 
     
Oil & gas producers 
    
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Exxon Mobil 11732 269074 106100 603.59 
Chevron 7376 146539 59000 267.89 
ConocoPhillips 9851 136861 35600 105.97 
Sasol 1745 9255 30004 30.34 
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Oil equipment, services & distribution 
Company name 
Capital 
expenditure 
(mio €) 
Net sales 
(mio €) 
Number of 
employees 
R&D 
investment 
(mio €) 
Schlumberger 1350 12130 60000 428.54 
Halliburton 552 17797 106000 204.31 
Baker Hughes 405 6091 29100 159.55 
Weatherford International 446 3691 25100 91.02 
Smith International 151 4730 14697 62.39 
BJ Services 274 2749 13600 45.95 
FMC Technologies 78 2735 10000 43.66 
 
3.3.2. Salience of SAPP 
It is difficult to argue with the assumption that the US prioritizes power projection. Across the 
span of a little more than six decades since the end of World War II, the US has spent over $25 
trillion on its military, formally declared war against foreign nations eleven times (in five overall 
wars), conducted seven undeclared wars, and executed well over a hundred brief military 
expeditions.274 Since 1950, more than 130,000 of its soldiers have died on foreign battlefields, 
45,000 of which have fallen since 1980 (Leland and Oboroceanu, 2010). Indeed, power projection 
and the marshal tradition to secure its national interests or protect its citizens by the use of 
uncompromising military force has been a major component of American political thinking since 
the country’s foundation in 1776 and as the country’s industrial power base expanded, so too did 
the importance of securing its interests through the projection of strength.275 Proclamations of its 
political elites evidence this. Ronald Reagan noted in 1989 that “common sense also told us that 
to preserve the peace, we'd have to become strong” as did Secretary of State George Shultz five 
years earlier declaring, “Diplomacy not backed by strength will always be ineffectual at best, 
dangerous at worst” (Reagan, 1989; Shultz, 1985).  
                                                          
274
 The five official wars, (and 11 declarations and their dates) include: (1) the war with Great Britain (1812); 
(2) the war with Mexico (1846); (3) the war with Spain (1898); (4) the First World War (Germany and 
Austria-Hungary (both in 1917); (5) and World War II (Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1941 and Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Rumania in 1942). Undeclared major wars include the Naval War with France (1798 to 1800); 
the First Barbary War (1801 to 1805); the Second Barbary War (1815); the Korean War (1950-1953); the 
Vietnam War (1964 to 1973); the Persian Gulf War (1991); the global war against foreign terrorists 
(Afghanistan and global, 2001-), and Iraq (2003-2010). All of these actions, except the Korean War had 
formal Congressional authorization short of a formal declaration of war. For a comprehensive listing see 
Grimmett (2010). 
275
 For a detailed analysis of the historical role of power projection and competing forces behind US foreign 
policy see Kagan (2006).  
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This marshal theme of US behavior was evident early in its history as the country grappled with its 
post-revolution loss of UK naval protection for its merchant fleet.276 When the Barbary powers of 
North Africa began pirating US trade vessels in the 1780s, then minister plenipotentiary Thomas 
Jefferson declared, “We ought to begin a naval power, if we mean to carry on our own 
commerce” (Boyd, et al., 1950:511-13).277 As President, Jefferson sent the country’s nascent 
marine force first to blockade the port of Tripoli, then to bombard it, and finally to capture the 
Pasha’s second biggest city.278 In the ensuing decades, the US would conduct similar missions inter 
alia in the Gulf of Mexico, in Algeria, in Oregon (a future US state that the UK and Russia claimed), 
and in Argentina, Cuba, Greece, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, China, and Somoa. US 
Presidents Monroe and Roosevelt would go on to issue doctrines to claim suzerainty over the 
entire western hemisphere and send a battle fleet around the world merely to demonstrate the 
country’s growing reach, capability, and will.279  
The country’s ability to project power grew visibly the nineteenth century. However, the US was 
little more than a second-rate power for much of its pre-World War I history. A snapshot of 
comparative hard power capabilities over the period between 1820 and 1900 reveals its relative 
weakness (see Figure 28 below). Hard power in this case specifically refers to the widely used 
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) consisting of annual values for total population, 
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military 
expenditures. Originally established by Singer et al. (1972), updated by Singer (1987), CINC scores 
measure these six factors as a share the world total, and establishes an index, of which the world 
total is one. The formula for calculating CINC is as follows: 
      
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
Where the variables c and w represent country and world respectively, P=total 
population and U=urban population (population living in cities with a population > 
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 Before the revolution, American merchant marine vessels were flagged with the Union Jack and thus 
afforded UK naval protection. 
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 Already in 1794, President Washington requested and received funding to build four frigates to send to 
the Mediterranean. The ships were built, but never sent because the country reached a tribute agreement 
with the Barbary powers and paid them not to attack their vessels over a subsequent period of 20 years. 
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 The original mission was a disaster as the flagship, the frigate Philadelphia, ran aground in shallow 
waters. 
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 See the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, and the sailing of the Great White 
Fleet (1907-1909). 
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100,000) both measured in thousands; I=Iron and steel production (1000s of tons), 
E=primary energy consumption (1000s of tons of coal equivalents), M=military 
manpower (1000s) and X=military expenditures (1000s of current year UK Pounds 
(1816-1913) or US dollars (1914 forward).  
In 1820, the US hard power capabilities (.037) were on par with the Netherlands (.040) and the 
Two Sicilies (.031), but far below that of Austria-Hungary (.093), Germany (.052), France (.123), 
and Russia (.161), not to mention the UK, which with a CINC score of .316 commanded almost a 
third of all global power capabilities. This relative balance of power changed significantly over the 
subsequent 80 years as the UK, France, Russia, and Austria each declined sharply and Germany 
and the US emerged as new industrial powers.  
The balance shifted further in the US favor by 1950. Not only did the two World Wars arrest 
Germany’s growth and eliminate Austria-Hungary from the club of states, together with the 
Bolshevik revolution and the loss of Europe’s colonial holdings, the changes shattered the relative 
power positions of the European powers. Beginning in 1941, the balance turned decidedly toward 
the US, which was already on steep trajectory to increased hard power dominance (See Figure 29 
below). By the end of World War II, the US had supplanted the UK by controlling almost a third of 
all global power capabilities. 
Figure 28: Relative national material capabilities of leading/emerging powers 1820-1900 
 
Source: Singer et al. (1972) and updated by Singer (1987) 
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Figure 29: Growth in US hard power 1816-1950 
 
Source: Singer et al. (1972) and updated by Singer (1987) 
Having emerged as the proverbial ‘last man standing’, the US was poised in 1945 to reshape the 
world to its linking; and it did not hesitate doing so. Presidents Roosevelt then Truman ushered in 
watershed changes to the international system, founding the United Nations and establishing the 
Bretton Woods international financial institutions. However, just as the war ended, the US and 
the Soviet Union squared off over the future trajectory of Iran (1946), Turkey (1947), and Greece 
(1947).280 Fearful of the specter of Communism and the spread of Soviet influence, Truman and 
consecutive US Presidents enacted a policy to contain Soviet expansion and defend Europe. The 
resulting Cold War led to stand offs that tested not only US resolve, but directly challenged its 
ability and will to project power. When the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin (1948-1949), the US 
cooperated with the UK to create an air bridge into city. The so-called Berlin Air-Lift transferred 
not only food, but also troops, fuels, and armaments to the city buried deep inside Soviet 
occupied Germany. Thus, in its first challenges of the Cold War and newfound position as a 
superpower, the US demonstrated both its will and its ability to project conventional power 
rapidly thousands of miles from its shores; and it provided a preview of the vital importance that 
global mobility would play in determining future conflicts. 
The combination of the early post-war military confrontations with the Soviet Union, the need to 
rebuild and defend both Europe and Japan, and its long developing trajectory towards increased 
power led the US to make two vitally important decisions about its post-war military posture. 
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First, after failing to get an international agreement to curtail the use of the same nuclear 
weapons that the US had used to win the Pacific War and followed by the successful Soviet 
detonation of an atomic device in August 1949, the government rapidly moved to expand its 
nuclear arsenal. This set into motion a program of cooperation between the country’s newly 
founded Atomic Energy Commission, major US engineering companies such as Westinghouse and 
General Electric, and the military to construct new nuclear based weapons and systems. Second, 
to combat the Soviets, and more importantly to secure the country’s interests as it had been 
doing for the past century, Washington needed to dominate the seas and the skies. Although it 
already had the largest naval and air fleets of all remaining powers, World War II had 
demonstrated that both were vulnerable to fuel shortages. Thus, in order to secure its position, it 
needed either new sources of fuel to supplant production at home or to change the fuel it was 
consuming. This did not pose a serious problem for the newly formed Air Force because 
petroleum supplies were abundant, under US or allied control; and there were few cost-effective 
alternatives for use in aircraft. For the navy, however, the energy question was an entirely 
different matter.  
The Navy’s dependence on diesel fuel was seen as serious problem because of the limitations that 
it placed on how far ships could travel before requiring refueling, a problem that was multiplied 
by the country’s increasing reliance on petroleum-based combat aircraft stationed on carriers. 
Likewise, in the case of the increasingly important submarine, diesel engines posed two additional 
problems. They were loud and thus detectable and those same refueling requirements limited 
their ability to execute long and secret missions, essentially negating their attack value. The navy 
needed a newer, faster fleet that it could deploy for longer periods at sea. Hence, it turned to 
nuclear power. 
The Navy asked for and received permission and funding to design nuclear propulsion systems in 
1951 and after a brief period of reorganization and trial and error, the US began constructing its 
first nuclear powered submarine, the Nautilus, in 1952. Two years later, it was deployed to sea, 
travelling immediately from Connecticut to Puerto Rico in less than a day, submerged the entire 
time. The Nautilus not only revolutionized naval strategy with its exceptional speed and 
submersible duration, six years later, when it conducted a submerged transit underneath the 
North Pole, it demonstrated that there was no place on earth outside of the US military’s reach. 
Between 1954 and 1967, the US commissioned another 57 nuclear-powered submarines in 
multiple phases of technological evolution and increased energy efficiency, including 29 attack 
submarines capable of launching ballistic missile strikes (Hewlett and Duncan, 1974). The navy 
also developed nuclear power for surface ships, launching a missile cruiser (1961), an aircraft 
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carrier (1961), and a frigate (1962). By the time Kennedy took office, the US had a functioning 
nuclear navy, and while many ships still relied on diesel fuel, the military’s adoption of this new 
energy source had secured the country’s global dominance of the seas.  
The timing could not have been more propitious. A heightening of tensions between the US and 
the Soviet Union quickly followed Kennedy’s entry into office and reached an apex in October 
1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis and the subsequent US naval blockade. Faced with increasing 
competition from the Soviets and enabled by its new high speed, long-haul navy, the US began 
extending its reach via the sea into distant lands in the 1960s. The US deployed forces and 
engaged in armed conflict against a variety of state and non-state actors in Laos, Cambodia, and 
North and South Vietnam, all supported by the Soviet Union. It provided transport and logistics 
for France and Belgium in the Congo and expanded both its air and naval forces in a huge military 
buildup. By the end of 1970, the US had an active arsenal of 15 aircraft carriers, 102 submarines, 
between 180 and 200 principle surface fighting ships, and approximately 7,000 combat aircraft 
including long range bombers (and excluding helicopters).281 Its military budget had grown from 
$330 billion (in $2008) to $442 billion.282 The post-war plan to dominate the seas and the skies 
were well underway. 
After the 1960s, the US continued to expand its military and significantly increased its activities 
overseas engaging in a growing number of unique territories. In so doing, it followed the opposite 
trajectory of Europe, which saw that number decline (Compare with Figure 12 and Figure 13 on 
page 129). Although the US avoided large-scale occupations in the decades following its 
withdrawal from Vietnam, the US was not shy about using its military. It launched missions in six 
unique locations in the eighties and nine in the nineties (see Figure 31 below). In addition to the 
more traditionally registered large-scale battles, the US also stepped up evacuation missions, 
supported the militaries of foreign government, provided logistics to allies and the UN, and 
launched several numerous short-term bombing runs on countries such as Libya and Iraq. 
Because such conflicts often resulted in high property damage, but little loss of life, they are not 
present in the UCDP dyadic set of international conflicts. Therefore, we have added them to 
accentuate the case that the US does in fact prioritize power projection. The source of the 
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 Based on data gleamed from multiple editions of IISS’ annual The Military Balance. See International 
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 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database on NATO military expenditures, available at 
http://www.sipri.org. 
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additional conflict data comes from various historical accounts including Presidential submissions 
under the US War Powers Act gleamed from (Grimmett, 2010). 
Figure 30: Quantity of dyadic armed conflicts fought by US 
1946-2009 
 
Figure 31: Distribution of unique conflict areas 
in ten-year periods 
 
Figure 32: Revised quantity of dyadic armed conflicts 
(including minor engagements) fought by US 1946-2009 
 
Figure 33: Revised distribution of unique 
conflict areas (including minor engagements) 
in ten-year periods 
 
Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset, version 1-2010 and Grimmett (2010). 
 
Although the shift to a nuclear navy opened up new opportunities to conduct distant missions, 
allowing it to effectively control the world’s seas, control of the skies as well as the ability to fight 
ground wars remained entirely dependent of petroleum-based fuels. Supply of those fuels was 
the responsibility of the Navy.283 This posed a recurrent problem because endemic inter-service 
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 The Navy had been managing three major oil fields located in California and Wyoming and oil shale 
reserves in Utah and Colorado for decades. Faced with a supply crisis in 1976, Congress passed the Naval 
Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-258) ordering the Navy “to commence a 
vigorous production program from the three naval petroleum reserves located in California and Wyoming”. 
The act also reassigned the Navy’s fourth petroleum reserve in Alaska to the jurisdiction to the Department 
of the Interior. In 2000, the last and largest of the three Oil Shale Reserves administered by the Naval 
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rivalries plagued efficient cooperation. Further expansion of US force deployments, and thus fuel 
needs, quickly made the situation untenable. In 1961, the Defense Department established the 
Defense Supply Agency (DSA), later called the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which centralized 
the supply of US forces, implemented a new national contracting system, and assumed 
responsibility for the worldwide procurement and distribution of coal and petroleum. In 1986, 
Congress moved to restructure the military through The Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). In addition to reorganizing the chain of 
command, it also formally consolidated the shared procurement of technologies and fuels under 
the management of the DLA. Its energy wing, the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) or the 
DLA-E, now supplies all services with their fuel needs.  
Still, the consolidation of the US military’s fuel supply chain was only part of the transformation 
that occurred in its handling of energy issues. The crises of the 1970s also demonstrated the need 
to consolidate the types of fuel being used. Thus, in 1988 the Defense Department issued 
Directive (DODD 4140.413) ordering field commanders and weapons designers, to “minimize the 
number of fuels required in joint and combined operations and maximize the use of locally 
available fuels” (Stucker, et al., 1994:53-6). It further ordered the adaptation of aircraft and 
combat vehicles to use multiple fuels, i.e. allow immediate in theatre fuel switching, and ordered 
the DLA to be prepared to introduce alternative fuels to the battlefield if the need arises. The 
Directive marked a serious departure point in US military energy thinking. It now sought fuel 
flexibility and initiated a serious effort to acquire those fuels as close to operational theatres as 
possible. 
It did not take long for the DESC and the new rules to be tested. The 1991 Gulf war with its 
massive forward positioning of ground and air forces required enormous amounts of fuel. 
Between August 19, 1990 and May 31, 1991 (Operations Desert Storm/Shield), US forces 
consumed 1,883 million gallons (7,172 million liters) in total of eight different liquid petroleum-
based fuels, 58% of which was Jet A-1, Air Force fuel. Of this, host nations Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman supplied 1,779.5 million gallons (or roughly 94%). On average, 
the ODS mission consumed more than 20 million gallons (75 million liters) a day according to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves (NOSR), No. 2 in Utah, was transferred to the Ute Indian Tribe. NOSRs-1 
and 3 have been transferred to the U.S. Department of the Interior. 
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USCENTCOM data (Stucker, et al., 1994:111-31).284 By all accounts, the new organization of fuel 
supplies was a smashing success. Although, the ‘locally available fuels’ mentioned in the 1988 
Directive were plentiful in the Arabian Peninsula and hypothetically would be less available 
further from the source, the US has faced few strategic problems in fueling subsequent wars. In 
the years since the conclusion of the Gulf War, the US military has increasingly focused on a two-
track strategy to keep its ships, planes, and combat vehicles fueled and ready for action. It 
maintains a global supply chain for petroleum based fuel deliveries and is actively investing in 
alternative substitute fuels.  
The US military operates an extensive international network of suppliers for oil, coal, and natural 
gas, which the DESC buys and resells (through budget line transfers) to operational command 
centers when and where they need them; and to account for possible disruptions, it plans and 
stockpiles. Between 2007 and 2009, DESC purchased more than 400 million barrels of petroleum 
fuels (circa 63 billion liters) and as of September 2009 held 59 million barrels (circa 9.3 billion 
liters) in stock (DESC, 2010:24-5). Its commercial purchases are both geographically and financial 
risk distributed, with no single supplier above 12% and thus minimizes situations where conflicts 
of interest could disrupt supplies.285 In fact, to keep the military running, the DESC operates some 
179 vehicle filling terminals around the world, an additional 149 installations in 96 countries for 
aviation needs, and over one billion dollars worth of contracts at 87 ports in 61 countries. This is 
in addition to 625 different support locations, eight of which are operated by foreign 
governments.286 The magnitude of these efforts points to one conclusion. The US places an 
extremely high salience on supply availability for power projection. 
Meanwhile, the US is increasing its efforts and pouring funds into alternative energy research 
programs, including batteries and flexible solar technologies to allow for less liquid fuel 
dependency in forward land deployments and is actively investing into liquid synthetic and biofuel 
programs to find alternative mixes for aviation fuels. Renewable energy targets (5% by 2010) for 
government agencies established the Energy Policy Act of 2005 have provided the legal basis for 
the Department’s push for demonstrative evidence that alternative fuel mixes will work and can 
be produced at home at stable and reasonable prices. The DESC itself has begun to develop 
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 See Stucker, Schank, Dombey-Moore, United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. and National Defense Research Institute (U.S.) (1994), a detailed Rand Report that provides 
complete tables of as reported by the services, agencies, and countries mentioned here. 
285
 Its two largest suppliers are the foreign owned BP and Shell. 
286
 The DESC provides a map of these on page 44 of DESC (2010). 
The US’ Energy Policy 
207 
alternative fuel supply chains by purchasing multiple contracts for hydro-treated renewable jet 
(HRJ-8,) which is a biofuel drop in replacement for JP-5 and JP-8, and in 2009, awarded numerous 
contracts to purchase over 200,000 gallons of biofuels (DESC, 2010). While still a drop in the 
bucket compared to its overall needs, the military is taking an active role in freeing itself from 
fossil fuels, with a special focus on aviation fuels; a logical approach given that the latter makes up 
the largest portion of fossil fuel annually consumed by the military. As Kristin Blackwell observes,  
“In Fiscal Year 2005, DOD consumed roughly 125 million barrels of oil — approximately 1.2% of 
the nation’s total. About 74% of that was used to power mobility vehicles — Air Force aircraft, 
Navy ships, and Army ground vehicles. Over half (roughly 52% ) was aviation fuel” (Kristine E. 
Blackwell, 2007).287 
Costs are a big part of the story. Dependence on oil, foreign or domestic is extremely expensive 
and volatility in the markets can greatly increase the cost of military operations and drain the US 
budget. According to Blackwell (2007:2) a $10 increase in the price of a barrel of oil, translates 
into an operating cost increase of close to $1.3 billion (in $2007). Thus, it is not difficult to 
understand why the military wants to seek alternatives, which even if they are more expensive in 
short term, may prove to be less volatile in the long term and hence advantageous for strategic 
planning.  
The US military began researching alternatives in earnest in 2001 when the Defense Science 
Board Task Force delivered a report recommending the implementation of greater efficiency in 
the military’s weapons systems and the development of alternative fuels (United States. 
Department of Defense, 2001). That report gave the impetus for products currently coming online 
and set-off a flurry of activity in the defense industry both in support and opposition to the use of 
substitute fuels.288 Irrespective of the debate, the Department has taken its approach to a future 
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 The latter case was made in a JASON (2006) Report that concluded that despite any price fluctuations, 
shortages should not be expected in the near future, and thus there was no need to rapidly invest in 
alternatives. JASON is an independent scientific advisory group established in 1960 that provides consulting 
services to the US government on matters of defense science and technology. It has produced numerous 
public and secret reports. The Federation of American Scientists provides a list of unclassified JASON 
reports on its website. See < http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/>. For additional reports, see Air 
Force Scientific Advisory Board (2006) ‘Quick Look, Technology options for improved air vehicle fuel 
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switch toward renewable fuels seriously. In 2006, it established a Defense Energy Security Task 
Force with goal of reducing its combat vehicle fuel intensity (United States. Energy Security Task 
Force, 2007). In 2009, the task force became the Office of the Director of Operational Energy 
Plans and Programs with authority to “oversee operational energy plans and programs, establish 
and implement an energy strategy, coordinate all the branches’ energy plans and research-and-
development investments related to operational energy demand and supply technologies”(PEW, 
2010:10). The military has also begun working closely with DARPA to develop demand-side 
technologies to be deployed on multiple defense weapons platforms and vehicles.  
Finally, the Department singled out the importance of increased energy efficiency and laid out its 
plans to develop a “green carrier strike group” in its 2010 Congressional mandated Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report (United States. Department of Defense, 2010). The QDR, one of the most 
important US military strategy documents, places energy squarely in the context of operational 
security: “Energy security for the Department means having assured access to reliable supplies of 
energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs” 
(QDR:87). In military terms, energy efficiency is now recognized as “a force multiplier, because it 
increases the range and endurance of forces in the field and can reduce the number of combat 
forces diverted to protect energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and 
conventional attacks and disruptions” (QDR: 87).  
As was predicted in our model, the military has taken the lead among US government agencies on 
renewable energy. It has set high targets including posturing the Air Force “to cost-competitively 
acquire 50 percent of its domestic aviation fuel via an alternative fuel blend” and to deploy “a 
‘green’ carrier strike group using biofuel and nuclear power” both by 2016 (QDR:87-88). It also is 
working to invent, test, and deploy technologies and fuels to achieve them. The Navy 
commissioned the first all electric-drive amphibious assault ship, USS Makin Island and tested an 
F/A-18 engine on camelina-based biofuel, both in 2009. The military’s engagement in developing 
non-petroleum substitutes makes perfect sense given the high priority that the US places on 
supply availability for power projection; and hard power projection remains a vital instrument of 
its foreign policy. President Obama summed it succinctly: “For decades, we've talked about the 
risks to our security created by dependence on foreign oil”, but “here at home, as politicians in 
Washington debate endlessly about whether to act, our own military's determined that we can no 
longer afford not to” (Obama, 2010b).  
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3.3.2.1. SAPP relevant data 
3.3.2.1.1. US military expenditures / personnel 
The following charts show the growth of US military expenditures from 1949 to 2009 in constant 
$2008 and active military personnel between 1950 and 2007. It is juxtaposed to the price of oil 
(set on the secondary, right axis) for context. The chart illustrates that military expenditures have 
spiked during the Korean, early Vietnam Wars, Reagan buildup, and post 9/11 periods. However, 
it also shows a decline in the later Vietnam years, even as US military activity was increasing. This 
may indicate that in the high mobility costs of initially moving forces into theatre. Personnel 
numbers dropped off significantly towards the end of Vietnam. The US terminated compulsory 
military service in 1972. Since then, voluntary signups have declined slightly.  Military expenditure 
data comes from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Database on NATO 
military expenditures, available at http://www.sipri.org and SIPRI's Full Military Expenditure 
Database from 1988-2009. Personnel data comes from the Correlates of War Project originally 
published and updated in (Singer, 1987; Singer, et al., 1972). 
Figure 34: US military expenditures, 1949-2009 
 
Figure 35: US active military personnel, 1950-2007 
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3.3.2.1.2. Estimated inventories of energy dependent military hardware 
The following table is presents an estimated assessment of the total energy dependent active 
military hardware in the US arsenal in selected years between 1960 and 2005. The selection of 
hardware is based on a subjective assessment of its military value. Only weapons systems that are 
practical for offensive power projection are included. Transport ships and planes, minesweepers 
are not included. Principle surface fighting ships include a broad range of coastal and deep-water 
destroyers, frigates, and escorts; the determination of their relevance to offensive power 
projection is the sole discretion of the author. The table illustrates the enormous arsenal of air 
and naval power that the US amassed by 1965 and its continued expansion through 1970. 
Although the quantity of aircraft carriers and submarines declined since, the US continues to 
maintain a commanding array of power projection assets. Data for the table comes from multiple 
annual editions of The Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1965; 1966; 
1969; 1970; 1974; 1975; 1979; 1980; 1984; 1985; 1989; 1990; 2004). 
Table 20: Energy dependent active power projection military hardware for selected years (US) 
  1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2005 
Aircraft/Helicopter Carriers 4 15 15 13 14 15 12 
Submarines 35 102 73 80 97 96 72 
Principle Surface Fighting Ships 
60 
< x > 
80 
180 
< x > 
200 
220 
< x > 
240 
170 
< x > 
190 
210 
< x > 
230 
210 
< x > 
230 
160 
< x > 
180 
Air Combat / Bombers c. 5000 c. 7000 c. 7000 c. 5000 c. 6000 c. 7000 c. 6000 
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3.4. Hypotheses 
Based on the assumptions that energy is vital to power projection, that states must not always 
prioritize power projection, and that initial states of autonomy and investments into substitutes 
modify state behavior under different price and resource flow conditions, we can begin to 
propose several hypotheses about EU and US behavior. By looking at that behavior under 
different price and supply availability conditions, we should be able see a set of common and 
distinctive behaviors and link them to their levels of energy autonomy and the importance they 
place on supply availability for power projection. An analysis of the divergent evolutionary paths 
of EU and US energy policies largely, but not entirely, supports our nine overriding assumptions 
linking internal energy policies, external outcomes, and the interning variables of price and supply 
availability for power projection. 
A brief appraisal of those assumptions in the context of our initial findings is helpful in establishing 
three broad groups of hypotheses about how states behave externally toward each other, 
internally toward substitution, and how the two interact in a feedback loop. Based on how EU and 
US energy policies evolved to their present condition, particularly the historical politicization of 
energy as it shifted from irrelevance to economic and military importance and assumptions about 
supplies swung between presupposed abundance and scarcity, we can posit nine hypotheses in 
three broad categories. The first hypothesis pertains to the actions of states when energy supplies 
are cheap and easy to access; the next four pertain to the opposite, when energy supplies are 
expensive and difficult to access; and the third pertains to the feedback loop between external 
outcomes and internal energy policies. 
In both the US and EU case there appears to be some predictable behavior concerning the supply 
of energy. Long periods of sustained low prices generally were accompanied by less government 
intervention specifically and increased liberalization generally (Assumption 1). However, when 
prices rose, the expected opposite reaction of increased government action did not always occur. 
The duration of price swings, domestic politics, and the availability of domestic resources appear 
to have played a significant role in determining when and how each state reacted to the 
exogenous factor of price and ease of supply. When the theme of substitution did arise, it usually 
was associated with the notion of autonomy or independence (Assumption 2). The longer prices 
remained low, the less sensitive became the issues of supply availability and energy autonomy; 
and with that decline, so too did active support to find alternatives (Assumption 3). Finally, no 
matter how distant the achievement of energy autonomy may appear at present, both the US and 
the EU were entirely energy independent throughout their pre-industrial history. The US was 
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energy autonomous right up until middle of the twentieth century. This supports the argument 
that energy autonomy, while an ideal, is achievable (Assumption 4). Recent advancements in 
biofuels for transport, electricity generation, and storage support show that this is not only 
possible, it also is the ultimate target that states would like to reach.  
Further, the importance of energy is linked to the ebb and flow of EU and US orientation towards 
power projection. As the US rose in terms of military dominance and as the EU declined, the 
importance of supply availability moved with them (Assumption 5). As of 2010, we can safely 
conclude that the orientation of European powers toward hard power projection, and thus the 
need to fuel a vast military machine, has declined significantly from the pre-World War era. 
Conversely, the US orientation toward power projection has increased dramatically. Thus, supply 
availability for power projection (SAPP), the second key intervening variable, is visibly evident.  
However, this does not mean that military expenditure, a real measure of the importance of 
power projection, is in any way correlated to the price of oil. In fact, an analysis of the year on 
year change in the price of oil and military expenditures reveals that in the long-term view it is 
not. Between 1955 and 2009, Pearson correlates of changes in oil prices and military expenditures 
for both a group of five core EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the 
UK) and the US are insignificant and uncorrelated (0.046 and -0.064 respectively; see Table 21 
below). However, upon closer examination of specific periods with high or low prices (1955-1972, 
1973-1982, 1983-1998, and 1999-2009), certain tendencies do appear to exist. While never 
strong, the correlates jump in all periods for the US and are consistently negative. In the selected 
EU case, there is no discernable pattern at all while US expenditures show some extreme year on 
year shifts (see Figure 36 below). The evidential lack of tendency linking oil price and military 
expenditures for the EU group and the greater extremes in the US case makes it safe to assume 
that price does not affect the power projection orientation of low SAPP countries, but does in 
some way effect those of high SAPP countries. Importantly, however, it does not guarantee that 
high SAPP countries will increase spending as price rises. Why is this so? One possible explanation 
is that high SAPP countries invest in energy savings more rapidly than low SAPP countries in order 
to minimize the excessive costs of the military activities and that this can sometimes increase or 
decrease year on year spending. Another, more logical conclusion is that there simply is no 
relationship between the two on an annualized basis. Indeed, the only certainty one can derive 
from the evidence is that the spikes in the price of oil do not guarantee increased military 
investments in either high or low SAPP countries, a rather unflattering conclusion for the 
proponents of resource-war theorists.  
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Table 21: Analysis of relationship between changes in oil prices and military expenditures, 1955-2009 
Range: 1955-2009; N=110 
Variables: 
Milex.Change (US/EU): %-change in y-on-y milex  
OP.Change: %-change in y-on-y average price of oil 
Extremes: 
OP.Change EU.Milex.Change US.MilexChange 
Max: 217.26% Max: 9.75% Max: 20.79% 
Min: -48.60% Min: -8.34% Min: -12.17% 
STDV: 0.397 STDV: 0.025 STDV: 0.071 
Pearson Correlations (1955-2009) 
0.046 Change in EU.Milex to oil price 
-0.064 Change in US.Milex to oil price 
Pearson Correlations for select high-low periods 
Price-class Period EU US 
Low US-55-72 -0.066 -0.297 
High US-73-82 0.021 -0.262 
Low US-83-98 0.141 -0.218 
High US-99-09 -0.417 -0.168 
Source data for above table and chart below: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Database on NATO military expenditures; 
Pearson correlations calculated with SPSS. 
 
Figure 36: Analysis of relationship between changes in oil prices and military expenditures, 1955-
2009 
 
 
Note: the above chart excludes extreme year-to-year (Y-Y) movements in oil prices in 
excess of 25% for visual effect. This occurred 10 times over the 55 years of measured data 
(19%) of the cases. However, 7 of the 10 (or 12% of the cases) occurred during the period 
from 1999-2009, meaning that the excluded extremes only occurred in 5% of the cases for 
the preceding 44 years. 
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The cheap and easy hypothesis. 
Combining these factors, we can begin to assess when and how the intervening variables of price 
and supply availability for power projection are likely to affect both internal and external state 
behavior and how that behavior in effect requires a constant reassessment of the value of those 
variables. Between 1950 and 2010, the governments of the EU (and by this is meant the Member 
States) and the US changed their practical orientation toward energy on several occasions. When 
energy was cheap and abundant for sustained periods, both eschewed interstate cooperation, 
indicating that price is the stronger variable than SAPP when it is low. Hence, it appears that 
countries will adopt a Market Commodity Approach (MCA), i.e. execute a minimum of internal 
reforms and interventions and limit international cooperation, when prices are low (Assumption 
6).  
Because we can assume that both the EU and US share a similarly high salience on supply 
availability for their economic well-being, we can also assume that neither the US nor the EU will 
take significant internal or external action to alter current circumstances when prices are low and 
access is easy. Hence the first hypothesis (the cheap and easy hypothesis) is: 
H1:  Both the US and the EU will adopt market-commodity approaches under low-price-free-
flow circumstances. 
 
The expensive and difficult hypotheses 
The next four hypotheses extend from the assumption that there are differences in the degree to 
which power projection is prioritized between the US and EU. We have shown that over time the 
former has placed a higher priority on SAPP than the latter and that this difference should effect 
external approaches. Together we may call these four the expensive and difficult hypotheses.  
The historical record shows that even when disruptions occurred, EU Member States generally 
increased cooperation with other states, both consumer countries like the US and supplier states. 
This in part confirms Assumption 8 that even under the condition of disruptions states with a low 
salience of SAPP are more likely to seek cooperation rather than conflict. Likewise, the US with its 
high salience of SAPP turned to its European partners to coordinate an international response in 
forming the IEA under the stress of the 1973-1974 oil crises. This leads to the second hypotheses: 
H2: Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, both the EU and US will employ a 
cooperation strategy. 
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However, there is a caveat here. When major disruptions occurred in 1973-1974, EU Member 
States were able to cooperate with the US and Japan, but were unable at the time to bring France 
into line. There may be many reasons why the EU generally sought cooperation under such 
conditions, not least of which is a philosophical disposition to eschew military force borne out of it 
recent warring past. Still, the EU’s material inability to project force, evident through their military 
budgets and arsenals, seems to be an equally if not relevant explanation. During the years that 
France and the UK did prioritize power projection (shortly after World War II), they plotted 
together to use military force to secure transit routes for fuels considered vital to their military 
and economic capabilities. Such actions declined significantly in later decades. Conversely, the US 
underwent a massive military buildup after World War II. Power projection was a central 
component of its external strategy and remains so today. A quick glance at the average 
dimensions of the military arsenals of the US and selected EU Member States (UK, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain) between 1965 and 2005 shows that the US placed a special 
focus on aircraft carrier battle fleets and air power. In other words, it built a military machine 
designed to project force globally, while the EU Member States designed theirs to defend their 
coastlines and support escort missions, a clear indication of lesser salience of SAPP. 
Table 22: Average military projection capacity of selected EU Member States and the US, 1965-2005 
 
EU US 
 
1965-1980 1980-2005 1965-1980 1980-2005 
Aircraft/Helicopter Carriers 6 6.75 11.75 13.5 
Submarines 139.25 140.25 72.5 86.25 
Principle Surface Fighting Ships 152.5 175 167.5 197.5 
Air Combat / Bombers 1850 2050 6000 6000 
Source: Multiple IISS (1965-2005) with estimations from the author. 
 
When disruptions or even the threat of disruption of oil flows did occur, the US intervened, 
sometimes with direct aggressive force (1991) and at others with defensive measures (the mid 
1980s during the Persian Gulf Tanker Wars when oil shipments were endangered by Iraqi and 
Iranian mines). This confirms Assumption 7, which posits that states which prioritize SAPP are 
more likely to enter into conflict, and leads to the three additional hypotheses: 
H3:  Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, the US, which places higher salience on 
SAPP, is more likely than the EU or its Member States to resort to military means and 
even armed conflict to secure either access or flow. 
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H4:  Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, the EU, which places lower salience on 
SAPP, is less likely than the US to resort to military means and even armed conflict to 
secure either access or flow. 
In fact, because the EU places a relatively low salience on SAPP, and because low SAPP assumes 
lower power projection capabilities and thus higher risks associated with any such action, we can 
go one step further to claim a third hypothesis: 
H5:  The EU will never seek conflict even when prices are high and flow is restricted. 
 
The feedback hypotheses 
Following the latest jump in oil prices beginning in the late 1990s, both the US and EU stepped up 
efforts to invest in alternatives. Such action was not new to either party. However, recent efforts 
and the sums invested by the US far outstrip that of the EU. Indeed, despite the EU’s recent 
adoption of 2020 targets to achieve increased energy efficiency and shares of renewable supplies, 
the scale and speed of the effort appears to be of a lesser magnitude than similar activities 
underway in the US. According to the evidence collected so far, it is difficult to assess the precise 
amounts that the EU invested in the 1970s following the first oil crises. Open records have made it 
easier to examine the US approach. What is certain is that the US spent more. Moreover, the fact 
that the US military now plays such a central role in the development of new fuels and practical 
uses of non-petroleum energy supplies indicates that states that place a high salience on SAPP are 
likely to invest more than low SAPP salience countries when the situation arises that warrants 
such investments. While this does not fully confirm the supposition in Assumption 9 that lower 
salience of SAPP equals less investment in substitute technologies, the claim apparently seems 
credible. Thus, together with assumptions made about the need for states to enhance their 
energy autonomy, we have the basis for two feedback related hypotheses.  
H6:  Both the US and the EU will increase investments into substitutes when prices are high 
and flow is restricted  
and  
H7: Both the US and the EU will dramatically reduce investments under conditions of low 
prices and free flow.  
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The null hypotheses 
And finally, for logical completeness we can posit two null hypotheses that would disprove the 
relevance of the intervening variables altogether and disregard any form of determinant 
relationship between those variables and internal policies toward substitution.  
H8: Both the US and the EU never enter into conflict in energy rich areas when energy prices 
are high or disruptions are imminent. 
H9: Both the US and the EU do not change their investments strategies toward substitutes 
when conditions of prices and flow change.  
If either of these two are confirmed in the case studies, then it would indicate that the intervening 
variables of price and SAPP are at least weak, if not irrelevant.  With these nine hypotheses in 
hand and a broad set of initial findings, we can now move to test them against four common 
cases involving the US and EU. 
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4. Four Cases 
4.1. Case selection 
The broad analysis provided in Part 3, ‘Testing the Model’, provides a foundation for several 
hypotheses about the relationship between international energy prices, external state behavior 
and the internal energy substitution programs in the context of the US and the EU. Initial findings 
point to three important preliminary conclusions, namely prices matter, SAPP salience effects 
their relative importance, and the US with its high-salient SAPP should act quicker and with 
greater effort whenever energy supplies are threatened or costs increase.  
When international prices are low, both the EU and US should be expected to reduce both their 
levels of cooperation and their efforts to find substitute fuels because doing so is expensive and 
requires long temporal horizons; two factors negatively affected by domestic politics. However, 
when prices are high, both can be expected to seek cooperation with other states in order 
mitigate negative economic effects. The salience of power projection changes the relative 
importance of prices. The US places a comparatively high level of importance on its ability to 
project power and, therefore, should be more likely at least to deploy its military in order to 
secure the free flow of energy resources internationally, including in situations where its own 
supplies are not threatened. Why? Because its claim of global power status obligates it to protect 
its own interests as well as those of lesser capable states. Conversely, the EU places a relatively 
low salience on power projection, evidenced by its smaller and less capable military arsenal. The 
EU simply does not have the capability or reach to wage sustained operations far from home and, 
therefore, should rarely resort to armed force, and if so only in cooperation with other equally 
powerful states or a single more powerful one such as the US.  
Finally, no matter how important energy supplies are for either economy, supply availability 
should always be of greater importance to the US because of its fuel intensive military. Therefore, 
when prices rise, we should be able to observe that the US invests greater effort with greater 
urgency to develop alternatives fuels for its military. The primary historical example of this is the 
development of its nuclear navy between 1950 and 1965. Have there been cases of this since? 
Has the EU deployed military force unilaterally to protect its energy flows? Have the two really 
developed discernable patterns in response to common energy crises that substantially differ in 
the short to medium term of few years to a decade? To answers to these questions, we will now 
examine four common cases. 
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4.1.1. Focus on common cases and on oil 
Because the EU and US are such very different international actors, it is helpful to identify 
common cases where incidences of energy price shifts and supply availability have a similar 
economic effect on both parties. To do this we must focus our efforts on energy themes that are 
common to both. Petroleum provides the best standard of measure for two reasons. First, both 
the US and the EU are almost entirely petroleum dependent for their commercial transport 
sectors and military mobility. While both rely on various mixes of fuels for their electricity and 
residential heating, and do so in vastly different mixes between their Member States, oil 
dependency largely is uniform across both parties. Second, since the first ships began transporting 
oil through the Suez Canal in the late nineteenth century, oil has increasingly become an 
international commodity. When oil futures trading opened in New York in 1983, the 
transformation was completed. Major disruptions in any large producing country, as well as 
increases in international or seasonal demand will spike prices everywhere.  
This is not the case for other major energy commodities. Electricity and natural gas are largely 
regional matters, the vast majority delivered through lengthy transmission networks and 
transnational pipelines respectively. Disruptions of gas flows in Russia may affect prices in Europe, 
but they have little effect on US prices, and breakdowns in Canada or the US electricity grid has no 
direct effect on Europe. Importantly, the gas sector is changing. Recent advancements in 
liquefaction and shipping have introduced a new international market in the trade of Liquefied 
Natural gas (LNG). However, the LNG market was only in its nascent stages in the mid 2000s and 
there is not yet enough data to make a sound comparison with oil or coal as a shipped 
commodity. Coal is incompatible for our needs for different reasons. It is similar to oil in that it is 
mined in numerous countries and shipped around the world. However, more like gas, it is not 
used to power the industrial world’s mobility, but rather its electricity and heating sectors. Coal to 
liquid technologies may change this if they are successfully commercialized in the future.  
For the moment, however, oil is the unambiguous common denominator to compare EU and US 
responses to changes in pricing and supply flow. There are several recorded cases of oil supply 
disruptions and more than a few cases where oil prices have either been cheap or expensive for 
extended periods of time. To select appropriate cases, therefore, we must first make a simple 
division between cases of high price and low price and then set some temporal and geographic 
markers.  
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Time constraints and two low price cases 
Temporal constraints require us to exclude all cases prior to the 1970s. The logic behind this is 
rooted in the distinctive differences in the importance of foreign oil to Europe and the US and 
nature of the political relationship between the EU’s most powerful Member States. To begin 
with, the US only began importing significant amounts of oil in the late 1940s, and it only became 
relevant in 1948 when domestic consumption in the US exceeded imports for the first time (see 
page 148). Thus, no case prior to World War II can be considered as common for the EU and US, 
and that excludes quite a few incidences where the lack of oil was an essential component of 
domestic political decision making in the UK, France, and Germany.  
We also can exclude all cases prior to Europe’s first attempts to unify its political and military 
spheres under a common banner. It is impossible to refer to Europe as a group prior to the period 
of 1950 to 1954, when France pushed for political and military union (see page 130). That attempt 
failed and two years later France joined future EEC Member, the UK, in attacking the Suez Canal 
(see page 130), which in turn soured relations between the US and France. A little over year later, 
the EEC was born. Hence, we can exclude all cases involving the EU and its predecessors prior to 
January 1958. Further, over the course of the subsequent two decades, France and the UK lost 
most of their colonial holdings and the US became mired in a war in Vietnam; two very distinctly 
different paths. Indeed, it was not until the early 1970s, when the UK joined the EEC and many of 
the major oil exporting countries (excluding the US and Soviet Union) began to expropriate 
American and European petroleum assets that we begin to see a common basis to compare the 
two. By 1973, the economic playing field between the US and the EEC was leveling. Both had 
become sorely dependent on foreign oil from the Middle East; and Europe’s post-war recovery 
was well underway. Therefore, our starting point to look for cases cannot predate 1970.  
As presented initially on page 69, the price of oil exceeded or fell below the historic average a 
total of 18 times since 1861. During more than a hundred of the years on record, the price settled 
below the historic average. When it fell below the marker in 1921, it remained there until 1973. It 
would drop again in the mid 1980s and edge just above the average for a few short years until 
dropping again in the 1990s, before beginning its most recent climb in 2000. Because we want to 
check whether the EU and US reduce cooperation and cut energy research budgets during times 
of cheap prices and free flow, we can therefore initially identify two common cases of relatively 
cheap prices. These would be (1) the mid 1980s (the years of declining oil prices and endangered 
flows) and (2) the 1990s (the years of low oil prices and free flows).  
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4.1.1.1. Shared versus unique playing fields and the two high price cases 
In addition to the temporal factor, we also have to consider geography. While the EU and US 
share some common playing fields, there are several areas of the world that are either of unique 
value to each party or of such lesser importance in terms of their core interests that they do not 
constitute a common basis for comparison. What we are looking for then are cases were both the 
US and the EU have a common denominator of interests.  
By the 1970s, both Europe and the US relied heavily on the Middle East for oil. Throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, European and American companies invested fortunes into concessions in Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia and French companies invested heavily in Algeria. Outside of the 
region, there were other sources of oil, but none where Europe was so heavily engaged or reliant. 
This is not true for the US, which received vast amounts of oil from Venezuela and Mexico. When 
we add power projection into the equation, our list of possible common cases shrink even further. 
Europe was in no position after World War II to project force outside of its immediate 
neighborhood. Thus, we can exclude all cases that are outside of Europe’s reach, including the 
2004 crisis in the oil market caused by general strikes in Venezuela. Even had Europe made a 
concerted effort to act then and there, it would not have been able to bring military force to bear. 
The same is true for the ongoing territorial disputes over the resource-rich Spratley Islands in the 
South China Sea and alleged conflicts over Arctic are just that; they have not yet occurred.  
The limited geographic reach of Europe and the global reach of the US makes Europe’s access to 
and dependency on specific oil producers the common denominator for identifying our common 
high price cases. The list is long despite this constraint. We could draw from multiple brief periods 
of disruptions in Nigeria and Algeria, the 1980s American boycott of Libya, the run-up on oil 
demand caused by the emergence of China and India, and the EU’s open competition with Russia 
for access to Caspian oil. However, in order to observe changes in state behavior not only towards 
increased international cooperation, intervention, or restraint as well as internal change in the 
support for energy research and development, we need to look at longer periods of sustained 
pricing and supply availability. The best extended case on record for high prices and restricted 
flows is the period from 1973 to through 1980 when first the OPEC boycott and then the Iranian 
Revolution cut off supplies and sent oil prices skyrocketing to historic highs. Thus, our third overall 
case and first high price case will be (3) the two oil crises of the 1970s (the years of high prices 
and restricted flows).  
Finally, to allow us to examine the most recent evidence of EU and US behavior in relation to high 
prices, we will examine the Post 2003 high price period (the years of rising oil prices – and 
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endangered flows) as our fourth (4) and final case. Doing so opens the analysis to the maturation 
of Europe’s political union (1993), its numerous enlargements (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, and 2004-
2007), and allows for changes in US or EU orientation toward power projection in the extended 
post-Cold War and immediate Post-911 eras. Furthermore, because of its recent nature, extended 
period, and relationship the world’s most recent wars and trouble zones, it provides the most up-
to-date test of our model.  
4.1.2. Case order, grouping, and components 
Our four cases are divided into two groups. Each group consists of two cases. In one group, the 
price of oil was cheap or on the decline and in the other, it was high or on the rise. Importantly, 
we must recognize that none of the periods are perfect price case matches. Because prices are 
never constant, we must allow for spikes and drops within each period. For example, during the 
1973-1981 period of high prices, year on year price changes ranged between 200 and -12 percent, 
but notably these were toward the beginning and end of the period. Further, consumption 
patterns tend to change with price. An analysis of oil prices in one year versus the change in 
consumption in the following year between 1965 and 2009 reveals that higher prices lead to 
lower consumption about 29% the time worldwide and about a third of the time in the US and EU. 
The relation is even stronger in the year on year changes in consumption and production patterns, 
where an increase in worldwide consumption in year one leads to an increase in worldwide 
production in year two about 70% of the time.  
Table 23: Relationship between oil price in Y(1) and ... 
Consumption of oil in Y=1+1 
 
World -29.00% 
 
US -33.5% 
 
EU Majors -38.10% 
Production of oil in Y+1 
 
World 69.60% 
Source: Based on BP (2010) data; EU Majors 
refers to France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. 
 
Each group contains one case with lasting seven or eight years and one case each of relative high 
and low price volatility (the standard deviation of year to year price fluctuations). Also, across 
those cases where prices were low or declining, world production and consumption tended to 
increase above 10%; and in the years where it was expensive neither production nor consumption 
grew by more than 8% (See Table 24).  
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Table 24: Case overview 
Class Start End Duration 
Price 
Change 
($2009) 
STDV.P 
World 
Production 
World 
Consumption 
low / 
declining 
1982 1989 7 -57% $18.21 12% 13% 
low / 
declining 
1991 1999 8 -27% $4.34 11% 13% 
high / rising 1973 1981 8 434% $0.76 2% 7% 
High / rising 2002 2009 7 107% $22.49 7% 8% 
 
Each case study presented below will consist of four parts. The first part presents an overview of 
the case period beginning where necessary with a brief background on the preceding years for 
context and an examination of what happened to price and supply availability over the period. 
This is followed by an analysis of the EU and US responses in terms of their respective external 
strategies and internal approaches to substitution. Each case is concluded with a summary of 
findings as relate to our nine hypotheses. 
 
4.2. The low price-cases 
4.2.1. 1980s (dropping oil prices – increasing flow) 
The early 1980s were years of recession and collapsing oil prices. They were also years of 
heightened Cold War tensions, a massive military buildup by the US and USSR, and the outbreak 
of the Iran-Iraq war and subsequent tanker war in the Persian Gulf. The decade began with the 
world reeling from the two oil crises of the 1970s, which had sent prices skyrocketing and severely 
damaged supply flows. The world responded to those shocks in three important ways.  
First, global energy consumption declined by 2.8% between 1979 and 1982 and global oil 
consumption declined by 9.7% over the same period (OECD, 2010).289 This was accompanied by a 
worldwide recession, which saw an annual increases in overall OECD GDP290 decline for each of 
the four years and by 0.3% overall between 1980 and 1982, the first such decline on record. By 
1981, the nominal price of oil ($35.93) rose to 992% of its 1973 departure point of $3.29 (434% 
from $15.89 to $84.80 in $2009). Spot prices peaked in October 1982 at just over $35. The 
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 All GDP related figures presented here and in subsequent paragraphs is from the OECD (2010). 
290
 Measured in millions of Current Prices and Current Exchange Rates in USD 
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prolonged price spike sapped demand for oil in both the US and the six Member States of the 
then EEC as higher energy costs drained their respective economies. Between 1982 and 1989, EEC 
oil consumption declined by as much as 2 million barrels a day and US consumption by as much as 
1.2 million.291  
Figure 37: Oil prices and consumption 1978-1982 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
Meanwhile, higher prices made it economically feasible to begin exploration of harder to reach 
resources. North Sea oil, aggressively explored in the 1970s because of the higher profitability 
resulting from higher prices began flowing into the market. The UK and Norway together were 
producing 2.6 million barrels a day in 1982. By 1989, they were producing almost 3.5 million 
barrels a day. Although US production declined over the period, worldwide production exploded. 
By 1982, non-OPEC producing countries had begun to replace OPEC’s 1970s reductions, adding 
4.5 million barrels a day in comparison to 1977. They now accounted for 67% of world production, 
almost double the share from 1973. Moreover, non-OPEC production continued to climb through 
1985, sending OPEC’s share of world production to a nadir of 27%. Finally, the previous period’s 
higher prices split OPEC as its producers sought to rake in the enormous rents. Instead of cutting 
production to offset those increases, Iraq, Kuwait, and Oman added two million barrels a day 
between 1982 and 1985. The result was that by the middle of the 1980s, the world oil market was 
literally flooded with surplus. 
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Figure 38: Distribution of global oil production 1980-1989 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
In addition to changes in production and consumption, the market itself changed. New suppliers 
emerged, both as a result of new production and the expropriation of western oil companies in 
the Middle East and South America, creating new opportunities to trade oil free from the vagaries 
of Arab politics. In late March 1983, the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) introduced the 
option to buy and sell crude oil future contracts, essentially transferring price-setting powers to 
free market control. By the time futures trading began, spot prices had already dropped off 8% 
from their 1982 peak. Despite efforts by OPEC to raise the well-head price, the damage of a 
flooded and far more diverse market prevented it from effectively increasing the price. Over the 
course of the next three and a half years, the price of oil collapsed by another 62% and between 
February 1986, when future prices fell below $20 for the first time, and November 1989, when 
they started to rise again, the mean future was around $17.22 and its standard deviation was 
$2.47. Oil had become dirt-cheap and it was literally pouring into the market.  
Figure 39: Oil production and prices 1980-1989 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
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Finally, the equalizing effect of new production largely marginalized the power of Arab oil 
producers, but it in no way reduced their geopolitical relevance. The war between Iraq and Iran 
spun rapidly out of control in the early months of the conflict. Both sides began attacking the 
other’s oil facilities in order to weaken their opponent’s war-making capabilities. By one account 
(Stagliano, 2007), the first three months of that conflict resulted in a three-month long disruption 
of as much as three million barrels a day. As the war progressed, and the ground war stalemated 
in 1984, the principle combatants began mining the Persian Gulf in order to cut off the other’s 
revenue flows. Although little oil was actually lost during this period of heightened tensions, the 
mere threat that mines could disrupt flows out of the region was enough to provoke a military 
response. Both the US and the EU sent escort ships to the region. The US also reflagged Kuwaiti 
and other vessels. As the conflict wore on, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, which in 
turn provoked the Reagan administration to establish a permanent naval presence in Gulf. 
Altogether, there were over 300 separate Iraqi or Iranian attacks (including mines, air strikes, and 
surface ship attacks) on international oil tankers between 1980 and 1989. Therefore, not only 
does the 1982-1989 low price case provide us with an example to test behavioral changes toward 
substitution, it provides an excellent case to test the hypotheses pertaining to external 
cooperation patterns in the form of responses to explicit threats to supply availability.  
 
4.2.1.1. EU response 
As oil prices started to decline and flows began to increase in 1982, the impetus for coordination 
that had existed in the previous decade rapidly receded. Although the foundational idea of a 
common energy policy had been laid during the dual 1970s crises, Member States had made little 
progress in enacting a common response, and progress toward internal deregulation of their 
respective concentrated energy markets had fallen victim to divergent national priorities. Each 
Member had followed its own path forward making progress toward achieving the 1975 
established goal of increasing the use of nuclear power. However, differences between their 
respective national energy balances continued to hamper coordination. France emphasized 
nuclear power; as did Germany until the mid decade Chernobyl accident dampened public 
support for further development, and the UK focused on increased oil production in the North Sea 
(see Table 25 below). However, EU energy consumption patterns between 1982 and 1989 were 
most remarkable in the overall reduction of oil consumption (see Table 26 below).  
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Table 25: Nuclear power consumption in annual terawatt-hours 
 
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 
France 40.0 105.3 144.3 224.2 265.6 304.0 
Germany 52.1 65.5 78.1 138.7 141.7 161.7 
UK 38.3 38.0 49.9 61.1 55.2 71.7 
EU(2009) 192.5 306.6 398.3 616.0 691.5 793.1 
Source: BP (2010) 
 
Table 26: Oil consumption in thousands of barrels a day 
 
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 
Germany 3380 2788 2592 2670 2747 2593 
France 2434 2059 1881 1792 1846 1879 
UK 1947 1559 1531 1630 1608 1744 
NL 857 743 623 635 706 735 
BE/LUX 560 499 434 431 489 502 
Ire 129 104 84 82 88 83 
Greece 248 238 232 244 269 305 
Italy 2081 1940 1821 1732 1851 1931 
Subtotal 11636 9930 9196 9214 9604 9770 
EU(2009) 15879 13858 12820 13114 13537 13764 
Source : BP (2010) 
 
Thus as the decade wore on, oil was becoming cheaper, there was more of it flowing in the 
international market, and Europe was consuming less of it. Although consumption began to rise 
again in the mid 1980s, the EU was consuming less oil on a daily basis in 1989 than it was in 1979. 
Further, as the economic woes of the early 1980s took hold, Europe’s Member States focused 
inward, cooperation between the Member States decreased as each sought first to address their 
own domestic economic needs. Indeed, throughout the 1980s the EU demonstrated very little 
internal or external multilateral cooperation on the energy front beyond setting intentions. This 
affirms the EU half of the first hypothesis (H1) that both the US and the EU will adopt market-
commodity approaches (i.e. the lowest common denominator of cooperation) under low-price-
free-flow circumstances.  
Still, it is important to note that the terms of hypothesis one (H1) are not fully met by the EU case. 
Indeed, the wording itself may be misleading. Throughout the period, the Member States may not 
have cooperated, but France certainly intervened in its own energy infrastructure, pushing 
increased nuclear power through national mandate. Conversely, the UK under Prime Minister 
Margret Thatcher began liberalizing her country’s economy opening up expanded opportunities 
to drill and produce oil off the English coast. Thus, it is somewhat misleading to argue that the EU 
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developed a ‘Market-Commodity Approach’ in the broader sense of its meaning. Still, if we 
examine the EU as a whole, and consider that as a group there was little cooperation and virtually 
no coordinated top-down intervention and rule making, we can broadly say the EU did uphold the 
principle if not the spirit of a reduced interventionist approach. 
A similar trend is revealed in the area of energy research and development (ERD). In fact, the 
1980s evidenced two trends in the EU’s approach. First, overall ERD investments in non-nuclear 
ERD tailed off by €337 million (in €2009) between 1981 and 1989 (a decline of 29%) while the 
total including nuclear and other non-specific research fell by over €1 billion (a similar 28%). 
Nuclear ERD accounted for 68% of total funding over the period, but annual funding for nuclear 
fission and fusion declined by 40% by over the period. Meanwhile, the distribution of the reduced 
ERD changed. Fossil fuels research declined from 10.9% of all funding in 1981 to 8% in 1989 and 
from 34% to 18% of non nuclear ERD. Investments in energy efficiency rose in the early part of the 
decade in the aftermath of the 1970s crisis, but then began to decline from 1985 onward, 
finishing the decade 16% below where it started in 1980. Research funding for renewables also 
declined by 22% from beginning to end of the period (see Figure 40 below). In fact, the only area 
that received increased funding was the category of ‘other’, which primarily included energy 
systems analysis (see Table 27 below). The record shows that as oil prices declined over the 
period, so too did EU interest in developing substitutes. This seems to confirm half of the seventh 
hypothesis (H7) that the EU will reduce ERD investments considerably under conditions of low 
prices and free flows. The fact that there is a demonstrable decline in EU ERD during a period of 
declining prices and increasing flow also falsifies the EU half of hypothesis nine (H9), one of our 
null hypotheses, that the EU or its Member States will not change their investments strategies 
toward substitutes when conditions of prices and flows change.  
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Figure 40: EU non-nuclear ERD in the 1980s 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
Table 27: EU ERD funding in the 1980s 
EU-12 1980s 
     1980 1989 Change 
Efficiency 233.87 196.80 -16% 
Fossil Fuels 438.97 233.61 -47% 
Renewables 328.50 255.63 -22% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 2,730.80 1,638.68 -40% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells - - 
 
Power/Storage  161.93 139.97 -14% 
Other and Analysis 117.35 433.32 269% 
Total ERD 4,011.45 2,897.99 -28% 
Annual share 
Efficiency 5.8% 6.8% 16% 
Fossil Fuels 10.9% 8.1% -26% 
Renewables 8.2% 8.8% 8% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 68.1% 56.5% -17% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Power/Storage  4.0% 4.8% 20% 
Other and Analysis 2.9% 15.0% 411% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 18.3% 15.6% -14% 
Fossil Fuels 34.3% 18.6% -46% 
Renewables 25.7% 20.3% -21% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Power/Storage  12.6% 11.1% -12% 
Other and Analysis 9.2% 34.4% 275% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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What is particularly interesting about the 1980s is that not only did oil prices decline and flows 
increase, there also were serious threats to Europe’s oil supplies and this did cause a military 
response by at least some EU Member States. The actions of the EU Member States during the so 
called 1980s Tanker War at least in part contradicts hypothesis five (H5) that posited the EU will 
never seek conflict even when prices are high and flow is restricted. Still, we cannot dismiss the 
hypothesis in its entirety. While EU Member States acted individually, there is not enough 
evidence to point to a unified EU response.  
In the mid 1980s as the ground element of the Iran-Iraq War reached a stalemate, the two 
countries began mining the Persian Gulf and attacking international tankers in order to cutoff 
each other’s source of income. European ships became targets (See Table 28 below). In response 
to those attacks, several EU Member States sent warships and minesweepers to the Persian Gulf 
in order to escort tankers. The UK and France deployed armed helicopters, equipped with 
advanced countermeasures to the region (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990:XIV, 23). Since France’s 
ships were attacked exclusively by Iran, Paris took sides with Iraq, first loaning five Exocet (anti-
ship missiles) armed Super Entard fighter jets and then selling some thirty Exocet-equipped 
Mirage F-1 fighters in 1984. One of those planes later attacked the US Guided Missile Frigate, the 
USS Stark, in 1987. Germany, which was legally restricted from sending forces abroad, relied on 
the US and others to protect its ships, while it stationed several warships in the Mediterranean to 
make up for their allies’ relocation. In short, the 1980s provided an intriguing situation whereby 
oil prices were cheap and flows were generally plentiful, but had periods where threats to that 
flow existed; and in response, the EU did not sit passively by and ignore the situation. When its 
energy supplies were threatened directly by military force, the EU responded in kind, if only 
defensively. 
Table 28: EU flagged ships targeted by Iran and Iraq, 1979-1987 
Flagged Vessel Attacked by Iran Attacked by Iraq 
France 5 0 
Greece 10 22 
Italy 1 1 
Netherlands 0 2 
Belgium 1 0 
Spain 3 0 
Germany 1 4 
Source: Cordesman (1990:Chapter XIV, p.7) 
 
Finally, the EU’s behavior in response to the threat of disruptions caused by the 1980s Tanker War 
indicates that we can initially evaluate two more of our hypotheses. Hypothesis eight (H8), a null 
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hypothesis which claims that both the US and the EU will never enter into conflict in energy rich 
areas when energy prices are high or disruptions are imminent is at least in part falsified. The EU 
response (or the sum of actions carried out by its Member States) proves one important aspect to 
be false. Although prices were never high during the period and disruptions only occurred at the 
onset of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1981), the threat of disruptions resulting from attacks on tankers 
sailing the Gulf did in fact lead to EU military intervention.  
It is important at this juncture to restate the difficulty in referring to the EU as a unified or single 
international actor.292 Security and foreign policy decision making remained squarely under the 
sovereignty of the individual Member States and we can hardly refer to the actions of individual 
Member States as equaling EU action. Nevertheless, the Council did express ‘concern’ in 1984 that 
increasing tensions between Iran and Iraq could “endanger the freedom of navigation in the Gulf” 
(European Communities, 1984). Given that the EU itself lacked the legal framework to jointly 
coordinate foreign military activities, the Member States turned to the dormant Western 
European Union (WEU) in order to coordinate their activities. In October 1984, they agreed to 
reactivate cooperation under the WEU framework via the Rome Declaration. Four years later, the 
Member States launched a two-year, coordinated minesweeping effort in the Persian Gulf.293 
Hence, although we cannot say that the EU acted as a single player, six of its Member States did in 
fact coordinate their military actions under the auspices of another accompanying alliance.  
Despite the evidence that EU Member States did in fact militarily cooperate in response to supply 
threats from the Persian Gulf, their limited response in relation to that of the US, which sent a full 
fleet to the region and directly engaged in hostilities with Iran, initially demonstrates that part of 
hypothesis four (H4) seems to be correct. Hypothesis four posits that under restricted-flow 
circumstances, the EU, which places lower salience on SAPP, would be less likely than the US to 
resort to military means to secure either access or flow. Given the nature of the EU’s response (or 
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 For a further explanation of the difficulties in analyzing the EU as a unified or solitary international actor 
and comparing it to the US see pages 59 to 60. 
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 Their actions were taken under the authority of Article VIII (3) of the Brussels Treaty. Labeled ‘Operation 
Cleansweep’, the navies of Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK cleared a 300-mile stretch of 
sea lanes around the Strait of Hormuz; and Germany, otherwise restricted from foreign military operations, 
sent ships to the Eastern Mediterranean to relieve its allies’ redeployments. A year after the Iran-Iraq War 
ended (1989) the Member States continued their cooperative efforts in executing humanitarian actions 
during ‘Operation Safe Haven’ in Northern Iraq (1991). For a detailed discussion of the role of the WEU in 
the Tanker War see Duke (2000), particularly Chapter Two, ‘The Rebirth of European Security’ and 
specifically pages 77-79. Also see Gnesotto, Roper and Western European Union. Institute for Security 
Studies. (1992), particularly pages 162-167; and for a specific accounting of EU Member State naval 
deployments see Cable (1988). 
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more precisely the coordinated efforts of six of its Member States) to limit their actions to 
minesweeping, this seems to be affirmed. This does not mean, however, that H4 is affirmed in full 
because for that to be so, we would need to test a case were prices were both high and flows 
restricted; and throughout the 1980s prices were low, despite increased threats to the flow of 
supplies.  
 
4.2.1.2. US response 
The US responded to the 1980s decline in oil prices in predictable manner according to our 
hypotheses. As the price declined and flows increased, the US reduced both the level of external 
energy cooperation and largely liberalized its domestic energy sector. As mentioned in the 
chapter on the Evolution of US energy policy, the Reagan-Bush-Clinton years witnessed a 
wholesale reversal of the country’s approach to energy policy. Emphasizing the country’s strong 
natural inheritance of fossil energy resources, the US lifted almost all regulations and price 
controls and redirected ERD investments away from substitutes into basic research. Although the 
US did pour money into ERD, almost all of it went into developing military technologies, from 
nuclear weapons to anti-ballistic missile lasers. It decommissioned the government run Synthetic 
Fuels Corporation, the paradigm of an attempt to promote substitute fuel, and repealed its 
windfall profits tax placed on oil companies during the late 1970s.  
Similar to the EU, in the early years of the decade Americans were consuming less oil. However, 
this would change in the mid of the decade as prices became so cheap that consumers again 
began to ramp up consumption (see Table 29 below) By the end of the decade the US was 
consuming almost 14% more oil than it had in 1983.  
Table 29: US oil consumption 1983-1989 
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Thousands of  
barrels a day 
15235 15725 15726 16281 16665 17283 17325 
Source BP (2010) 
 
As oil became cheaper and more of it flowed on the international market, the US economy 
started to grow and Americans began consuming more. Meanwhile, the focus of the new Reagan 
administration was unabashedly oriented toward reduced government intervention at home and 
reduced economic cooperation worldwide, unless that cooperation was oriented toward an 
overall reduction of government intervention everywhere. Indeed, during the 1980s the EU-US 
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relationship weakened significantly, while the US-UK relationship expanded. Both were led by 
politicians seeking to liberalize their economies; and the US was primarily focused on a massive 
military buildup to counter the Soviet Union. To a certain extent, this affirms the second half of 
the first hypothesis (H1) that both the US and the EU will adopt market-commodity approaches 
(i.e. the lowest common denominator of cooperation) under low-price-free-flow circumstances. 
Indeed, that is precisely what happened in the US case throughout the 1980s price decline period. 
Still, the evidence is not sufficient enough to proclaim causality. While the US clearly adopted an 
MCA approach during the 1980s, the cause need not only have been lower prices and expanded 
flows of oil. The ideological orientation of the Regan administration seems to be a far more 
important factor in the calculation. Thus, we find in the US case that there appears to be a 
correlation between lower prices, free flows, and reduced international cooperation on the 
energy front (i.e. little to no serious cooperative engagement on the issue). 
In terms of ERD, the US showed a similar pattern to that of the EU, dramatically reducing its 
overall ERD investments by 51% in the 1980s from €5 billion in 1981 to €2.5 billion in 1989 in 
€2009. Similar to the EU, the US consistently reduced its support for nuclear research, even 
though it was pouring funds into the development of nuclear weapons. While funding for the 
nuclear ERD areas was cut in half, funding for ERD into renewables was reduced by 87%, fossil 
fuels by almost 60%, and investments into efficiency improvements by almost 50%. Over the 
course of the 1980s, as the US first faced a recession, then experienced a massive liberalization of 
its energy sectors, and oversaw the initial commercialization of energy futures, the US virtually 
shut down public financial support for the search for substitute fuels. Moreover, if one excludes 
nuclear and nuclear-military related investments and then examines the investments in efficiency, 
fossil fuels, and renewables, one sees a clear indication that the US prioritized ERD in the area of 
fossil fuels and energy systems analysis (other). In other words, the only non-nuclear areas 
essential to power projection, the discovery and development of fossil fuels and coal to liquids, 
became the focus of US research See Table 30 and Figure 41 below).  
Therefore, in terms of its investments into substitutes, the US response completes the affirmation 
of the seventh hypothesis (H7) that the US will dramatically reduce investments under conditions 
of low prices and free flows. It also affirms the falsification of the ninth hypothesis (null 
hypothesis H9) that the US will not change its investments strategy toward substitutes when 
conditions of prices and flow change. 
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Table 30: US ERD focus 1981-1989 in millions of €2009 
 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Change 
Efficiency 341 207 290 217 280 226 203 170 180 -47% 
Fossil Fuels 1228 547 381 375 386 385 319 507 513 -58% 
Renewables 1005 482 364 298 274 203 185 146 129 -87% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 2324 2414 2051 1675 1537 1395 1245 1209 1018 -56% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 
          
Power/Storage 30 103 75 74 78 65 54 60 56 84% 
Other 73 105 434 392 485 455 405 459 569 684% 
Total ERD 5000 3859 3595 3030 3040 2730 2411 2551 2465 -51% 
Y_Y Change 
 
-23% -7% 16% 0% -10% -12% 6% -3% 
 
Annual share 
Efficiency 7% 5% 8% 7% 9% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 
Fossil Fuels 25% 14% 11% 12% 13% 14% 13% 20% 21% -15% 
Renewables 20% 13% 10% 10% 9% 7% 8% 6% 5% -74% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 46% 63% 57% 55% 51% 51% 52% 47% 41% -11% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 
          
Power/Storage 1% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 272% 
Other 1% 3% 12% 13% 16% 17% 17% 18% 23% 1490% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 13% 14% 19% 16% 19% 17% 17% 13% 12% -2% 
Fossil Fuels 46% 38% 25% 28% 26% 29% 27% 38% 35% -23% 
Renewables 38% 33% 24% 22% 18% 15% 16% 11% 9% -76% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 
          
Power/Storage 1% 7% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 240% 
Other 3% 7% 28% 29% 32% 34% 35% 34% 39% 1350% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
 
Figure 41: Shares of US non-nuclear ERD, 1981-1989 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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Finally, the US response to the 1980s Tanker War in the Persian Gulf seems to affirm several of 
our hypotheses and falsifies both of our null hypotheses. Although prices remained low 
throughout the period, the US responded to the mere threat of disruption by sending ships not 
only to protect US flagged vessels, but by 1986 began reflagging Kuwaiti vessels as well. In 1983, 
the Reagan administration took Carter’s Rapid Joint Defense Force (RJDF) setup in the aftermath 
of the Iranian revolution and US hostage crisis, and established a special military command 
(Central Command) to oversee activities in the region and introduced new ships and technologies. 
The US navy began flying remotely powered vehicles over the Gulf (a forerunner to today’s 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In 1987, the intense US presence and hostile relationship with 
Iran broke out in the form of an Iranian air strike on a US frigate using a French-made anti-ship 
missile, killing more than 37 sailors. The ship, which had been stationed in the Gulf since 1984, 
was severely damaged. Although the US did not immediately respond, it did do so when another 
warship struck a mine in 1988. The US then launched an attack on two Iranian oil platforms, 
destroying an Iranian frigate and several missile boats (de Risse and Kemp, 2009).  
The massive US military response to a mere threat to the free flow of oil affirms that part of 
hypothesis three (H3), which pertains to US responses under circumstances of restricted flows, 
the US, which clearly places a premium on SAPP, demonstrated that it is clearly more likely to 
resort to military means and even armed conflict to secure either access or flow of energy 
resources when they are threatened. Still H4 is not affirmed in full because for that to be the case, 
we would need to test a case were prices were both high and flows restricted. The US’ behavior in 
response to the mere threat of disruptions also indicates that we can at least in part falsify null 
hypothesis eight (H8), which claims that both the US and the EU will never enter into conflict in 
energy rich areas when energy prices are high or disruptions are imminent. At least part of this 
hypothesis is proven incorrect by the US response. Although prices were never high during the 
period and disruptions only occurred in the early 1980s, the continued threat of flow disruption 
from the oil rich Gulf did indeed lead to explicit US military engagement. 
 
4.2.1.3. 1980s Summary 
An analysis of EU or the cooperative actions of its most important Member States (see page 231) 
and US responses to the decreasing oil prices and increasing flows of the 1980s, as well the 
nominal threat to supplies which occurred during the Persian Gulf Tanker War allow us to initially 
asses several of our hypotheses. We were able to confirm one hypothesis, falsify three, and 
partially confirm another three. It seems safe to conclude on the basis of the 1980s case that the 
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US and will adopt a minimal intervention or MCA strategy when prices are low or declining and 
supplies flow freely (H1). In the EU case, this is less clear as Member States chose to intervene 
internally while not cooperating externally. However, the evidence suggests that both the US and 
the EU will in fact reduce their investments in ERD when prices drop and supply flows ease (H7). 
Likewise, this allows us to reject the null hypothesis positing that neither the US nor the EU will 
exhibit any change at all in the attitudes toward developing substitution fuels as manifested by 
their related investments (H9).  
In both the EU and US cases, the predicted orientation toward military behavior (H3 and H4) 
seems to hold true. However, since the hypotheses only posit increased or decreased military 
intervention under the conditions of high prices and free supply flow, they cannot be affirmed 
definitively. Nevertheless, because both acted within the predictable parameters of behavior 
when supplies seemed threatened, we can initially assess both positively. Meanwhile, hypothesis 
five (H5), which predicted that the EU would never seek conflict when supplies become restricted 
and prices rise, must be rejected because the EU did in fact respond militarily to the threat of 
disruptions, even if it was of a more limited scale than the US. Likewise, this allows us to reject the 
null hypothesis positing that neither the US nor the EU will ever intervene militarily in energy rich 
areas when prices are high or disruptions are imminent (H8).  
Table 31: Summary of affirmed/falsified hypotheses in Case 1 
Hyp.# Topic US EU Evaluation 
H1 MCA approach True Partly True Partly True 
H2 Coop approach   n/a 
H3 US > military likelihood Partly True  Partly True 
H4 EU < military likelihood  Partly True Partly True 
H5 EU Never use military  False False 
H6 EU/US Increase ERD   n/a 
H7 EU/US reduce ERD True True True 
H8 Null-never military False False False 
H9 Null-no change in ERD False False False 
 
4.2.2. 1990s (low oil price – free flow) 
Throughout most of the 1990s prices were low. In seven out of ten years, the international oil 
price hovered below the historical average. However, the 1990s were by no means docile years in 
the international energy markets as the global political landscape underwent significant changes. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 brought about some of the most 
dramatic changes. Riding on the coattails of the end of the Cold War, proponents of liberalization 
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claimed that globalization had not only won, but that it had become universal.294 Unfortunately, 
this universal globalization was accompanied by almost universal chaos as conflicts erupted in 
Yugoslavia (1991-1995), Kosovo, (1996-1999), and Chechnya (1994-1996); even Afghanistan fell to 
the Taliban.  
In Europe, major changes were the only constants. In early 1990, Margaret Thatcher resigned in 
the UK after more than a decade of leadership, ushering in a new era of UK-EU relations. The 
reunification of Germany, also in 1990, changed the internal EU balance of power, the recognition 
of which was manifested in a new treaty (1993, Maastricht) and another enlargement of the EU. 
Despite starting the decade in recession, by its close many of Europe’s economies, Germany’s in 
particular, were expanding steadily. Meanwhile, the US underwent one of its longest periods of 
economic expansion and joined with Mexico and Canada in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Its stock markets boomed as millions invested into technology and Internet 
companies. Indeed, after a rocky start to the decade, both Europe and the US were growing by 
mid decade and oil prices were very cheap (see Figure 42 below). 
Figure 42: Nominal oil prices (NYMEX Futures-C1) and events in the 1990s 
 
Source: United States. Energy Information Administration (2010)295 
The decade began with a sudden and sharp but short-lived oil price shock caused by the August 
1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iraq had accused Kuwait of stealing its oil and overproducing its 
own, hence flooding the market, sinking prices, and ruining Baghdad’s chances to successfully 
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 NYMEX Future C1 refers to the settlement price on the day listed (averaged per week) for the earliest 
delivery date, which in the case of crude oil is the third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the 
month preceding the delivery month, or approximately one week before the start of every new month.  
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recover from its war with Iran. Within two weeks of the invasion, the nominal price had risen by 
24% and by October, it was up 67%. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait not only threatened neighboring 
suppliers among the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. According to Stagliano (2007), it directly removed 
more than five million barrels a day from the market for a period of almost ten months, a shortfall 
filled by those most worried about Iraq’s intentions, its immediate neighbors. Once again, both 
the US and at least some Member States of the EU met the threat to supplies with armed force, 
albeit to vastly different degrees.  
After reaching a peak in December 1990, however, prices began to decline just as sharply as they 
had risen (see Figure 43 below). By January 1991, the nominal price had fallen below $25, a 
threshold it would exceed only twice more and each only for brief periods at the end of 1996 and 
again in December 1999. In fact, nominal oil prices exceeded $25 a barrel in only three out of the 
decade’s 120 months. The Gulf war notwithstanding, the nineties thus present an almost perfect 
case of low prices and easy flows. 
Figure 43: Nominal oil price changes (NYMEX Futures-C1) around the 1990-1991 Gulf War 
 
Source: United States. Energy Information Administration (2010) 
Three additional factors are important in understanding the context of the 1990s low price free 
flow period. First, while prices remained low, global production exploded (see Figure 44 below). 
By 1999, there were in excess of seven million barrels a day more on the market than in 1991 (see 
Table 32 below), including a one third increase in EU oil output; and all of that growth came 
alongside significant reductions in Iraqi exports and a decline in US production over the period. 
Second, efficiency programs installed in the previous two decades were working in the sense that 
US and EU consumers were doing more with every single barrel of oil they were consuming. Thus 
as time progressed, every increase in consumption was actually resulting in greater economic 
The low price-cases 
239 
output.296 Third, by the middle of the decade, global warming had formally taken its place as a 
major international political issue and it increasingly was being tied to energy issues. Starting in 
1995, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) began to 
coordinate international efforts to reduce carbon emissions through annual summits on climate 
change. Through that development, the EU in particular found an issue that its Member States 
could agree on, and thus the Union began to take the lead on pushing an environmental agenda 
closely tied to energy security. The combination of all these factors (a changed political landscape, 
particularly the addition of new state actors, increased efficiency, a direct challenge in the Gulf to 
the control of oil supplies, and the fusing of environmental and energy issues) amplified the 
importance of energy in international relations. Indeed, energy supplies, routes, and mixes 
became focal points of US and EU strategies to stabilize and integrate the emerging economies of 
the post-Soviet world.  
Table 32: Prices, production and consumption levels, 1990-1999 
 
Prices Production millions of barrels/day Consumption 
Nominal 
Price $ 
2009$ range 
EU 
1995 
EU 
2009 
US World 
EU 
1995 
EU 
2009 
US World 
1990 23.73 38.94 High 2.14 2.67 8.91 65.46 12.25 13.93 16.99 66.69 
1991 20.00 31.51 High 2.15 2.65 9.08 65.27 12.53 14.03 16.71 66.74 
1992 19.32 29.54 High 2.23 2.71 8.87 65.77 12.73 14.04 17.03 67.43 
1993 16.97 25.20 Low 2.38 2.84 8.58 66.03 12.65 13.93 17.24 67.26 
1994 15.82 22.90 Low 2.96 3.44 8.39 67.10 12.65 13.94 17.72 68.61 
1995 17.02 23.95 Low 3.04 3.50 8.32 68.10 12.82 14.16 17.72 69.82 
1996 20.67 28.26 Low 3.06 3.48 8.30 69.90 13.05 14.44 18.31 71.39 
1997 19.09 25.52 Low 3.06 3.45 8.27 72.18 13.19 14.58 18.62 73.55 
1998 12.72 16.74 Low 3.16 3.55 8.01 73.54 13.42 14.85 18.92 73.90 
1999 17.97 23.14 Low 3.31 3.68 7.73 72.32 13.46 14.81 19.52 75.65 
2000 28.50 35.50 High 3.12 3.49 7.73 74.82 13.38 14.69 19.70 76.43 
Source: BP (2010) 
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 This is often referred to as the energy intensity index. Metcalf (2008) provides an analysis of energy 
intensity and its determinant at the state level. Likewise, the US Department of Energy provides a detailed 
explanation of the concept and the formula it uses for calculation. See: 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/ba/pba/intensityindicators/total_energy.html. 
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Figure 44: Oil prices in $2009 and worldwide production , 1990-2000 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
 
4.2.2.1. EU response 
At first glance, the 1990s pose a series of contradictions for our model. The decade was filled with 
examples of increased not decreased cooperation on the part of the EU and its Member States. 
Upon closer examination, however, much of that cooperation occurred as part of a response to 
the changed political landscape that it faced. How should the Member States respond to a much 
larger Germany? What should Europe do to secure the economic independence of the new post-
Soviet states? Many of these countries, the Caspian littoral states in particular, were rich in oil and 
gas. Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus were all vital transit corridors for western flowing resources. 
Russia was weak and NATO was inching eastward, partially as a result of western policy and 
partially because the newly freed Eastern European states were clamoring for entry to secure 
their independence from Russia. Indeed, the early 1990s presented the EU with a litany of reasons 
to increase cooperation; and energy issues in particular provided a logical basis upon which to 
proceed. 
Still, the cooperation that did occur took on a curiously Market-Commodity Approach. The 
seeming victory of market over controlled economies led to the unified promotion of 
liberalization. Thus, the increased cooperation practiced by the EU in the energy area in the 1990s 
was in fact a cooperative effort to reduce government intervention and not to increase it. 
Moreover, the fall of the Soviet Union, a larger Germany, and the breakup of Yugoslavia, which 
raised the ugly specter of further chaos occurring on its Eastern borders, literally forced Europe to 
at least try and overcome their differences and seek a new level of political and economic 
cooperation. The 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) addressed precisely such 
issues, creating not only a single currency, a goal that had been pursued for years, but also a new 
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level of political unity and created a single High Representative for EU Foreign Policy. 
Nevertheless, the increased cooperation largely was internal in nature and thus not fully 
applicable to our model. If we understand the actions of each EU Member State independently, 
then indeed we would have to conclude that the first hypothesis (H1) that predicts the EU will 
decrease cooperation in times of lower prices and free flows is false. Understood as a group and 
its cooperation with outsiders, however, the formal formation of the EU in 1993, its fourth 
enlargement in 1995, and the internal agreements made by the Member States to individually 
liberalize their energy sectors through collective decision, can be taken as cooperation in the 
sense that is posited by our hypothesis. 
What can be understood in this light is the collective EU strategy to capitalize on the fall of the 
Soviet Union in order to gain access to the East’s vast energy reserves and the use of liberalization 
of the energy sectors in those respective countries. The EU wasted little time to do just that. 
Already in 1990 at the Dublin European Council (June 1990), Ruud Lubbers floated the idea of 
establishing a framework for international cooperation to develop the energy potential of central 
and Eastern Europe to secure EU energy supplies. Within a year, the Commission proposed the 
European Energy Charter, an agreement that would codify legal guarantees concerning 
investments, transit and trade of energy resources from East to West, and within a year of that 
had signed up 51 countries in support. The success of the ECT in many ways marks the best 
example yet of the EU following a cooperative external strategy to secure its interests. After two 
more years of continued promotion and the inclusion of energy efficiency and environmental 
components, the EU convinced many of its neighbors to upgrade the Charter to a full-blown 
international treaty. The EU’s success in promoting the ECT formally raised the profile of energy 
from an internal market issue to a fundamental aspect the EU’s nascent foreign policy. 
Unfortunately, the EU could not get the most important party, Russia to ratify it, but here we are 
concerned not with a measure of the EU’s success, but rather the attempt to cooperate.  
The ECT seemingly demonstrates that ceteris paribus the EU sought increased cooperation and 
not less during a period of low prices and free flows, thus contradicting hypothesis one. However, 
there is one more issue here to consider, before we refute the hypothesis completely, namely 
that all other things were not the same. The assumption presented here is that the 1990s was a 
case period of low prices and free flows. While it is clear that prices were in fact low for much of 
the period, they were exceedingly high in the last months of 1990 and early months of 1991, just 
as the EU launched the idea of an Energy Charter. The cause of that spike was the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, which directly challenged the security of flows from the Persian Gulf, and saw many 
Member States supply military support in armaments and personnel to dislodge Iraq. Likewise, 
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the fall of the Soviet Union, the chaos that ensued in Yugoslavia, and the economic crisis that 
befell Russia, all pointed to serious and legitimate concerns about the security of energy supply 
flows. Hence, the establishment of the ECT was in fact a reaction to higher prices and the fear of 
restricted flows and not the other way around. Europe’s energy security was being challenged in 
multiple explicit ways, and the Union responded with concerted action. Thus, the early 
cooperation of the 1990s does not necessarily disprove our first hypothesis, but rather validates 
the EU half of the second hypothesis (H2) that states the EU and US will employ cooperation 
strategies under higher prices and restricted flows. While helpful for our overall analysis, it also 
demonstrates a weakness in this particular case selection as one of purely low price and free 
flows in nature.  
Nevertheless, the EU explicitly demonstrated continued willingness to cooperate on the energy 
front throughout the nineties. While it is safe to assume that this largely is the result of the 
increased role of its supranational institutions stemming from the fragile roots of political union 
introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, it is a pursuit of international cooperation nonetheless. The 
Commission’s 1996 Green Paper on renewable sources of energy (Com (96) 576 Final), the 
unilateral establishment of renewable supply objectives by 2010, and its 1997 Action Plan for 
renewable energy (COM (97) 599 final) all point to heightened level of cooperation at a time 
when prices were in fact low and in practice supplies were flowing freely. Thus, despite the fact 
that other factors played a role in instigating cooperation, its continuation significantly weakens 
the strength of the argument that the EU will always eschew cooperation under low price-free 
flow conditions. Therefore, based on the case of 1990s, we must reject hypothesis one as it 
currently stands.  
The nineties case also challenges the hypothesis (H5) that the EU will never seek conflict even 
when prices are high and flow is restricted and successfully disproves the null hypothesis (H8) that 
predicts that the EU will never enter into conflict in energy rich areas when energy prices are high 
and flows are restricted or threatened. In response to the Iraqi invasion, a number of EU Member 
States (UK, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Denmark) and future 
perspective Member States (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) joined the US and nineteen 
other countries in executing a war to dislodge Iraqi forces. In fact, collectively seen, almost 70,000 
EU military personnel took part. Importantly, the basis for the action was UN Security Council 
Resolutions 600 and 678, ordering Iraq to leave Kuwait. Importantly, the EU’s actions were 
neither unilateral, as was the case during the 1956 Suez crisis or the 1980s Tanker wars, nor 
initiated by the EU as a group, but rather by the US. In fact, the EU probably could not have acted 
alone as it lacked a common defense system. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that the EU 
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will engage in conflict unilaterally when energy supplies are at risk. However, the significant 
involvement of EU military personnel demonstrates that hypothesis five cannot be affirmed. The 
makeup and leadership of the forces, and the requirement of the UN sanction, also in part 
confirms the hypothesis (H4) that the low-SAPP EU is less likely than the high-SAPP US to resort to 
military means to secure energy flows. Without the lead role of the US, it seems unreasonable to 
think that the EU’s Member States would have unilaterally intervened. 
In terms of ERD, the 1990s case confirms our assumptions about the predicted low-SAPP EU 
response to longer periods of low prices and free flows. Again, the Gulf crisis, notwithstanding, 
the 1990s were years of generally low prices and free flows, even if the perception of risk was 
greater than the reality. Between 1990 and 1999, the combined ERD efforts of the EU’s 1995 
fifteen Member States declined from €2.77 billion to €1.56 billion in €2009 (see Table 33 and 
Figure 45 below). Even more revealing is the fact that non-nuclear related ERD also declined, 
particularly investments into developing renewables and fossil fuels. This makes sense given that 
Europe already had begun to substitute natural gas for oil in its electricity and heating sectors 
after the 1970s and exchanged it with an increasing dependency on Russian natural gas. By the 
end of the nineties, Russia had emerged as a major player in the global energy market. The fact is 
that EU energy supplies in the 1990s were for the most part safe and secure and, apparently, 
there was little need to invest heavily in finding alternatives to oil, despite the rhetoric and 
diplomacy to the contrary.  
  
Table 33: EU ERD trends in millions of €2009 across the 1990s 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Change 
Efficiency 274 322 197 271 227 235 254 256 263 193 -29.8% 
Fossil Fuels 220 166 153 132 130 111 92 92 69 79 -64.1% 
Renewables 312 311 280 308 254 253 261 257 268 225 -27.8% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 1471 1378 1039 1114 1029 1035 1000 1003 1047 918 -37.6% 
Power/Storage 75 103 61 93 117 82 86 104 99 67 -11.2% 
Other 424 435 83 167 161 169 137 144 127 88 -79.3% 
Total ERD 2777 2702 1800 2063 1917 1885 1830 1854 1873 1569 -43.5% 
Y_Y Change 
 
-2.7% -33.4% 14.6% -7.1% -1.7% -2.9% 1.3% 1.0% -16.2% 
 
Annual share 
Efficiency 9.9% 11.9% 11.0% 13.2% 11.8% 12.5% 13.9% 13.8% 14.0% 12.3% 24.3% 
Fossil Fuels 7.9% 6.1% 8.5% 6.4% 6.8% 5.9% 5.0% 5.0% 3.7% 5.0% -36.5% 
Renewables 11.2% 11.5% 15.5% 14.9% 13.2% 13.4% 14.2% 13.8% 14.3% 14.4% 27.7% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 53.0% 51.0% 57.7% 54.0% 53.6% 54.9% 54.6% 54.1% 55.9% 58.5% 10.5% 
Power/Storage 2.7% 3.8% 3.4% 4.5% 6.1% 4.4% 4.7% 5.6% 5.3% 4.3% 57.1% 
Other 15.3% 16.1% 4.6% 8.1% 8.4% 9.0% 7.5% 7.8% 6.8% 5.6% -63.3% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 21.0% 24.3% 25.9% 28.6% 25.5% 27.6% 30.6% 30.0% 31.8% 29.6% 40.9% 
Fossil Fuels 16.8% 12.5% 20.1% 13.9% 14.6% 13.1% 11.1% 10.8% 8.4% 12.1% -28.0% 
Renewables 23.9% 23.5% 36.8% 32.4% 28.6% 29.8% 31.4% 30.1% 32.5% 34.6% 44.8% 
Power/Storage 5.8% 7.8% 8.0% 9.7% 13.2% 9.7% 10.4% 12.2% 11.9% 10.3% 78.1% 
Other  32.5% 32.9% 10.9% 17.6% 18.1% 19.9% 16.5% 16.9% 15.4% 13.5% -58.4% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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Figure 45: EU non-nuclear ERD investment expenditures 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
EU ERD investment patterns across the 1990s thus confirms the EU half of the hypothesis that the 
EU and US will dramatically reduce investments into substitutes under conditions of low prices 
and free flows (H7). It also further rejects the null hypothesis (H9) that both the EU and US will 
not change their investment strategies toward substitutes when prices and flow conditions 
change. Indeed, during the extended period of declining prices and increasing worldwide 
production, the EU dramatically reduced its substitution related investments.  
 
4.2.2.2. US response 
The US response to the 1990s low price free flow period is revealing in multiple ways. Because the 
period began with a direct threat to supply security and a subsequent spike in prices, we would 
assume that the US would be more likely to cooperate with others on energy issues and respond 
militarily. That is precisely what happened in the case of the Gulf War. When prices then started 
to decline in early 1991, the US government then reduced its role in the energy market and cut its 
overall investments into ERD. Thus, the nineties case reveals that the high-SAPP US once again 
behaves in accordance with most of our related assumptions. 
To begin with, the 1991 Gulf war has to be considered in the context of the disintegrating Soviet 
Union, the disappearance of which hoisted the US to a status of unipolar superpower. Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait was the first test not only of that new global alignment, but also of measures 
taken by the US in the 1980s to revamp the way in which it fuels its military. Recalling our analysis 
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of the high salience of SAPP for the US, the US had implemented structural changes in order to 
fuel foreign military operations. The Gulf war tested this new structure, as its military required 
some seven billion liters of fuel to execute its mission, relying largely on ‘locally available fuels’ 
from the Arabian Peninsula. The massive military response of the US to the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait 
is a clear affirmation of hypothesis three (H3) that the US is more likely to act militarily when 
supplies are at risk. We can safely conclude that this is because of the high salience that the US 
places on power projection in general and SAPP specifically. The former component is borne out 
by the rise of the US to unipolar status and the direct challenge to the regional status-quo posed 
by Baghdad. The latter is demonstrated not only by the enormous amounts of fuel used in the 
conflict, but also by the extensive and well laid plans to acquire local sources of fuel in order to 
carry out the conflict. Once again, we can also falsify our null hypothesis that the US would never 
enter into conflict in energy rich areas when prices are high or disruptions are imminent (H8). If 
that were the case, the US would never have engaged in the conflict. 
The Gulf War represents the only explicit US example of successful energy-related coordination 
with other states in the nineties. Although the US would use the 1990s to finalize NAFTA, and 
within that context secure access and further development of Canadian heavy petroleum and 
natural gas supplies, the US largely eschewed any form of international coordination on energy 
issues that did not entail the liberalization of energy markets, international trade, and the 
expansion of petroleum exploration. Even in the area of climate change, a theme championed by 
the Clinton administration, the agreements the US signed onto internationally, were never 
implemented because Congress refused to subject the US economy to international regulation. 
Thus, because words do not equal deeds, we cannot argue reasonably that US efforts to pass 
energy-relevant international emission standards constitutes increased cooperation. Even on the 
military front in the Gulf, the level of US cooperation changed immediately following the 
termination of hostilities. In fact, by then mid of 1991, most coalition members had recalled their 
forces from the region. Only the US and UK remained in any significant quantity and over the 
course the next eight years, the US would singlehandedly push through and then more-or-less-
unilaterally implement two separate no fly-zones over Iraq and build up a semi-permanent 
military presence in airbases in several Gulf states. In short, the US implicitly claimed suzerainty 
over the entire oil producing region, and this under an administration that was perceived by many 
to be less military oriented than the previous Reagan administration. Moreover, the US continued 
to do this while prices were sinking and global production was increasing. There simply is no 
better example for the effect of high SAPP on the external actions of states than the US in the 
Persian Gulf in the 1990s.  
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In terms of its internal response, the US government not only removed itself from the energy 
marketplace through deregulation, it actually transferred responsibilities for energy research to 
the private sector and placed the country’s automobile manufacturers in charge of developing 
more fuel-efficient vehicles. While the Clinton administration invested over $200 million in energy 
related areas in its initial stimulus package to pull the country out of an early 1990s recession, 
much of the later focus was placed conservation and the development of fossil fuels. What efforts 
were made in developing renewables were almost entirely in the electricity sector, including the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 that introduced subsidies for renewable electricity suppliers. Hence, we 
can conclude that the central theme of US internal energy policy in the 1990s was a concerted 
emphasis on efficiency, conservation, renewables, and the expanded development of North 
American fossil fuels, all driven by private industry. US ERD investment patterns reveal the 
magnitude of that change.  
Between 1990 and 1999, total US ERD declined by almost €700 million in €2009 or 24 percent and 
government investments in fossils fuels dropped off by over 81 percent. Concurrent with this 
decline in fossil based research, however, was a demonstrable increase in government backed 
research in renewables and increased energy efficiency. It should be noted that at its maximum 
US investments in renewables barely exceeded the EU’s minimum investments for the period, and 
the latter had experienced consecutive years of decline. One has to be cautious to read too much 
into the increase in US investments in renewables in the nineties, however, because the starting 
amount of €119 million in 1990 was negligible in comparison €945 million spent on fossil fuels. 
More important is the clear change that occurred in the focus of US ERD toward efficiency, which 
expanded from €199 million in 1990 to €438 million in 1999 (see Table 34 and Figure 46 below). 
 
  
Table 34: US ERD trends in millions of €2009 across the 1990s 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Change 
Efficiency 199 229 295 311 424 491 393 363 390 438 121% 
Fossil Fuels 945 810 408 400 481 293 327 154 164 182 -81% 
Renewables 119 159 133 121 219 265 195 184 226 236 98% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 930 891 570 457 420 440 265 258 220 222 -76% 
Power/Storage 59 58 41 43 115 128 115 117 117 116 96% 
Other 486 602 803 866 760 722 751 762 757 898 85% 
Total ERD 2737 2749 2249 2198 2418 2339 2047 1839 1874 2091 -24% 
Y_Y Change 
 
0.4% -18.2% -2.3% 10.0% -3.3% -12.5% -10.2% 1.9% 11.6% 
 
Annual share 
Efficiency 7.1% 8.5% 16.4% 15.1% 22.1% 26.1% 21.5% 19.6% 20.8% 27.9% 290.3% 
Fossil Fuels 34.0% 30.0% 22.7% 19.4% 25.1% 15.6% 17.9% 8.3% 8.8% 11.6% -65.9% 
Renewables 4.3% 5.9% 7.4% 5.9% 11.4% 14.1% 10.7% 9.9% 12.1% 15.0% 250.4% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 33.5% 33.0% 31.6% 22.2% 21.9% 23.3% 14.5% 13.9% 11.7% 14.1% -57.8% 
Power/Storage 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 2.1% 6.0% 6.8% 6.3% 6.3% 6.2% 7.4% 247.5% 
Other 17.5% 22.3% 44.6% 42.0% 39.6% 38.3% 41.0% 41.1% 40.4% 57.2% 227.0% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 11.0% 12.7% 16.3% 17.2% 23.4% 27.2% 21.8% 20.1% 21.6% 24.2% 120.6% 
Fossil Fuels 52.3% 44.8% 22.6% 22.1% 26.6% 16.2% 18.1% 8.5% 9.1% 10.1% -80.7% 
Renewables 6.6% 8.8% 7.3% 6.7% 12.1% 14.7% 10.8% 10.2% 12.5% 13.1% 98.0% 
Power/Storage 3.3% 3.2% 2.3% 2.4% 6.4% 7.1% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.4% 96.4% 
Other 26.9% 33.3% 44.4% 47.9% 42.1% 39.9% 41.6% 42.2% 41.9% 49.7% 84.8% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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Figure 46: US non-nuclear ERD investment expenditures in €2009 across the 1990s 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
The decline in overall US ERD coupled with the clear preference towards efficiency and the rather 
small, albeit increasing, investments in renewables, largely affirms our hypothesis predicting a US 
decline in investments in substitute fuels when prices are low and resources flow freely (H7). 
Although investments in renewables did increase, we must recognize that the category includes 
both renewable liquid fuels as well as alternative sources of electricity. Taking that into account 
and reviewing the other figures, it is clear that efficiency was an important focal point of US 
efforts during the 1990s outside of others and systems analysis. As in the case of the 1980s, ERD 
data also denies the null hypothesis (H9) that the US would not change its investment pattern 
during years of low prices.  
4.2.2.3. 1990s Summary 
The 1990s case was largely defined by low prices and free flows. However, it also contained a 
brief time period where prices spiked and disruptions were threatened. The unique circumstances 
of the 1990s allowed us to test different assumptions laid out in our model. We were able to 
confirm two hypotheses, falsify three, and partially falsify one other.  
It seems safe to conclude on the basis of the 1990s case that the US and will adopt a minimal 
intervention or MCA strategy when prices are low or declining and supplies flow freely (H1) and 
will adopt a cooperative (H2) or even conflictual/interventionist (H3) approach when those 
conditions are reversed. What was particularly intriguing is that the US continued to act militarily 
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after the threat of disruption disappeared and even as prices declined. This would seem to 
confirm our assumptions about the high level of salience the US places on SAPP. However, in 
retrospect, it weakens support for hypothesis three (H3) insofar as it does not allow for the 
possibility that the US with its high SAPP may be more likely to intervene militarily even under 
conditions of low price and the mere perception of possible future threats to supply flows.  
In the EU case, the evidence is not as clear. Taking into consideration the changes that occurred 
during the decade, the EU increased external cooperation in the energy sector even as prices 
were declining. This would seem to falsify hypothesis one. Similar to the case of US actions that 
illustrate the explanatory limits of our third hypothesis, EU actions in the 1990s weaken support 
for the formulation of our first hypothesis, which does not include the possibility of the EU also 
taking a cooperation strategy under conditions of low prices and free flows. Given that there were 
so many other extenuating circumstances (powerful intervening variables such as a changing 
political landscape), we can nevertheless conclude that H1 is only partly falsified. If we further 
consider that EU external cooperation in 1990s was oriented toward promoting liberalization, i.e. 
the EU increased cooperation in order to decrease its partners’ interventionist strategies, then H1 
seems to be confirmed in principle, if not practice. In terms of predicted orientation toward 
military engagements, the active involvement of EU Member States indicates that EU will in fact 
intervene militarily when supplies are threatened. This might seem to falsify hypothesis four (H4). 
However, upon further examination it becomes clear that the Member States only acted under 
UN authority and behind the lead of the US. It is safe to assume that they would not have acted 
unilaterally, even though they were more dependent on Persian Gulf Supplies than the US. Thus, 
we can also affirm at least in part our hypothesis (H4) that the EU is less likely than the US to 
resort to armed conflict to secure flows. As in the 1980s case, we can again falsify hypothesis five 
(H5). It predicted that the EU would never seek conflict when supplies become restricted and 
prices rise. Their actions allow us to fully falsify the null hypothesis positing that neither the US 
nor the EU will ever intervene militarily in energy rich areas when prices are high or disruptions 
are imminent (H8). 
On the ERD front, the evidence of the 1990s suggests that both the US and the EU do in fact 
reduce their investments when prices drop and supply flows ease (H7). This allows us 
concurrently to falsify the null hypothesis positing that neither the US nor the EU will exhibit any 
change in their attitudes toward developing substitution fuels as manifested by their related 
investments (H9).  
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Table 35: Summary of affirmed/falsified hypotheses in Case 2 
Hyp.# Topic US EU Evaluation 
H1 MCA approach True 
Partly True 
Partly False 
Neutral 
H2 Coop approach True True True 
H3 US > military likelihood True  True 
H4 EU < military likelihood  Partly True Partly True 
H5 EU Never use military  False False 
H6 EU/US Increase ERD    
H7 EU/US reduce ERD True True True 
H8 Null-never military False False False 
H9 Null-no change in ERD False False False 
 
4.3. The high-price cases 
4.3.1. Two oil crises (OPEC, Iranian Revolution) of the 1970s  (high price -restricted flow) 
The dual oil crises of the 1970s provide an excellent case to test EU and US responses to 
conditions of high prices and restricted flows. Over the course of the decade, the price of oil rose 
from an annual average of $9.94 in 1970 to $93.41 in 1979 (in $2009).297 At two separate points, 
late 1973 and again in 1979, the price skyrocketed as international crises in the Middle East led to 
shut-ins, shutdowns, and an embargo (See Table 36 and Figure 47 below). The result was a 
noticeable increase in efforts by our two actors to cooperate multilaterally a common response as 
well as to negotiate bilaterally, particularly through the use of arms deals in exchange for secure 
fuel supplies.  
The early 1970s brought watershed changes to the geopolitical landscape and the global energy 
balance of power. Toward the end of the sixties, new sources of oil had been discovered in 
Alaska’s North Slope (1968) and the North Sea (1969) and global production had continued to rise, 
increasing by 16.5% between 1969 and 1970 (BP, 2010). However, beginning in 1970, a currency 
crisis in the US and the subsequent devaluation of the dollar sparked severe recessions in both 
the US and the Europe. The economic downturn in the early years of the decade was paralleled 
with political upheaval as the rise of socialist governments in the oil-rich Middle East and North 
Africa changed the geographical landscape of the Cold War.298 The region’s increasingly 
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 All average annual prices come from BP (2010) unless otherwise stated. 
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 Socialist coups and revolutions occurred in Egypt (1952), Iraq and Syria (1963), and Libya (1969). 
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empowered governments began raising the posted price of their oil and increasing excise taxes 
midway through 1970. In 1971, OPEC agreed to a new formula on oil pricing, one that included a 
55 percent tax on all its oil exports, and backed it up with threats to embargo any company that 
refused to pay.299 After decades of low prices and tight control by western oil companies, oil 
prices began to rise rapidly. The days of cheap oil were over.  
 
Table 36: Nominal and $2009 oil prices, 1970s 
 
Nominal price $2009 
1970 1.80 9.94 
1971 2.24 11.85 
1972 2.48 12.72 
1973 3.29 15.89 
1974 11.58 50.41 
1975 11.53 45.98 
1976 12.80 48.25 
1977 13.92 49.24 
1978 14.02 46.13 
1979 31.61 93.41 
Change: 
 
1656.1% 839.7% 
Source: BP (2010) 
 
Figure 47: Oil prices in $2009, 1970s 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
 
As the decade progressed, OPEC continued to push the price of crude upwards to offset the 
continuing decline in the US dollar. In 1973 alone, it increased the selling price on two separate 
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 Acting on behalf of its partners Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, in April 1971, Libya raised the price of oil 
sold at Mediterranean ports, up to $3.45. By the end of the year, the country had nationalized its major oil 
fields, and together with a falling US dollar caused enormous upward pressure on the price of oil. 
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occasions, once by five percent and then by another eleven percent; increases that came on the 
heels of a wave of nationalizations that led to the wholesale transformation of the international 
oil market.300 Midway through the decade and for the first time since the commercialization of 
petroleum in nineteenth century, a cartel of governments controlled most of the world’s supplies 
and its flow onto the market. The nominal price of Saudi Light crude ($1.21 in 1970) was selling 
for more than $11 by the end of 1974 (Adelman, 1990:3). Europe was particularly vulnerable to 
these changes as it depended on the region’s suppliers for more than eighty percent of its oil 
consumption. Although the US was far less dependent on the region’s oil (at around eighteen 
percent of its imports and six percent of its overall oil needs), the impact of decreased supplies 
and higher prices could not have come at a worse time. The US economy was in the doldrums, its 
currency was collapsing, and its military was orchestrating a rapid evacuation of Vietnam. 
Meanwhile, the new socialist regimes of the Middle East were turning to the Soviet Union for aid 
and arms. The regional anti-Soviet alliance, built up in the early 1950s and stretching from 
Afghanistan to Turkey, was gone and with it US and European orientation and influence in the 
region changed. Under pressure from its oil suppliers, France had stopped supplying Israel with 
weapons in the late 1960s and instead started selling them to Arab oil exporters. Under different 
pressures, the UK surrendered its remaining Persian Gulf colonial holdings, evacuating the Trucial 
Coast sheikdoms in 1971; setting the stage for an Iranian invasion of three of the islands near the 
entrance to the Strait of Hormuz and giving birth to the United Arab Emirates.301 For its part, the 
US was showing increasing interest in the area as it moved its focus away from East Asia and 
toward new and stronger alliances with Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, which unlike its fellow OPEC 
members had decided to buy out rather than expropriate western oil companies.  
Against this backdrop of increasing empowerment of Middle Eastern oil producers, a sinking US 
currency, and a new thrust by the Soviet Union to gain influence in the region, an Arab coalition 
led by Syria and Egypt attacked Israel in early October 1973.302 The subsequent 19-day war ended 
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 Nationalizations of different foreign held concessions occurred in Algeria in 1971, Libya 1971 and 1973, 
Iraq in 1972 and 1973, Iran in 1973, Venezuela and Kuwait in 1975. In addition to the nationalizations, the 
geography of access changed as well. Following closure of the Suez canal during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
and an eight-month shut down of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline that carried oil from Saudi Arabia, over Jordan 
and Syria to the port city of Sidon in Lebanon due to bomb attacks, access to Gulf oil became a matter 
distance to port, which raised transport costs.  
301
 The islands were the Abu Musa, the Greater Tunbs, and the Lesser Tunbs. 
302
 To be precise, the Egyptian-Syrian led coalition of forces arrayed included additional expeditionary forces 
from Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Algeria, and Sudan as well as outsiders from 
Pakistan, Cuba and North Korea. 
Four Cases 
254 
in a stalemate, but in the process pushed the US and the Soviet Union dangerously close to the 
brink of nuclear war and ushered in a five-month long oil embargo, the first of the decade’s two 
very serious oil crises.303 Operating under the threat of a feared Israeli defeat, the US began an 
emergency airlift of weapons and ammunition to Tel Aviv (Operation Nickel Grass) via Dutch 
territory on October 14. That same day, Israelis forces encircled the Egyptian army in the Sinai and 
began bombarding Damascus. The Arab members of OPEC responded by quadrupling their base 
oil price and committed to cut production by as much as 10% by the end of 1974. When at the 
height of the conflict President Nixon authorized some $2.2 billion in aid and arms to Israel, Libya 
and Saudi Arabia declared an embargo first against the US and then together with other Arab 
OPEC members against the Netherlands (and later Portugal). 
The ensuing 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo took almost 1.6 million barrels a day off the market for 
approximately five months (Stagliano, 2007) and by the time it was lifted in March 1974, the 
nominal price of oil had risen from less than $3.00 to more than $11.00 (from $15 to $54 in 
$2009). The crisis prompted not only a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activity between importers 
and exporters, but it also increased cooperation between consumer states, and set in motion a 
wholesale reassessment by US and EU leaders over the role of energy in international politics. As 
Henry Kissinger later noted, “we have learned that the energy crisis is not a mere problem of 
transitional adjustment; it is a grave challenge to the political and economic structure of the free 
world” (Kissinger, 1982). At the highest levels of government, access to oil or an alternative to it, 
became a central theme of international politics, one explicitly caged in the vernacular of national 
security. 
In the aftermath of the first crisis and throughout much of second half of the decade, the price of 
oil remained steady, but high; although regional events continued to plague energy markets and 
raise the geopolitical profile of the Middle East.304 Both the EU and the US reacted to the crisis 
years by creating strategic petroleum reserves, increasing external cooperation, and initiating the 
search for alternative fuels and suppliers. Nevertheless, little could be done to mitigate the 
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 Originally, the war (October 6 to 25, 1973) was proceeding in the Arab’s favor. However, as the tide 
turned in Israel’s favor following the arrival of US aid, the Soviet Union threatened to send troops to the 
region to support Damascus and Cairo to beef up its military advisors already on the ground. For a full 
accounting of the 1973-1974 crisis and the role of the superpowers see for example Rabinovich (2004) and 
Wehling (1997); and  for historical background of superpower politics in the region through the 1960s see 
Gerges (1994). 
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 Nationalization continued. OPEC members continually tried to coordinate further increases in excise 
taxes and well-head prices. And in early 1976, oil exports from Iraq were slowed for two months when the 
trans-Lebanon pipelines were shut down amidst the country’s exploding civil war.   
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damage as the price shock dampened economic growth and subsequently sapped EU and US oil 
consumption through 1975, when it began to rise again (see Figure 48 and Figure 49 below).  
Figure 48: EU oil consumption, 1970s 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
Figure 49: US oil consumption, 1970s 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
Then in 1979, another oil crisis sent prices skyrocketing once again. The Shah of Iran was already 
losing control of his country in 1978, but as student protests turned violent, provoking an 
evacuation of foreign oil workers, the situation spun out of control. With its foreign engineers 
gone, Iran experienced a sharp drop in production, down to 500,000 barrels a day in December, a 
far cry from the 1.5 million being produced just a month earlier and the 5.7 million it produced 
daily in 1977. The price impact was substantial. Across the twelve months between the 
Decembers of 1978 and 1979, the average nominal price of oil rose by 119% from $14.85 to 
$32.50 (or almost $95 in $2009); and the situation deteriorated from there. By the end of 1979, 
Iran was under the control of Islamic government and US diplomats were being held hostage in 
their embassy, ending a decades-long courtship between Iran and the West. Shortly thereafter, 
the US stopped importing Iranian oil altogether and Iran countered by cutting all contracts with 
the US. Then, seizing a rare opportunity to expand its own oil assets and export capabilities, Iraq 
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moved to occupy the Shatt al-Arab waterway, initiating the Iran-Iraq War, launching another crisis 
that would spike prices even higher, and send much of the world into another recession. 
4.3.1.1. EU response 
The 1970s began as period of cheap oil solid economic growth in Europe, raising hope for greater 
cooperation among Member foreign and energy policies and EU leaders were able to make some 
progress on the energy front (raising petroleum stock levels and establishing basic rules to 
respond internally to external supply shocks). The spirit of political unity quickly deteriorated, 
however, in 1971 when the US currency crisis sent many of Europe’s economies into a 
recession.305 By the time the first oil crisis hit, Europe had not one, but rather many independent 
energy markets, each carefully guarded as a precious national asset. The embargo thus tested the 
limits of European solidarity. In response to the events unfolding in the Middle East, European 
leaders tried and failed to reach a consensus on joint action. The Union was divided. The UK and 
France, with their vast oil interests in the region at stake, argued in opposition to Germany and 
the Netherlands about the cause of the crisis. What they could agree on was that they needed to 
consume less oil, diversify their sources, and do so not as a group but as individual independent 
states (European Communities, 1973). As a result, the Member States began to enter 
independently into negotiations with the Arab oil producing states, organizing independent 
supply contracts and major arms deals (see Table 37 and 38 below). 
A few years later, just as the initial shock of the oil the 1973-74 crisis was receding, a revolution in 
Iran shut down the country’s production. As the data on EU arms sales indicate (see Table 39 on 
page 259) throughout the period, the EU considered Iran as a pro-Western stabilizing force in the 
Persian Gulf, an ally worth supporting. In fact, Iranian oil production between 1970 and 1978 had 
increased from 3.8 million to 5.3 million barrels a day and much of it was heading to Europe. By 
the end of 1979, in the wake of recent events, Iranian production had dropped below 3.3 million 
barrels daily and a year later after Iraq launched an invasion, production fell to below 1.5 million. 
Finally, throughout the 1970s, Western Europe was the single biggest regional oil importer in the 
world. In 1973, Europe was importing a little more than 10 million barrels a day from the Middle 
East and by the end of the decade the Gulf had become a major transit area for much of Europe’s 
oil supplies. Thus, when Iran stopped producing, European supplies were acutely endangered.  
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Table 37: Classes of weapons systems sold by EU to key parties after 1973 crisis 
 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Totals 
Air Dominance Weapons 59 63 44 33 84 4 0 287 
Air/Ground Support 60 61 80 28 36 76 20 361 
Anit-Aircraft Weapon Systems n/a 36 n/a n/a 0 0 0 36 
Land Dominance n/a 690 1220 2241 2000 670 360 7181 
Naval Dominance 3 22 14 90 28 9 0 166 
Totals 122 872 1358 2392 2148 759 380 
 
Source: Multiple editions of IISS The Military Balance (1974, 1975,1976,1977,1978,1979) 
 
Table 38: EU Arms deals with oil providers, 1973 combatants (excl. Israel), 1973-1979 
 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Totals 
 
D° C* D C D C D C D C D C D C D C 
France 6 4 12 6 9 6 6 4 7 6 6 4 2 2 
 
12 
Germany 1 1 
      
1 1 2 2 
   
4 
Italy 1 1 5 5 6 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 
   
11 
UK 2 2 14 5 8 4 9 6 5 3 2 2 
   
9 
Netherlands 
  
1 1 
  
1 1 1 1 
     
2 
Austria 
      
1 1 1 1 
     
2 
Totals 10 7 32 9 23 11 21 12 19 8 15 9 2 2 
 
14 
D stands for “Deals” and C stands for “Countries” 
Source: Multiple editions of IISS The Military Balance (1974, 1975,1976,1977,1978,1979) 
The countries in question include Abu Dabai, Dubai, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
 
There are two possible interpretations of the EU’s approach to selling arms for oil. The first takes 
such action as a sign of a lack of cooperation and coordination, whereby each Member acted on 
independent initiative and interest. However, given that the Member States had earlier agreed on 
such an approach, we also can draw the contrary conclusion that the multiple independent arms 
deals were in fact a semi-coordinated response to enhance the overall interest of the Union by 
strengthening the respective positions of each Member State.  
Moreover, the actual event of a bilateral deal is precisely the form of activity that we would 
expect to see as one manifestation type of a cooperation strategy. In this case, the EU is 
cooperating with its suppliers in order to secure its interests. In fact, in response to debates 
arising in early 1975 about the use of military force to secure Western interests in the oil-rich 
Middle East, Armin Grünewald, a spokesman for Helmut Schmidt’s government put it succinctly, 
“We are not interested in any kind of confrontation with the oil countries, but rather in 
cooperation" (New York Times, 1975). This would seem to affirm our hypothesis about EU 
likelihood to increase cooperation under conditions of high prices and restricted flows (H2). 
Further, with the significant exception of the UK, the EU did not respond with any specific military 
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buildup or even threat of one. Over the years subsequent to the first crisis, the annual rate of 
growth of EU military expenditures was both steady and fairly low at about three percent (see 
Figure 50 below). 
Figure 50: Index EU9 military expenditures, 1970s 
 
Source: SIPRI's Full Military Expenditure Database (1988-2009) 
The fact the EU and its Member States (outside of the UK) neither made any military moves 
outside of cooperative deals to secure their oil nor substantially changed their military investment 
behavior to plan for such action, would seem to affirm our hypothesis (H5) that predicted that the 
EU will never seek conflict when prices are high and flow is restricted. If taken out of context it 
also could affirm the null hypothesis (H8) that the EU will never enter into conflict in energy rich 
areas when prices are high or disruptions are imminent. Indeed, West German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt explicitly warned in late 1974 against "the irrational use of force" to secure oil supplies 
that could instead be had through negotiations (Yergin, 1975). However, we also could 
understand the willingness to sell arms to active combatants of a conflict that resulted in higher 
prices and disruptions of oil flows as at least tacit engagement in the conflict. Indeed, there was 
almost uniform support for Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. However, based on the dyads of 
weapons supplier to buyer, the various Member States of the EU also allied themselves with 
different combatants, including the initiators of the 1973 hostilities (Egypt and Syria), and their 
respective national oil suppliers (See Table 39 below).  
  
The high-price cases 
259 
Table 39: Dyadic set EU-Middle East arms deals in the 1970s 
  FR UK IT DE NL AT 
Abu Dabai + + + 
   
Dubai 
 
+ + 
   
Egypt + + + 
   
Iran + + + + + 
 
iraq + 
     
Kuwait + + 
 
+ 
  
Lebanon* + + + 
   
Libya + 
 
+ 
   
Oman + + + 
 
+ 
 
Qatar + + 
    
Saudi Arabia + + + + 
  
Syria + 
 
+ + 
 
+ 
Tunisia 
  
+ 
  
+ 
UAE + 
 
+ 
   
* Lebanon provided a major Mediterranean 
termination point for Iraqi and regional pipeline 
exports to Europe. 
Source: Multiple editions of IISS The Military 
Balance (1974, 1975,1976,1977,1978,1979). 
 
What is remarkable about the period is the boldness of France to act alone, even in opposition to 
its partners in the Union. Beside the number of unique arms deals it made and the variety of 
partners it made them with, France’s independent ways were demonstrated in its refusal to join 
the other eight Member States in forming the International Energy Agency (IEA) with the US.306 
Notwithstanding the French exception, the EU did in fact agree to the establishment of an 
international Energy Program that at its base created an international consumer alliance whereby 
its signatories would be prepared to build, store, and share stockpiles in the event of future 
disruption. The establishment of the IEA is the most substantial evidence so far that the EU will 
seek cooperation under conditions of high pricing and restricted flows (H2). Immediately after 
founding the IEA, the EU also moved to begin coordinating energy policies internally with a 
specific focus of not only reducing their dependence on Arab oil suppliers, but achieving a higher 
degree of overall energy autonomy (see Com(74) 550 Final/2) including substitution fuels (COM 
(74) 20 Final). By 1975, the EU had laid several new objectives for the coming decade including 
increases in nuclear power, coal production and imports, and natural gas.  
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The change of focus to find substitutes was evident in EU ERD spending. While nuclear and 
weapons related ERD continued to take up the lion’s share of Member ERD (78% of all funding for 
the period between 1974 and 1979), the EU invested heavily in renewables, efficiency, and fossil 
fuels, altogether €2.93 billion (in €2009) over the period. Investments in renewables saw the 
largest growth from almost nothing (€3 million) in 1974 to €233 million by 1979. However, in 
terms of shares of non-nuclear related ERD, continued investments in fossil fuels was, in financial 
terms, the EU’s most important focus area (see Table 40 and Figure 51 below), if not in 
percentage figures. This carries two important implications for our hypotheses. First, the EU did in 
fact increase its ERD when faced with conditions of high prices and restricted flows (63% between 
1974 and 1979), which supports the EU half of hypothesis six (H6) that predicts exactly such 
behavior. It also provides another falsification of the null hypothesis, which predicts that the EU 
would not change its ERD investment patterns when price and flow conditions change (H9). The 
evidence demonstrates that they did just that in the area of renewables.  
Table 40: EU ERD investments (in €2009) in the 1970s 
 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Changes 
Efficiency 62 163 161 153 198 183 192.6% 
Fossil Fuels 149 155 183 261 343 434 191.5% 
Renewables 3 22 45 80 136 233 6794.9% 
Nuclear 
Fis./Fus. 
1943 2069 2040 2425 2413 2597 33.6% 
Power/Storage 33 33 41 87 111 98 201.1% 
Other 48 58 73 57 100 107 122.4% 
Total ERD 2238 2499 2543 3062 3302 3651 63.1% 
Y_Y Change 
 
11.6% 1.8% 20.4% 7.8% 10.6% 
 
Annual share 
Efficiency 2.8% 6.5% 6.3% 5.0% 6.0% 5.0% 79.4% 
Fossil Fuels 6.6% 6.2% 7.2% 8.5% 10.4% 11.9% 78.7% 
Renewables 0.2% 0.9% 1.8% 2.6% 4.1% 6.4% 4126.9% 
Nuclear 
Fis./Fus. 
86.8% 82.8% 80.2% 79.2% 73.1% 71.1% -18.1% 
Power/Storage 1.5% 1.3% 1.6% 2.8% 3.4% 2.7% 84.6% 
Other 2.2% 2.3% 2.9% 1.8% 3.0% 2.9% 36.3% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 21.1% 37.8% 32.0% 24.0% 22.3% 17.3% -18.0% 
Fossil Fuels 50.4% 36.0% 36.3% 40.9% 38.6% 41.1% -18.4% 
Renewables 1.1% 5.1% 9.0% 12.5% 15.3% 22.1% 1831.3% 
Power/Storage 11.0% 7.6% 8.2% 13.7% 12.5% 9.3% -15.7% 
Other 16.3% 13.5% 14.4% 8.9% 11.3% 10.2% -37.7% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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Figure 51: EU investment in non nuclear/military ERD, 1970s 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
 
4.3.1.2. US response 
Both the external and internal US responses to the oil crises of the 1970s supports several of our 
hypotheses, but in terms of foreign policy the results are less definitive than in the low price free 
flow case. In the years following the 1973-1974 oil embargo, the US floated the idea of military 
intervention, but in fact took no related action. Instead, the US pushed for and won cooperation 
not only from its allies in Europe and Japan to establish something akin to a consumers union, but 
also tacit support from key Gulf suppliers to increase production, first to offset the crunch of the 
mid 1970s and then again toward the end of the decade. Concurrent with those efforts, the US 
also began investing heavily into alternatives and efficiency.  
Coming on the heels of price controls and the general economic malaise of the previous years, the 
embargo caused serious shortages in the US. With motorists famously lining up to buy gasoline, 
President Nixon announce a new massive energy program, “Project Independence” to achieve 
“energy self-sufficiency” by 1980 (Nixon, 1971c). Through executive actions, the President seized 
control of the domestic supply of oil, reversing decades of an internal Market Commodity 
Approach. In May 1974, Congress passed the Federal Energy Administration Act, setting into 
motion a strategy to develop the country’s vast oil shale and coal reserves and began investing 
into solar energy and nuclear fusion. Yet internally, the US faced other dilemmas, including the 
disastrous Watergate Scandal that abruptly ended the Nixon Presidency and brought Gerald Ford 
into power who quickly established a national energy board, signed into law the Energy 
Reorganization Act and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, and established an Energy 
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Research and Development Agency (ERDA) to coordinate national ERD priorities. Ford also 
reshuffled his staff, bringing in oil industry stalwarts Senator Nelson Rockefeller as his new Vice 
President, Congressman Donald Rumsfeld to run his Office of Economic Opportunity (later as 
Counselor and then NATO Ambassador), and hired George H. W. Bush first as Liaison to China and 
then to run the Central Intelligence Agency. By the time the second oil crisis arrived in 1979, the 
US had built up substantial strategic reserves and begun the process of phasing out oil prices 
controls.  
Externally, the US responded to the first crisis with a complex cocktail of divergent, but reinforcing 
approaches that included multilateral cooperation, bilateral arms deals, the threat of force, and a 
push for peace. The US stepped up efforts to cooperate with industrialized consumers countries 
by calling for an international conference of consumers to coordinate a response. Part of that 
response would be to coordinate international research and develop new energy technologies 
and non-oil sources of energy. The focuses, however, were to establish a joint allocation system 
to be made available in times of supply emergencies and a plan to coordinate with oil-producing 
nations to guarantee stable supplies. At the same time, the US was convinced that Europe would 
only go so far in its cooperation with the US, choosing instead to go it alone where it could, largely 
because it was it was incapable as a group to take definitive policy actions. As Kissinger noted in a 
1975 interview, "Why are the Europeans so hostile to the United States? I think they suffer from 
an enormous feeling of insecurity. They recognize that their safety depends on the United States", 
a feeling Kissinger said led to a feeling of political "impotence" that produced "a certain 
peevishness which always stops short of policy actions" (Gwertzman, 1975). During the quickly 
assembled Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, Nixon implored his allies not to “go 
into business” for themselves by making bilateral agreements with oil producers (Nixon, 1974b). 
Then the US did exactly that, establishing a series of arms deals with key Middle East suppliers 
(see Table 41 below). Over the course of the subsequent five years, the US made 59 separate 
deals with 11 oil-relevant Middle Eastern countries (see Table 42 below).  
Table 41: Classes of weapons systems sold by the US to key parties after 1973 crisis 
 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Totals 
Air Dominance Weapons 2580 60 
 
3349 12 110 47 6158 
Air/Ground Support 2 18 52 6 68 94 6 246 
Anti-Aircraft Weapon Systems 
   
12 n/a n/a 72 84 
Land Dominance 
 
10 18 250 
 
1200 2143 3621 
Naval Dominance 
 
6 103 
 
4 
  
113 
Totals 2582 94 173 3617 84 1404 2268 
 
Source: Multiple editions of IISS The Military Balance (1974, 1975,1976,1977,1978,1979) 
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Table 42: US Arms deals with oil providers, 1973 combatants (excl. Israel), 1973-1979 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Totals 
D C D C D C D C D C D C D C D C 
2 2 9 4 8 3 15 5 10 4 5 3 10 5 59 11 
D stands for “Deals” and C stands for “Countries”; The countries in question include Abu Dhabi, 
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. 
Source: Multiple editions of IISS The Military Balance (1974, 1975,1976,1977,1978,1979) 
 
Unlike Europe, however, the US took a much more focused approach delivering the bulk of its 
supplies to two parties (see Table 43 below), Iran and Saudi Arabia, delivering some 280 attack-
aircraft, 6 destroyers, and thousands of missiles to the former and hundreds of air-to-air and anti-
ship missiles and some 250 tanks to the latter.307  
Table 43: US-Middle East arms deals in the 1970s 
 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Abu Dhabi + 
      
Algeria 
      
+ 
Egypt 
   
+ 
 
+ + 
Iran + + + + + 
  
Kuwait 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
Lebanon* 
  
+ 
    
North Yemen 
      
+ 
Oman 
 
+ 
     
Qatar 
    
+ 
  
Saudi Arabia 
 
+ + + + + + 
Tunisia 
   
+ + + 
 
* Lebanon provided a major Mediterranean termination point for 
Iraqi and regional pipeline exports to Europe. 
Source: Multiple editions of IISS The Military Balance (1974, 1975, 
1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979). 
 
Those sales came on the heels of a delicately, but successfully implemented third tangent of 
raising the specter of a US military attack on oil producers if they ever implement such an 
embargo again. A coordinated, heated, and very public debate began in the US in late 1974 as to 
whether or not the US should use military force to bring OPEC suppliers back in line with US 
interests. At the time it was assumed that three divisions, some 45,000 troops would be sufficient 
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to seize and hold two key fields on the western shores of the Gulf, allowing the US to pump its oil 
and take it back to the US.308 The debate began at a senior level meeting of the President and his 
advisors late in 1974 where OPEC’s use of oil as a political weapon was described as a casus belli 
(Yergin, 1975). A few weeks later, Henry Kissinger publicized the idea in an interview where he 
laid out the difference between “a dispute over price” and “actual strangulation of the 
industrialized world" leaving the option of military force open by adding, "there's no 
circumstances where we would not use force" (Gwertzman, 1975). As the debate increased, 
tensions spread around the world, causing angst in Europe and the Middle East.  
In the end, the US neither attacked the oil producers nor even raised its military readiness. The 
public nature of the debate moved from an argument over the pros and cons of military force, to 
the advantages of removing economic and military support for oil exporting regimes. In a famous 
article on the topic, Daniel Yergin (1975) observed "the conservative leaders around the Persian 
Gulf have chosen to forget that their only effective guarantee against external and internal 
enemies is the West, particularly the United States. If these guarantees should be weakened, if 
consuming countries led by the United States indicate that the price of oil is a more vital interest 
than the preservation of monarchies, then the renewed recognition of their political vulnerability 
may give these rulers significant pause." It had become clear that a policy of squeezing was better 
than seizing. Finally, the Nixon administration made a concerted effort to resolve both the Middle 
East conflict and reduce US-Arab tension resulting in the reopening of diplomatic relations with 
Egypt and Syria and the reopening of Suez Canal, a much needed transport route for petroleum. 
Those moves also laid the groundwork for future peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel 
under the Carter administration, in exchange for which would be massive economic and military 
aid. 
The US response thus composed a combination of multilateral and bilateral cooperation imbued 
with the tacit threat of force and active peacemaking. This approach strongly confirms a couple of 
our hypotheses about US behavior under circumstances of increased prices and restricted flows. It 
confirms both that the US will employ a cooperation strategy under such conditions (H2) and that, 
as a country which places a high salience on SAPP, is also more likely than the EU or its Member 
States to resort to military means or at least threaten to do so (H3). The fact that the US 
subsequently responded by identifying and massively supporting two proxies in the region in 
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Saudi Arabia and Iran also in part falsifies the null hypothesis eight (H8) that the US will never 
enter into conflict in energy rich areas when disruptions are imminent because threatening force 
and arming combatants qualifies at least in an indirect manner.  
In terms of ERD, the 1970s crises also support our hypotheses pertaining to US responses toward 
the search for substitutes. The sustained increase in the price of oil had made non-oil energy 
sources “economic” literally creating “an energy rush" (Yergin, 1975). The result was a massive 
national effort aimed at achieving, not just a reduction in foreign imports, but rather the full scale 
achievement of energy independence. To achieve that goal, the US instituted a massive research 
program spending the equivalent of over €26 billion (in €2009) between 1974 and 1979. Although 
circa 55% of that money went into nuclear (and nuclear weapons related ERD), the share of 
nuclear related ERD declined from 75% in 1974 to 48% by 1979. Further, funding for efficiency 
and renewables skyrocketed with the former being 81 times greater in 1979 than in 1974 and the 
latter following a lesser but nonetheless impressive increase of 38 times over the same period.  
In terms of actual monetary values, funding for renewables and efficiency exceeded funding for 
fossil fuels by the end of the decade. In fact, the US outspent the EU in every area of ERD except 
for efficiency. In the renewables area alone, the US spent five times as much as the EU between 
1974 and 1979 and in the last year of the decade, renewables accounted for 29.6% of its non-
nuclear ERD as opposed to 22.1% among its European allies.  
 
Figure 52: US investment in non nuclear/military ERD, 1970s 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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Table 44: US ERD investments (in €2009) in the 1970s 
 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Changes 
Efficiency 4 20 39 178 236 318 8133.8% 
Fossil Fuels 196 326 537 851 1048 1010 414.9% 
Renewables 26 106 205 500 753 1023 3830.7% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 1561 2084 2037 2757 2924 3135 100.8% 
Power/Storage 8 32 62 216 298 477 5689.0% 
Other 288 312 510 660 738 622 115.8% 
Total ERD 2084 2882 3389 5162 5995 6586 216.0% 
Y_Y Change 
 
38.3% 17.6% 52.3% 16.2% 9.9% 
 
Annual share 
Efficiency 0.2% 0.7% 1.1% 3.4% 3.9% 4.8% 2505.6% 
Fossil Fuels 9.4% 11.3% 15.8% 16.5% 17.5% 15.3% 62.9% 
Renewables 1.2% 3.7% 6.0% 9.7% 12.6% 15.5% 1143.9% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 74.9% 72.3% 60.1% 53.4% 48.8% 47.6% -36.5% 
Power/Storage 0.4% 1.1% 1.8% 4.2% 5.0% 7.2% 1731.9% 
Other 13.8% 10.8% 15.1% 12.8% 12.3% 9.4% -31.7% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 0.7% 2.5% 2.9% 7.4% 7.7% 9.2% 1147.0% 
Fossil Fuels 37.5% 40.9% 39.7% 35.4% 34.1% 29.3% -22.0% 
Renewables 5.0% 13.3% 15.1% 20.8% 24.5% 29.6% 495.3% 
Power/Storage 1.6% 4.1% 4.6% 9.0% 9.7% 13.8% 776.8% 
Other 55.2% 39.2% 37.8% 27.4% 24.0% 18.0% -67.3% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
 
Analysis of the evidence demonstrates that US not only reacted to high prices and restricted flows 
by increasing its ERD, affirming H6, and changing the focus of that research, hence falsifying null 
hypothesis eight (H8), the US also did so in more extreme fashion. This supports the argument 
that governments that place a high salience on SAPP (which is clearly the case for the US) are 
more likely to act with greater urgency and effort in finding substitutes. Finally, although it is not 
explicitly revealed in the data above, the US made serious efforts to specifically address the issue 
of substitute transport fuels particularly in the latter part of the decade via the institutionalization 
of a government coordinated Synthetic Fuel Corporation (see page 168). This implies that the US, 
with its high salience of SAPP understood that it needed alternative fuels not only to reduce 
foreign dependency, but also to secure its ability to continue maintaining a highly mobile power 
projection capacity.  
4.3.1.3. 1970s Summary 
The 1970s were years of transformation for the politics and economics of oil. Nationalizations, 
expropriations, price hikes, an embargo, and finally a massive shut down of Persian Gulf supplies 
defined a decade of rising prices and decreased stability in the flow of supplies. Both the US and 
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the EU responded to these events with increased levels of multilateral and bilateral cooperation. 
As expected the US included as part of its response portfolio the threat of force, even though it 
did not use it. The events also resulted in direct increases in ERD and changes in ERD focus in the 
both the US and EU. Therefore, the 1970s high-price, restricted flows case allows us to confirm 
five of our hypotheses and falsify both null hypotheses.  
The evidence substantiates that both the EU and the US will increase international cooperation 
when prices are high or rising and supplies are restricted or threatened (H2). This is 
comprehensible for no other reasons than the founding of the International Energy Agency, the 
coordinated building of domestic stockpiles, and the establishment of an international emergency 
sharing mechanism, not to mention the failed attempts to coordinate a floor on prices that would 
decrease consumption and increase private investments in exploration and alternatives. The 
evidence further demonstrates that the US is more likely than the EU to adopt a 
conflictual/interventionist (H3 and H4) approach under those conditions. The efforts put forward 
by European leaders to counter US threats of force as irrational and at the same time to secure 
special commitments from suppliers in exchange for aid and armaments deals further supports 
the hypothesis that the EU with its low SAPP salience will eschew any sort of conflict whatsoever 
(H5). Indeed in contrast to the 1990s low price free flow case, EU Member States eschewed active 
involvement at precisely the moment when supplies were threatened. One could argue that the 
EU’s arms deals with the 1973 combatants, the same ones that caused the crisis in the first place, 
amounts to engaging in the conflict. However, the fact of the matter is, the EU’s arms deals seem 
more driven by the Union’s disunity, as witnessed by the spread and diversity of deals made by 
individual Member States, particularly France. Conversely, the US supplied mainly two countries 
and did so in a rather uniform fashion, by first supplying Iran with offensive air and sea power and 
then Saudi Arabia with air and sea defenses and offensive land power weapons in a bid to 
establish a regional balance of power in the Persian Gulf and secure US interests there. Likewise, 
the many arms deals, specifically the carefully orchestrated US threat of force if any second 
embargo would ever occur, provides a reasonable enough basis to falsify the null hypothesis 
positing that neither the US nor the EU will ever intervene militarily in energy rich areas when 
prices are high or disruptions are imminent (H8). Although neither intervened directly, there was 
certainly enough activity to suggest engagement in the conflict, not least of which was a 
concerted effort of the US to make peace between the warring parties and the combined efforts 
of the EU and US to resolve tensions with Gulf suppliers.  
On the ERD front, both the US and EU reacted sharply and predictably to conditions of higher 
prices and restricted flows. Both dramatically increased their investments; and hence confirmed 
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hypothesis (H6) that they in fact will both do exactly that. Along with their increased investments, 
the focus of funding also changed as efficiency and renewables received an enormous push and 
nuclear related research, while still increasing, consumed a lesser overall share. This falsifies the 
null hypothesis (H9), which posited that neither the US nor the EU would change their investment 
strategies toward substitutes under high prices and restricted flows.   
Table 45: Summary of affirmed/falsified hypotheses in Case 3 
Hyp.# Topic US EU Evaluation 
H1 MCA approach    
H2 Coop approach True True True 
H3 US > military likelihood True  True 
H4 EU < military likelihood  True True 
H5 EU Never use military  True True 
H6 EU/US Increase ERD True True True 
H7 EU/US reduce ERD    
H8 Null-never military False False False 
H9 Null-no change in ERD False False False 
 
4.3.2. Post 2003 (rising oil prices – restricted flows) 
Following almost two decades of sustained lows, the international oil prices began to rise again in 
late 1998 sparking years of rather consistent growth and high volatility. Besides being the most 
recent case of high prices on record, the 2000s and specifically the period after 2003, provide an 
excellent example to test EU and US responses to conditions of high prices and restricted flows. In 
terms of both pricing and supply availability, the period was saturated with events that in a broad 
sense came together at the worst possible moment, creating a perfect storm of high prices, 
restricted flows, economic disaster, and war.  
Figure 53: Average annual oil prices (in $2009), 1998-2009 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
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Throughout the latter half of the 1990s, the price of oil was low but steadily rising as the world’s 
economies began a recovery from the decade’s early recession. A financial crisis in Asia in 1997 
dampened the previous years’ growth in global consumption creating a glut on the market and 
instigating three consecutive OPEC production cuts between July 1998 and April 1999. By the mid 
of 1999, OPEC had removed almost three million barrels a day from the market. Nevertheless, 
with the US economy expanding coupled with sharp growth in Chinese and Indian and 
consumption, global demand continued to rise. Between 1995 and 2001, average annual oil 
consumption in China grew from 3.4 million barrels a day to almost 4.9 million barrels; in India, it 
grew from 1.6 million to 2.2 million. Meanwhile, the US was consuming an additional one million 
barrels. Only the EU’s consumption patterns held steady. Despite growth in world production by 
almost 10% over the period (See Table 46 below), an expanded and sustained run on oil had 
begun. OPEC tried to reverse the trend with production increases in 2000, but their efforts were 
too late. By the middle of 2001, the US economy had turned sour as the country’s tech bubble 
burst and higher oil prices put the squeeze on consumers.309 The incongruent timing of OPEC cuts 
and a slowing US economy sent prices downward causing OPEC to respond with more production 
cuts, once again taking more than three million barrels off the market by September 2001.  
Table 46: US, EU, China and India oil consumption and world production, 1995-2001 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Change 
US 17.72 18.31 18.62 18.92 19.52 19.70 19.65 10.9% 
EU 14.16 14.44 14.58 14.85 14.81 14.69 14.86 5.0% 
China 3.39 3.70 4.18 4.23 4.48 4.77 4.87 43.5% 
India 1.58 1.70 1.83 1.96 2.13 2.25 2.28 44.5% 
World Production 68.10 69.90 72.18 73.54 72.32 74.82 74.81 9.9% 
Source: BP (2010) 
 
On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda forces launched a coordinated multi-target attack on the 
United States. The attackers specifically identified US and European presence in the oil-rich 
regions the Islamic Middle East and their support for corrupt governments and monarchies as 
cause for their actions. Years of oil diplomacy and cold war machinations had resurfaced in a fury. 
In addition to numerous actions specifically aimed at reducing energy dependence in the region, 
the US responded with an October invasion of Afghanistan, the host nation of the attackers. For 
the first time in its history, NATO activated its Article 5 protocols sending European air forces to 
the US to come to its defense. The shock of the events sent an already slowing US economy into a 
                                                          
309
 The US also underwent a sharp economic crisis when the driving force behind the US expansion of the 
1990s, a massive growth in technology stocks, came to an abrupt end.  
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tailspin. Between August and November 2001, US gasoline consumption dropped by over four 
million gallons (16.5 million liters) a day, a decline of almost 7%, and the first serious drop in 
decades. As a result, oil prices once again began to decline sharply. This time, however, OPEC 
refrained from cutting output, given the sensitive political environment, causing an even more 
massive decline in prices; in the six months between August 2001 and January 2002, NYMEX 
future prices for next month deliveries declined almost 28% (See Figure 54).  
Figure 54: NYMEX next month future price, 01.1999 to 11.2001 
 
Source: United States. Energy Information Administration (2010) 
OPEC could no longer resist. In January it set out to cut production by 1.5 million barrels and was 
joined by Russia, which agreed to cut an additional half million. Prices began to rise again. Strikes 
in Venezuela in late 2002 took another half million barrels off the market pushing prices even 
higher. By early 2003, the price of oil was back up to $35 a barrel.  
Then in March 2003, the US invaded Iraq, shutting down almost a million barrels a day of the 
country’s oil production. The reduction of Iraqi output, together with previous cuts, shut-ins, and 
continued growth in global demand, removed much of what was left of the world’s excess 
production capacity. By mid 2003, that excess capacity was down to 2 million barrels a day, a 
sharp decline from mid 2002, when it was around six million. Within two years of the Iraq 
invasion, global spare capacity fell below one million barrels a day. Despite Russia’s reemergence 
as a global energy player (expanding its output significantly between 2000 and 2002), growth in 
global demand outpaced non-OPEC production increases every year between 1990 and 2006. 
Indeed, by 2004, global demand had increased by as much as 16 million barrels a day in 
comparison to 1990 and non-OPEC increases amounted to only 6 million. The margin for error in 
the market was slipping away rapidly. Therefore, OPEC, and particularly the Arab and Gulf 
producers were left to make up the difference, resulting in a gradual decline in OPEC spare 
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production capacity (Fattouh, 2006). Hurricanes Ivan (2004) and Katrina (2005) which temporarily 
shut down US refinery output, leading to a temporary release of five and nine million barrels 
respectively from the US strategic reserve together with another OPEC production increase sank 
prices briefly. However, the steady decline in the strength of the US dollar over the decade added 
to the overall upward forces already present in the market. Oil prices continued to rise. 
The pressures of increasing global demand, the resulting decrease in spare capacity, and the US’s 
global war on terrorism, including the invasions of the Afghanistan and Iraq, its massive forward 
positioning of armed forces in the Persian Gulf and increased tensions with Iran and Venezuela, 
combined to form a perfect storm. By the end of 2003, the price of oil was rising rapidly and, with 
the exception of several short dips, continued to rise steadily through October 2008 (see Figure 55 
below). Meanwhile, higher energy prices and continuously increasing demand from China pushed 
up commodity prices across the board. The negative effects of these increases reached a breaking 
point in late 2007, when consecutive real-estate and financial crises hit the US as the market for 
mortgage-backed securities, developed in the wake of 1990s deregulations, collapsed. The crisis 
spread rapidly throughout the industrialized world, forcing Europe and the US to spend over a 
trillion dollars in stimulus spending to revive their sinking economies. Oil demand, which had 
already begun declining in the US by 2006, started declining in Europe in 2007. By 2009, US was 
consuming 10% less oil than in 2005 and Europe was consuming 7% less. By comparison, world 
consumption grew a sluggish 0.7%, largely due to a massive increase of 23.6% of the combined 
demand of China and India (see Table 47 below). Even more rapidly than prices had risen in the 
previous years, they plummeted in October 2008, falling to $40 by February 2009 before 
beginning to rise again and settle at an average of around $77 in the first nine months of 2010. 
Table 47: Year on year consumption patterns 2005-2009 
 
Change from previous year  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2005-2009 
World 1.02% 1.48% -0.44% -1.36% 0.7% 
EU 0.37% -2.19% -1.01% -4.27% -7.0% 
US -0.55% -0.03% -5.72% -4.16% -10.2% 
China/India 4.57% 6.19% 5.18% 5.83% 23.6% 
Source: BP (2010) 
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Figure 55: NYMEX one-month futures, May 2003 to Spetember 2010 
 
Source: United States. Energy Information Administration (2010). 
The period from 2003 to 2008 thus marks one of the most substantial periods of price rises in the 
history of oil trading and marks the first extended period of gains after the establishment of oil 
futures trading in the early 1980s. The period’s price gains were paralleled by increasing demand 
from the expanding economies of China and India and a tightening of OPEC’s spare production 
capacity. Thus, the period represents a case where prices were high and rising and supply 
availability became increasingly under threat.  
4.3.2.1. EU response 
In response to rising prices and restricted flows of oil, the EU ramped up its efforts to develop 
alternative fuels and increased the level of its international cooperative activity. Although several 
Member States joined the US in its military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, the Union was 
divided over it ally’s military responses throughout the period. However, when piracy attacks 
began to expand in the Gulf of Aden, endangering first food aid shipments and then later 
commercial traffic including oil flows en route to the Suez Canal, the EU responded with a 
coordinated naval defense program to secure shipping in the region. 
EU external political and economic cooperation increased significantly in the years following the 
Iraqi invasion. Energy had moved to the center stage of European politics early in the decade as 
internal cooperation in the area expanded. Already in 2001 at the Stockholm Council the EU 
decided it needed to invest in energy infrastructure and a year later at the Barcelona Council 
decided build such a network in order to enable growth in its internal energy market 
(1229/2003/EC). Further, increasing prices and supply vulnerability strengthened the Union’s 
drive to find a substitute for oil. In 2003, it passed legislation requiring greater use of biofuels and 
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other renewable transport fuels (DIRECTIVE 2003/30/EC).310 Then in its 2006 “Renewable Energy 
Road map” (COM (2006) 848 final) it called for an overall reduction in annual fossil fuel 
consumption, most of which was imported. Within a year, EU Member States agreed to overall 
renewable targets (see Directive 2009/28/EC and Directive 2009/30/EC). After almost fifty years 
of trying, the EU finally equated energy autonomy with its collective political survival. Although oil 
still was a problem area, the dilemmas of the 2000s were not those of the 1970s. Europe no 
longer relied heavily on oil for electricity and heating. Instead, it relied on natural gas, large 
amounts of which were being imported from its rising eastern neighbor Russia. The switch away 
from oil between 1970 and 2003 is an important indicator of the longer-term ramifications of high 
prices and restricted flows. It created a situation whereby oil, although vital for transport, meant 
less to the European economy. Gas was the new fuel of choice wherever possible and Russia was 
now the political focal point; and notwithstanding occasional problems with gas and oil deliveries, 
this new dependence, particularly of Germany, began to tip key EU allegiances eastward. Finally, 
the entry of climate politics into the European energy debate bound the two issues together and 
coupled the internal and external dimension of the Union’s energy policy. In 2007, when the 
Member States agreed in Lisbon to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the 
Union became officially responsible to ensure the integrity of its energy market, to secure 
external energy supplies, and to develop of substitutes.  
Externally, the EU coordinated multiple energy-related deals with a wide range of countries, 
including Russia, the Mediterranean coastal states, and African energy suppliers.311 It extended its 
energy acquis to the Balkans, included Azerbaijan into the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
launched the Baku initiative to develop fuel links with the Caspian littoral states, and a Black Sea 
initiative aimed at integrating its regional neighbors directly into its energy market.312 The EU tried 
with limited success to condition its bilateral aid on successful reform of the receiver’s domestic 
economy, while multilaterally pursuing a course of global standardization in the oil industry. 
Energy was key component of the EU’s regional developments programs covering the former 
Soviet Union (TACIS), accession countries in Eastern Europe (PHARE), and the Mediterranean area 
(MEDA). In the oil domain, the EU led the way in promoting transparency and liberalization of its 
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The original Commission proposal can be found in OJ C 103 E, 30.4.2002, p. 205 and OJ C 331 E, 
31.12.2002;  
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 See “The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy” Council Press Release 16344/07 
(Presse 291). 
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 Based on plans lid out in its report, the “Black Sea Synergy – a New Regional Initiative”(COM (2007) 160 
final) 
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primary oil suppliers. Two examples of the latter include the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EU is a major player in both 
organizations.313 The former has led to improved statistical systems in many oil-producing 
countries and the latter pairs the Union with a complex club of companies and organizations 
active in the oil industry, including France’s Total, the UK’s BP, and the Netherlands’ Royal Dutch 
Shell as well as is the EBRD, OECD, World Bank, UBS, Merrill Lynch, ING, and Deutsche Bank.314   
All of the EUs actions since the latest upturn in oil prices began indicate that the Union has been 
extremely active in promoting its energy interests, and most importantly, it has done so through 
international cooperation and not unilateral actions. This seems to confirm the EU half of our 
hypothesis pertaining to EU and US behavior under conditions of high prices and restricted flows.  
The post 2003 case also substantiates our hypotheses pertaining to EU military behavior. Despite 
claims by French and British leaders at their joint 1998 summit in Saint-Malo that the EU “must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in response to international crises”, the Union as 
whole did not substantially engage in military activities to secure it oil interests during the case 
period.315 While it is true that the EU did establish a European Defense Agency in 2003 to 
coordinate defense related research, the EU as a group was either absent or only part of a larger 
UN authorized coalition throughout the period.  
Moreover, while several EU Member militaries joined the US as junior partners in the Afghan and 
Iraq wars, one cannot claim they did so over oil, but rather in the former case out of treaty 
obligation and in the latter out of political path precedence (the UK had been jointly operating the 
US managed, UN mandated no fly zones). In fact, in the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq, key EU 
Member States France and Germany went to great lengths to delay if not prevent the attack. 
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 JODI is an international reporting mechanism coordinated by the International Energy Forum Secretariat 
and supported by the European Union’s own Statistical Office, Eurostat. Unfortunately, because the 
initiative is solely a statistical standardization movement, it has little power to implement any changes in 
producer countries and membership and performance remain voluntary.  Nevertheless, Eurostat’s high 
profile role as a founding member makes the European Union a primary player in JODI and creates 
opportunities for an increased EU role in standardizing data quality and reporting requirements in the oil 
sector. For a detailed discussion of JODI see Schubert (2007). 
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 Like JODI, the EITI is voluntary and does not include Russia or any country from the Middle East. The EITI 
was founded in late 2002 by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development. For an analysis of the group and its operations see Schubert (2007). 
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 The full text of the joint statement of the Heads of State and Government of France and the United 
Kingdom can be found in the public domain. See for example: < http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-
Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>. 
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France even put forward a resolution in the UN Security Council removing the term “material 
breach” in relation to Iraq’s behavior toward UN weapons inspectors in order to eliminate any 
legal justification the US might use to initiate hostilities. Indeed, the combined efforts of Germany 
and France, together with Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, all point to the first post-Cold War 
example of international power balancing against the US.316 It would appear that the EU, faced 
with a direct threat to its oil supplies out of the Persian Gulf, intriguingly caused by the US, chose 
a new method of balancing, one not based on offensive or defensive weapons buildups, but 
rather on international cooperation and obstruction. The EU’s response to the Iraq crisis thus 
corroborates our hypotheses about expected EU caution in engaging in military activity when 
prices are high and flows restricted (H4). That said, it also must be noted that EU did partake in 
the US’ war in that it allowed over-flights and basing operations. However, given the general 
support for the ‘war on terror’ and the fact that the US justified the invasion of Iraq with the 
alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction and ties to Al Qaeda, EU Member States faced a 
policy dilemma. The fact that overall EU participation in the events was so limited is testimony to 
the EU’s general unwillingness to use of armed force.  
Nevertheless, the EU’s intervention in the Gulf of Aden, known as Operation ATALANTA provides 
a less severe but contradictory example. Launched in 2008 in support of several UNSC resolutions 
(1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846), EU Member navies joined an international fleet to deter acts of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia. What was originally based on the protection of WFP food supplies 
in 2007 became a full-blown operation to protect international shipping, not least of which 
included oil tankers.317 Although there have been few direct attacks on oil tankers in the region 
(one in 2008 and another 2009), the area around the coast of Somalia is a vital choke point for 
international shipments to Europe. The EU’s willing engagement may indicate the beginning of a 
change in EU behavior towards its SAPP. However, the fact that their involvement required first 
UN authorization and second cooperation with an international fleet, provides ample evidence of 
the limited nature of the EU’S response. Therefore, we cannot take the presence of EU forces in 
the Gulf of Aden as falsifying our fourth hypothesis. Indeed, Europe’s lack of military response and 
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 Although no formal anti-US alliance was established, the 2003 Iraq war, which directly affected the oil 
markets, presented a perfect example soft balancing, whereby an alliance of opposing powers withhold 
their support for a leading power. For an analysis of pre-Iraq war soft balancing see Pape (2005). 
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 It was also the first EU joint naval operation under the framework of the EU’s Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). By 2010, it included contributions from Italy, Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, and Greece as well as technical support from Irish, Finnish, Maltese, and Swedish military 
personnel. 
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its increase in international cooperation seem to affirm it. The same cannot be said for our fifth 
hypothesis (H5) which posits that the EU will never seek conflict even when prices are high and 
flow is restricted. The initial role of the UK in Iraq, the later role of EU policing and training forces 
there, and the EU’s naval engagement in the Gulf of Aden, all point to the fact that either the EU 
or an increasing number of its Member States are willing to engage in conflict under those 
conditions. Thus we can once again falsify hypothesis five. Likewise, we can equally falsify half of 
our similar null hypothesis claiming (H8) that the both the EU and US will never enter into conflict 
in energy-rich area when under high price, restricted flow conditions.  
In terms of ERD, the post-2003 case fails to confirm, but does not completely falsify the EU 
component of our hypothesis about internal behavior toward substitutes; and it falsifies our null 
hypothesis of about changes in funding priorities. Total EU ERD declined €467 million (in €2009) 
between 2003 and 2008, a reduction of 22% (see Table 48 below).318 However, most of that 
decline in terms of real values was in nuclear related research funding, which was reduced by 
€491. There were also sharp declines in funding for fossil fuels, which were cut in half, and power 
storage programs were cut by more than 70%. This development at first seems at odds with the 
stated policy of the EU over the period to greatly enhance its non fossil fuel exposure. However, 
reductions in those three areas amounted to a savings of €800 million, leaving more than €330 
million to be distributed in other programs, which is precisely what happened. Concurrent with its 
overall reductions, the EU ramped up efforts in hydrogen and fuels cell technologies, increasing 
funding by as much as 279% over the period; and research into renewables (and with it biofuels) 
grew collectively by almost €140 million or 43% over the period. The visible shift in ERD research 
priorities has aspects that point to a strategy of seeking petroleum substitutes, despite an overall 
reduction in funding (see Figure 56 on page 277).  
Still, the EU in fact did decrease its overall ERD spending at precisely the moment when oil prices 
began to rise and serious security threats to the flow of oil began to emerge. This presents a 
conundrum. Does cutting overall ERD, but then taking the savings and actually increasing the 
funding for substitution-specific research qualify as a valid change in “investments into 
substitutes” as posited in hypotheses five and six? Or must we reject the hypothesis out of hand 
because the EU’s approach failed to meet the letter rather than the principle of those 
                                                          
318
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hypotheses? In the other three cases, there were definitive overall increases or decreases, which 
were accompanied largely by similar changes in the majority of focus areas. Here we have a 
definitive overall decrease, but an increase in four of seven focus areas.319 This indicates that our 
hypothesis about the EU increasing funding for ERD during periods of high prices and restricted 
flows (H6) is either not always true, if indeed false in the post 2003 case, or partially affirmed, if 
understood in principle. In the face of blatantly higher energy costs and direct threats to its long-
term supply of oil, the EU simultaneously cut overall ERD spending while increasing funding for 
specific oil substitutes. Thus, we can conclude EU behavior in the period as both a partial rejection 
and partial affirmation of H6. The change in EU priorities is more explicitly evident and thus 
falsifies our null hypothesis (H9), in that there was a clear change in the ERD investment strategy 
over the period favoring renewables and hydrogen technologies.  
Figure 56: EU investments into non-nuclear ERD 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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 There are several possible explanations for the post-2003 overall decline in EU ERD. It could be that that 
the severity of the economic impact coupled with the high cost of the EU’s fifth enlargement sapped 
national ERD budgets. It could also be that there was a large quantity of ERD funding by the Member States 
that either went unreported to the International Energy Agency, or that an increasing amount of funding 
was indirect in the form of tax incentives that favor private investments and are therefore not translated 
into actual government reported outlays, but rather a reduction in tax income. Queries to the IEA and 
Commission did not reveal specific answers to these questions. However, according to the IEA, nationally 
submitted data follows a standard set of forms and methodology from the OECD. A cross-check of the IEA’s 
figures with a Commission report on scientific research trends (see subsequent note) confirm our overall 
findings; the numbers accurately reflect the ERD behavior for the period. 
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Table 48: EU ERD investments 2002-2008 in €2009 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Change 
Efficiency 217.56 201.44 227.22 314.62 369.07 395.11 236.61 8.8% 
Fossil Fuels 247.75 209.96 227.55 246.12 229.70 239.86 113.40 -54.2% 
Renewables 320.81 296.85 387.87 450.06 480.35 517.53 461.05 43.7% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 917.28 844.86 850.62 866.06 862.85 909.68 425.57 -53.6% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 29.26 68.50 102.99 149.90 167.10 144.04 111.09 279.7% 
Power/Storage  175.76 138.83 113.19 166.95 139.52 95.05 41.68 -76.3% 
Other E-Technologies 216.29 201.06 195.11 192.12 177.29 289.76 260.01 20.2% 
Total ERD 2,115.93 1,953.94 2,104.55 2,385.81 2,425.88 2,591.04 1,649.40 -22.0% 
Y_Y Change 
 
-7.7% 7.7% 13.4% 1.7% 6.8% -36.3% 
 
Annual share 
Efficiency 10.3% 10.3% 10.8% 13.2% 15.2% 15.2% 14.3% 39.5% 
Fossil Fuels 11.7% 10.7% 10.8% 10.3% 9.5% 9.3% 6.9% -41.3% 
Renewables 15.2% 15.2% 18.4% 18.9% 19.8% 20.0% 28.0% 84.4% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 43.4% 43.2% 40.4% 36.3% 35.6% 35.1% 25.8% -40.5% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 1.4% 3.5% 4.9% 6.3% 6.9% 5.6% 6.7% 387.0% 
Power/Storage  8.3% 7.1% 5.4% 7.0% 5.8% 3.7% 2.5% -69.6% 
Other E-Technologies 10.2% 10.3% 9.3% 8.1% 7.3% 11.2% 15.8% 54.2% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 18.0% 18.0% 18.1% 20.7% 23.6% 23.5% 19.3% 7.3% 
Fossil Fuels 20.5% 18.8% 18.1% 16.2% 14.7% 14.3% 9.3% -54.8% 
Renewables 26.6% 26.6% 30.9% 29.6% 30.7% 30.8% 37.7% 41.8% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 2.4% 6.1% 8.2% 9.9% 10.7% 8.6% 9.1% 274.6% 
Power/Storage  14.6% 12.4% 9.0% 11.0% 8.9% 5.7% 3.4% -76.6% 
Other E-Technologies  17.9% 18.0% 15.6% 12.6% 11.3% 17.2% 21.2% 18.6% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
 
4.3.2.2. US response 
International oil prices were already on the upswing when George W. Bush entered the White 
House in 2001. Asian energy demand was growing rapidly, a charge led by China and India to gain 
access to the world’s remaining untapped reserves. Russia was re-emerging as a major energy 
player and together with China they were actively using state-run oil companies as tools of their 
foreign policy. Energy mercantilism seemed to be growing. Meanwhile, the US Air force was 
actively engaged in the decade long Southern Watch operation to control Iraqi air space, run out 
of air bases in Saudi Arabia; and the shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf were protected by the US 
Fifth Fleet, based out of Bahrain. When the President’s commissioned National Energy Policy 
Development Group warned early in 2001 that the country was moving rapidly toward an 
untenable posture of depending on suppliers that may ultimately work against the country’s 
national interest, the Bush administration pushed the national security consequences of foreign 
dependence to the top of its agenda. 
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An April 2001 report by the influential James Baker Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations 
observed that “chances are greater than at any point in the last two decades of an oil supply 
disruption that would even more severely test the nation’s security and prosperity” and issued an 
ominous warning: “we are reaching the beginning of an extensive period of sporadic supply 
shortages and periodic price hikes” requiring “a reevaluation of U.S. policy approaches” (Morse 
and Jaffe, 2001:34). The influential report put forward several recommendations for the new 
administration including enhancing international cooperation on the energy front by developing 
diplomatic programs with the Gulf Cooperation Council and OPEC to stabilize prices in times of 
turmoil, diffuse tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict, expand international oil forums, establish a 
North American energy agreement, engage China in the IEA, join transparency initiatives, and 
consider adopting the EU’s Energy Charter. It also recommended a review all of current US 
sanctions and policies toward Iraq to “eventually ease Iraqi oil field investment” (Morse and Jaffe, 
2001:46). 
The Bush administration acted immediately on the recommendations. It began pushing for 
increased refineries, expanded domestic production in Alaska, the Rocky Mountains, the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the outer continental shelf as well as expanded use nuclear and coal power to 
diversify electricity generation, and began to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, internal actions 
that it took unilaterally. Internationally, the US took a dual approach actively pursuing oil 
agreements with Venezuela, Colombia, several countries in West Africa, the Caspian and even 
Indonesia; and signed free trade agreements with Bahrain and Oman. On issues of security, 
however, the administration acted in a decidedly unilateral fashion. In its 2002 National Security 
Strategy, the administration codified a strategy of preemptive intervention against hostile acts by 
adversaries. Pointing to Iran’s nuclear program as a major threat, the US unilaterally withdrew 
from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia in late 2001 and began working with select 
EU allies to build European based missile shield. Thus, in the face of high prices and increased risks 
to supply availability, the US initiated cooperation where it was feasible, and took unilateral 
action whenever its interests were not served.  
Back home, the administration used virtually every tool at its disposal to seek alternatives to 
petroleum, placing incentives for biofuels production in a 2002 Farm Bill, initiating a $1.2 billion 
hydrogen-fueled vehicles program in 2003, providing extensive loan guarantees and tax breaks to 
domestic energy producers and taxpayer incentives to buy hybrid cars in 2005. It received from 
Congress the authority to issue leases for exploration on the outer continental shelf and when 
faced with immediate disruptions caused by Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina, the administration lifted 
fuel standards and opened its Strategic Petroleum Reserves to keep prices stable and supplies 
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flowing. As the price of oil continued to rise throughout the decade, the administration oversaw 
the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) specifically 
designed to develop new energy technologies and reduce the country’s energy imports, 
increasing automobile mileage standards to 35 mpg, and set the highest standards on record for 
minimum shares of biofuel mixes in all the gasoline sold in the country.  
When the country was attacked by Al Qaeda in September 2001, energy became an even higher 
priority. Although most of the deaths and damage occurred in New York, it did not go unnoticed 
in Washington that the Pentagon had been singled out for attack. Almost instantly, the US moved 
to a war footing. It implemented massive security changes at home and began deploying forces all 
over the world. The President requested and received Congressional authorization to use force in 
Afghanistan. He would later get similar permission to attack Iraq based on President Clintons 1988 
Iraq Liberation Act which required the government to seek regime change there. Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz later told Congress that the country’s oil would more than pay for its 
reconstruction (United States. Congress, 2003:26791). Although much of the world acquiesced to 
US action in Afghanistan, the US faced a concerted diplomatic effort to thwart its efforts in Iraq. 
Thus, it essentially acted alone in Iraq, albeit with support from a wide coalition of junior partners.  
By early 2003, the US was embroiled in two wars. Energy independence was firmly on the agenda 
and financially backed with a technology program aimed at finding substitutes. Barack Obama 
picked up in 2009 where Bush left off and accelerated the rush toward substitutes. Adding to 
previous efforts, Obama injected billions in to alternative energy and fuels, initiated a national 
infrastructure renewal program, and like Bush, made the reduction of foreign dependency on oil 
the centerpiece of his energy program. The 2007-2008 financial crises and the extreme spike in oil 
prices of the previous years had drained consumers’ pockets and sent the country into a deep 
recession. Obama called for and passed a massive stimulus package, one that invested hundreds 
of billions in energy related investments including grants, tax credits, and ‘green energy loans’. 
Despite Obama’s declared proclivity for increased international cooperation, he too used his 
executive authority to act unilaterally at home raising efficiency standards on automobiles and 
establishing a program for consumers to trade-in old cars for new, more efficient vehicles. 
Altogether, the Obama administration spent over €8 billion equivalent in 2009 alone on ERD, 
almost double what was spent yearly on the Manhattan Project. By the end of the decade, the US 
had allocated almost €30 billion to find a ways to reduce its foreign dependence on oil and much 
of that was through hidden tariffs, subsidies, and direct protection of American industry.   
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Notwithstanding the powerful forces of war that drove much of US policy after 2001, the actions 
of the US under conditions of high prices and restricted flows point to a selective use of 
cooperation where it required little compromise and unilateral action where it did not. While 
neither the Afghan nor Iraq campaigns were initiated because of oil, both contained key energy 
aspects. Iraq was a major producer. Its past behavior had demonstrated that it could and would 
disrupt oil flows if it had the capacity; and Afghanistan has long been discussed as a possible 
transit route for Caspian and Iranian oil and gas. Most intriguing among the military-oil related 
events of the post-2003 era was the US withdrawal from Saudi Arabia in late 2003 and its 
repositioning in Qatar. The US also transferred leadership on the Iran nuclear problem to the EU 
as it continued to try to pacify Iraqi and Afghan resistance. Finally, George W. Bush, who 
campaigned against the foreign nation building of his predecessor, had done just that.  
Although the fight against Al Qaeda marked the turning point in US external behavior and brought 
about new deployments of US forces in oil rich areas from Asia to Africa, the Iraq war and the 
promise of a stable, new, oil-rich ally in the Persian Gulf and the source of most conflict in the 
region since the 1980s, was the surest demonstration if not the most disastrous test of its resolve. 
All of these events, including both the multilateral agreements and unilateral attacks and policy 
actions strongly support hypotheses two (H2) and three (H3), which predict that the US will 
increase cooperation and be more likely to resort to military means to secure energy flows 
respectively under conditions of high prices and restricted flows. Even the repositioning of US 
forces from Saudi Arabia to Qatar demonstrates this latter point. Although one could argue that it 
proves the opposite in that the US evacuated a key regional base, the flexibility it demonstrated in 
terms of moving those bases and redeploying ships to account for power changes unfolding in the 
region are testimony to the salience the US puts on SAPP. Indeed, when asked to evacuate Saudi 
Arabia following the attack on Iraq, the US could have left the region entirely; because of its high 
salience on SAPP, it did not. Finally, the US actions in Iraq completely falsify our null hypothesis 
(H8) positing that the US will never enter into conflict under high-price-restricted-flow conditions.  
On the ERD front, US actions match those predicted by our hypotheses. The US not only increased 
ERD after 2003, it did so in dramatic fashion. Between 2003 and 2009, the US increased overall 
ERD spending by €1.6 billion (in €2009), an increase of 70% in six years, and that is excluding an 
addition €4 billion spent in 2009 alone as part of the Obama stimulus package (see Table 49 
below). Including the stimulus, the US spent more than €24 billion in ERD between 2003 and 
2009. Further, in every category except power storage (i.e. batteries) US funding increased. Even 
the reduction in storage related investments over the period were reversed by the stimulus 
package, which dedicated €531 million to the cause, just short of surpassing the combined efforts 
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of the previous five years. Thus, the US component of our post-2003 case validates our hypothesis 
(H6) that the US will increase investments into substitutes when prices are high and flow is 
restricted. 
Intriguingly, the US did not dramatically alter its distribution of funding, at least when one 
excludes the effects of the 2009 stimulus. It did however make changes (see Table 49 and Figure 
57 below). Between 2003 and 2008, US priorities for nuclear and hydrogen research expanded. 
Support for renewables and efficiency grew only slightly. Fossil fuels declined moderately and 
battery storage investments fell out of favor. However, more than half of the 2009 stimulus 
package, some €2.4 billion worth went into fossil fuels, including clean coal technologies, coal-to-
liquid, gas-to-liquid, and shale conversion. In short, the US responded to high prices and 
increasingly endangered flows by investing heavily into research first to replace foreign petroleum 
and then oil altogether. The enormity of the stimulus package’s focus on energy demonstrates the 
most decisive evidence yet that the US is increasingly prioritizing its energy autonomy. What is 
not shown in the data are the military non-research related acquisition programs for biofuels 
discussed on pages 179 to 181. Taken together, the these two factors point to the US prioritizing 
ERD not only to reduce foreign energy dependence, but to increase its political and military 
autonomy in world affairs, which is precisely what would be expected when prices are high and 
flows are restricted. Thus, US actions in terms of ERD prioritization falsify the null hypothesis (H9) 
posting that no such change will occur. 
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Table 49: US ERD investments (in €2009) between 2003 and 2009 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2009 
Stimulus 
Change 
with 
Stimulus 
Change 
without 
stimulus 
Efficiency 329 311 385 322 408 483 1049 475 218% 74% 
Fossil Fuels 350 352 318 316 337 412 3026 2449 765% 65% 
Renewables 204 199 198 156 415 327 884 406 333% 135% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 312 313 591 503 626 704 916 66 194% 173% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 
 
122 249 249 239 234 245 27 100% 78% 
Power/Storage 138 92 123 111 98 88 622 531 352% -34% 
Other 980 971 749 755 887 949 1725 582 76% 17% 
Total ERD 2312 2361 2614 2412 3010 3198 8467 4535 266% 70% 
Y_Y Change 
 
2.1% 10.7% -7.7% 24.8% 6.2% 164.7% 
   
Annual share 
Efficiency 14.2% 13.2% 14.7% 13.3% 13.6% 15.1% 12.4% 
 
Fossil Fuels 15.1% 14.9% 12.2% 13.1% 11.2% 12.9% 35.7% 
Renewables 8.8% 8.4% 7.6% 6.5% 13.8% 10.2% 10.4% 
Nuclear Fis./Fus. 13.5% 13.3% 22.6% 20.9% 20.8% 22.0% 10.8% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 0.0% 5.2% 9.5% 10.3% 7.9% 7.3% 2.9% 
Power/Storage 6.0% 3.9% 4.7% 4.6% 3.2% 2.8% 7.3% 
Other 42.4% 41.1% 28.7% 31.3% 29.5% 29.7% 20.4% 
Annual share of non-nuclear 
Efficiency 16.5% 15.2% 19.0% 16.9% 17.1% 19.4% 13.9% 10.6% 
 
Fossil Fuels 17.5% 17.2% 15.7% 16.6% 14.1% 16.5% 40.1% 54.8% 
Renewables 10.2% 9.7% 9.8% 8.2% 17.4% 13.1% 11.7% 9.1% 
Hydrogen/Fuel Cells 0.0% 6.0% 12.3% 13.0% 10.0% 9.4% 3.2% 0.6% 
Power/Storage 6.9% 4.5% 6.1% 5.8% 4.1% 3.5% 8.2% 11.9% 
Other 49.0% 47.4% 37.0% 39.6% 37.2% 38.0% 22.8% 13.0% 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
 
Figure 57: US non-nuclear and other ERD (in €2009), 2003-2009 (exc. Stimulus) 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
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Figure 58: US ERD distribution of 2009 stimulus package in €2009 
 
Source: Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010c) 
4.3.2.3. Summary of the post-2003 case 
The post-2003 years were a period of great stress in international energy markets and world 
politics; a period of higher prices and both restricted and endangered flows. Tightening global 
markets together with an increasingly higher risk associated with terrorist attacks, wars, natural 
disasters, and increasing nationalist oriented energy mercantilism created an atmosphere of 
instability. Cooperation increased as did US military intervention; and ERD investments took on a 
somewhat different but nonetheless relevant course of action. An analysis of the price-restricted-
flow period between 2003 and 2008 allows us to confirm three of our hypotheses, partially affirm 
another, and falsify three more including both null hypotheses. 
Both the US and the EU responded to these events with increased levels of multilateral and 
bilateral cooperation, thus affirming that both will increase international cooperation when prices 
are high or rising and supplies are restricted or threatened (H2). As expected, however, the US 
included as part of its response portfolio an increased use of military force. Although initial US 
actions were not in response to any specific threat to oil, its war on terrorism brought it directly 
into heart of the world’s oil production center. Moreover, the US increasingly turned to unilateral 
decision making both internally and externally to secure it interests. This substantiates that the US 
is more likely than the EU to adopt a conflictual/interventionist (H3) approach under those 
conditions. Likewise, the US’ invasion of Iraq completely falsifies the null hypothesis positing that 
neither the US nor the EU will ever intervene militarily in energy rich areas when prices are high or 
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disruptions are imminent (H8). In fact, the US military action directly reduced supplies on the 
market. The EU also acted predictably in that it demonstrated that it was far less likely to engage 
in military activity on its own (H4). Indeed, most EU Member States eschewed active involvement 
at precisely the moment when supplies were threatened by the US invasion of Iraq, leaving both 
troubles and spoils to Washington. Still, it too decided to act when international authorization 
was provided and they could join others in carrying out the mission, which in turn falsifies the 
proposition that the EU will never seek conflict in a high price-restricted flow environment (H5).  
Finally, the post-2003 years also witnessed direct increases in ERD in the US and overall 
reductions in the EU, but both changed their ERD focus over the period. The predictably strong 
response of the US confirms its half of the increased funding hypothesis (H6). However, the EU’s 
response is less clear. Despite an overall decrease, which would falsify the hypothesis, the EU 
increased funding in four of seven focus areas, partially affirming it. Indeed, the EU took an 
intriguingly dualist approach cutting overall ERD spending while increasing funding for specific oil 
substitutes. Thus, EU behavior can be taken as cautious but nonetheless partial affirmation of H6. 
More clear was the combined approach of the EU and US toward the distribution of funding 
during the period. One of our null hypotheses posed that both the US and the EU will not change 
the investment strategies toward substitutes under conditions of high prices and restricted flows 
(H9). Since they did in fact change their priorities, we can consider H9 as falsified.  
Table 50: Summary of affirmed/falsified hypotheses in Case 4 
Hyp.# Topic US EU Evaluation 
H1 MCA approach    
H2 Coop approach True True True 
H3 US > military likelihood True  True 
H4 EU < military likelihood  True True 
H5 EU Never use military  False False 
H6 EU/US Increase ERD  Partly True Partly True 
H7 EU/US reduce ERD    
H8 Null-never military False False False 
H9 Null-no change in ERD False False False 
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5. Conclusion 
Does heightened international competition over access to energy resources increase the 
likelihood of war as suggested by the proponents of energy-resource war theories? Or is it more 
likely to lead to cooperation? Indeed, do states ever go to war over energy resources? An 
examination of the evidence behind US and EU behavior to secure access to the free flow of 
energy resources abroad as well as their internal approaches to developing substitutes reveals 
that the answer is not uniform across states. Energy does not play the same role everywhere all 
the time. In fact, states rarely go to war over energy resources. Why is this case? The answer lies 
in the interaction of two factors, international energy prices and the salience placed by states on 
the supply availability necessary for power projection (SAPP), which while related, is not the same 
as energy itself. Despite recent increases in the securitization of energy issues in international 
politics, the external behavior of states is still driven by traditional pursuits of power and security.  
This dissertation examined these questions in the context of international relations. Thus, our 
primary concern has been the behavior of states. How, why, when, and where are they likely to 
act or not act in response to energy related events and issues? The internal aspect of our analysis 
focused on substitution policies and not energy policies in general because the former is relevant 
to power projection, while the latter is so broad and diffuse that it has little measurable effect on 
inter-state relations. Countries do not go to war over environmental or efficiency standards, at 
least not yet anyway. Increased solar power and heating, and more efficient insulation in 
residential homes and commercial buildings no doubt plays a role in mitigating some foreign 
energy dependence problems. However, such measures have little impact on the ability of a state 
to project power abroad; and that is precisely what is at issue in the debate about energy 
resource wars. Further, mobility is a key factor in power projection, if not the single most 
important factor overall. Therefore, only those domestic energy programs that aim at increasing 
the supply or developing alternative transportation fuels have any real foreign policy impact. At 
present, that boils down to programs aimed at finding substitutes for oil.  
The link between internal substitution programs and external cooperation and conflict can be 
found in the effects of the former on the latter. The development of substitutes leads to increased 
energy autonomy, which in turn directly affects a state’s power projection capabilities and its 
freedom to act internationally by reducing the negative security impacts of external supply shocks 
and price hikes. Therefore, success in the former removes both the necessity and the constraints 
around the latter raising the profile of internal substitution programs beyond that of other 
internal energy polices.  
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In evaluating how this relationship plays out in inter-state relations, we established a framework 
linking internal substitution policy to external behavioral outcomes. The model consists of four 
components: (1) an internal dimension where energy policies are determined by a limited group 
of actors, institutions, processes, and available instruments; (2) two key intervening variables of 
price and supply availability for power projection that shape external policy outcomes; (3) three 
ideal external policy outcomes including inaction, cooperation, and conflict; and (4) a feedback 
process whereby external outcomes feed back to the internal dimension by enhancing or 
diminishing the immediate need to invest in substitutes, which in turn changes the significance of 
the variables of price and SAPP. We found that internal energy policies differ significantly from 
other public policies because energy related decisions produce national security and foreign 
policy consequences. When successful, they change the calculus of government options across 
the entire spectrum of internal and external policy because they can enhance productivity and 
alter the technological foundation of a country’s industrial base. Substitution policies, therefore, 
constitute a fundamental component of national security.  
When composing internal substitution policies, politicians draw from a pool of voluntary and 
obligatory financial and legal policy instruments. Most aim at changing market conditions. They 
target specific fuels or technologies through laws, regulations and incentives that reduce market 
barriers and increase access to capital financing for energy research, development, and 
demonstration (ERD). Where conservation and efficiency policies address the symptoms of a 
larger problem, the development of alternative fuels attacks the cause head on. The results of the 
former can be observed in the medium-term; the results of the latter only over the long-term. 
And where the former is often vague (increasing the use of alternatives) and indeterminate 
(becoming more efficient), substitution policies are very specific and their outputs are reasonably 
easy to measure through financial cost and market activity.  
Even when policy goals are set, funds are committed, and scientists and businesses develop the 
relevant alternatives, substitute fuels remain irrelevant to international politics unless fuel 
commodity markets exist to set energy prices and provide for a mechanism to measure through 
trade whether or not a substitution policy is actually having an effect. The volume of that trade 
informs us about the economic relevance of the product, the facts of supply and demand. It is in 
the market, and only in the market, where the underlying competitive basis for a substitute will 
be set and where essential private financing for further research and development will be found. 
Success is a factor of time. Some policy instruments have immediate short-term effect (taxes and 
rebates), while others lead to a slow evolutionary enhancement of competition (investments, 
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regulations, and subsidies) or a minor tweaking of consumer behavior (efficiency and pollution 
standards). Among all the tools available, however, only direct investments increase future 
industrial capabilities; and for ERD investments to have a noticeable impact, they need to be 
substantial and sustained. Unfortunately, time and political reality works against such programs. 
For example, since oil began selling in significant quantities in the late nineteenth century, it has 
been fairly abundant and cheap. When it did rise above historic average, it rarely remained there 
because prolonged higher energy costs sapped economic growth, reducing demand, and sinking 
the price again. In the process, public support for such programs quickly waned. This poses a 
serious dilemma for policy makers whose temporal horizons tend to be brief in comparison to 
those required for sound economic decision-making, particularly in representative democracies 
where the stresses of public opinion and short electoral cycles render most energy policies 
incompatible with the vagaries of political expediency.  
The legislative procedure behind the budgeting of ERD largely depends on the form and 
organization of government. Here, the US and EU differ sharply because of their distinctive 
political structures and procedures. Our analysis of the evolution of EU and US energy policy as 
well as the four case studies point to the fact that the US is more centralized in its decision making 
process, while the EU is still in the process of forming a unified approach. Within both political 
systems, certain key governmental or non-governmental actors are essential to the successful 
implementation of substitution programs. Senior executives such as heads of governments, 
Ministers or Secretaries of Energy, National Security, and Defense, each posses some power of 
fiat and budgets to dole out. In the US, these are most often found in the federal government. In 
the EU they are largely found in the Member States. Senior legislators can promote or block bills 
and to some extent control budgetary assignments and can sway the votes of junior legislators 
though internal party mechanics, institutional procedure, and political largesse. Once politicians 
do agree to move forward, nongovernmental agents are assigned the task of researching, 
developing, and commercializing the relevant technologies. Indeed, the inputs from those outside 
of government are often the most valuable. The scientific, market, and defense related 
knowledge they provide is essential for sound decision making. Technical experts provide 
assessments of what is possible. Powerful market actors, provide valuable insight into the 
commercial viability of those possibilities. And the military sets the bar on the importance of 
substitution for national security. 
When fuels are cheap and abundant, public debates about policy engage a wide array of vested 
commercial, environmental, civil and government interest groups. However, when prices rise or 
disruptions occur, debates become increasingly focused, and in the event of war outright muted 
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as energy issues climb the latter of urgency and move from market matters to those of national 
security. When this happens, the quantity of actors involved in the decision making process 
shrinks rapidly and considerably. Energy not only becomes “securitized”, it becomes synonymous 
with power and when that happens, the role of the military changes the course of policy. 
When countries prioritize hard power projection, their immediate energy needs and the 
perceived vulnerability to disruptions in international supplies create a nexus of motivations to 
develop and deploy domestically produced substitutes. For the military, the issue of substitute 
fuels is simple and direct. A military unable to fuel its ships, planes and vehicles simply cannot 
project power. Entrusted with the responsibility to protect the state and to project power abroad 
when and where necessary, the military has the immediate material need for substitute 
technologies and fuels, possesses the political prestige to win funding for research and 
development, and maintains the institutional stability to plan and act over long temporal 
horizons. Most importantly, military institutions carry special weight as consumers. When they 
fund research, commercial producers know that success will lead to large scale, long-term supply 
contracts, enhancing the incentive to take risks and produce the volumes necessary to establish a 
market where it would otherwise not exist. 
Heightened security concerns of foreign fuel dependence make internal substitution programs 
relevant to international relations. They affect the international market by permanently reducing 
dependency on or altogether delinking an economy from specific globalized markets, and they 
thus enhance the political and military autonomy of the state. This is not simply a matter of 
comparative or absolute advantage in economic terms, but rather a source of relative power gain 
in political terms. The mere perception that substitutes can so significantly increase external 
power projection options and capacities enhances the role of those actors who are directly 
engaged in national security and foreign policy, in particular the executive agencies of the 
government and the military. Thus, substitution policies are driven by fewer actors whose stake in 
the process tends to be of a higher order than mere market or consumer players.  
Support for substitution policies are directly caused by external conditions. The very notion of 
developing a substitute for an existing fuel occurs either because of the vaguely perceived danger 
of foreign dependence on a specific fuel or the specific specter of some foreign government using 
its control of supplies to harm one’s national and economic security. Substitution policies are not 
created and implemented to save the world, but rather in response to disruptions or the threat 
thereof. Thus substitution policies can be both dependent and independent variables in the 
relationship between internal energy policies and international outcomes. Their status as such 
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depends on the progress of those programs, the relative importance placed on the ability to 
project power abroad, and the price and availability of existing external supplies.  
In most cases, substitution policies are dependent variables. Assuming that power projection is 
important, when substitutes are lacking and disruptions occur, internal energy policies will initiate 
substitution measures and governments will actively pursue external policies to secure external 
resources. However, once a substitute exists and is competitive with existing fuels in the market, 
we can expect that higher prices or disruptions will be less likely to require immediate external 
action, which, ceteris paribus, lessens significantly the likelihood of international conflict in the 
short-term. Hence, substitution policies become an independent variable that shape international 
outcomes by weakening the pull affect of external conditions. This dual internal-external quality 
of substitution policies is unlike any area of energy policy, including the use of large strategic 
reserves, which may mitigate the short-term effects of supply disruptions, but in no way can 
sustain the prolonged fuel requirements of a modern mobile military.  
All of these findings rest on the dual assumptions that states deem autonomy to be important and 
that most are to some degree interdependent on one another in the supply chain of energy 
resources. Our two intervening variables (the price of a particular energy resource, in our case oil, 
and the importance placed on supply availability of that resource for the purpose of power 
projection (SAPP) by the state or group of states) explain the relationship between internal 
support for energy substitution programs and external state behavior. Oil prices are affected by 
actual availability of supplies, which may be free flowing or restricted. The importance of power 
projection to a state, however, is independent from actual international flows. In combination 
with perceptions about how current or future flows affect that capability, energy can become a 
reason for action, if not even a cause for war. Does this then mean that states do go to war over 
energy resources, as posited by advocates of resource war theories? In theory, that would seem 
logical. In practice, however, the facts reveal a different story. 
Assuming that states wish to maintain the status quo, higher oil prices are in fact more likely to 
lead to cooperation than conflict. The negative correlation between oil prices and macroeconomic 
activity is well documented. What is not is the fact that high prices also tend to dampen the 
likelihood for armed interventions as opposed to enhance them because higher prices raise the 
transaction costs of military actions and economic sanctions. Indeed, it influences states to 
choose inaction or appeasement in order to keep prices steady or low in defense of their 
domestic economies and negatively influences the choice to resort to armed intervention by 
raising the fuel costs of any such operation. Moreover, as prices rise and substitutes are 
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developed, market traders will factor in expectations about future technologies and their effect 
on both supply and demand. Thus, the closer a policy of substitution moves toward success, 
originally instigated by concerns over price and supply availability (or energy security as some 
prefer to label it), the quicker oil futures and expected prices will decline, reducing that original 
economic impetus to continue supporting the program. 
Furthermore, underlying the hypothesis that countries wage war over energy resources is the 
notion that a threat to energy security, that is the availability of supplies at a reasonable price, will 
naturally drives states into conflict. However, there is scant evidence to substantiate such a claim. 
Do states really wage war when their supplies are threatened? Our variable SAPP provides some 
important insights. Supply availability refers to the actual or perceived flow of resources 
internationally. It is largely a matter of the balance between supply and demand or production 
and consumption and, without a doubt, is important for internal economic planning and 
interstate trade relations. However, prioritizing supply availability for internal economic stability is 
distinctively different than prioritizing supply availability for the purposes of power projection; it 
is not enough to justify war. When states prioritize power projection, supply availability takes on a 
different meaning. In that case, we are no longer referring to supply availability per se, but rather 
supply availability for power projection (SAPP), which specifically refers to the importance placed 
on the availability of supplies by states for the purpose of maintaining military advantage over 
others and using that capability to change the behavior of other states through some sort of 
coercion. SAPP directly affects the ability of a state to use armed force as an instrument of foreign 
policy, which throughout history has been an essential component of the equation behind state 
behavior, a material fact that determines a state’s ability to wage war. Thus, energy’s specific 
value to international war is located in its centrality to projecting force in a world where 
comparative military advantage largely determines the balance of power; and the mobility of 
forces largely determines the ability do so. 
While every energy-importing country is more or less equally affected by higher prices and 
reduced flows of oil, the status of SAPP varies significantly between states. Power projection is 
not equally important for all players. Even when it is important, it must not always lead to the use 
of force. However, in absence of the ability to use hard power, third parties are less likely to 
succumb to pressure. Thus, those states that prioritize power projection also are likely to invest 
more resources into military capabilities, the functioning of which is determined by the availability 
of fuels necessary for its mobility. This makes the prioritization of power projection an essential 
component of state approaches to the steady supply of energy resources and explains which 
states are more or less likely to resort to conflict when faced with disruptions. It also takes the 
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energy resource war debate and puts it back where it belongs, namely not as the primary cause of 
conflict driven by commercially influenced governments, but rather as a subordinate variable to 
the exercise of expanding relative power. Governments that place a high salience on power 
projection simply cannot ignore the negative impact of high prices and restricted flows on their 
military capabilities.  
Importantly, SAPP is only relevant when prices are high and actual or perceived flows are 
restricted. Irrespective of its salience, the combined condition of low prices and free flows 
predicates a reduced incentive for states to take any international action, be it of a cooperative or 
conflictual nature. There simply is no good reason to spend human, material, or financial 
resources to secure energy resources that are cheap and freely flowing. However, when prices are 
high and flows are restricted or disruptions exist or are imminent, the state’s orientation toward 
SAPP determines both its external strategy and its internal approach toward developing substitute 
fuels. Three ideal type outcomes emerge from this combination of prices, supply flows, and the 
salience of supply availability for power projection. These are a Market-Commodity Approach, 
Cooperation, and Conflict. The Market-Commodity Approach (MCA) is a minimalist, Laissez Faire, 
strategy whereby governments eschew any action that might alter or disrupt the free functioning 
of international energy markets. Cooperation is largely, but not exclusively, a strategy of peaceful 
interstate coordination. Conflict strategies include a wide array of defensive and offensive military 
actions that need not lead to armed conflict, but may include threats, forward deployments, 
escorts, and even arms sales and training. These same factors are reflected internally in terms of 
government backing of domestic substitution programs. Low-price-free-flow conditions leading to 
a reduction in international cooperation also removes the impetus to invest public funds into 
alternatives. Higher prices, restricted flows, or outright disruptions, on the other hand will tend to 
motivate increased investments. Conflict outcomes have the greatest impact because they raise 
the urgency of that need. However, states that prioritize SAPP are more likely to invest 
substantially more than those that minimize SAPP. Likewise, when substitutes are finally 
developed, the impetus for conflict due to high prices and disruptions are diminished. This 
feedback loop illustrates the fluid nature the energy-war question. Heightened external tensions 
over energy resources lead to increased internal efforts to develop substitutes, which ultimately 
reduce the likelihood for energy resource related conflicts. Therefore, contemporary international 
competition over energy resources, so-called energy wars, actually leads to decreased tensions 
down the line. Thus, not only is the energy resource war theory flawed in terms of the variables it 
defines as important (namely the economic well being of countries as the primary driver); it is also 
flawed in its assumptions about the outcomes of international competition to secure resources. 
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These conclusions and the model we have constructed linking internal approaches to substitution 
programs, external outcome strategies, the intervening variables of price and SAPP, and the 
feedback loop between them led us to nine basic assumptions about energy and international 
politics. We can group them into three broad categories; two that pertain to the larger feedback 
loop; three about autonomy and substitution; and four about intervening variables and outcomes. 
On the basis of those assumptions, we reviewed the evolution of EU and US energy policy from 
the politicization of energy that began in the late nineteenth century through the present. Based 
on that assessment we proposed nine hypotheses, which we tested against four common 
historical cases, leading to mixed results. Before reviewing those hypotheses and the evidence 
supporting or falsifying them, it is helpful to review our initial assumptions. 
Our first assumption was that a feedback loop exists between internal substitution policies, 
intervening variables and external outcomes. Every external outcome affects internal substitution 
policies, which in turn revises the importance of supply availability for power projection over time 
because the combination of prices, supply flow and outcomes enhance or decrease the need and 
impetus to legislate and invest in substitution programs. Thus, there is an inverse relationship 
between government intervention in supporting the emergence of substitutes and the time that 
prices of existing fuels remain low. Our second assumption was that countries with a lower 
salience of supply availability for power projection can be expected to invest less in developing 
and deploying substitute fuels than those with a higher salience. Because militaries play a lesser 
role when power projection is downgraded, one can safely assume that countries that place a 
lower salience on SAPP will have smaller military budgets, which will be reflected in fewer 
available financial resources and market opportunities for the corporate and scientific institutions 
that they contract. Conversely, when the military pays to develop and deploy a new fuel, there is 
a much higher certainty that it will end up purchasing large orders. This higher certainty in terms 
of future sales all but guarantees a higher level of interest and rate of return by those in the 
private sector charged with developing the substitute in the first place. Therefore, overall public 
outlays into substitution fuels will be lower in countries where the salience of SAPP is low. 
Our third assumption was that the underlying purpose of substitution policies is always energy 
autonomy, also known by the more politically savvy term, energy independence. Mitigating and 
ideally eliminating the vulnerability of foreign dependence is not only popular politically, it 
directly enhances national security. Without the strategic goal of increasing autonomy based on 
an ideal target of achieving complete energy independence, there would be no strategic rationale 
to invest substantial resources into developing and deploying costly alternatives. Directly 
connected to this notion is our fourth assumption that total energy autonomy is an ideal 
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possibility, although one that is unlikely in the short term. Before the advent of petroleum, most 
countries were entirely energy independent. It seems logical to assume that at one point in the 
future they will be again, at the very latest when oil becomes too difficult to extract and too 
expensive to consume en masse. In fact, the post 1974 concentration of extended periods of 
expensive oil indicate that supply availability is in fact becoming more restricted and more 
expensive with time. In its first hundred years, a barrel of oil cost $24.13 on average. In the last 
fifty it averaged $36.60 and in the last twenty it average almost $40. This means that the 
maintenance of military dominance in the world is becoming more expensive and thus increasing 
the need to adopt measures that reduce those costs if political autonomy is to be secured. Each 
time that a conflicts occurs the process toward developing substitutes will accelerate, but when 
prices drop again, countries will revert to a do nothing approach decelerating the process. Since 
conflicts do not occur perpetually, the evolution toward energy autonomy will be slow, arduous 
and uneven, but sure enough will occur over a long enough period of time. This led us to the fifth 
assumption that long durations of cheap prices reduce concerns about supply availability and sap 
support for substitution programs and do so irrespective of the importance of SAPP. That is 
precisely what happened during the low price periods of the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, it also 
explains why no commercially viable alternative to oil has yet been developed. Oil has been 
abundant since 1861 and periods of cheap oil (that is where prices were below the historic 
average) lasted twice as long (10 years) as expensive oil (5 years). Indeed, most high price periods 
lasted for two years or less, way too few to justify a serious investment into alternatives.  
Our last four assumptions pertained to the relationship between intervening variables and 
outcomes. Our sixth assumed that state prioritization of SAPP should be visibly evident through 
domestic military budgets, physical engagements on the world stage, and official declarations 
about energy security. This assumption was found to be largely correct, but incomplete because 
military expenditures, understood as the real measure of the importance of power projection, do 
not actually correlate to the price of oil. In fact, an analysis of the year on year change in the price 
of oil and military expenditures reveals that no correlation exists, although the US responded with 
greater extremes than the EU. Nevertheless, we found that we still could assume that 
cooperation and conflict outcomes will occur in areas where there are transnational pipelines, 
maritime choke points, and energy resource concentrations. The geography of energy geopolitics 
was glaringly evident in the multiple crises faced around the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. 
Given that SAPP should be visible evident, we formulated three more assumptions about how it 
affects behavior. We assumed that irrespective of their SAPP orientation, large net energy 
importing states are likely to adopt a Market Commodity Approach during periods of low prices 
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and free flows because of a reduced impetus to take any sort of action. Under such conditions, 
there is simply no reason to seek conflict or even to increase cooperation. Doing so might change 
the outlook on the market, raise prices and thus result in higher transaction costs for every sort of 
government action. Indeed, the absence of the stress to secure the flow of supplies should be a 
prerequisite to such a strategy. While states that place a premium on power projection in general 
may still pursue aggressive actions on the international stage, they will do so because they are 
interested in increasing their relative power positions and not the specific availability of energy 
supplies.  We also assumed that actual or perceived disruptions will lead to conflict among 
countries only when one of them places a high salience on SAPP. No state with a low SAPP priority 
can reasonably be expected to initiate hostilities, choosing instead either to adopt a strategy of 
cooperation or leave the business of conflict to an ally. In fact, not only are high SAPP states 
inclined to use force more frequently and earlier than low SAPP ones, they also are more likely to 
eschew cooperation and pursue unilateral actions. Conversely, we assumed that countries that 
place a low priority on SAPP are likely to cooperate as a result of disruptions because they place a 
lower priority on power projection and have lesser capabilities. Even in the extreme event that 
low SAPP countries are forced into conflict in some manner, such as joining a naval fleet to secure 
vital transit pathways, they will always choose to pool their resources, rather than act unilaterally. 
Moreover, it is safe to assume also that because low SAPP countries have reduced military 
expenditures, their militaries play a lesser role in the formulation of external policies and are less 
present as a tool of foreign policy. Therefore, the impact of fuel disruptions, while equally felt by 
the military will be more severely recognized within the economy at large, which inevitably will 
lead to market intervention.  
Based on these assumptions, we examined the evolution of EU and US energy policy both 
internally and externally. We found that in large measure, we could claim the US places a high 
salience on power projection in general and thus can be qualified as a high-SAPP actor. 
Conversely, we found that as the EU has evolved to an increasingly unified entity, the relatively 
high SAPP salience of its Member States has declined. Today, the EU, with its overall lack of 
unified military command and a philosophic proclivity to promote international institutions and 
legal norms qualifies it as a low-SAPP actor. This in turn provided us with two ideal types of actors 
necessary in order build a series of hypotheses.  
Based on our nine assumption, which we may summarize to say that energy is vital to power 
projection, that states do not always prioritize power projection, and that initial states of 
autonomy and investments into substitutes modify state behavior under different price and 
resource flow conditions, we posited nine hypotheses in three broad categories about EU and US 
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behavior and then tested them across four case studies of different price and supply availability 
conditions. The first hypothesis was in a group by itself. We called it the cheap and easy 
hypothesis. The next four pertained to the opposite condition, when energy supplies were 
expensive and difficult to access, aptly labeled the expensive and difficult hypotheses. The next 
two hypotheses pertained to the feedback loop between external outcomes and internal energy 
policies. This we called the feedback hypotheses. For logical completeness, we posited two null 
hypotheses that would disprove the relevance of the intervening variables altogether and 
disregard any form of determinant relationship between those variables and internal policies 
toward substitution. Our hypotheses were as follows: 
The cheap and easy hypothesis. 
H1:  Both the US and the EU will adopt market-commodity approaches under low-price-free-
flow circumstances. 
The expensive and difficult hypotheses. 
H2: Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, both the EU and US will employ a 
cooperation strategy. 
H3:  Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, the US, which places higher salience on 
SAPP, is more likely than the EU or its Member States to resort to military means and 
even armed conflict to secure either access or flow. 
H4:  Under high-price-restricted-flow circumstances, the EU, which places lower salience on 
SAPP, is less likely than the US to resort to military means and even armed conflict to 
secure either access or flow. 
H5:  The EU will never seek conflict even when prices are high and flow is restricted. 
The feedback hypotheses: 
H6:  Both the US and the EU will increase investments into substitutes when prices are high 
and flow is restricted  
H7: Both the US and the EU will dramatically reduce investments under conditions of low 
prices and free flow.  
The null hypotheses:  
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H8: Both the US and the EU never enter into conflict in energy rich areas when energy prices 
are high or disruptions are imminent. 
H9: Both the US and the EU do not change their investments strategies toward substitutes 
when conditions of prices and flow change.  
With these hypotheses in place, we selected four common international cases to compare EU and 
US responses. Because the two are in fact such very different international actors, we found it 
helpful to identify cases where incidences of energy price shifts and supply availability have a 
similar economic effect on both parties. To do this we needed to limit our cases by product and 
time. Petroleum provided the best standard of measure for two reasons. First, both the US and 
the EU are almost entirely petroleum dependent for their commercial transport sectors and 
military mobility. Second, oil has increasingly become an international commodity. Major 
disruptions in any large producing country, as well as increases in international or seasonal 
demand will spike prices everywhere. Temporal constraints require us to exclude all cases prior to 
the 1970s largely because it was then that the EU actually incorporated all of Europe’s leading 
military powers, and it was also then that the US became critically dependent on foreign supplies. 
Finally, we also had to consider geography. While the EU and US do share some common playing 
fields, there are several areas of the world that are either of unique value to each party or of such 
lesser importance in terms of their core interests that they do not constitute a common basis for 
comparison. Since, by the 1970s, both Europe and the US relied heavily on the Middle East for oil, 
we selected all four cases with respect to events that either originated or involved the broader 
Middle East. We divided our four cases into two groups, each consisting of two cases where the 
price of oil was either cheap or on the decline or high or on the rise.  
Broadly described, our two low-price-free flow cases included the 1980s and the 1990s and our 
two high-price-restricted flow cases included the 1970s and the years following the 2003 US 
invasion of Iraq. Each of the cases was imperfect in that there were fluctuations in price and 
supply availability. However, each also provided for most of the conditions we were looking for. 
There were several incidents of military engagements and military absence, increased or 
decreased international cooperation, and changes in domestic substitution programs.  
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Table 51: Summary of case findings 
 
CASE1: 
t=1980s 
CASE2: 
t=1990s 
CASE3: 
t=1970s 
CASE4: 
t>2003 
Final 
Analysis 
H1: MCA under low-price-free-flow 
Partly 
True 
Partly 
True   
Partly True 
H2: Cooperation under high-price-
restricted-flow  
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
H3: US more likely than EU to use 
military under high-price-
restricted-flow 
Partly 
True 
TRUE TRUE TRUE Usually True 
H4: EU less likely than US to use military 
under high-price-restricted-flow 
Partly 
True 
Partly 
True 
TRUE TRUE Usually True 
H5: EU never seeks conflict FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE False 
H6: Increase ERD into substitutes under 
high-price-restricted-flow   
TRUE 
Partly 
True 
Usually True 
H7: Reduce ERD under low-price-free-
flow 
TRUE TRUE 
  
TRUE 
H8: Null 1 (never use military) FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE 
H9: Null 2 (never change ERD priorities) FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE 
  
Our investigation delivered mixed results. Both of the null hypotheses (H8 and H9) were rejected 
in every case. We found that the US and the EU will in fact enter into conflict in energy rich areas 
when energy prices are high or disruptions are imminent. The US did this on several occasions in 
the Persian Gulf. The EU joined the US in thwarting Iraq’s capture of Kuwait and acted unilaterally 
to protect its ships during the Tanker Wars that erupted in the Persian Gulf during the height of 
the Iran-Iraq war. The implications for this are important in so far as they point to the fact that 
energy is a relevant factor in international politics. Even states that do not prioritize hard power 
projection may be forced to act when conditions render inaction too costly. It is perhaps this 
rejected null hypothesis, which provides the strongest evidence in favor of the energy resource 
war theory. However, it is also the only one.  
The second null hypothesis that both the EU and the US (as representative agents of the ideal 
high and low SAPP type states) do not change their investments strategies toward substitutes 
when prices and flows change was also rejected. Indeed, in every case, as prices fell or increased, 
so too did EU and US ERD investment priorities. This shows that factors exogenous to domestic 
political forces do in fact affect internal policymaking. A closely related hypothesis was the 
proposition that both the US and the EU will increase investments into substitutes when prices 
are high and flow is restricted (H6). This proved to be largely, but not always correct. The 1970s 
and post-2003 years witnessed direct increases in ERD in the US, but increases in the EU only 
during the 1970s. Intriguingly, the EU reduced ERD spending significantly in the post-2003 years. 
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At first glance, this would appear to falsify the proposition. However, upon closer examination, 
the EU took most of its overall reductions in the post-2003 case and shifted them to funding in 
four of seven focus areas that related specifically to finding oil substitutes. The fact that both the 
high and low salient SAPP states increased funding for oil substitutes when prices were high and 
the threat of disruptions was becoming increasingly relevant, further substantiates that there is a 
direct causal link between international politics and domestic affairs, and perhaps more 
importantly, that the system-level constellation of the global balance of power does not play a 
role in that link. Every state seeks energy autonomy and high prices make substitution a viable 
means to achieve it. 
In addition to those already mentioned, only two of our hypotheses proved correct in every 
situation where they were applicable, while another four proved either only partly correct or 
correct most of the time. However, one was falsified in three out four cases.  
Our proposition that the EU will never seek conflict even when prices are high and flow is 
restricted (H5) can be rejected entirely. It was based on the notion that the EU places a low 
salience on SAPP. The fact that the EU did engage in military actions when prices were high 
indicates one of three possible explanations: (1) there is no connection between SAPP and the 
proclivity to engage in conflict; (2) the EU prioritizes SAPP more than we considered; or (3) that 
the EU’s military engagements were of an order of magnitude so far below that of the high-SAPP 
US and committed in cooperation with others such that their actions are testimony to increased 
cooperation (on the military front) and not increased unilateral action as implied (but not 
explicitly stated) in the hypothesis. The first explanation seems weak because in almost every 
other case, including the four case studies presented here, but also revealed in the chapters on 
the evolution of EU energy policy and the politicization of energy, EU Member States executed 
more military operations when they prioritized SAPP as when they did not. This is reflected in the 
reduced number of military engagements and countries where they committed troops since the 
end World War II just as they were lowering the overall salience of power projection as part of 
their foreign policies. The third explanation seems more valid because it takes note of the 
important qualification that the EU’s military engagements examined in the four case studies 
were either done in concert with other high-Salience SAPP actors, or were first authorized by the 
UN, and in no way demonstrate a proclivity to use force unilaterally. Finally, the second 
explanation is the most intriguing. We assumed that the EU was an ideal example of a low-SAPP 
agent. This may not be the case. Indeed, previous to the birth of the circa fifty year old project 
that is now the EU, several of its most powerful Member States were the instigators of raising 
energy supply issues to the commanding heights of international politics. Europe’s two great wars 
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pointed to the importance of controlling coal and steel, and the Franco-British attack on the Suez 
Canal in 1956 exemplified the centrality of energy transit security to the power projection 
capacities of both great powers. Does the EU really deserve the label of low-SAPP? An analysis of 
the evolution of EU energy policy and the actions of its Member of the last fifty years indicates 
that it does. However, this does not mean the EU is not undergoing a change at this very moment. 
Its Member States have prioritized SAPP in the past. It is impossible to exclude the possibility that 
they might do so as a group in the future. 
The two hypotheses that our investigation fully affirmed were that under high-price-restricted-
flow circumstances, both the EU and US will employ a cooperation strategy (H2); and that under 
conditions of low prices and free flow, both will dramatically reduce investments into substitution 
programs (H7). In all four cases, both the EU and the US increased their international efforts to 
cooperate with others during periods of crises. The most obvious examples of this include the 
founding of the International Energy Agency and the large quantity of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements they either negotiated or signed onto in the wake of price hikes, market tightening, 
or supply disruptions. As expected, the US also included in its portfolio increased military efforts 
during those periods, but that does not negate their efforts to increase cooperation. Meanwhile, 
the EU exemplified the hypothesis’ underlying assumption about the behavior of low-salient-SAPP 
actors. The EU worked diligently in response to higher prices to negotiate deals with suppliers, 
establish an international energy community based on its own internal market standards, and 
engage in multilateral transparency initiatives. Moreover, both the EU and the US demonstrably 
cut their funding for ERD shortly after price pressures eased and did so in every case were prices 
declined for extended periods.  
Both of these findings lead to conclusions that are very important for the study of international 
relations. The fact that major energy consuming states demonstrate an inclination to cooperate 
under conditions of direct stress to their economic well being and the cost and ability to project 
hard power in the case of those that prioritize power projection indicates that the fundamental 
argument of the energy resource war theory is flawed. Apparently, states always increase 
cooperation when their energy supplies are threatened and do so irrespective of their SAPP 
salience. They do not always go to war. Furthermore, evidence from the cases implies a causal 
relationship between the exogenous factors of decreased prices and free flows and internal policy 
priorities. Thus, it provides supporting evidence for the argument that there is not only a 
relationship between international and domestic politics, but that the struggle for the global 
balance of power and the relative positions of agents within the international system is 
manifested domestically in internal energy research and development investments.  
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The evidence was less substantial for the four remaining hypotheses. We found that they were 
either correct to some degree all the time or partly correct most of the time. For example, our 
hypothesis about the adoption of a market-commodity approach under low-price-free-flow 
circumstances (H1), turned out to be only partly true in the two relevant cases. In the 1980s, the 
US clearly adopted an MCA strategy. It not only began deregulating its own domestic energy 
industries, but also began promoting deregulation everywhere and minimized all international 
discussions over energy to a common denominator of no intervention being the best form of 
cooperation. The evidence for the EU was mixed as the individual Member States (with the 
exception of the UK) actually increased government intervention and internal cooperation 
between governments and their industry champions, but essentially failed to cooperate between 
themselves. What is intriguing with the EU in the 1980s was not that it eschewed inter-Member 
cooperation, for it certainly tried to enhance it, but rather that it failed miserably. Throughout the 
period the EU Member States reduced their overall cooperation levels as well as their interest in 
beefing up strategic reserves and establishing a model system to exchange oil in times of 
emergencies. The nineties presented different circumstances that forced the EU Member to 
cooperate. These had more to do with Member States finding ways to deal with a newly united 
Germany and the Union’s latest enlargement, rather than it did with energy. Likewise, our 
hypotheses about the US and EU in terms of their respective proclivity (H3) or restraint (H4) in 
resorting to military means or even armed conflict to secure either access to or flow of resources 
under high-price-restricted flow conditions proved correct most of the time, but not always. In 
the wake of the 1970s crises and again in the post-2003 era the US demonstrated a willingness to 
react sooner and stronger by military means than the EU or any of its Member States under 
similar conditions. Although the US did not actually engage in military actions in response to the 
1973 oil embargo, it certainly floated the idea in a very public manner. It is hard to believe that it 
is a mere coincidence that this was followed by targeted arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Similarly, the US showed little constraint in attacking Iraq in 2003, a step that removed more than 
a million barrels a day from the market and sent already high prices even higher. Conversely, in 
both cases neither the EU, nor its Member States took unilateral military action. What they did do 
was increase their arms sales to selected suppliers (and combatants) following the 1973 crises, 
and in fact worked in large measure to soft balance the US in 2003.  
The actions of the EU in these two cases imply the broader finding that states with low-SAPP 
salience are less likely to engage in military activities in general and take unilateral action 
specifically. In a unipolar world that translates into a broad global condition defined by its general 
absence of conflict. However, as the world shifts toward non-polarity, or as some would have it, a 
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return to multi-polarity, we can expect to see greater competition for regional hegemony and 
suzerainty. The reintroduction of competing powers, either at the regional or global level, implies 
an increase in the importance of power projection (and thus SAPP) among regionally distributed 
actors. The actions of the US, which exemplify the behavior of an ideal high-SAPP state, indicate 
that the world is likely to see more conflict in the future rather than less as new poles form. That 
these conflicts may emerge around energy issues, however, should not be mistaken as support for 
the energy-war thesis. Instead, it should be understood for what it is, namely increasing 
competition to project power and change the status quo. To do so successfully, new claimants to 
power will need to upgrade their power projection capacities, and barring the development of 
homegrown fuels to feed that growth, they will need to secure access to the free flow of energy 
resources. At one point, even low-salient SAPP states may need to consider revising their 
approach. 
In summation, the overall analysis of the role of energy in international politics reveals some 
important conclusions. States do not always go to war over energy resources. In fact, the rarely 
do. The energy-resource war theory contains a great deal of bluster and little practical 
applicability for the study of international relations. This dissertation has rejected several of its 
key elements. It has shown that energy disruptions, crises, and the pursuit of secure supplies by 
states, not only must not lead to war, more often than not they lead to cooperation. Essential to 
the equation are two important variables. These are price and supply availability for power 
projection; the former largely, although not entirely, results from market mechanics. The latter 
addresses the core issue at study in the field of International Relations.  
Importantly, SAPP is a subset of power projection itself. States that do not wish to project power 
will not unilaterally engage in war or hostilities of any kind in order to secure energy flows. 
Conversely, states that prioritize power projection, including revisionist states that wish to change 
the status quo at a global or regional level, will do so. However, it would be a mistake to 
understand conflicts in energy-resource-rich area as conflicts over energy resources. They are not. 
They are conflicts over the balance of relative power where energy resources are a prize to be 
won.  
It is true that certain energy resources are strategic goods. However, they only became so over 
the last century. Previous to that, energy was a communal good, neither excludable nor 
particularly subject to rivalry. States projected force and managed mobility using renewables. 
Today, much of the US’ naval projection capacity is based on nuclear power and its Air Force and 
Army are developing renewable substitutes.  One day in the not too distant future, power 
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projection will be significantly less materially dependent on petroleum. As that transformation 
takes place, many of the acidic debates about rational plausibility of energy independence will 
dissipate. Those that claim that energy independence is impossible do a disservice to the 
historical record, rational thought, and the national security of their countries. Nevertheless, their 
argument is not without solid ground. Energy autonomy is not impossible, but it is very difficult to 
imagine under the current economic context of the petroleum age; and given the timeframes to 
develop alternatives, transform the entire global transport infrastructure, and resolve the difficult 
issues around the peaceful use of nuclear power, it is in fact impossible to put a time line on its 
demise. For the present and foreseeable future, petroleum remains the key to a state’s capability 
to project power beyond its sovereign territory. 
Finally, those that argue that energy independence is vital for peace, largely those that also 
support the energy competition leads war thesis, make a grave mistake in assuming that energy 
autonomy will decrease international conflict. They are wrong because they misunderstand the 
causes for interstate conflict. Contrary to popular belief, states do not wage war over money and 
oil. It is true that real-estate has value, and that wars can expand territory, which down the line 
can increase a state’s wealth. However, the event of war itself is extremely costly. When states 
choose to go to war, they do so for far less precise reasons than becoming richer. They go to war 
over power and the desire to have more of it.  
Therefore, removing energy from the calculus of the international competition for power will 
either have no effect, or much worse, it may free up states to wage war at their will with little or 
no constraint to hold them back. If the US did not import so much oil, one argument explains, it 
would have no interest in regional hegemony in the Middle East. That is simply incorrect because 
power itself knows no bounds. In the end, energy independence will not guarantee less conflict. It 
will create the conditions to allow for even more of it. A modern world with all its existing 
technology and no longer interdependent on fuel supplies, i.e. a world of energy independent, 
industrialized nations, may become the most chaotic and unstable system history has ever known.  
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7. Annexes 
7.1. Abstract  
This dissertation studies how, when, where, and why states’ pursuit of energy autonomy affects 
international cooperation and conflict. Taking the EU and the US as ideal examples, it addresses 
important questions relating to energy and state behavior. How do internal energy policies affect 
a state’s capability to project power externally? What is the relationship between domestic 
investments into substitute fuels and international cooperation and conflict? Does heightened 
international competition over access to energy resources increase the likelihood of war or is it 
more likely to lead to cooperation? There is little doubt that energy is relevant to international 
conflict; it plays a role in the ability to project force in a world where comparative military 
advantage largely determines the balance of power. However, an examination of US and EU 
behavior to secure access to the free flow of energy resources abroad and their internal 
approaches to develop substitutes reveals that they rarely go to war over energy resources. 
Indeed, energy disruptions, crises, and the pursuit of secure supplies more often than not lead to 
cooperation. This can be explained by the interaction of two variables: international energy prices 
and the salience of supply availability for power projection (SAPP), a product of a state’s 
inclination to project power externally. 
Internal substitution policies and external power projection are linked because the development 
of substitutes leads to increased energy autonomy, which directly affects a state’s power 
projection capability and its freedom to act internationally by reducing the negative security 
impacts of external supply shocks and price hikes. Power projection is not equally important for 
all players. States that do not wish to project power will not unilaterally engage in hostilities in 
order to secure energy flows. In fact, irrespective of SAPP salience, heightened external tension 
over energy resources increases internal efforts to develop substitutes and ultimately reduces the 
likelihood for energy resource related conflicts. Further, a state’s focus on developing substitutes 
is not merely a matter of economic advantage, but also a source of relative political power. When 
states prioritize hard power projection, their energy needs and the perceived vulnerability to 
supply disruptions create a nexus of motivations to develop and deploy substitutes creating a 
feedback loop that illustrates the fluid nature of the energy-war question. 
This dissertation presents a four-part model for analyzing the relationship between internal 
substitution programs and external state behavior. This includes an internal dimension, the 
intervening variables of price and SAPP, three ideal-type external policy outcomes including 
inaction, cooperation, and conflict, and a feedback process where external outcomes enhance or 
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diminish the need to invest in substitutes and thus change the significance of the intervening 
variables. Based on the assumptions that energy is vital to power projection, states do not always 
prioritize power projection, and initial conditions of energy autonomy and investments into 
substitutes modify state behavior under different price and resource flow circumstances, three 
broad categories of hypotheses are proposed pertaining to the external behavior of the EU (and 
its Member States) and the US and their respective support for internal substitution programs (as 
manifested in financial backing of substitution relevant energy research and development (ERD) 
programs). These include one cheap and easy hypothesis, four expensive and difficult hypotheses, 
and two feedback-related hypotheses. They are tested across four cases (two groups of two 
similar cases where oil prices were high in comparison to their historical median and flows were 
restricted or oil prices were low in comparison to their historical median and flows were 
uninhibited) leading to several conclusions. 
SAPP is relevant only when prices are high and actual or perceived flows are restricted or 
disruptions are imminent. Under such conditions, high-salience SAPP states are more likely to 
invest substantially more into developing substitutes than those that minimize SAPP and they also 
are more likely to enter into conflict in energy rich areas to secure access to the international flow 
of resources. Conflict type outcomes seem to have the greatest impact on internal substitution 
programs because they raise the urgency of the need to develop substitutes. However, high prices 
also tend to dampen the likelihood for armed interventions as opposed to enhance them because 
higher prices raise the transaction costs of military actions and economic sanctions. In fact, when 
prices are high or their energy supplies are threatened, states apparently increase external 
cooperation and do so irrespective of their SAPP salience. They do not always go to war. 
Conversely, when prices are low or supplies are flowing freely, the role of SAPP in determining 
external behavior diminishes. States with low-SAPP salience are less likely to engage in military 
activities in general and are even less likely to take unilateral action specifically. Although states 
do not eschew cooperation completely under low-price-free-flow conditions, they significantly 
reduce the depth and effort underlying their cooperation. Likewise, ERD investment priorities 
decline sharply under low price conditions.  
Analysis of the behavior of the EU and US in relation to energy and power projection reveals a 
fundamental flaw in the energy aspect of the resource war thesis, which suggests that if states go 
to war over energy resources, then energy independence is vital for peace. However, it is a 
mistake to assume that energy autonomy will decrease international conflict. States do not wage 
war over money or oil, but rather for the competition over power and the desire to have more of 
it. Despite the increased securitization of energy issues in recent years, external state behavior 
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still is driven by traditional pursuits of power and security. Proponents of the resource-war theory 
misconstrue conflicts in energy-resource-rich area as conflicts over energy resources; they are 
not. They are conflicts over the balance of relative power where energy resources are just one 
prize to be won. Removing energy from the calculus of the international competition for power 
will either have no effect, or much worse, it may free up states to wage war at their will with little 
or no constraint to hold them back. Energy independence will not guarantee less conflict; it will 
create the conditions to allow for even more of it.  
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7.2. Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation untersucht, unter welchen Bedingungen staatliches Streben nach 
Energieautonomie internationale Beziehungen beeinflusst. Folgende Forschungsfragen bezüglich 
des Verhältnisses von Energie und (außen-) politischem Verhalten werden am Beispiel der EU und 
den USA zu beantworten versucht: Wie beeinflusst die innerstaatliche Energiepolitik die Fähigkeit 
eines Staates, seine Macht nach außen zu projizieren? In welcher Beziehung stehen 
nationalstaatliche Investitionen in Energiesubstitute und internationale Kooperation/Konflikt? 
Erhöht stärkerer internationaler Wettbewerb um den Zugang zu Ressourcen die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von Konflikt oder führt er vielmehr zu vermehrter internationaler 
Zusammenarbeit? Es besteht kein Zweifel, dass Energie im Kontext von Konflikten eine Bedeutung 
hat - in einer Welt, in der hauptsächlich militärische Mittel das Gleichgewicht der Macht 
bestimmen, beeinflusst die Verfügbarkeit von Energie die Fähigkeit, diese Macht nach außen zu 
projizieren. Allerdings zeigt eine Analyse der Art und Weise, wie die Europäische Union und die 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika den Zugang zu Energieressourcen im Ausland sichern und intern 
die Entwicklung von Substituten fördern, dass sie selten aufgrund von befürchteter 
Ressourcenknappheit in den Krieg ziehen. Im Gegenteil, Störungen des Energiehandels, Krisen 
und das Streben nach sicheren Lieferwegen führen in der überwiegenden Zahl der Fälle zu 
internationaler Kooperation. Dies kann mittels der Interaktion von zwei Variablen erklärt werden - 
der internationalen Energiepreise und der Bedeutung des verfügbaren Energieangebotes für das 
Militär (supply availability for power projection, SAPP). Letzteres ist wiederum eine Funktion der 
Neigung eines Staates, seine Macht im Ausland zu demonstrieren.  
Interne Substitutionspolitik und externe Machtdemonstration sind miteinander verbunden, da die 
Entwicklung von Alternativen die Energieautonomie erhöht, was die Fähigkeit eines Staates, seine 
Macht nach außen zu projizieren und seine Freiheit, international zu agieren, direkt beeinflusst, 
indem sie die negativen Auswirkungen von Sicherheitsrisiken wie externen Lieferschocks und 
Preissteigerungen reduziert. Machtdemonstration ist nicht für alle Staaten gleichbedeutend. 
Staaten, die ihre Macht nicht beweisen wollen oder müssen, werden sich nicht unilateral in 
Feindseligkeiten verwickeln, um den Energiefluss zu sichern. Tatsächlich - und unabhängig von der 
Wichtigkeit von SAPP – verstärken internationale Spannungen wegen knappen Energieressourcen 
mit zunehmender Intensität die eigenen Anstrengungen zur Entwicklung von Substituten und 
reduzieren schlussendlich die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Konflikten, die mit Energieressourcen in 
Verbindung stehen. Darüber hinaus bedeutet die Fokussierung eines Staates auf die Entwicklung 
von Substituten nicht nur einen ökonomischen Vorteil, sondern auch eine Quelle relativer 
politischer Macht. Wenn Staaten ihre Macht bevorzugt mittels der Militärgewalt demonstrieren, 
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erzeugt ihr Energiebedarf und die wahrgenommene Verwundbarkeit als Folge von 
Lieferunterbrechungen eine Verkettung von Motivationen, Substitute zu entwickeln und 
bereitzustellen. Damit wird ein Kreislauf in Gang gesetzt, der die dynamische Natur der Energie-
Konflikt-Frage illustriert. 
Die vorliegende Dissertation präsentiert ein vierteiliges Modell, um die Beziehung zwischen 
internen Substitutionsprogrammen und externem Agieren zu analysieren. Es beinhaltet eine 
interne Dimension, die intervenierenden Variablen von Preis und SAPP, drei idealtypische 
Möglichkeiten außenpolitischen Handelns - Untätigkeit, Kooperation und Konflikt - und einen 
Feedback-Prozess, der die vorangegangen drei Bestandteile des Modells im Bezug auf die Frage, 
wie internationale Ereignisse die Notwendigkeit von Investitionen in Substitute steigern oder 
vermindern und so die Bedeutung der intervenierenden Variablen verändern. Basierend auf der 
Annahme, dass Energie für externe Machtdemonstration entscheidend ist, Staaten diese nicht 
immer in den Vordergrund stellen und anfängliche Bedingungen von Energieautonomie und 
Investition in Substitute das Verhalten von Staaten unter verschiedenen Preis- und 
Lieferbedingungen modifizieren, werden drei wesentliche Kategorien von Hypothesen vorgestellt, 
welche das außenpolitische Verhalten der EU (und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten) und der USA und ihre 
jeweilige Unterstützung für Substitutionsprogramme – etwa in der Form der Bereitstellung 
finanzieller Mittel für relevante Energieforschungs- und Entwicklungsprogramme (ERD) - 
betreffen. Die erste Kategorie umfasst eine Hypothese des billigen und einfachen Zugangs zu 
Ressourcen. Kategorie zwei enthält vier Hypothesen, die teure und schwierige Wege diskutieren 
und die dritte und letzte Kategorie beinhaltet zwei feedback-bezogene Hypothesen. Sie werden 
mittels vier Fällen getestet, gegliedert in zwei Gruppen zu je zwei Fällen, die zu verschiedenen 
Schlussfolgerungen führen. Die eine Gruppe basiert auf der Annahme hoher Ölpreise im Vergleich 
zum historischen Durchschnitt und eingeschränktem Energiefluss, die andere auf niedrigen 
Ölpreisen relativ zur Historie und uneingeschränktem Energiefluss. 
SAPP ist nur relevant, wenn Preise hoch sind und der tatsächliche oder wahrgenommene 
Handelsstrom beschränkt ist oder wenn Unterbrechungen unmittelbar bevorstehen. Unter diesen 
Bedingungen investieren Staaten, die SAPP betonen deutlich mehr in die Entwicklung von 
Substituten als Staaten, für die SAPP von untergeordneter Bedeutung ist. Zudem begeben sie sich 
auch mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit in einen Konflikt in ressourcenreichen Gebieten, um den 
Zugang zum internationalen Ressourcenstrom zu sichern. Konflikte scheinen den größten Einfluss 
auf interne Substitutionsprogramme zu haben, weil sie die Notwendigkeit steigern, Alternativen 
zu entwickeln. Derweil pflegen hohe Preise die Wahrscheinlichkeit bewaffneter Interventionen zu 
dämpfen, weil sie die Kosten von Militäraktionen und wirtschaftlichen Sanktionen steigern. 
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Tatsächlich kooperieren Staaten bereitwilliger, wenn die Preise hoch sind oder die 
Energieversorgung bedroht ist. Sie tun dies wiederum unabhängig von der Wichtigkeit, die sie 
ihrer SAPP beimessen. Im umgekehrten Fall niedriger Preise und frei zugänglicher Versorgung, 
schrumpft die Rolle von SAPP in der Bestimmung des außenpolitischen Verhaltens. Staaten, die 
SAPP geringere Bedeutung beimessen, verwickeln sich im Allgemeinen weniger in militärische 
Aktionen und unilaterale Aktionen werden unwahrscheinlicher. Obwohl Staaten eine Kooperation 
unter den Bedingungen niedriger Preise und freier Handelsströme nicht gänzlich vermeiden, 
reduzieren sie doch deutlich die Ernsthaftigkeit ihrer kooperativen Bemühungen. Ebenso fallen 
die ERD-Investitionsprioritäten unter Niedrigpreisbedingungen deutlich ab. 
Die Analyse des Verhaltens von EU und USA betreffend Energie und Machtdemonstration deckt 
einen grundsätzlichen Mangel des Energieaspektes der Ressourcen-Krieg-Theorie auf. Die 
Ressourcen-Krieg-Theorie geht davon aus, dass soferne Staaten wegen Energieressourcen in den 
Krieg ziehen, Energieautonomie von zentraler Bedeutung für den Frieden sei. Es ist allerdings ein 
Fehler, anzunehmen, dass Energieautonomie Konflikte verringert. Staaten brechen keinen Krieg 
wegen Geld oder Öl vom Zaun, sondern vielmehr wegen des Wettbewerbs um Macht und dem 
Wunsch, mächtiger zu werden. Trotz der in den letzten Jahren gestiegenen Bedeutung von 
Energiethematiken im Rahmen nationaler Sicherheitsagenden, wird Außenpolitik immer noch 
vom traditionellen Streben nach Macht und Sicherheit getrieben. Vertreter der Ressourcen-Krieg-
Theorie interpretieren Konflikte in Gebieten, die reich an Energieressourcen sind, als Konflikte um 
Energieressourcen. Die vorliegenden Dissertation zeigt auf, dass dies nicht der Fall ist. Vielmehr 
sind es Konflikte um das Gleichgewicht relativer Macht, in welchem Energieressourcen nur einer 
von mehreren Preisen sind, die gewonnen werden können. Wird Energie aus der Rechnung des 
internationalen Wettstreits um Macht entfernt, hat das entweder keinen Einfluss oder es könnte 
dazu verführen, dass Staaten willentlich Konflikte vom Zaun brechen, da die Fähigkeit zu 
militärischer Machtdemonstration nicht mehr durch Energieverfügbarkeitsbedenken limitiert 
wird. Energieunabhängigkeit liefert nicht die Garantie für weniger Konflikte - vielmehr kann sie 
Bedingungen für mehr Konflikte schaffen. 
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